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urban centers around Africa, from Lagos to Nairobi to Bamako. The growth of annual investments 
in African startups – rising from $12 million to $560 million between 2013 and 2017 (Kazeem, 
2018) – is an indication that many, including investors abroad, believe the trend in African 
involvement in international technology innovation practices is just beginning. Yet while these 
changes are promising, this dissertation encourages critical reflection on them and asks: To what 
extent are Africans really able to fully participate in the production of the new technologies 
shaping their experiences of the modern information economy? To attempt to answer this, from 
2013 to 2016 I conducted an ethnography of one of the centers of innovation in Africa that has 
received the most media attention, a “technology hub” based in Nairobi, Kenya called the iHub. I 
spent a year as a participant observer on the iHub’s communications team, conducted numerous 
focus groups, site visits to other tech hubs, participated in dozens of events and interviewed over 
80 members of Nairobi’s tech community. With this data, I built an analytical lens that brings a 
critical communications perspective to communities of practice theory. By integrating narrative 
theory, this lens draws attention to the potential for conflict and hierarchies of legitimacy in 
transnational communities built around shared practices. In the pages that follow, I argue that the 
actors around the iHub are engaged in a Global Community of Technology Innovators in which 
their participation, and the community’s larger narratives are mutually constructed. One such 
narrative about how “Anyone Anywhere” in the world can become a successful technology 
entrepreneur helped attract Kenyan entrepreneurs, while others restricted their ability to be taken 
serious, often leading to their being pigeonholed as “social entrepreneurship”. By the end of 2016, 
the discrepancy between narratives and lived experiences led many to reject certain global 
practices – like the pressure on startups to scale globally – and focus instead on building a 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION	
It’s September 1st, 2016, and I am in a small Kenyan café in Nairobi called Artcaffe, situated in 
an upscale shopping mall interviewing Gathii,1 a Kenyan entrepreneur. Near the end of our chat, 
I notice I have a WhatsApp message from Njeri, a friend, and one of the employees of a 
technology hub and coworking space called the iHub, which sits at the top of a caramel colored 
stucco and green glass office building called the Bishop Magua Centre down the road. “I heard 
Mark Zuckerberg will be at Gearbox today,” she writes. “Let’s see how that pans out”. Gearbox 
grew out of the iHub and is also a coworking space in the Bishop Magua Centre, but unlike the 
iHub, it is geared towards hardware engineers and equipped with 3D printers, jigsaws, and 
circuit board printers. “I would rather come for you than Mark, if you’re saying that just to get 
me to come in 😊,” I write back. Earlier that morning I’d read that Zuckerberg was in Lagos, 
Nigeria, meeting with entrepreneurs there and checking out Andela, a training center for African 
developers and the first major recipient of an investment from the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative. 
Just two months prior they’d led a Series B round of funding in Andela on the order of $24 
million. Returning to my interview, I ask Gathii what he thinks of Zuckerberg visiting Africa.  
“My frustration is this,” he says, “Zuckerberg will invest in Stanford and public 
institutions in the US to strengthen them. But when he comes here he says, ‘forget institutions, I’ll 
fund Andela instead.’” 
After we wrap up, I make my way over to the iHub. To get there, I hop into a crowded 
matatu (one of Nairobi’s smaller and somewhat more chaotic buses), pay 30Ksh (the equivalent 
of 30 US cents) and we make our way through Ngong Road’s ample traffic heading towards 
Nairobi’s city center. Before it gets there, I hop out at another shopping mall, this one called 
Prestige, though it is slightly older and somewhat less prestigious than the one I have come from. 
I continue walking along the road past outdoor market vendors selling old suitcases and shoes or 
tomatoes and red onions. There’s no stop light so when I see a rare lull in the traffic I dart across 
the road. Continuing along, I pass more vendors selling hand painted flower pots and past a 
bright Hulk-green billboard advertising the telecommunications giant Safaricom’s latest feature. 
In about five minutes, I arrive at the Bishop Magua Centre. It’s a caramel-colored walls are 
surrounded by a few pale blue painted balconies, and small signs advertising the companies 
inside. The signs for the iHub and GSMA, the international telecommunications association, are 
the most noticeable. At the entrance, a friendly female security guard smiles and leisurely looks 
through my purse. A laptop, a mobile, a wallet, nothing she hasn’t seen before. She waves me in 
and I walk up the terracotta tile ramp turning past Akirachix, a small startup that trains women 
and girls in how to code, on my left, and the frosted glass office of MFarm, a similarly small 
startup that developed a program to get market price information to farmers, on my right. I can 
smell the coffee brewing from Pete’s down the hall, but I make my way up two flights of stairs 
instead. The stairs are narrow, surrounded by white walls and sporting a recently repainted pale 
blue railing matching the outdoor balconies. At the top of the second flight, I make my way past a 
small emergency exit sign that reads “*iHub_ IN CASE OF FIRE: Please leave the building 
before posting to social media” and into a bright room labeled ‘iHub Research”. It is in fact, the 
office of most of the iHub’s staff, not just the research division, but the sign has not been updated. 
Inside the room, shiny sand colored square tiles cover half the floor, while a carpet covers the 
other; white walls and a full wall of windows trimmed in green frame the space. I see Njeri sitting 
in a bright blue dress on a black mesh office chair in front of her laptop at her usual table closest 
to one of the windows. I walk past the white boards covered in code to sit next to her as I often 
                                                      
1 This name and others are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of those in this study. 
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do. Her colleague Franklin is sitting next to her, and we start chatting about a recent project 
Franklin has just wrapped up teaching data science skills to entrepreneurs and university 
students. Suddenly, Lilly, one of the iHub team leads walks into the room and quite loudly – more 
loudly than I had become accustomed to hearing her speak in fact – asks everyone to refrain from 
leaving the building for lunch.  
“There will be an opportunity for a photo with Mark in Gearbox shortly,” she adds 
without further explanation, leaving the room quickly. 
Franklin turns to us and asks, “Mark who?” There are, in fact, at least three Marks that I 
know who work in Bishop Magua at any one time.  
“Zuckerberg,” Njeri and I say in unison, smiling. 
“Unless he’s giving us money, this is a waste of time,” Franklin retorts. 
Coming back into the room just as hurriedly as she left it, Lilly adds, “and please don’t 
Tweet about this. Otherwise there will be too many people and the picture won’t happen.” 
Almost every day I spend in the iHub I see one tour or another making its way through 
the building. Representatives from the World Bank or from the Swedish government, or from 
Google, or TED, or UNESCO, and now, it seems, the founder of Facebook. There are so many 
tours that Njeri once complained to me that it felt like they worked in a “zoo”. The three of us 
continue our work in the office for a while. So much time passes in fact that Franklin speculates 
the visit has all been a hoax designed so Lilly could have the popular lunch café around the 
corner all to herself. A few minutes later Lilly comes back and waves us through the door into a 
narrow hallway.  
Njeri sighs and doesn’t move from her chair. “I have too much to do. Tell me if he’s 
really as short as he looks.”  
Franklin and I decide to follow. “I hope this is worth leaving my chicken for,” he says. 
For about 15 minutes, we wait in a small hallway while the crowd grows in size. 
Eventually we’re waved into the Gearbox office. The room fills with people that I think work at 
Gearbox; we’re ushered in to join them. But there’s no Zuckerberg. And again, more waiting. 
Quite a bit more, in fact. I start to take pictures with my iPhone of the people waiting. Some look 
excited, some bored. Over time the crowd swells. 10 minutes. 20 minutes. 30 minutes. 20 people. 
40 people. 70 people. All just standing around, missing work, missing lunch, for a photograph 
with the billionaire who built Facebook. By this time, another iHub employee that I work with, 
Jimiyu, comes to join us. Like Lilly, he is a team lead. 
“This is real power,” he observes, “Making so many people wait around like this!” 
Suddenly, a woman with an American accent walks in. “Thank you for waiting. We’d like 
you to squeeze in more so we can get you all in the photograph. …and can some of you kneel 
down here in front?” She disappears back through the door. 
Franklin leans over and whispered, “I would never kneel! He’s not Jesus! It feels too 
much like we’re supposed to worship him.” Instead we decide to keep to the back of the crowd. 
We stand precariously on swivel chairs so we can still see what’s going on. 
“You know how you know who has the real power at the iHub?” Jimiyu asks. “It’s not 
me! And it’s not anyone waiting in this room, I can tell you that!” 
10 more minutes. 15. 
“You know, I would leave if it didn’t feel like there was so much social pressure to stay,” 
Franklin moans. “I thought this was going to be more than just standing around.” 
The woman with the American accent returns. “I know it’s hard,” she says. “But you 
have to keep your cell phones down when he comes in.” 
And then he appears. A smattering of cell phones come out to take pictures despite the 
instructions. He looks almost exactly like I expect. His hair has the same blond curls you see in 
pictures, his face the same half smile turned up occasionally in a sort of excitable grin, and yes, 
he is as short as he seems in photos. He’s wearing a grey short sleeve t-shirt and jeans, and 
behind him come at least 20 people, some unfamiliar faces I assume are his Facebook team, some 
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familiar faces, members of the iHub and Gearbox management teams and at least six 
photographers. While all the seemingly important people who had followed him in stand on the 
sidelines near the door, he comes over to the crowded semi-circle of everyone else waiting to 
meet him, smiles, shakes a few hands, turns around to pose for a few photographs, and then, just 
as quickly, he’s gone and we shuffle out of the Gearbox office with the rest of the crowd. 
“Definitely not worth missing my chicken for,” Franklin whispers. 
~ 
The	Story	of	a	Visit	
Barely five minutes after Franklin and I left the Gearbox office, Mark Zuckerberg (or more likely 
someone from his team) posted the following message about his visit to the Bishop Magua Centre 
to his more than 100 million Facebook followers. 
Just landed in Nairobi! I’m here to meet with entrepreneurs and developers, 
and to learn about mobile money – where Kenya is the world leader. 
I’m starting at a place called iHub, where entrepreneurs can build and 
prototype their ideas… [like] Two of the engineers I met – Peter and 
Harrison…It’s inspiring to see how engineers here are using mobile money to 
build businesses and help their community. 
Along with this text, he included a picture of himself surrounded by some of the people 
who worked in the building – one of them was Harrison, an entrepreneurs working on pay-as-
you-go energy project – all standing in front of a table with two mac laptops and some hardware. 
All told, Zuckerberg spent less than 24 hours in Kenya during his surprise visit. Along with 
Bishop Magua, he visited Mama Oliech, a restaurant known for its Luo style fried fish, and Lake 
Naivasha, a preserve in the Rift Valley known for its wildlife, before heading back to Nigeria. 
The story Mark Zuckerberg told his global audience in his Facebook post about this 
particular visit was certainly based in reality. He did indeed visit the iHub and did indeed meet 
some of the entrepreneurs working there who had built new technologies around Kenya’s 
infamous mobile money platform and Safaricom cash-cow, M-Pesa. And Kenya had indeed 
become a “world leader” in mobile money. Safaricom launched M-Pesa back in 2007, two years 
before the American startup Venmo launched its own peer-to-peer mobile payment platform and 
a full seven years before Apple launched ApplePay. Domestically, M-Pesa had become an 
enormous success. By 2011, 72 percent of Kenyans living outside of Nairobi and below the 
poverty line reportedly used M-Pesa (McKay & Mazer, 2014), and by 2013, close to 50 percent of 
the country’s GDP reportedly “flowed through” the platform (Runde, 2015). It was celebrated by 
international and domestic media alike as a “success story of digital financial inclusion” 
(Ndung’u, 2017) that had “fundamentally altered the landscape of financial services in Kenya” 
(McKay & Mazer, 2014) and that was transforming Kenya into an “innovation and technology 
hub” (Runde, 2015). And indeed, since about 2010, Kenyans had begun building startups that 
made use of the M-Pesa platform allowing them to use their mobiles to access loans and to pay a 
variety of different vendors, from grocery stores to solar power providers to the pay-as-you-go 
cooking gas entrepreneurs that Zuckerberg met. Over the following seven years, Africa’s startup 
scene would grow, attracting an increasing number of international investors. While the total 
amount invested in startups across Africa was just $12 million in 2013 (Jackson, 2014), that 
number had expanded to $560 million invested in 124 companies by 2017 (Kazeem, 2018), a 
sizeable increase though still just 0.007% of the $84 billion invested in American startups in 2017 
(Richter, 2018). It is not entirely surprising that Zuckerberg would choose to stop in Kenya (and 
Nigeria the day before) for his first ever visit to Africa. Of the $560 million invested in 2017, 
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over three quarters of that reportedly went to startups in just South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. In 
the rise of what began to be described as a “Africa’s tech movement” (Bright & Hruby, 2015), 
Kenya frequently came at or near the top of the list of countries to watch. Since 2010, Kenya has 
appeared on numerous lists of new “startup hubs” to watch (Pullen, 2013; Shadbolt, 2014), and in 
2012, The Guardian declared that “if there is such a thing as an African version of California’s 
Silicon Valley, the country that is arguably leading the race to the future is Kenya” (D. Smith, 
2012).  
Nor is it entirely surprising that in visiting Kenya, Zuckerberg chose to stop at the iHub. 
A self-described “open space for technologists, investors, tech companies and hackers in 
Nairobi,” (iHub, 2011) the iHub has been many things since it first opened in 2010 – a 
community center for Kenyan techies, a coworking space for entrepreneurs, and a gateway for 
foreigners interested in learning more about the growth of technology startups in Kenya. It has 
been variously described as “Kenya’s unofficial tech headquarters” (Munford, 2013a), the 
“epicenter of Kenya’s burgeoning tech scene” (Court, 2015), and the “most successful tech hub in 
Africa” (Shapshak, Toby, 2016). It has been credited with no less than giving rise to “Africa’s 
innovation center movement, inspiring the upsurge in tech hubs across the continent” (Campbell, 
2015). It was indeed among the first such physical spaces for African techies and innovators to 
meet that was built in Africa. Six years later, when Zuckerberg visited, the number of African 
tech hubs had exploded, with a total of 314 across the continent (Du Boucher, 2016). In the years 
after the iHub opened, the building that housed it, the Bishop Magua Centre, began to embody its 
newfound identity as a physical tech hub attracting technology companies that opened their own 
offices within its walls – like Akirachix, MFarm, and GSMA, mentioned in the story above – 
some companies that got their start at the iHub, others that wanted to be close to the circulation of 
people, ideas, and money that it attracted, and others still that wanted to compete with it, building 
rival coworking spaces. In visiting the Bishop Magua Centre and highlighting the iHub in the 
story he told about the visit, Zuckerberg was following in a long line of other foreigners – 
investors, entrepreneurs, journalists, and techies, myself included – who all made the iHub their 
first port of call when coming to check out Nairobi’s tech scene. 
Missing	from	the	Story	
But as with many stories intended for the public eye, the one Zuckerberg (or his team) chose (or 
was able) to tell about that day in September was not the whole story. While he did visit the iHub, 
Gearbox is where hardware entrepreneurs like the ones he was photographed with “can build and 
prototype their ideas”; the iHub is more focused on supporting software entrepreneurs and has no 
physical prototyping facilities for hardware itself. And while he did meet with entrepreneurs who 
were using M-Pesa, their encounters were as brief and fleeting as one might expect from a day 
that also included a visit to a game park in another part of the country. In a conversation I had 
later with Harrison, the entrepreneur photographed with Zuckerberg, and his colleague, Peter, 
they described how manufactured and superficial the meeting had felt. 
Harrison: The interaction itself? Very short. 3 minutes. ‘He’s gonna come 
round. Position your stuff here. Face this way. Shake hands this way. Explain 
it this way’. 
Peter: He had a whole communications team. 
Harrison: ‘We want some kind of smiling picture. Try to make him laugh. 
We’ll get a picture’. …It’s tough because everyone was showing him 6 
different things at the same time and I think he was kind of jetlagged too. 
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Harrison and Peter also lamented Zuckerberg’s mischaracterization of their business 
model and their level of success, a not unsurprising byproduct of the brevity of their interaction. 
“The reality is,” Harrison explained, “we have very few customers. We had one at the time of his 
visit!” More worryingly in their eyes was the post’s characterization of them as somehow 
representative of Kenya’s startup scene. While they were entrepreneurs working in Nairobi, they 
were, in fact, not Kenyan. Neither one is ethnically Caucasian, but Peter is American and 
Harrison is British. 
Part of it is, we’re happy to take a back seat because we’re not Kenyans. 
…We said [to the Gearbox people who coordinated the meeting] ‘don’t you 
want to showcase a Kenyan team?’ But they thought because we’re the only 
really active hardware company out of Gearbox, that we were the best option.  
It clearly worried them that they’d been put in the center of a spotlight intended to 
highlight African innovators. “Innovation in Kenya,” Peter added, “should be about the Kenyan 
innovators in the space not about us.” 
The	Techno	Evangelist	
Telling a story can often go hand in hand with twisting or stretching the truth. The contemporary 
information-flooded “attention economy” (Davenport & Beck, 2001) –  aggravated by social 
media companies like the one that Zuckerberg represents – creates pressures to tell stories that 
will shock and awe with “clickbaity” attention-grabbing titles, that retain tenuous relationships 
with the truth. At the same time, the ability to disseminate stories online has made audiences 
simultaneously broader and more global, and more siloed (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & 
Bonneau, 2015; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), while also making the attention they acquire more 
fleeting and precarious (J. Anderson & Rainie, 2012; Batchelor, 2012; Goodwin, Griffin, Lyons, 
McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2016). In such an environment, the pressures on our modern 
storytelling can be enormous. These can be compounded further for those working to build new 
technologies, a sector notorious for its (ironically) long-term obsession with the “new new” thing 
(Lewis, 1999) and its worryingly short attention span. 3D printing, facial recognition, algorithmic 
customization, automation, virtual reality, and on and on. New companies and new products 
emerge just as quickly as the merely new-ish seem to disappear. While it may briefly surprise us 
when technologies and their startups in Silicon Valley, like Vine, Jawbone, and Theranos, 
suddenly collapsed as quickly as they had risen, by the next day investors are already looking 
elsewhere. Even with an effective novel product and a sustainable business model it can be 
difficult to get both attention and investment if an entrepreneur wakes up to find their product is 
suddenly off-trend.  
Audiences that pay attention to tech news have expanded across the globe. Entrepreneurs 
and developers in Hong Kong, Berlin, and Nairobi all read American outlets like Tech Crunch 
and Wired online. Programmers in London and Bangalore alike know about the latest 
developments with Oculus Rift (Deahl, 2018) or the latest barrier to Uber’s global expansion; 
female entrepreneurs in Nairobi and elsewhere are well aware of Ellen Pao and Silicon Valley’s 
gender discrimination problem (Bennett, 2017); and even those who only pay attention to the tech 
world in passing are likely to have heard about the explosion of Facebook’s new satellite along 
with the SpaceX rocket that was meant to carry it beyond our atmosphere in the New York Times 
or other generalist news outlets. 
But in this information environment, not all storytellers are created equal. While most 
Kenyan techies I know read Tech Crunch, few Americans I know read the popular Kenyan tech 
blogs, Kachwanya or TechWeez, unless they already have a particular interest in Kenyan 
technology news. Similarly, before Zuckerberg’s visit, Peter and Harrison had been working hard 
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to fundraise getting their story out, but had struggled to get the attention of the limited number of 
investors already paying attention to Kenya. After his visit, they were overrun. “All of a sudden,” 
Peter explained, “we were under attack! I got like 60 questions on how our system works coming 
into the website immediately.” Just by mentioning them briefly in his Facebook post, omitting 
even the company’s name, Harrison and Peter were immediately put into the global public eye, 
reaching an audience that they never could have reached on their own. In our conversations, Peter 
sometimes characterized Zuckerberg cynically as a “tech rock star”. “I found it really bizarre,” he 
explained. “I know he’s a tech rock star. But it’s a weird thing, why does that mean so much?” In 
many ways, a “rock star” is a fitting analogic description for a man who attracts groupies and 
‘fan-geeks’ wherever he goes. But an even more accurate description of Zuckerberg and the 
handful of those like him at the very peak of the global culture around tech may be that of techno 
or innovation evangelists (Irani, 2015), or a techno-visionary storyteller. Like a rock star, 
Zuckerberg may have gained prominences for his particular talent at his given practice, but he has 
subsequently used it to sell a very specific message and a vision of the future of the world, an 
ideological objective that rockstar musicians are less inclined to have. In Facebook’s case, that 
vision is of a “global community” built on the back of Facebook’s social media platform. “Our 
greatest opportunities,” he wrote in Facebook’s new manifesto published on February 16, 2017, 
“are now global. …Progress now requires humanity coming together not just as cities or nations, 
but as a global community” (Zuckerberg, 2017). He goes on to lay out the ways in which 
Facebook can enable greater interconnectedness while wondering in bewilderment at the 
“movements” around the world pushing for “withdrawing from global connection.”  Like their 
counterparts in religious communities, evangelists and techno-visionary storytellers in technology 
communities seek to inspire, persuade, and ultimately convert their audiences into customers for 
their products, into new innovators and engineers, and fundamentally into believers of the techno-
utopian vision they are selling. In many ways, the belief in the ability of new technologies to 
bring about positive change in the world is as ingrained in this culture as the belief in God is in 
the culture of Christianity. No wonder that it took Facebook so long to accept and respond to 
reports that its platform was being used for ill, to disseminate hate speech, violent content, and 
fake news, encouraging crime and division rather than just “peace and understanding”. In order to 
do anything about such failures, it first had to admit that its technology could be used to bring 
about more than just “positive change”. 
In her excellent book on the culture of technology innovation in Peru, Networked 
Peripheries, Anita Say Chan writes that “even while it might now be recognized that IT 
engagements are no longer limited to Western IT experts and enthusiasts, it remains a relatively 
narrow set of voices that speak for an IT-enmeshed contemporary” (Chan 2014, p. 5). Even while 
innovators like Peter and Harrison and their Kenyan counterparts work on projects far removed 
from Silicon Valley in response to problems more common in Kenya than the Western 
metropoles, an elite few, like Zuckerberg or Elon Musk or Steve Jobs, have historically captured 
the lion’s share of the world’s imaginings as forecasters of “the world’s common digital future” 
(Chan 2014, p.5). Stories about how humanity’s future is on Mars or how the iPhone is going to 
revolutionize the way we communicate, or about a global village that only needs more 
engagement from everyone, purport to see the future at a global scale, but still convey a 
particularly Amero-centric view of the world. And while there may be more platforms for more 
voices from more places today than there were four years ago when Say Chan published her 
book, the loudest, most attention-grabbing voices still belong to this set of “highly visible digital 
enthusiasts” (Chan, 2014, p.5), the techno-visionary storytellers. 
In many ways, and as I will make the case in this dissertation, the art of storytelling is at 
the center of how technology innovation is currently being practiced in the modern information 
economy. The venture capital dominated nature of the Silicon Valley approach to building 
technology means that in addition to having an exceptional product and a solid business model, 
innovators need to get the attention of both prospective customers and prospective investors in 
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order to make it. Book after book, article after article, TED talk after TED talk have been 
produced to help entrepreneurs improve their storytelling along with their chances of success and 
of “changing the world” (e.g. De Reu, 2017; Evans & Handley, 2015; A. Smith, 2018). “Tension 
and struggle, heroes and villains,” Carmine Gallo writes in Forbes, “are the stuff of great movies. 
As it turns out, they are also key to selling one’s ideas” (Gallo, 2015). Steve Jobs, the archetypal 
tech evangelist praised by that same outlet as “The World’s Greatest Business Storyteller”, may 
hold some responsibility for the storied way in which Silicon Valley innovation has evolved. 
Legend has it, he once said to an employee that the “most powerful person in the world is the 
storyteller,” because the storyteller sets “the vision, values and agenda of an entire generation” 
(Yarow, 2013), and this quote has fittingly itself attained a sort of mythological status as it spread 
online. Academics too have begun exploring the role that telling a good story can play in the 
work of entrepreneurs (Henry, Dana, & Murphy, 2018; Lurtz & Kreutzer, 2014; O’Connor, 
2002), and have made similar arguments (likely to smaller audiences) about how influential 
stories can be in shaping communities and their core values and practices (Humphreys, 2000; 
Rappaport, 2000). This dissertation is, in part, an attempt to more fully theorize about the role 
such stories, as well as the larger community narratives that they help to construct, in the 
changing practices of technology innovation in a global setting. 
The dexterity with which Jobs and others craft compelling stories around their products, 
combined with the positions they hold in the popular imagination of our tech-centric modernity, 
can blind audiences to the “myth of techno-inevitability” (Srinivasan, 2017). The future of 
humanity as Jobs and Zuckerberg and Musk tell it is a happy one if and only if humanity is 
willing to embrace the revolutionizing power of constant technological advancement. In the case 
of the story of Zuckerberg’s visit to the iHub, we indeed see depicted a tech-enabled future, but 
one that innovators in Kenya, and not just in Silicon Valley, are helping to build. In his post, 
Zuckerberg paints himself as a visitor come only to learn. Like any true tech rock star, the 
enthusiasm for him and his visit were palpable throughout the media coverage that inevitably 
followed him and in the comments section of his Facebook post. Many praised the lack of pomp 
and circumstance with which he traveled and his interest in entrepreneurs rather than in poverty. 
“Mark Zuckerberg,” one commenter wrote on his Facebook page, “one of the world’s most 
influential people arrives in Kenya without fanfare and sirens while some politicians who have no 
influence in their villages cannot let Kenyans drive in peace.”  In Wired’s coverage of the visit, 
Steven Levy wrote that “Other billionaires come to Africa to be photographed with emaciated 
babies in rural villages. Zuckerberg has come to a throbbing, chaotic megacity to check out the 
programming styles of children” (2016). Some saw his visit as validation of the work that 
Kenyans were doing around technology, while others speculated at what it, and his visit to 
Nigeria the day before, would mean for the future of technology innovation on the continent. In 
his Facebook comments, one follower wrote enthusiastically, “You just proved to the world that 
indeed Kenya is the Silicon Savannah. Never a prouder moment like this to be a Kenyan;” while 
in a blog post on Medium, a Nigerian entrepreneur wrote that, “It really put Nigeria in the 
spotlight and I can’t quantify how much progress that single visit will bring to the Nigerian tech 
community” (2016).  
Situated	Storytelling	
No story, let alone a story told by such a “highly visible digital enthusiast” (Chan, 2014, p.5), 
stands alone in a vacuum, independent of the world in which it exists. Stories are informed by the 
world the storyteller experiences or by the world as he or she wants to see it, and they can in turn 
act upon that world (Bruner, 1991; Herman, 2011; Polletta, 2009). Enough stories told enough 
times by enough people can build up dominant cultural narratives that shape our view of the 
world (Herman, 2011; McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich, 2006; Stephens & McCallum, 2013), 
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our understandings of what’s normal, and beliefs about what’s likely to happen in the future. 
Narratives about how new technologies can save the world, or how blockchain is the future of 
finance, or even about how Africa is the next best frontier for innovation all can become 
embedded as cultural norms shaping our assumptions, expectations, and dreams.  
The interrelationship between our lived experiences and the stories we hear and tell and 
the narratives they build is worth paying attention to in any context, but becomes urgent when 
looking at its impact in the process of producing new technologies. Not only, as Srinivasan has 
pointed out, can techno-visionary stories “naturalize a belief that technologies should dictate our 
material and sentient experiences,” (Srinivasan, 2017, loc 208) but they can shape the 
assumptions and expectations of those designing, building, and funding new technologies. 
Academics writing about the social construction of technology have, since Bijker and his 
coauthors in the 1980s (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987), followed by Bruno Latour (1990) and 
Andrew Feenberg (1991) in the early 1990s, drawn our attention to how influential the social 
context of innovation can be in shaping the physical hardware and digital software that will come 
to shape our experience of and interactions with the world (Gieryn, 1994; Williams & Edge, 
1996). Fittingly since then, there has been a wealth of scholarship examining the physical spaces 
of innovation for digital products (Harvey, 2000; Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; Massey, 2004), and the 
institutions, cultures, and networks of power around it (Kirkpatrick, 2008). There have been 
movements to practice innovation in more inclusive and collaborative ways (Foster & Heeks, 
2013; Sanders & Westerlund, 2011), engaging with those who have not typically been engaged 
for this process like artists (Balsamo, 2011), and for there to be more public discussion and 
transparency around what assumptions and beliefs go into new technologies, like the algorithms 
that shape our experiences online, from Google’s search algorithm to Facebook’s newsfeed 
algorithm, to the algorithms being created by startups in Kenya to help financial institutions 
assess the credit potential of prospective loan recipients (Gillespie, 2014; Kitchin, 2017; Noble, 
2018). 
Utopian visions about a tech-enabled future can also normalize existing dominant 
approaches to innovating (Grunwald, 2018). For example, reflections on whether the capitalist 
startup-centric approach that dominates Silicon Valley’s style of innovation is really the best path 
to building new technologies that will benefit rather than hurt are worryingly rare. Stories, 
amplified by tech and innovation evangelists, about the heroic self-made tech entrepreneur who 
becomes a billionaire can capture the imagination of aspiring tech innovators the world over and 
can help to accelerate the adoption of Silicon Valley’s particular approach in diverse and 
nontraditional sites of innovation. 
Interconnected	Innovators	
What is also apparent in the stories around Zuckerberg’s visit to Kenya is how interconnected 
technology innovation, as it is currently practiced in Nairobi, is with its practice elsewhere around 
the globe. Diverging significantly from the isolated “ecosystem” that it is sometimes 
characterized as in the literature (Feld, 2012; Stangler & Bell-Masterson, 2015; Wong, 2006), not 
only are there countless foreign entrepreneurs in Kenya like Peter and Harrison, but there are also 
countless foreign visitors like Zuckerberg (or Vince Serf or Barack Obama), many of whom bring 
global attention or financial support and some of whom stay for far longer. Many Kenyan 
innovators also travel abroad. They attend international technology and innovations conferences 
like SOCAP and South by Southwest; they travel to Silicon Valley to train at the legendary 
startup incubator Y-Combinator, to Hong Kong to develop investor partnerships, and to London 
to pitch their ideas at global startup competitions like the Global Edtech Startup Awards. They 
consume international tech news as vociferously as any aspiring entrepreneurs in New York or 
Berlin, and while, like Peter and Harrison, they may struggle to attract attention, they can tell 
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their own “startup story” through their websites, blogs, and social media accounts, accessible to 
anyone who knows where to look online. The physical practice in which they’re engaged also 
shares more in common with the practices in which other programmers and entrepreneurs in 
Hong Kong are engaged than the practices of the onion and tomato vendors down the road. They 
build things like design studios, fab labs, coworking spaces; they run hackathons and startup 
competitions and host fireside chats and training bootcamps – all practices that are 
“transnationally legible emblems of innovation” (Irani, 2015), recognizable the world over. 
Moreover, at least for the software developers in Nairobi, the internet has created not just a 
common platform of communication but also a common platform on which to practice and share 
their craft, like GitHub or Forrst.  
But while innovators in Kenya, India, and Germany may be engaged in the same practice, 
their experiences around building their companies can differ greatly, shaped by their geographies, 
economies, national policies, and the individual stories and larger cultural and community 
narratives around and about them.  
While Germany, for example, has benefitted from the immense investment that flowed its 
way in the reconstruction after World War II, researchers have found that Indians involved in 
transnational technological labor have experienced barriers as a result of their accents and 
nationalities, sometimes, as Winifred Poster argued, engaging in “national identity management” 
to disguise their true nationality (W. R. Poster, 2007). Of all regions of the world, Africa has 
perhaps been the most economically disadvantaged by the weight of its colonial history, as many 
important postcolonial theorists and Africanist scholars like James Ferguson, Ngugi Wa 
Thiong’o, and Franz Fanon have written (Fanon, 1965; Ferguson, 2006; Wa Thiong’o, 1994). 
Even long after the formal “colonial pathways” (Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, Philip, & Grinter, 2010) 
have been dismantled, many have argued that these hierarchies of power remain in the form of 
neoliberal structures in which money and influence often flow to the continent in the form of 
government or NGO aid and assistance (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Ferguson, 2006; Harrison, 
2013) and rarely from it. As Lilly Irani and her coauthors have argued in their excellent piece 
seeking to shape the approaches to technology production in developing countries the field of 
human computer interaction, “colonial relationships may have dissolved, and yet the history of 
global dynamics of power, wealth, economic strength, and political influence shape contemporary 
cultural encounters” (Irani et al., 2010).  
To this list I would add stories and narratives. For example, pervasive narratives about 
the “Failed Continent” can also serve to restrict international perceptions of Africans to the 
primitive, poor, and war-hungry (Carruthers, 2004; Zeleza, 1997). While there has been some 
change in the international media representation of Africa in recent years, most notably 
conveying a new narrative of a “Rising Africa”, scholars have shown how many of the negative 
characterizations of Africans persist (Mel Bunce, 2015). On a continent more commonly seen by 
outsiders as under-developed or developing rather than innovative or innovating, the weight of 
such narratives can be particularly heavy, limiting the kinds of technologies investors look for 
from African entrepreneurs and the success the expect from them. In this dissertation, by bringing 
a communications perspective to communities of practice theory and combining it with narrative 
theories, I hope to build a theoretical framework that will provide a useful way of analyzing the 
role that narratives play in shaping the experiences of African involved in transnational labor. In 
particular, as I will make the case in this dissertation that pervasive cultural narratives like the 
Failed Continent Narrative have served to pigeonhole many Kenyan entrepreneurs as foreign 
investors coming to Kenya look only for startups that will have a “social impact”. As Yuri 
Takhteyev has written in his excellent book on software development in Rio Di Janiero, “the 
practice of software development thus appears to be simultaneously remarkably placeless and 
starkly placed” (Takhteyev 2012, p. 4). While the practices may be virtual, the geographic 
environments in which individual entrepreneurs are embedded can have often unseen influences 
over their ability to build technology and businesses around them. 
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In this environment, a visit from one of the biggest tech icons there is can enhance the 
sense of belonging to a community that is global and not merely national in scope. Seeing this 
icon tell the story about engineers and entrepreneurs in Nairobi can also legitimize the work being 
done in this corner of the global community in both the eyes of Kenyan entrepreneurs and those 
outside looking for new investments, helping to counteract some of the more insidious narratives 
about the failure of Africa and Africans. His story, repeated and reiterated by media and 
audiences alike, may also have strengthened existing narratives about Africa Rising and the 
growth of technology innovation in Africa, conveying the message that if Zuckerberg were 
interested then it might be worth paying attention to after all.  
The	Gap	Between	Stories	and	Reality	
However, the impact of Zuckerberg’s story does not stop at the beneficial. The inevitable 
inaccuracies in a story written from so short a visit also acted upon the lived experiences of those 
in and around the Bishop Magua Centre. Take Harrison and Peter for example. Zuckerberg’s 
story (likely inadvertently) characterized their company as structured differently from how it was 
in reality and presented it as further along, rather than a company in a beta testing phase with only 
one customer. While an endorsement from a tech icon may appear to be a necessarily positive 
thing under the old adage that “there’s no such thing as bad publicity,”2 overselling and 
overpromising can be as problematic for a technology startup trying to get off the ground as 
underselling (Cremades, 2016). In our conversation, Peter talked about the problems that 
Zuckerberg’s story about them had caused. After having to scramble to answer the flood of 
questions with which they were bombarded over just the next day, Peter found himself still 
having to dispel misconceptions about their work and their interaction with Zuckerberg even 
weeks later. 
I went to SOCAP [The Social Capital Markets annual conference] afterwards, 
and every single person there asked me about how Mark Zuckerberg thought 
we were so cool, and how I was like chatting with him, and hanging out, but it 
was just three minutes of me watching Harrison get to talk to him for a 
second. So it was pretty much just letting people down for the next month 
about what really happened. 
Not only did Zuckerberg’s story significantly increase interest in their company, but 
through its misrepresentation of what they did, it also increased the spread of misinformation 
about their company, creating pressures on them to correct and clarify what they did, pressures 
that would not have existed otherwise. Later in our conversation, Peter told me about how this 
had led them to include a Frequently Asked Questions section on their new website to head off 
the barrage of ill-informed questions that had been distracting them from completing their beta 
testing phase. Furthermore, by highlighting Harrison and Peter as the “engineers” who were 
“building companies to help their community” [emphasis added], Zuckerberg unintentionally 
turned two foreigners into the representatives of Kenya’s community of technology innovators. 
Through this interplay between the reality as experienced by people who work in the Bishop 
Magua Centre and the story that Zuckerberg told describing it, it becomes apparent that the 
practice of innovating new technologies in Nairobi, like what Peter and Harrison and their 
Kenyan counterparts are doing, and the stories about that practice are mutually constituted, 
constantly shaping and shaped by one another. It also draws attention to the delicate balancing 
act in the relationship between perceived truth and storytelling. The integration of Peter and 
                                                      
2 Often attributed to P.T. Barnum, the 19th century circus owner and founder of Barnum and Baileys. 
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Harrison for example into Zuckerberg’s story shows that care must be taken when attributing 
authenticity to spokespeople and when interpreting stories that claim to represent whole 
communities.  
Furthermore, the lived experiences I observed of people around the Bishop Magua Centre 
during Zuckerberg’s visit also draw into question the accuracy of the broader media narratives 
that emerged celebrating Zuckerberg and his visit. I did find people who were thrilled about his 
visit, like the iHub team lead, Lily, or like Adam, a designer I knew who worked with a hardware 
startup that featured prominently in the day’s media coverage. Adam was effusive when I saw 
him after the visit. He told me that Zuckerberg had spent the morning in his company’s office, 
“where the real work happened.” “What impresses me,” he explained, “is the money he could 
easily drop here that could really help our company go where we want to go.” One of the board 
members of the iHub also spoke favorably and publicly about the billionaire and about 
Facebook’s new mission to help extend internet access to Africa, through programs like free 
basics. “He’s interested in cool tech that solves real problems, and I think to his credit – which is 
not him believing his own PR – he really does care about getting the internet to emerging markets 
and out to the edge of the world” (Shapshak, 2016). 
By contrast, many of the people I knew best were more incredulous. Njeri, for example, 
saw the visit as a distraction from her work, Franklin, as a distraction from his lunch, and Jimiyu, 
as a symbol of power. Gathii, the entrepreneur I’d interviewed that morning pointed to what he 
felt was the hypocrisy in Zuckerberg’s approach, funding startups in Africa but “institutions” in 
America. Similarly, Grace, another iHub employee with whom I worked, and who had been in a 
partnership meeting off-site during Zuckerberg’s visit, echoed Gathii’s skepticism. She rolled her 
eyes when I saw her the next day. “Facebook thinks it’s going to save Africa.” Together the 
experiences and impressions of people at the Bishop Magua Centre were varied, and the situation 
far more complex than the one presented in Zuckerberg’s story or the media coverage of it.  
The responses of Grace and Franklin and the others also underscores the fragile nature of 
authenticity in storytelling. Franklin, for example, bristled at the idea of “kneeling” for the photo 
in front of Zuckerberg, clearly skeptical of any real human-sized person behind the super human-
sized stories that followed him. Grace saw a similar gap between the rhetoric she heard from 
Facebook and its ‘real’ practices in Africa. She was also clearly exhausted by the recirculation of 
the old outdated story about a Westerner coming to save Africa, be those Westerners colonizers, 
NGOs or multinational technology company. If the gaps between the world as it is portrayed in 
stories and larger narratives, and the world as it is experienced grow too wide, then the reputation 
of the stories, their storytellers, and even the practice of storytelling itself can suffer. For 
example, the story of the white savior of Africa has become so discredited in many parts of 
Africa, that those who still tell such stories are ridiculed; movements have emerged challenging 
the role of international NGOs and ex-pat NGO workers in domestic African development 
projects and the discrepancies between the pay they and their local counterparts receive (O’Neal, 
2016; Peters & Wendland, 2016; Secret aid worker, 2016). Tech icons like Mark Zuckerberg 
present themselves as fortune tellers of our globally realized technological future. Their stories 
are meant to inspire, to keep our own visions of the future firmly fixed on the technological. But 
in a practice like technology innovation so embedded in the contemporary attention economy, 
with its pressures to tell headline-grabbing stories about the latest product in health or 
entertainment or education, the stories they tell can be especially prone to exaggeration and hype, 
leaving audiences open to disappointment, frustration, or even anger.  
New	Stories	
In the last five to ten years, there has been an undeniable upswing in the success of startups and 
technology entrepreneurs from outside of the United States. There are now reportedly 106 non-
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American companies that have joined the unicorn club and been valued at, and acquired for, over 
$1 billion, 55 of which are in China alone (CB Insights, 2017). With the success of, and publicity 
around, startups from much smaller or unexpected countries – like Waze from Israel, purchased 
by Google for $1.3 billion in 2013, or Spotify from Sweden, valued at $8.3 billion (CB Insights, 
2018), or Careem, the rideshare rival to Uber from the United Arab Emirates valued at $1.7 
billion (Lunden, 2017) – it is clear that Silicon Valley companies no longer have a monopoly on 
innovation. As Elizabeth Scharpf, an American entrepreneur, wrote in an opinion piece for Wired 
in 2016, “true innovation now comes from places and people that are typically overlooked by 
Silicon Valley” (Scharpt, 2016). And as one well-known Nigerian tech blogger wrote in 2016, “I 
think people are (slowly, but surely) beginning to realise that over-reliance on a small 
demographic for (I don’t know) ALL THE SOLUTIONS IN THE WORLD is a bad idea” 
(Osamuyi, 2016). Along with this trend in practice, there has been a gradual but important 
increase in academic work foregrounding technology innovators outside of The Valley. 
Takhteyev’s study of software programmers in Rio Di Janiero (2012) Anita Say Chan’s study of 
the culture of innovation in Peru (2014), and Aneesh Aneesh’s study of Indian software 
programmers (2006), and Richard Pfeilstetter work on the promotion of startup culture in 
Manchester, England (2017) are all examples that come to mind of other ethnographers who have 
done this important work.  
But the iHub is not just outside of Silicon Valley, it is in Africa, and of the 106 unicorns 
that have emerged outside of the United States, only 3 are based in Africa: Africa Internet Group 
in Nigeria, and Promasidor Holdings, and Cell C in South Africa, and even their relationships 
with Africa are complicated. Africa Internet Group, for example, the company responsible for the 
well-known internet retailer Jumia, was indeed started in Lagos Nigeria, but has European 
founders. While new entrepreneurs everywhere struggle to gain attention amidst the hype and the 
noise of the industry in which they work, over the course of my fieldwork it became apparent that 
those in Africa face unique challenges. Starting in about 2013 Africa suddenly became “sexy” (as 
one iHub staffer described it to me) to the global tech community, following an earlier media 
trend that began to include narratives about Africa as Rising rather than Failed (Melanie Bunce, 
Franks, & Paterson, 2016; Nothias, 2014). Just as innovation from Silicon Valley seemed to be 
becoming increasingly frivolous – “a service that packs your suitcase virtually” and “a ‘smart’ 
button and zipper that alerts you if your fly is down” are just two examples listed by one New 
York Times columnist (Arieff, 2016) – American entrepreneurs and investors began to look 
elsewhere for meaning and to fulfill technology’s mission to “do good things” rather than just 
trivial ones. From this perspective, Africa gradually became a setting where the Facebooks and 
Googles of the world could prove that their products really were changing the world for the 
better, and Harvard Business graduates could test out their own world changing ideas. They could 
bring the internet to those in the dark! Bank the unbanked! Disrupt poverty! But for those Kenyan 
entrepreneurs and techies I came to know, while the growth of the Africa Rising Narrative as well 
as others optimistic techno-visionary stories helped to inspire many Kenyans to become startup 
entrepreneurs, many faced very real limitations in doing so. As a result, Nairobi as a “tech hub” 
of Africa, became a site of contestation over how technology innovation in Africa should be 
practiced and what its values and priorities should be, often boiled down to a debate about 
whether international legitimacy or local relevance mattered the most. 
A	New	Lens	
This dissertation takes head on the multifaceted, and often fraught, relationship between stories 
and narratives on the one hand and the lived experiences in our contemporary interconnected 
information economy on the other, and draws attention to the unique impact they have on the 
lives of techies and entrepreneurs in one seemingly “unlikely place” (Takhteyev 2012, p.1) for 
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innovation, Nairobi, Kenya. Over the course of two two-month visits in 2013 and 2014 and one 
year-long stay from January to December 2016, I conducted an in-depth ethnography of the 
Kenyan “technology hub” known as the iHub, collecting firsthand the stories (like Zuckerberg’s 
or Harrison and Peter’s above) and observing the experiences (like Franklin’s, Njeri’s, or Grace’s 
above) of some of the entrepreneurs, programmers, researchers, managers, and investors in and 
around the Bishop Magua Centre. In the pages that follow, I seek to draw attention to these 
experiences and examine how they have shaped and been shaped by the stories told around them. 
To do so, I have built a theoretical framework without which I believe making sense of the unique 
challenges faced by Kenyan innovators as well as the iHub itself would extremely difficult. 
Throughout this dissertation, I hope to make a persuasive case that stories and narratives, though 
themselves intangible, influence the extent and quality of Kenyan engagement in the globally 
interconnected work of technology production, and operate to create pressures that are notably 
different from those experienced by other aspiring entrepreneurs outside of Africa. They inspire, 
motivate, and legitimize, as well as mislead, constrain, and de-legitimize. They are used to 
perpetuate hegemonic approaches to innovation and ideologies as well as to resist and reframe 
them and they create hierarchies of legitimacy that can be particularly challenging for African 
innovators to climb. 
In the first chapter, I begin by using the ways in which technology innovation has been 
practiced in Silicon Valley to build a new theoretical framework that makes sense of the 
expansion of those practices to other parts of the globe and the implications of that expansion for 
techies in a historically disadvantaged region of the world. The framework begins from Lave and 
Wenger’s communities of practice theory, which seeks to explain how people learn, become 
members of, and gain legitimacy within communities built around practice rather than identity 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991). I strengthen the theory by bringing a more critical eye and focusing on 
certain aspects of it that had been frequently overlooked, namely the power imbalances, the 
potential for conflict inherent in heterogeneous communities formed around practice rather than 
identity or geography, and most importantly, the role that stories and narratives play in these 
communities and the construction of the legitimacy of new members. While linguists have 
frequently taken up communities of practice theory to look at micro-level communications 
patterns like accents and jargon, I believe the roles played by stories, like Zuckerberg’s techno-
visionary stories, and larger cultural narratives, like the Africa Rising Narrative, have been 
notably under-theorized. By incorporating narrative theory, I am able to build a new lens that 
helps to understand how communities of practice are formed and change and how members’ 
sense of meaning and legitimacy are constructed. 
In the first chapter, I also introduce the concept of a Community of Technology 
Innovators (CTI), a community of practice formed around the practice of designing new 
technologies for commercial purposes and building fast growing startups around them. In the case 
of technology innovation practices in Silicon Valley, I show how its own CTI is characterized by 
its rapid pace of innovation, its capitalist ideology, its venture capital funding structure creating 
pressures to expand quickly and globally, its material culture like its open-plan coworking spaces, 
its storytelling practices like the techno-visionary storytelling, and its community narratives, like 
the Technology is Good Narrative, that transmit and reinforce common values and create a model 
of the practices of a successful member of Silicon Valley’s CTI. By the end of the chapter, I make 
the case that the interconnected way in which technology innovation is currently practiced can be 
most usefully conceptualized as a set of overlapping Communities of Technology Innovators. 
Some of these communities are geographically situated, like the Silicon Valley or the Kenyan 
CTI, but there is also a larger over-arching community that I call the Global Community of 
Technology Innovators (GCTI) in which innovators in very different geographic environments 
are simultaneously engaged. 
In Chapter 2, I use the theoretical lens I built in Chapter 1 to analyze the ways in which 
storytelling and narrative construction help to expand and reinforce the GCTI, its practices, and 
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its norms. By focusing on the development and evolution of one particular new narrative about 
how “anyone anywhere” in the world can design and build new transformative technologies, what 
I refer to as the Anyone Anywhere Narrative, I demonstrate how narratives enhance the sense of 
transnational belonging in the GCTI and how they inspire outsiders to want to join and to believe 
that they too can be successful technology innovators. This was particularly the case I found as a 
result of the integration of new settings, heroes, and storytellers into the stories being told about 
“anyone anywhere” that transformed it into a new more locally-relevant narrative, the Kenyans 
Can! Narrative. Beginning to draw down to the particular way in which narratives operated in the 
context of Kenya, I show how the Anyone Anywhere Narrative was able to resonate especially 
well with hyper-connected young middle-class Kenyan audiences because it echoed beliefs 
embedded in existing narratives about Kenyan identity and aspirations. 
By Chapter 3, I turn the narrative/communities of practice lens on the experiences of four 
Kenyan entrepreneurs and their technology startups as they work to gain legitimacy and to be 
taken seriously at home and abroad. In it, I show how the Anyone Anywhere Narrative may have 
helped to inspire them to try their hand at entrepreneurship, but other reductive narratives, like the 
Failed Continent Narrative, also influence expectations about entrepreneurial identity and about 
Africa and Africans that in turn served to restrict the ability of three of these entrepreneurs to 
participate fully in the GCTI. In particular, many felt pigeonholed, seen by international investors 
as “social entrepreneurs” rather than being judged by the same criteria as their international 
counterparts. With the story of the fourth entrepreneur, I show how through embracing the GCTI 
practice of storytelling and embodying the techno-visionary storyteller she was able to gain 
attention in the saturated information environment of the GCTI and to construct a narrative for 
herself as a successful technology entrepreneur from Kenya. 
If Chapter 3 draws attention to the gap between the stories about technology innovation 
and the experiences of Kenyan innovators, then Chapter 4 answers the question: What happens 
when these gaps become exposed? In it, I demonstrate how in some cases this has led to a decline 
in both the desirability of membership in the GCTI and in the reputation of storytellers and the 
practice of storytelling. I show how particular GCTI practices like potentially discriminatory 
investment practices, an infatuation with the newest technologies beholden to hype cycles, and an 
obsession with open-plan coworking spaces have all been offered up for rejection. I follow some 
of Kenya’s disgruntled innovators as they not only reject the GCTI and many of its practices, but 
also – through the use of more subversive storytelling techniques, like rumor, humor, and Twitter 
– built new counter-narratives about how they want technology innovation in Kenya to be 
practiced going forward. I argue that the development of such counter-narratives represents a 
movement to disentangle Kenya’s own Community of Technology Innovators from the Global 
community, and to force a national-level dialogue about how to practice technology innovation in 
Kenya in a way that is reflective of Kenyan needs and values and not just subject to the pressure 
to conform to existing GCTI practice. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I focus on the single case study of the iHub and use the 
analytical lens I have built and refined over the proceeding chapters to make sense of its fate and 
understand its role among Kenyan techies. In its first few years of existence, the founders of the 
iHub used their own experience with storytelling as bloggers to shape key narratives about how 
Kenya was the “technology hub of Africa” and the iHub was at the center of it, attracting foreign 
GCTI interest to Kenya and to the Bishop Magua Centre in particular. By doing so the iHub 
constructed a narrative for itself as a legitimate member of the GCTI and as a gateway to Kenya’s 
own CTI. However, by the time I was conducting my principal fieldwork in 2016, the fame that 
the iHub had received as a result of these narratives ended up creating new barriers for it. By 
being in the spotlight as a “center of innovation” and a “gateway” to Kenya’s technology sector, 
new counter-narratives eventually emerged about the iHub being “all hype” and more focused on 
international visitors and funding than on the local community that helped to create it. For many 
in Kenya’s CTI, I found that the iHub had come to be seen as too closely associated with the 
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GCIT, representing for many the injustices they felt they had experienced in their interactions 
with foreign members of the GCTI, particularly investors. Through this process, the iHub was 
transformed on a narrative level from the storyteller of a movement around African-led 
innovation and a symbol of its success, into (at least for a Kenyan audience) a symbol of the 
deception of Kenyan innovators, a symbol against which a new movement to make Kenyan 
innovation more authentically Kenyan could rally. 
Methodology	
Finally, before proceeding to the meat of this dissertation, I would like to talk a bit about the 
methodological approach chosen for this study in order to give the reader a more complete picture 
of the perspective from which I write and the depth of the data from which I draw. 
Setting:	The	iHub	
The primary site of my fieldwork is of course the iHub. The iHub sits on the 4th and top floor of 
an older office building called the Bishop Magua Centre, situated just off one of Nairobi’s main 
transportation arteries, the often jammed Ngong Rd, a road sometimes referred to by members of 
the Kenyan CTI as “Silicon Alley” for the large number of technology related companies that 
opened offices on and around it. The Bishop Magua building, as we saw in Zuckerberg’s visit, 
boasts a particularly large number of technology companies. But it is the iHub itself and its 
offshoots that take up the majority of Bishop Magua’s office space. In addition to the main 
community space on the 4th floor, the iHub also maintains a staff office on the 2nd floor (where 
Franklin, Grace, Njeri, Lilly and others are based), a Google-sponsored user experience lab on the 
1st floor, and a World Bank assisted incubator called m:lab on the 3rd floor. A number of the other 
offices in the building are also closely connected to the iHub: the hardware company, BRCK, 
founded by two of the iHub founders, the hardware coworking space, Gearbox (where the group 
picture with Zuckerberg was taken) and the startups like MFarm that got their start at the iHub, 
are all often referred to as “friends of the iHub” by iHub staff members. The iHub has become so 
interconnected with Bishop Magua that people often refer to the building itself as the iHub.  
The work that the iHub actually does is somewhat difficult to describe and undeniably 
broad. Since its founding in 2010, it has been many things: A community center for techies, a 
coworking space for entrepreneurs, an incubator for technology startups, a pre-incubator for ideas 
that did and did not lead to startups, a trainer in programming languages and data science skills, 
an organizer of a regional startup competition, a research and software programming consultant, a 
host for networking events, for hackathons, for other startup competitions, and for prominent 
international techie visitors like Marissa Mayer and Mark Zuckerberg, a matchmaker for 
entrepreneurs and investors, a model for other technology communities across the continent, and 
a representative for and leader of a movement to build technology by, for, and in Africa. In the 
eyes of much of the international press that pays attention to Kenya, the iHub has often been both 
the storyteller for, and the gateway to, Nairobi’s technology sector. 
Gaining	access	to	the	iHub	
I first visited the iHub in June 2013. After exploring potential avenues of research during my first 
year of the PhD, I sent an email to the Research Lead at iHub Research, the organization’s 
research arm that studied technology and its uses in East Africa. She suggested that when I came 
to Kenya that summer, they could host me as a Visiting Research Fellow, as they had done for 
other technology researchers, foreign and Kenyan alike. I had little prior experience as either a 
programmer or an entrepreneur and so initially expected gaining access to a technology 
community to be somewhat difficult. Instead, the fact that the iHub had its own dedicated 
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research division meant that I found a team of like-minded people who understood and 
appreciated the role of research and looked at me, from the beginning, as more peer than 
complete outsider. Furthermore, the iHub’s mission of being an open community space, and its 
role as a gateway, meant that it was particularly easy to gain initial access as a visitor, even 
without an affiliation with the research team. And because of this openness, I experienced the 
iHub’s role as a gateway connecting Kenyans techies to the rest of the world and vice versa. Like 
many foreigners interested in Kenya’s technology sector, the iHub was my first port of call for 
this study, though unlike many others, I had previously lived and worked in Kenya, working at a 
Kenyan media freedom NGO. 
Gaining access to the rest of the staff, the designers and programmers and managers 
outside of the research division proved more difficult than accessing the space or the research 
division. As I would later learn, to some on the rest of the staff, the Research team often seemed 
quite distant, removed from the rest of the organization. And while the iHub was accustomed to 
receiving visiting researchers as fellows, hosting them while they studied some aspect of 
technology in Kenya, they were much less accustomed to having a researcher study the iHub 
team itself. After some time, through my relationship with the Research team, I eventually built a 
rapport with the iHub leadership. After sending them a written proposal of what I intended to do 
and holding a number of in-person and email conversations, they agreed to my study in January 
2016, after which I sent around an email to the rest of the iHub team with a description of it. Even 
so, it took over a month before I gained access to some of the normal channels of internal 
communication within the iHub (namely the mobile application for small businesses, Slack), and 
longer still before any particular role beyond Visiting Research Fellow was established for me. 
By March 2016, however, I was attending and permitted to record regular staff meetings and had 
been assigned to work as part of the organization’s small communications team, consisting at the 
time of two communications officers (one responsible for the iHub proper, the other for the m:lab 
incubator), a designer, and a photographer and videographer.  
Complicating my access to particular parts of the organization were a few somewhat 
unusual issues around the organization’s leadership. While the CEO ran the day to day operations 
of the organization and had approved of my study, the board members often spoke publicly for 
the organization and published blog posts about changes at the iHub, and I found them to be more 
difficult, though not impossible, to reach. Furthermore, in April 2016 the iHub acquired new 
investors and began evolving into more of a for-profit business; four months later, they had a new 
CEO. Each of these changes complicated the question of authority and made it necessary for me 
to frequently check in with the new leadership and regularly reassess and at times reaffirm my 
own role within the organization. Luckily, in the new CEO I had the good fortune of finding 
someone with a research background, who, while he at times took quite a strict approach to 
running the organization, seemed thankfully open to a researcher studying the changes that the 
iHub was undergoing. In the end, he gave me access to more senior level management meetings 
than I had previously had access to. 
Characters	
The	participants	
In January 2016, when I began my principal fieldwork, the staff of the iHub consisted of 
approximately 33 individuals, (not including the board) comprised of managers, programmers, 
designers, researchers, and communication specialists. Of these staff members, all but one were 
Kenyan citizens, racially black, and ethnically coming typically from Kenya’s more populous 
tribes, the Kikuyus and Luos. The remaining non-Kenyan on staff was a white female American 
designer experienced in user-centered research. Though only a few of the staff had a master’s 
degree, most had a bachelor’s degree, typically from a Kenyan university. Those that did have a 
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master’s degree had often studied abroad, usually in Europe to obtain it. In terms of gender, 
women made up over a quarter of all staff members, with most working at iHub Research or 
m:lab. Of those, three were in prominent leadership roles, heading the m:lab, iHub Research, the 
Design Lab, and serving as the COO. The iHub’s four original founders were also all Kenyan 
citizens, while there were black, one was a white Kenyan who had grown up in East Africa to 
American missionary parents. As I’ve been going to the iHub since June 2013, I have also seen a 
lot of changes in staff. Between 2013 and 2016, for example, the iHub Research Team shrank 
from about twelve people to five, and in mid-2016 the iHub brought in a new CEO who was 
ethnically Indian but had been raised and had previously worked in Germany. 
From 2010 to the end of 2016, the organization operated as a non-profit but had partnered 
with foreign and Kenyan donors and corporations to help fund its work, like intel, Google, Zuku, 
Safaricom, Hivos Foundation, and Omidyar Network. Beyond the iHub’s own staff, there were 
many, frequently changing faces that came through the iHub, particularly the 4th floor community 
space. Counting only those that I saw myself, these included: entrepreneurs trying to get an idea 
off the ground, programmers working with entrepreneurs or on consulting projects, students 
working on homework for their software accelerator classes, TED fellows, baristas, bloggers, 
designers, journalists working on stories about Kenyan startups, artists who’d come for a talk 
about the intersection between technology and art, managers of global startup competitions like 
the 1776 Challenge Cup, managers and employees of NGOs working on mobile applications or 
looking to fund them, foreign venture capitalists looking for a new project to invest in, 
representatives of other African coworking spaces looking for advice, and visiting foreign and 
Kenyan researchers like me. Aside from those who wanted a committed desk space or to host a 
sponsored event, access to the iHub was always provided free of charge. Of those that used the 
space, I also saw the demographic breakdown change over time. When I first visited in 2013, at 
perhaps the height of the international media attention it was receiving, the space was often about 
one quarter filled with foreigners from across Africa as well as Europe and the United States. By 
2016, the number of white foreigners in particular regularly using the space seemed to have 
dropped to only a handful. Among both the staff and members who used the iHub’s space the vast 
majority of people were young, in their 20s or 30s. 
The	researcher	
My ability to access different parts of the iHub and understand the lived experiences of people in 
and around it was shaped further by my identity, and the experiences that people in my fieldsite 
had previously had with white foreign female researchers. Throughout my fieldwork I 
endeavored to enact the reflexive turn in anthropology (Coffey, 1999; C. A. Davies, 2008; Foley, 
2002) and paid particular attention to the ways in which my own identity influenced not only the 
kind of access I was able to get and how I was seen, but also my own interpretation of what I 
observed. As John L. Jackson Jr. has written, “it is about recognizing that the anthropologist is 
always a political actor in the everydayness of her practice (in a way that demands unpacking and 
explicit articulation)” (Jackson Jr, 2010, p. 284). 
Firstly, being a foreign researcher looking to study some aspect of life around the iHub, 
was not unique, as the existence of a Visiting Research Fellows program might indicate. In 
particular, many of the entrepreneurs around the iHub were all too familiar with people – 
researchers and journalists alike – looking to interviews them. In my first two visits to the 
fieldsite in 2013 and 2014, I found this experience quite frustrating as many of the entrepreneurs I 
spoke with seemed both pressed for time and tired of fielding interviews often giving boiler plat 
answers to questions that felt far from the ‘lived experience’ I was hoping to see. By contrast, I 
found the staff at the iHub, aside from the communication officers who regularly fielded 
interviews, to be far less accustomed to being interviewed, and far more accustomed to operating 
behind the scenes. And while some initially seemed uncomfortable being in the proverbial 
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spotlight when being interviewed, they also were more likely to give thoughtful, less rehearsed 
answer to my questions. In this context, I found it particularly useful to use a mixture of 
interviews, informal discussions, and participant observations, allowing me to see how people 
chose to answer questions in the more structured format of even an unstructured interview, to 
hear what they were willing to discuss during after-work drinks with colleagues, and to observe 
how they practiced their profession and interacted with one another on a daily basis. Furthermore, 
because some of the iHub’s staff had their own experience conducting research, it is likely that 
they were often looking at me with the same inquisitive eye of a researcher with which I was 
observing them. Rather than ignoring this, I chose to take advantage of our shared interest. Over 
the course of my time there, I talked frequently with members of the iHub staff about my research 
methods, the process of writing fieldnotes, my interpretations of my observations, and challenges 
I was facing accessing particular individuals or interpreting a particular event. In exchange, they 
often did the same with me with various projects they were working on. On reflection, this mutual 
dialogic exchange, while a process that emerged organically from my relationship with my 
colleagues at the iHub, is, in fact, fitting for the inherently collaborative quality of ethnographic 
research (Lassiter, 2005). And while this finished dissertation is not fully collaborative in the 
more contemporary sense (Lassiter, 2005) in that I am its sole author, I take inspiration from 
Mitchell Duneier’s approach (Duneier & Carter, 1999) and have already made plans to return to 
Nairobi later this year to present my findings to those I worked with and plan to integrate some of 
their feedback, particularly in the form of an epilogue, as I move forward with the publication of 
this manuscript. Furthermore, the relationships I’ve built with these colleagues in the field have 
also led to a few collaborations to produce co-authored publications that are currently underway. 
In the end, over the course of the year I often felt like I was “studying sideway” (Plesner, 2011), 
studying and working with colleagues as opposed to research participants. Those I worked with 
not only had access to most of the same information I did, read the same news, followed the 
politics of my home countries (they were particularly interested, for example, in Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump), and had university degrees, but some of them shared a love of 
research with me. 
Secondly, being a foreign white woman around the iHub was also not an uncommon 
sight. There were frequently people who shared these identity traits coming through the iHub on 
brief visits, including women who ran NGO-sponsored events, like with the World Bank, or 
worked with visiting startup competitions, or who were writing journalistic pieces. There were 
even others who were there for long periods of time, a few months for the other foreign 
researchers I met, or indefinitely for some of the women looking to start companies, working for 
startups, or even, in the case of two individuals at various times, working as part of the iHub’s 
staff. Being a common sight meant that I didn’t stick out in the way that someone with my 
identity might have done in Bomet, a small village in Western Kenya for example. But at the 
same time, it also meant that there were often pre-established expectations that people in and 
around the iHub had when they saw me. Often these included expectations that I was wealthier 
than those around me and might be looking for things in which to invest. At other times, these 
included more cautious expectations from those wary of exploitation, not just as a result of 
Kenya’s colonial history, but also as a result of the many foreigners who had come through the 
iHub and used it for its connections and its ‘local’ knowledge, but who had not given much in 
return. Some of this was even informed by some of iHub Research’s own staff concerns about 
how the Visiting Research Fellow program had, on a few occasions, been used to facilitate 
research that had ended up being more extractive than beneficial to the iHub or its community. 
This was further complicated by the recent trends in broader Kenyan public discourse towards a 
more critical stance on the pervasive role of foreigners and foreign-run NGOs in Nairobi (Kuo, 
2016) that I alluded to earlier.  
A bit to my surprise, I found that my identity as a woman did not seem to greatly inhibit 
my research experience. This was likely in part because I found a significant number of women 
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playing prominent roles in the iHub, in many of the organizations around the building, and as 
entrepreneurs themselves. While I did, on rare occasions, find myself having to stave off a few 
unwanted male advances, such incidents were no more frequent than in any other professional 
contexts in which I have worked previously. Additionally, I found that traditional views about 
appropriate gender roles meant that, at times, I had difficulty successfully paying for lunches or 
coffees with male informants if I wanted to do so as a thank you. If anything, I found that being a 
woman with a somewhat laid-back demeanor seemed to put people at ease making them 
potentially more willing to open up than they might have been with a more intimidating male 
researcher. Furthermore, being a woman seemed to, unsurprisingly, open conversations more 
naturally with other women in the sector. Kenyan woman, for example, are keenly aware of the 
ongoing debates around gender discrimination in Silicon Valley and a comradery sometimes 
developed around the challenges women face in advancing professionally as technology 
innovators. 
As a result of all of these complex dimensions around my identity as a researcher, ex-pat, 
and a white woman, it felt particularly important that my study be an in-depth ethnography and 
that I establish an extended period of engagement and commitment to the Kenyans I worked with. 
And given the resources my university provided to me I was privileged enough to be able to 
spend the time to do so. By repeatedly visiting the iHub over a four-year period, and working 
with the iHub staff (rather than just as a member in the 4th floor space) continuously over the 
course of an entire year, I was able to gain access to the experiences that were rarely revealed to 
those who were just passing though, including to skepticism and critique (like those expressed by 
Njeri and Franklin during Mark Zuckerberg’s visit) whispered only to people of trust. 
Additionally, in an environment like the iHub that had attracted so much international attention 
for leading a movement around designing and building African technology in Africa, it is easy to 
get swept away by excitement at the prospect of a ‘rising’ Africa. Even on my own first visit in 
June 2013, I recall feeling this way, sharing Mark Zuckerberg’s excitement at seeing a place 
where it seemed like ex-pats like me were not dictating how technology was being used or 
created and instead it seemed like Kenyans were building their own technology for their own 
communities. For those who come through the iHub for only a brief period of time, this is likely 
one of the primary feelings they are left with. However, with more time at the iHub, that potential 
for blindly celebratory thinking dissipates. At times, even boredom sets in. Just like when you 
accept an exciting new job, the enthusiasm about what you thought the job would be eventually 
gives way to the day to day realities of actually doing the job. In environments like the iHub that 
have received extensive media attention and acclaim, and that is constantly engaged with the 
rapidly changing global information environment, I believe that a slower more protracted 
research methods like ethnography, combined with a critical eye, was indispensable in helping 
me to get beyond the hype and the chatter and to see some of the challenges that many of iHub’s 
members often faced. 
The	technology	
In sometimes subtle and surprising ways, technology itself, became a character in this study. I am 
hardly the first to use ethnography as a method for understanding labor that revolves around 
virtual practices (G. Coleman, 2014; Hughes, 2014; W. R. Poster, 2007; W. R. Poster & Prasad, 
2005). Aneesh Aneesh (2006), Yuir Takhteyev (2012), Anita Say Chan (2014) and Jenna Burrell 
(2012) have all demonstrated before me how ethnography, traditionally seen as an inherently 
physical method, can be adapted to enrich our understand of digital labor and the production of 
digital material. I also take particular inspiration from Miller and Slater’s (2000) assertion that 
ethnography, including in the off-line world, can be a rich way of understanding the complexity 
of human interactions with the digital internet. 
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Technology therefore played a primary role in this study. It was an object around which 
the digital labor I observed revolved, it was a platform on which work was conducted, it became a 
research tool for me, at times enriching the data I was able to gather, at others, creating digital 
barriers to some sources of data. It meant being introduced to new informants over WhatsApp, 
and following group discussions on Slack, WhatsApp, Periscope, and Twitter. It meant using 
Evernote to capture company websites at particular moments and to catalogue new articles as 
well as using the Wayback Machine to return to unique moments in time on relevant websites like 
the iHub’s homepage that had since disappeared from the present internet. It also meant needing, 
and sometimes failing, to overcome certain barriers to access for each new platform. For Twitter, 
for example, it took a long process of exploring the site and consulting with others around the 
iHub to find who to follow and how to interpret discussions around different trending hashtags. 
For Slack, it took getting an iHub manager to grant me access to the platform, but it also meant 
that when Slack eventually grew out of fashion with the iHub staff I had to reassess and follow 
the new, changing lines of communication that had migrated to email and WhatsApp. For 
WhatsApp, it meant needing to identify particular discussion groups and approaching each 
group’s managers in order to gain access. Sometimes this proved particularly difficult as in the 
case of one WhastApp group for Kenyan entrepreneurs. While I was repeatedly told that it was a 
rich site of debate around the future of the practice of technology innovation in Kenya, I found 
that the group retained an elite quality, making it impossible to access as a non-entrepreneur 
despite personally knowing two of the group’s managers.  
Fittingly, for working in a technology community, I also found myself integrating various 
applications into my own research method in a way that deviates from some earlier, more 
analogue approaches to ethnography. For example, I very rarely took jottings by hand, preferring 
instead notetaking either on my computer or on my mobile using the Notepad or Evernote 
applications. Similarly, I wrote my fieldnotes exclusively in Word or using oral transcription. I 
frequently used my iPhone’s features to take photographs, videos, audio recordings, and “sensory 
postcards”, finding the size of the iPhone to be far less invasive than a larger digital camera or 
microphone, though I had brought both with me. 
Finally, as Miller and Slater (2000) and others have successfully shown, just because the 
core practice of a community revolves around the digital, does not mean that the ethnography 
itself should be approach entirely virtually. Participants still, of course, exist and interact with one 
another off-line. Tellingly, the iHub itself was created because members of a virtual community 
of techies called Skunkworks, wanted a permanent and physical place where they could meet and 
interact face-to-face. In fact, members of the iHub would frequently talk to me about how 
important in-person contact had been, helping them to get a new investment, or spitball a new 
idea. Even for this community of practice that revolves around the digital, analogue interactions 
were not only important but essential. Because the lives of those who practice technology 
innovation in Nairobi comprise both online and offline experiences, an ethnography of their work 
would be incomplete without taking both into account. As a result, I believe that the hybrid 
approach taken for this study, collecting everything from Twitterstorms to clothing choices, Slack 
discussions to office jokes, provides a holistic view of the lived experiences of those in Nairobi’s 
technology sector that would not have been possible with an offline or online only approach. 
Plot	
Conceptual	approach	
In many ways, the iHub is the exact opposite of the mythological bounded fieldsite – isolated 
from the world and from the ethnographer’s experience of it – a myth that informed many of the 
early approaches to anthropological research (Candea, 2007). Over the last seven years the iHub 
has, by design, been made available, visible, and palatable to not only Kenyans but also 
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foreigners, not only students but investors. It is an entity very much of the modern hyper-
connected information economy. It has been a draw both for the internet savvy Kenyan who 
wishes to become a producer or who imagines himself a global citizen with the technological 
skills to match, and for the seasoned serial entrepreneur looking to branch out into a new market. 
With so many individuals with their organizations and ideas, their assumptions and expectations, 
their networks and areas of expertise, approaching the iHub as any kind of isolated single fieldsite 
would be missing the point of the organization. As a result, my approach to this study was 
informed by Arjun Appadurai’s assertion that culture in the contemporary global landscape is 
better conceptualized as fundamentally ungrounded and unbounded (Appadurai, 1996), and 
inspired by the recent movement in anthropology to “delocalize” ethnography (Sorge & Roddick, 
2012). While prominent advocates of the delocalizing movement, like George Marcus, advocate 
making the fieldworker herself more mobile traveling to multiple sites to follow things, lives, and 
stories (Marcus, 1986, 1995), I believe that the iHub, with its endless web of things, lives, and 
stories, represented an opportunity to approach fieldwork conceptually in a delocalized way while 
at the same time approaching it physically grounded largely in one place. For this, I took direct 
encouragement from the work of Jenna Burrell, who conducted her fieldwork based in a cyber 
café in Ghana. Burrell advocates imagining the single fieldsite itself as a heterogeneous network. 
“I advocated staying in place,” she wrote, “to ‘intercept’ circulations of data, people, and goods 
rather than following them” (J. Burrell 2009, p. 196). As a result, I chose to spend the majority of 
my fieldwork as a participant observer at the iHub, joining the staff as an advisor to the 
communications team. Doing so allowed me to observe the flows – sometimes denser and faster, 
other times slower and more intermittent – of people, technologies, ideas, inspirations, hopes, 
frustrations, and most interestingly, stories, that came through the iHub throughout 2016. Doing 
so allowed me to notice the excitement of people coming in for the first time and the frustration 
of others when the internet went out or when their office space was taken over for another event 
or when they saw the iHub they knew and loved change. It allowed me to hear the stories that 
entrepreneurs told in their pitches at competitions and to appreciate the laborious sometimes 
tedious work of building what they’d described. It allowed me, as I showed above, to see and hear 
the way that Mark Zuckerberg and others talked about his visit to the iHub, and also to watch 
how in practice it brought both attention and disruption to the iHub and the entrepreneurs that 
featured in his story. 
Methodological	approach	
Over the course of the 16 months in total that I spent in Nairobi for this study, I interviewed every 
staff member at the iHub, as well as over 80 entrepreneurs, investors, and other techies around 
Nairobi’s tech sector. The approach that I took to each interview was tailored to the particular 
interviewee. I took a semi-structured or unstructured approach depending on how relaxed the 
individual seemed for example. Their comfort level also dictated whether I chose to take notes by 
hand, on the Notepad or Evernote applications on my mobile, on my laptop, or created an audio 
recording of the conversation. Given that most of the people I spoke with were techies of one 
kind or another, I found most people to be particularly comfortable when I took notes using my 
laptop. This is in contrast to a fellow researcher I knew who said that the local politicians he was 
interviewing frequently preferred to be audio recorded because it added an air of importance and 
authority to their interactions. As part of my participant observation, I advised the iHub’s 
communications team on their media strategy, contributed to the blog, attended team meetings, 
and assisted with some of the events that were organized at the iHub. I attended as many of the 
events held in the iHub as possible, including entrepreneurial training sessions, startup 
competitions, a TED recruitment event, three iterations of an event series called iHub Speaks, and 
community events where the iHub team discussed changes in the organization with their 
members. Over the course of the year I had countless informal conversations with the iHub staff 
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members over lunch, in between assignments, over after-work drinks, during leaving parties for 
departing staff members, and during informal group outings like a hike, a visit to a nearby mall, 
or a wedding of one of the staff members. While the iHub was always my primary fieldsite, at 
times I ventured away from it to get a different perspective on the organization and on the 
practice of technology innovation in Nairobi beyond it. I visited six other coworking spaces in the 
city and spent a week traveling to one in Mombasa, Swahili Box, that had opened in 2015. I 
attended three major conferences for the Kenyan technology sector, Nairobi Tech Week in 
March, Innovation Week in July, and a 3D printing conference in June, and spoke to everyone I 
met there and elsewhere about their impressions of and views on Nairobi’s technology sector. I 
attended any, and nearly all, technology or innovation related events advertised on Eventbrite. 
While the interviews often provided glimpses of how individual entrepreneurs thought about their 
own work, these conferences and other discussion-based events I attended provided rich 
interactional data as a result of their debate-centric formats and the proclivity of the Kenyans I 
met to engage in heated discussions. Such debates – about, for example, whether foreign 
entrepreneurs or investors should be allowed in Kenya’s technology sector or about whether the 
iHub was worth the hype – rarely happened in the more isolated environment of an interview.  
Over the course of the four years of research on this project, I also regularly collected 
media content pertaining to the iHub and Kenya’s technology sector. This includes articles in 
international media outlets, like TechCrunch and Forbes, on the subject, as well as blogs written 
by the iHub’s employees and other Kenyan techies, the content of the iHub’s own corporate blog, 
and Twitter debates, particularly around controversial hashtags like #BlackFoundersMatter that 
advocated for more investment in black African entrepreneurs. It also included the PR content on 
the websites and marketing material of organizations operating in the sector, including 
international technology companies like Microsoft, Facebook, and IBM, local ones like 
Safaricom or Airtel, or startups like MKopa Solar, Eneza, or Sanergy. I saved all of this material 
in EverNote, an application as useful for web clippings as it is for note taking and which could 
sync across my mobile and laptop.  
In an acknowledgement of the role that the debate around “writing culture” (Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986) and the politics of cultural representation in the 1980s and 1990s played in the 
history of the field of anthropology, I want to say a final few words about the choices I have made 
in this dissertation around the presentation of my findings and the representation of the iHub that 
I have chosen. As Emerson and his co-authors have explained, the process of writing an 
ethnography is an inherently performative act; while the author attempts to represent the fieldsite 
as sincerely (Jackson Jr, 2010) as she can, the choice of style, content, and overall representation 
are informed, in part, by her intended audience (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). This is no less 
the case here. Overall, I have largely adopted a purposeful kind of hybrid writing style that 
attempts to combine academic insights and theorizing with the accessibility and flow of more 
popular writing. I have chosen to do so with multiple academic audiences in mind, from my 
dissertation committee, to my peers in my home discipline of communications, as well as other 
disciplines like anthropology, management, science technology and studies, human computer 
interaction, and African studies. It is also my hope that some non-academic audiences might find 
it useful, most importantly, the people in and around the iHub that I worked closely with.  
One of the most notable ways in which I have diverged from a more “traditional” 
approach to dissertation writing, is in choosing to begin many of my chapters, including this 
introduction, with a story. This was done as both a wave to the field of narrative ethnography 
(Tedlock, 1991), as well as a way of generating more immersive access into ethnographic 
moments for the reader. Most of these stories are adaptations of the fieldnotes I wrote while in 
Nairobi, and are told in the first person from my perspective, though, as in the case of this 
introduction, they focus on experiences I had interacting with other people around the iHub. 
While perhaps I could have written these vignettes positioning the techies I worked with in the 
first person, as the story’s “hero”, doing so felt disingenuous. However much I understand about 
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the iHub and its environs from this research, their experiences are not my own. By telling the 
stories from my perspective I hope to make my own positionality in these moments transparent 
and allow the reader to make their own assessment of my subjectivities and the insights I hope to 
provide. I am a “white foreigner” like many of the ones I discuss in this dissertation. My 
perspective, and likely my stories, may prove suspect to some readers as a result, particularly 
those who take the position that it is impossible to write accurately about an experience if you do 
not share the same identity traits or experiential background as those you are writing about. And 
Africans in particular have a long history of being written about by outsiders, frequently unfairly 
or inaccurately often shaped by the very narratives and stereotypes I discuss in this dissertation. I 
cannot change my identity, but I can continue to use my privilege to help African authors have 
more prominent platforms from which to write and to be heard, and I can endeavor to be as 
transparent and reflective as possible about my positionality throughout my own work. On first 
reading, these vignettes may perhaps appear anecdotal. Instead, they have been chosen because 
they are “ethnographic moments” (Dolby & Cornbleth, 2001; Nguyên, 2010), in the sense that by 
looking at them they reveal rich empirical data and trends that I observed in other interactions 
over the course of the last five years. They are not the complete picture, rather they are jumping 
off points, moments which offer new insight when we apply a critical analytical lens.  
I am also aware of the kind of irony of using stories and narratives to ground analyses of 
the role of stories and narratives at the iHub. Stories as a format for conveying a point of view 
have been used as much by those throughout history (frequently those sharing my own racial 
background) who have misrepresented the continent for their own gains as by those seeking to 
correct such misrepresentations, though stark power imbalances have long influenced whose 
stories have gained the largest audience. Furthermore, even in a position that would perhaps be 
described as peripheral to any of the communities of practice that I am discussing, my stories may 
also contribute to reinforcing certain narratives, dispelling others, or building new narratives. For 
example, it is my hope that this dissertation may contribute to building counter-narratives calling 
for a more realistic perspective of the role of technology in society beyond the currently pervasive 
Technology is Good Narrative, without falling pretty to purely dystopic narratives. More 
specifically, I hope this dissertation forces a reevaluation of the dominant narratives around what 
a successful technology entrepreneur looks, acts, and sounds like, and helps encourage investors 
to be more reflective of their decision-making processes and their approach to their work in 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER	1:	A	GLOBAL	COMMUNITY	OF	TECHNOLOGY	
INNOVATORS		
It’s April 2016 and I’m on my way to attend Nairobi Tech Week. I’m in an Uber with a talkative 
driver named Brian. We’re making our way slowly through the busy city streets; we stop 
periodically to get through the clogged roundabouts, around a flooded street, and break quickly 
for matatus (Nairobi’s small and chaotic buses) that cut in front of us. Last night it poured so 
much it felt like the city was drowning. The rainy season is here. Today, we’re driving down a 
road called Lenana and Brian tells me that yesterday a large wall collapsed here killing two 
people. The remnants of the wall are still visible crumbling on the sidewalk exposing the front of 
an urban military base. We drive further and get on a large highway up a hill, which offers a 
beautiful view of downtown Nairobi, known as the Central Business District (CBD). The 
buildings there seem to have multiplied rapidly in only a few months since I arrived in January; 
construction cranes and scaffolding are visible everywhere. One particularly imposing half-
finished building, glistening in the morning sunlight is the Britam Tower, owned by one of East 
Africa’s largest investment companies. Britam’s website announces proudly that when finished it 
will be the tallest building in Kenya and only the 3rd tallest in Africa. 
Finally, we turn off the highway and onto a newly paved road leading to one of Kenya’s 
most well-known private business schools, Strathmore University. The last time I’d been down 
this road it was not paved, making the ride along it dustier and bumpier than this visit. The main 
building for the business school is imposing, with three story glass windows, delicate stained-
glass detail, and energy provided entirely from the solar panels positioned outside. The 
building’s main hall is furious with activity. People – mostly women – in Twitter, the iHub, and 
other branded t-shirts run around making sure name tags are complete and speakers arrive with 
as little delay as possible. They stand in front of tables filled with branded swag, t-shirts, 
sunglasses, and a plethora of stickers. There is no printed program, I’m told it’s only available 
online or through a new Android app; an impressive decision until the app turns out to be a bit 
buggy and somewhat slow to access. 
I walk towards the main auditorium where the opening ceremony has just begun. To the 
left of the entrance, a woman wearing a grey Twitter t-shirt interviews a local hardware CEO in 
front of the bright lights of a video camera; an upright banner bearing the current Twitter slogan 
#helloworld is visible behind them. Inside the auditorium, the plush red seats and the extra black 
folding chairs are all filled. Entrepreneurs and programmers, students and investors, women and 
men, all sit or stand lining the walls watching as one of the iHub’s board members speaks on 
stage. By chance, I’ve walked in just as he is formally announcing a partnership between the 
iHub and Twitter called the #SmartCityNairobi challenge consisting of a hackathon that will take 
place over the course of Tech Week, and will, he announces proudly, provide participants with 
access to Twitter’s API in order solve the city’s “transportation problems”. On stage behind the 
speaker are more branded banners proudly displayed. Those for the iHub and Twitter are 
accompanied by banners for local startups – like the coding school, Moringa School, and a 
popular events magazine, Up – and international technology heavyweights, like Oracle, 
Microsoft, Google, and Merck. Throughout the rest of the week, I will sit in on more discussions 
than I can remember on topics ranging from fintech, to the role of data science and government 
in innovation, with panels offering advice on how to pitch to investors, how to identify good 
programming talent, and how to cultivate a productive startup culture.  
~ 
Together, the array of talks and interviews, pitches and hackathons, panel discussions and furious 
tweets, banners, branding, and swag that I observed and participated in that week in April made 
up Nairobi Tech Week in a city on a continent that has not historically come first in the global 
public imagining of the technological. Even the moniker that has come to be used by some to 
	 25 
describe Nairobi’s technology community – ‘Silicon Savannah’ – more readily evokes the 
historically rural and people-less image of Africa – a hot grassland full of zebras, acacia trees, and 
lions – and seems to acknowledge the high-tech only in its mimicry of the home of the seemingly 
truly technological, Silicon Valley. But just as the city of Nairobi embodies the intersection of 
disrepair and technological improvisation, frustration and hope, modernity and tradition common 
to other modern African (or for that matter American) metropolises, so Nairobi Tech Week 
embodied the multiple people and moneys, frustrations and hopes, and diverse array of cultures, 
ideas, assumptions, stories, and narratives that intersect in Nairobi’s community of technology 
innovators. In their introduction to a special issue of Public Culture focused on African cities, the 
legendary political theorist, Achille Mbembé and his Culture Studies coauthor Sarah Nuttall 
wrote:  
The obstinacy with which scholars in particular (including African scholars) 
continue to describe Africa as an object apart from the world, or as a failed 
and incomplete example of something else, perpetually underplays the 
embeddedness in multiple elsewhere of which the continent actually speaks 
[emphasis original] (Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004, p. 348). 
To the credit of those in this field of research, since they wrote their essay almost 15 
years ago, scholars like Seyram Avle (S. Avle, 2011), Jenna Burrell (2012), Jean and John 
Comaroff (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2002) and many others have followed their advice “to take 
seriously the fact that Africa like, everywhere else, has its heres, its elsewhere, and its interstices 
(emplacement and displacement)” (Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004). I hope to build on this important 
direction in research by foregrounding the global flows of people and ideas, as well as the 
complex international hierarchies of legitimacy embedded in the way new technologies are being 
designed and built in Africa and by whom. Even upon the first visit to the iHub or other material 
sites of Nairobi’s community of technology innovators, it is readily apparent that they are spaces 
of “flows, of flux, of translocation, with multiple nexuses of entry and exit points” (Mbembé & 
Nuttall, 2004). The young educated middle class Kenyans who make up the majority of this 
community are fundamentally connected to multiple ‘elsewheres’. Some are ‘glocal’ in Avle’s 
sense of the word in that they’ve been educated or trained in the West but have since returned to 
Kenya to start their own companies (S. Avle, 2011). Others have returned to, or never left, 
Nairobi and work for large Western companies like Google or IBM or work with American 
entrepreneurs, Chinese investors, or South African engineers. Even apart from such physical 
engagement, they are connected to other innovators throughout Africa and around the globe 
through the information they consume and produce. Through a rich communicative ecology of in-
person visits and shared online platforms, YouTube videos and TED talks, news articles, 
entrepreneur biographies, and media narratives, members of the iHub are connected to the 
practices, stories, and values of their counterparts abroad.  Moreover, through events like Tech 
Week, the #SmartCityNairobi hackathon, and spaces like the iHub and other coworking spaces, 
Kenyan innovators participate in events and practices that would be recognizable as 
“transnationally legible emblems of innovation” (Irani. 2015, p. 801) to anyone building or 
hoping to build a startup anywhere else in the world. 
In later chapters, I will draw attention to the spaces of difference and inequality, prejudice 
and conflict, the unique challenges that Kenyan entrepreneurs face, and the often-unbalanced 
negotiations they are forced to enter into as a result. But in this chapter, my goal is different. 
Here, I intend to build the foundation necessary for that discussion to be productive and 
analytically useful. To do so, I will use the case of the practice of technology innovation in 
Silicon Valley, to introduce and illustrate the theoretical framework through which I analyze the 
experiences of Kenyan innovators in the subsequent chapters. This framework combines and 
builds on “community of practice” (Lave & Wenger, 1991) theory and narrative theory. I will 
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outline the characteristics of a community of practice that formed in Silicon Valley, the Silicon 
Valley Community of Technology Innovators, and then make the case that the particular 
approach to innovation that originated there has come to be adopted in spaces far removed from 
California, gradually forming a Global Community of Technology Innovators. 
Communities	of	Practice	Theory	
In order to foreground the empirical data I collected about the lived experiences of Kenyan 
innovators over theories that are often embedded in the socio-political norms and ideologies of 
Western countries, I chose to adopt a grounded theory approach (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1997). As such, the processes of data collection and data analysis were 
intermingled, while theory building largely came in the later stages of the fieldwork and into the 
writing process. And while I have tried to let my analytical framework emerge from the data, I 
nonetheless still bring my own subjectivities to this study informed by my own identities, 
experiences, and grounding in the field of communication. In the end, I found adapting and 
combining two existing theories – communities of practice theory and narrative theory – was the 
best way to makes sense of the complex array of socio-political pressures, financial incentives, 
inter-cultural dynamics, ideologies, and communicative practices around Kenyan technology 
innovators that I observed. I will begin here by outlining communities of practice theory as it is 
the foundation on which my analytical framework is built, but I will wait to introduce narrative 
theory until later in the chapter when I believe its utility will become the clearest. 
Communities of practice theory was originally proposed by social anthropologist, Jean 
Lave, and educational theorist, Etienne Wenger, in their publication Situated Learning: 
Legitimate Peripheral Participation (1991) as an analytical tool to help education scholars 
foreground the social and not just the psychological in the process of how people learn. Their 
focus in this publication was less on the communities as a whole and more on the learners and 
how professional communities “induct and train new members, and perpetuate set routines for 
accomplishing specific tasks” (Meyerhoff & Strycharz, 2013, p. 528). This might include nurses 
learning how to draw blood, lawyers learning the procedures for addressing a judge, 
or…entrepreneurs learning how to pitch their ideas to an investor.  
While they spent a great deal of time laying out how new members learned a 
community’s practices, it was Wenger’s publication seven years later, Communities of practice: 
Learning, meaning, and identity (Wenger, 1998), that helped to refine the theory around 
communities of practice themselves. In it, he laid out in more specific detail what separates a 
community of practice from any other community or social configuration. The distinct 
characteristics, he argued, were threefold. Those involved in a community of practice needed to 
have “mutual engagement, a joint enterprise, and a shared repertoire of ways of doing things” 
(Wenger 1998, p. 49). In this conceptualization, members of a community of practice are not 
united around a particular locality or identity or even social or political interest, as members of 
other communities might be, but instead are mutually engaged in a shared practice. Practice, in 
this instance, involves doing (as in doing your homework or practicing drawing blood), but is also 
informed by the social context in which practice is embedded. This social context, Wenger 
argues, is what gives practice meaning (Wenger 1998, p. 47). Practices here include both those 
that are explicit – things like contracts and tools, specific procedures and individual roles – and 
those that are unspoken – things like subtle cues, tactic conventions, shared understandings, as 
well as “underlying assumptions and shared world views” (Wenger, 1998, p. 47). Members of a 
community of practice are in turn mutually engaged in this shared endeavor. Engagement, for 
Wenger, goes beyond being involved in a practice; it is also “being included in what matters” 
(Wenger, 1998, p. 74) to the community. Defining a community around those mutually engaged 
in a shared practice rather than around a particular shared identity, for example, also means that 
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the group is more likely to be a heterogeneous (Wenger, 1998, p. 75), often requiring varied 
individuals with varied skills and often conflicting opinions and world views to perform a given 
practice to its full extent. For example, editors, journalists, designers, researchers, and interns 
alike may all be members of a community of practice around publishing a physical or online 
newspaper. Together, they are mutually engaged in a joint enterprise, which, for Wenger, is not 
joint “in that everybody believes the same thing or agrees with everything,” but rather is joint in 
that it is “commonly negotiated” (Wenger, 1998, p. 78). Members must together decide on how 
the practice will be carried out. Moreover, that process of negotiation is not necessarily a peaceful 
one, a community of practice does not imply that everyone has commonly held beliefs about how 
and why a practice is performed, just that they jointly negotiate how that practice is carried out. 
As a result, participation in a community of practice can have a positive effect creating a “sense 
of community” (McMillan & Chavis, 1986) and meaning, but it can also be detrimental, leading 
individuals to feel pressured to conform to a particular form of practice or to feel excluded from 
participating in ‘what matters’. Finally, Wenger adds that a community of practice must have a 
shared repertoire made up of “routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, 
symbols, genres, actions, or concepts that the community has produced or adopted in the course 
of its existence, and which have become part of its practice” (Wenger 1998, p. 82). The inclusion 
in this final section of “words” and “stories” has made this analytical framework an appealing one 
for linguists, and it is where I believe the integration of a communications perspective, and 
narrative theory in particular, can be the most useful.  
Since their original publications in 1991 and 1998, Lave and Wenger’s theory has been 
adopted widely in academia, particularly in the fields of management, education, and linguistics. 
But, aided in part by Wenger’s own applied work in Paolo Alto and his 2002 publication, 
Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Knowledge Management (Wenger, McDermott, 
& Snyder, 2002), it has also been adopted by management practitioners as a way to enhance 
productivity and knowledge sharing within organizations by purposefully creating communities 
of practice. These practitioners as well as some of their academic counterparts tended to apply 
communities of practice theory uncritically, as a prescriptive tool rather than an analytical one. 
This instrumentalist approach – taking a community of practice as an aspiration entity to be 
fostered and encouraged rather than a previously existing social entity to be understood – ignored 
the richest, most analytically useful, parts of the original theory (Amin & Roberts, 2008; Contu & 
Willmott, 2003; Roberts, 2006). As a result of this misinterpretation, Amin and Roberts have 
argued that “the original emphasis on context, process, social interaction, material practice, 
ambiguity, disagreement – in short, the frequently idiosyncratic and always performative nature 
of learning – is being lost” (Amin & Roberts, 2008, p. 353). In a piece published in 2008, Jean 
Lave herself lamented this misapplication of their theory. “Projects that undertake to start a 
community of practice seem to rely on assumptions that making this new thing does not involve 
already existing social relations…the main point is that they always already exist…[participants] 
are already members of multiple communities of practicing, including some that may exclude 
each other” (Lave, 2008, 291).  
As a result of this imprecise adoption of the theory, some believe that the concept of a 
community of practice is too broad to be useful in certain disciplines, or that it is in need of 
revitalization by refocusing on certain aspects of the original framework that have been 
overlooked (Contu & Willmott, 2003; Henderson, 2015; Roberts, 2006). In choosing to adopt the 
community of practice framework, I reject the instrumentalist interpretation in favor of heeding 
such calls and embracing the theory’s original analytical purpose. As such, the communities of 
practice I discuss going forward are not presented as communities to be desired and sought after, 
rather they are often fraught with conflict. In fact, for the purposes of developing an analytical 
framework that could be useful for understanding the experiences of Kenyan technology 
entrepreneurs and designers looking to gain legitimacy for their work, the most useful, and among 
the most overlooked aspects of Lave and Wenger’s theory, are the incorporation of conflict and 
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heterogeneity as well as the power relations between existing members and new members into 
their original framework.  
In 2008, Lave wrote that she believed their theory was all too often “read as painting a 
view of social life as closed, harmonious, and homogeneous,” (Lave, 2008, 288) and that most 
community of practice research had too often ignored issues of “social class or race or ethnicity” 
(Lave, 2008, 291). In focusing on the experiences of Kenyan innovators and the relationships 
with investors and partner – who often come from historically advantaged regions of the world, 
like Europe and the US – the role of power imbalances and social hierarchies become impossible 
to overlook. In this, I take inspiration from the concept of “postcolonial computing” introduced 
by Lilly Irani and her coauthors writing in the field of human computer interaction. For them 
postcolonial computing was an attempt to re-center development discourse around “questions of 
power, authority, legitimacy, participation, and intelligibility in the context of cultural 
encounters” (Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, Philip, & Grinter, 2010, 1). I believe the community of 
practice framework can benefit from the same re-centering. In this dissertation, I intend to dispel 
the assumption that communities of practice are necessarily harmonious, by drawing attention to 
the conflict, the hierarchies of power, and the frequent power imbalances embedded in the 
experiences of new technology innovators trying to gain legitimacy. While, as Roberts has 
argued, Lave and Wenger may have under-theorized the role of power in the experiences of new 
community participants (Roberts, 2006), others have subsequently demonstrated in more detail 
how class, gender, and ethnicity can influence access to communities of practice, “truncating 
possibilities” for disadvantaged individuals “while for others, privileged access to these practices 
is enabled” (Contu & Willmott, 2003, 283). With this more critical, postcolonial computing 
mindset in place, communities of practice theory becomes a useful tool with which to analyze the 
work being done by technology innovators in and around the iHub in Kenya and to foreground 
the challenges and the hierarchies of power with which they have to contend.  
Other scholars similarly looking at digital labor or technology producers have chosen 
other conceptual frameworks like “cultures” or “ecosystems” or “communities” more broadly. 
Gideon Kunda, for example, conceptualized both the work inside an unnamed high-tech company 
and the products they produced as manifestations of “culture” (Kunda, 2009). Others have written 
about “hacker culture” (Palmas & Von Busch, 2006; Thomas, 2002) or “innovation culture” 
(Chan, 2014), or the “high-technology culture” particular to Silicon Valley (Rogers & Larsen, 
1984; Sprague & Ruud, 1988; Weiss & Delbecq, 1987) or have described tech hubs like the iHub 
or national-level approaches to technology innovation as “ecosystems” (Feld, 2012; Stangler & 
Bell-Masterson, 2015; Wong, 2006) “ecologies” (Munroe & Westwind, 2009) or “habitats” (Lee, 
2000). I have even done so myself  in a previous publication referring to the “organizational 
culture” at the iHub and the “startup ecosystem” in Nairobi (Marchant, 2017). But for this 
dissertation and as a result of the new fieldwork I conducted, “culture” felt too broad. While for 
example, innovation culture certainly plays a part in the work around the iHub, I wanted to focus 
on the practice of innovating new technologies at startups, and not on other kinds of innovative 
work like those performed in Kenya’s informal economy by road-side jua-kali salespeople or 
even those enacted at larger companies. Even “Silicon Valley culture”, while a useful way in 
which to look at the culture around the particular Silicon Valley approach to technology 
innovation, and one that I draw from later on (English-Lueck, 2002; Haines, 2014), is too broad a 
concept with which to understand the profoundly multi-cultural experiences of Kenyan 
innovators. 
By contrast, “ecosystem” is too narrow. The metaphor of an ecosystem connotes a finely 
balanced network of interconnected systems and actors. Often in biological ecosystems changing 
any one of the actors, or even introducing new actors can ‘throw off’ the ecosystem’s balance. 
Seeing the plethora of international, regional, and Kenyan actors, ideas, organizations, and data 
coming through the iHub, changing all the time, it no longer felt like an accurate metaphor to 
think of the iHub’s or even Nairobi’s innovators as acting in any kind of isolated ecosystem. 
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“Communities” also lacks specificity for my purposes. In her encyclopedia entry on the 
subject, for example, Karen Tracy, outlined no less than five different forms of use for the term 
(Tracy, 2009), ranging from a geographically-situated community to an identity community to a 
political community and so on. A community is also a term that generates quite positive 
imaginings, feelings of belonging and kinship – a “purr word” as Underwood and Frey put it 
(2007), something I believe that has contributed to the misapplication of communities of practice 
theory. However, unlike other kinds of communities, communities of practice, as I have shown 
above, are inherently heterogeneous and defined by the process of jointly negotiating through 
such difference. As the linguist Mary Bucholtz wrote in her study of “nerd girls” in a high school, 
“by defining the community as a group of people oriented to the same practice, though not 
necessarily in the same way, the community of practice model treats difference and conflict, not 
uniformity and consensus, as the ordinary state of affairs” (1999, p. 210).  
Additionally, within linguistics and communications, scholars often employ the narrower 
community frameworks of “speech” (Dorian, 1982; Gumperz, 1997) or “discourse” communities 
(Luck, 2003; Swales, 1987) for their ability to accentuate the role of language. But while 
communicative tools like storytelling and narratives will feature prominently in this study, they 
comprise just one component of the whole “repertoire”, as Wagner calls it, that these innovators 
share. While I have found communicative practices to comprise an important part of that 
repertoire and one that has been underexplored by researchers of communities of practice, it is not 
the primary “joint enterprise” around which the work in this community revolves. While 
innovators in Nairobi frequently tell stories, they more often talk about designing technology or 
building startups as the main practice in which they are engaged. 
In the end, I believe the communities of practice theory is the most analytically useful 
tool for this study for three main reasons: 1) Its obvious focus on the particular practice in which 
its members are mutually engaged; 2) its foregrounding of the role of language without its 
fetishization of it; and 3) its integration of the potentially conflictual nature of “jointly 
negotiating” practice and legitimacy into its framework for analysis.  
By adopting this framework, I am also taking to heart Lave and Wenger’s perspective 
that individuals are all members of multiple communities of practice simultaneously. As Wenger 
has explained, “At home, at work, at school, in our hobbies – we belong to several communities 
of practice at any given time” (Wenger 1998, p.6). Those involved in the practice of technology 
innovation in Nairobi are simultaneously involved in numerous communities. They may also be 
members of families, religious institutions, or sports teams outside of the iHub, or may engage 
with particular interest communities around specific programming languages or managerial skills, 
or belong to particular identity, political, or tribal communities. However, as Lave has pointed 
out, some of these communities of practice may exclude each other” (Lave, 2008, 291). 
Membership in multiple communities – be they communities of practice or otherwise – can create 
tensions, conflicting loyalties, and misunderstandings. An individual may be at the center of some 
communities while on the periphery of others, and membership in some may involve more 
upkeep and consistent involvement than in others. 
In the next section, I will introduce the case of a community of practice that emerged 
around the practice of technology design and production in Silicon Valley for a dual purpose: 1) 
To flush out my theoretical framework more thoroughly, including introducing the narrative 
theory component; and 2) to lay out the characteristics of the community of practice that has most 
greatly influenced the practice of technology innovation on a global scale.  
Silicon	Valley’s	Community	of	Practice	
As my own primary research was not conducted in California, I leave the comprehensive 
empirically-grounded analysis of innovation in Silicon Valley to others (English-Lueck, 2002; 
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Haines, 2014; Rogers & Larsen, 1984; Saxenian, 1996; Studholme, 2014). Instead, my intention 
here is to draw on this rich body of research as well as primary sources, including material from 
Silicon Valley organizations and the media outlets that cover them, to outline the characteristics 
of a community of practice that I believe has formed around technology innovation in Silicon and 
to build and illustrate my theoretical framework. To do so, I will outline the joint enterprise 
around which the members of Silicon Valley’s Community of Technology Innovators (CTI) are 
engaged, and the complex repertoire of practices that bring this community’s members together. 
While seemingly a detour from my Kenyan fieldsite, I believe it is a necessary one in order to 
fully grasp the complex array of meaning embedded in the practice and narratives around 
Kenya’s own technology innovators. 
In 1984, the same year as the release of Apple’s iconic IIe that transformed personal 
computing, Everett Rogers, a communications theorist best known for his diffusion of innovation 
theory, and his coauthor Judith Larsen, published a book called Silicon Valley fever: Growth of 
high-technology culture in which they talk about the history of Silicon Valley and outlined what 
they believed characterized the work being done there in the 1980s. In it, they argue that the 
“high-technology industry” as they described it included the following characteristics: “1) Highly 
skilled employees, many of whom are scientists and engineers; 2) a fast rate of growth; 3) a high 
ratio of R&D expenditure to sales; and 4) a worldwide market for its products” (Rogers & Larsen 
1984, p. 29). While these characteristics largely still hold, Silicon Valley has changed 
significantly since the 1980s. The case of Uber – the rideshare application valued at over ten 
billion dollars and one of the most controversial companies in contemporary Silicon Valley – may 
best illustrate these changes and will give context to the discussion of Silicon Valley’s 
community of practice going forward. 
As of March 2018, the origin story on Uber’s website described how the company’s 
founders, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp, apparently came up with the idea for Uber after 
having trouble hailing a cab “on a snowy Paris evening in 2008”. Of course, the story as it is 
presented in outlets like Business Insider, Vanity Fair, and Tech Crunch shows a somewhat more 
complicated picture. In this version, Kalanick and Camp were not just disgruntled cab riders, they 
were serial entrepreneurs. Kalanick had dropped out of UCLA to join an internet search startup 
called Scour that ultimately failed in 2000; the next year he went on to found the peer-to-peer file 
sharing startup, RedSwoosh, which he sold in 2007 for $23 million (Hartmans & McAlone, 
2016). Garrett Camp had similarly completed a profitable venture, selling the popular search 
startup, StumbleUpon, to eBay for $75 million in 2007 (Swisher, 2014). Both were “flush with 
cash” (Swisher, 2014) and looking for their next venture. By 2009, they, along with a handful of 
others - Oscar Salazar and Conrad Whelan among them – had founded and launched UberCab in 
San Francisco, renaming it Uber in 2010 after complaints from local cab companies. Uber’s early 
iteration targeted the luxury black cab market offering rides at 1.5 times the price of other black 
cabs in the city (Chokkattu & Crook, 2014). Then came a rush of funding, in the form of venture 
capital investments, over the next few years: $1.25 million in October 2010 from friends of the 
Kalanick and cofounder of the famously collapsed music sharing platform, Napster, $11 million 
in February 2011, and $32 million by December that year with high-profile funders like 
Amazon’s Jeff Bezos (Hartmans & McAlone, 2016). In May 2011, they began their national 
expansion and launched in New York, and by December of that year they’d launched in their first 
non-American city, Paris. By August 2013, they had launched UberX, their cheaper service 
competing more directly with the non-luxury cab markets, had opened in India and Africa 
(launching in Kenya in 2015), and had raised another round of funding, this time for $258 million 
from Google Ventures, and was valued at $3.76 billion. In just six years the company had 
attained the mythical unicorn status – when a startup is valued at over $1 billion (Hartmans & 
McAlone, 2016).  
 In the course of their rapid expansion, they frequently used the enormous financial 
support they had received to undercut existing taxi infrastructures, creating enemies and lawsuits 
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along the way, both within the US (e.g. in Austin and New York) and abroad (e.g. in the UK, the 
Germany, and India). By 2016, Uber’s promotional strategy had changed too, moving from 
targeting elite customers to instead trying to show how its product was changing the world for the 
better. While in 2010, Kalanick was often quoted in the company’s early years as saying that 
Uber was working to show that “everyone could ride like a millionaire” (Swisher, 2014), by 
2016, Uber had adopted the quite different byline, “creating possibilities for riders, drivers, and 
cities”.Uber’s story echoes much of Rogers and Larsen’s original description of Silicon Valley. 
Camp was a trained engineer and they employed others to improve the smartphone application 
around which their service revolved; they had an extremely fast rate of growth (likely much faster 
than Rogers and Larsen could have anticipated); their product was continuously changing; and 
they expanded into a global market, though often to great resistance.  
But the story of Uber diverges from the companies that Rogers and Larsen were 
characterizing in important ways. While many of the companies being built in Silicon Valley in 
the 1980s operated in clearly technological industries like silicon processors and consumer 
computers, Uber was instead using a technology innovation to ‘disrupt’ the decidedly non-
technological industry of taxi services. Moreover, Uber’s story illustrates how many of the 
characteristics of 1980s Silicon Valley companies have grown more extreme in the ensuing 
decades. While venture capitalism – the particularly risky approach to corporate financing – has 
long been closely intertwined with Silicon Valley and can even be said to have been shaped by 
the particularly rapid growth of high technology companies there (Kenney & Florida, 2000), the 
scale of venture capital investment in Uber is extreme by comparison. Technology startups did 
not begin to attain the high valuation of a $1 billion-dollar unicorn until the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century, and now some, like Uber, are attaining the even more extreme valuation of 
$10 billion, and graduating from the status of ‘unicorn’ to ‘decacorn’. Through the story of Uber, 
the join enterprise and share repertoires of practice that defines Silicon Valley’s community of 
technology innovators come into focus. 
Joint	enterprise	
Ultimately, the “joint enterprise” in Silicon Valley’s CTI has changed very little since Rogers and 
Larsen were writing. They still design new technologies and build companies around them 
through which they can sell the technologies they design. But technology innovation in and of 
itself is hardly a practice that is unique to Silicon Valley, from fire to airplanes to bombs, people 
have been inventing new technologies for nearly all of human history. And while studies 
problematizing the nature of technology, particularly those from history of science and science 
and technology studies are fascinating (Goody, 1980; Richards, 2009), for the purposes of this 
investigation I am narrowing the scope of my working definition of technology to specifically 
what Rogers and Larsen referred to as “high-technology”: electronic hardware like computers 
and semiconductors, and the virtual software, programs and operating systems, that runs on the 
back of the hardware. Even with this narrower definition, those who could be said to be 
“innovating” such technologies can run the gamut from kids tinkering with circuit boards for a 
class science project, to large scale advancement in factory machinery for clothing or airplane 
production. What I believe sets the particularly Silicon Valley approach to technology innovation 
apart from these others is twofold: 1) the pace of innovation and 2) the funding structure around 
it. 
The	pace	of	innovation	
Returning to Rogers and Larsen’s description of the “high-technology industry”, one of the things 
that they believed distinguished this industry from others was the pace of technological 
advancements. “Not only is the technology very advanced [in this industry],” they wrote, “but it 
is also continuously changing, at a much faster rate of progress than other industries (Rogers & 
	 32 
Larsen 1984, p. 29). For their book, they interviewed Mark Larsen, an Intel sales manager at the 
time, who agreed with this assessment. “If you stop for a week in this industry, I swear you would 
lose your technological state of the art knowledge. There is nothing about a two-year-old product 
that I couldn’t divulge to my competitors. A one-year-old product, you might not be able to tell 
everything, but a two-year-old is old” (Rogers & Larsen 50). In part, this was to do with the 
advancements in physics that could allow integrated circuits to get smaller and more powerful. 
But today, even though many of the most successful Silicon Valley startups do not themselves 
use silicon or build physical computer processors, the rapid pace of innovation in Silicon Valley 
continues seemingly unabated in large part because it no longer results only from the speed with 
which hardware processing power advances, but also from the speed with which investors’ and 
consumers’ attention shifts in the modern “attention economy” (Davenport & Beck, 2001). As 
information and communications scholars Davenport and Beck wrote in their 2001 book The 
Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business: 
In this new economy, capital, labor, information, and knowledge are all in 
plentiful supply. It’s easy to start a business, to get access to customers and 
markets, to develop a strategy to put up a Web site, to design ads and 
commercials. What’s in short supply is human attention. Telecommunications 
bandwidth is not a problem, but human bandwidth is (Davenport & Beck, 
2001, p2). 
Like Uber, many of the most recent innovations to come out of Silicon Valley have been 
more about bringing the utility of technological platforms to new industry, from taxis to vacation 
rentals (AribnB) to cooking (Blue Apron) and more. As Marina Gorbis, the self-described futurist 
wrote in a 2015 opinion piece in The New York Times, “technologies are emerging faster than our 
institutional capacity to adapt to them. In only six years of operation, Uber has upended the taxi 
industry in every city where it operates. Airbnb is more highly valued than the Hyatt and 
Wyndham combined!” (Gorbis, 2015).  
The	structure	of	funding	
What likely also intensifies the pressure to innovate so quickly and to keep up-to-date with the 
latest Silicon Valley CTI trends is also the commercial approach and venture capital funding 
structure around innovation in Silicon Valley. Like “techies” the world over, those in Silicon 
Valley’s CTI practice their trade by writing new code or building new hardware, but they do so in 
search of the invention of commercial products, “useful, profitable products” (Moore & Davis, 
2004, p.13) to be specific. Innovating new technology in a commercial setting is markedly 
different from doing so for the love of technology or curiosity of how things work common to 
many techies. In 2004, Gordon Moore, the renowned engineer and co-founder of Intel, 
coauthored a book chapter with Kevin Davis called “Learning the Silicon Valley Way”. In it, they 
write about how these commercial objectives differentiate Silicon Valley’s practice from that of 
scientists. 
The path to the success for Fairchild and Intel required orienting the process 
of scientific discovery towards profit-making goals [emphasis added]. …To 
do science for commercial ends, scientists had to move away from the 
academic approach of lingering on understanding the basic and abstract 
features of phenomena. Making sure that something worked in practice (even 
though not necessarily optimally) and at proper costs was and remains more 
important. (Moore & Davis 2004, p. 15) 
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To “innovate technology” in the Silicon Valley CTI, is not just about designing and 
building something innovative from circuits and wires or software, it is about doing so in a 
decidedly commercial way.  
What further sets Silicon Valley’s approach apart from other sites of commercial 
innovation, is the role of venture capital investing. “Venture capital,” as Rogers and Larsen 
argued, “goes hand-in-hand with entrepreneurship and one cannot understand a high-tech system 
like Silicon Valley without understanding how venture capitalists operate” (Rogers & Larsen, 
1984, p. 62). In fact, urban and human development scholars, Kenney and Florida, have made the 
case that venture capital as it currently exists evolved through its relationship with the high-tech 
industries in the Bay Area. 
In contrast to other concentrations of venture capital, such as New York City 
and Chicago, in Silicon Valley (as in Boston) venture capital evolved in 
tandem with its technological and entrepreneurial base. …Venture capital is 
now an institutional feature of Silicon Valley and a critical node in a network 
of institutions that evolved to encourage new form formation” (Kenney & 
Florida 2000, p. 98-99). 
Venture capital investing, unlike other types of investing such as small business loans 
from banks, brings a high-risk high-reward mentality. Investors are willing to invest in young, 
often very young, companies based only on the promise of an entrepreneur’s idea as long as they 
believe the company has a high value in its potential for growth. “During the start-up phase,” 
wrote Kenney and Florida, “the firm often has no income and is spending money to establish 
itself” (Kenney & Florida 2000, p. 102). As a result, an investor’s assessment of the value of a 
startup goes far beyond the actual revenue that a company brings in. For example, most of the 
companies, including Uber, that have become unicorns were not bringing in anything near 
billions of dollars of revenue when they received those valuations. Venture capital investors are 
able to take such risks because they receive equity, or ownership, in the company in which they 
are investing (which often in turn leads to a seat on the board and a say in critical decisions), and 
because they invest in many startups at once anticipating that some will fail, betting on big 
successes to make up the difference. This approach is far from the practices of more traditional 
investors like banks that require a more tangible form of collateral than a promising “idea”.  
Capitalist systems in general have a clearly powerful drive to expand and to accumulate 
greater wealth. As the computer scientist, David Kotz has written, “capitalists seek to increase 
their profits by expanding the scale of operations” (Kotz, 2003). But the rate of technological 
advancement in Silicon Valley coupled with the venture capitalists’ willingness to take risks 
created pressures on companies to expand rapidly, as Uber did, beyond their municipal, national, 
and regional borders, in their need to seek out ever larger markets. These combined pressures 
make sense when we return briefly to Rogers and Larsen’s assessment in the 1980s of the 
characteristics of Silicon Valley’s “high-technology industry”, that included not just highly 
skilled scientists and engineers but also “a worldwide market for its products [emphasis added]” 
(Rogers & Larsen 1984, p. 29). As they illustrated, outside of the field of technology, there were 
very few areas in the 1980s where a venture capitalist would consider the rewards high enough to 
take the risks associated with such early stage investments. Being on the cutting edge of 
innovation meant that companies building them could appeal to foreign markets, even in the 
1980s. But while companies growing in the 1980s, like Intel and Hewlett Packard, were 
expanding to Europe and Japan, the pace and breadth of expansion in the contemporary 
environment has accelerated. It took Uber just a year and a half from launching in San Francisco 
before it opened abroad, expanding globally in less than two years to even African markets, 
markets that were well-below the radar of Silicon Valley innovators in the 1980s. 
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The	startup	and	the	entrepreneur	
It is no wonder, that in my attempt to characterize the practices of Silicon Valley’s CTI I started 
with the story of a startup. Using the definition of those within the community, a startup is not 
just a new company, debatably in its first 5-7 years of existence, it is also working – in the words 
of Neil Blumenthal, the cofounder of the ‘disruptive’ eye glasses startup, Warby Parker – “to 
solve a problem where the solution is not obvious and success not guaranteed” (Robehmed, 
2013). This emphasis on risk and exponential growth is what sets startups apart from other new 
small businesses that expect more linear growth prospects. Leaner than other more established 
tech companies, and able to form around a single new idea or to ‘pivot’ when a new idea or new 
piece of technology becomes more lucrative or more productive, the startup is the organizational 
setting in which the practice of technology innovation in Silicon Valley takes place. In retelling 
the story of his days at Fairchild Semiconductors, Gordon Moore talks about how the pace of new 
company formation developed in those early years. 
At Fairchild, we were mining an extremely rich vein of technology, but our 
little company was too small to handle all that we discovered. The net result 
was what I call the ‘Silicon Valley effect’: every new idea that came along 
created at least one new company. Literally dozens of new companies came 
out of the Fairchild experience in just the first decade. Some we encouraged 
as a means of gaining a supplier, others we suffered as future competitors and 
drains on our resources. (Moore & Davis, 2004, p. 19) 
Since the days of Fairchild Semiconductors, Silicon Valley’s high-tech industry has 
evolved around nurturing and supporting the growth of these fledgling companies. Building 
successful startups has become big business—and in many eyes, the only business for building 
the necessary newness into technology. Icons of Silicon Valley’s contemporary community 
continue to celebrate the startup and its ability to adapt and evolve in a way that larger, more 
established, companies could not. Indeed, the revolution in personal computing came about not 
only from large reputable companies like IBM, but also from the upstart, Apple Computers; the 
burgeoning of social media, which shapes a significant portion of how people the world over 
experience the internet today, came not from an established company, but from one built by a 
college student, Mark Zuckerberg. In addition to actually “innovating technology”, startups – 
building them, running them, investing in them, incubating and nurturing, expanding and selling 
them – are the enterprises in which members of Silicon Valley’s CTI are jointly engaged. As a 
single organizational structure, the startup meets the needs of both Silicon Valley’s pace of 
innovation and its corporate global-scale-oriented funding structure. It is the entity that binds this 
community through practice and differentiates it from other technology innovators.  
Around the startups a flurry of individuals with diverse jobs and skillsets gather. 
Engineers and programmers tinkering with ideas in their proverbial garages or newfangled 
coworking spaces, create, test, and improve ideas for new companies; entrepreneurs work with 
mentors and advisors to build the startups around these ideas, pitching them often first to their 
friends and family then ultimately to venture capital investors. With early seed and eventually 
Series A and B funding, entrepreneurs work with their team to scale their product and turn their 
company toward an ever-increasing market. Their work is in turn supported by other individuals 
performing a range of roles from marketers to market researchers, coworking space managers to 
startup competition coordinators,. While customers and end-users play the important function of 
providing a consumer base for these new products, unless they are directly involved in the design 
process they are not members of this community of practice. More so than marketing specialists 
or even investors, the programmer and, perhaps even more so, the entrepreneur, are at the center 
of activity in this community. 
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Shared	repertoire:	Material	culture	
In Wenger’s 1998 framework, in addition to centering around a joint enterprise, members of a 
community of practice share a common repertoire of other practices that render them 
recognizable as members of this community or as not members of other communities. Among 
this repertoire, he includes “routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, 
symbols, genres, actions, or concepts that the community has produced or adopted in the course 
of its existence, and which have become part of its practice” (Wenger 1998, p. 82). For example, 
in the work of linguist Mary Bucholtz looking at a group of ‘nerd girls’ in high school, she 
showed how they developed a repertoire of practices in order to distinguish themselves from the 
community of “cool girls”. 
Where cool girls aim for either cuteness or sophistication in their personal 
style, nerd girls aim for silliness. Cool girls play soccer or basketball; nerd 
girls play badminton. Cool girls read fashion magazines; nerd girls read 
novels. …Cool girls wear pastels or dark tones; nerd girls wear bright primary 
colors (Bucholtz, 1999, p.213). 
Among communications scholars, some of the more tangible elements of Wenger’s 
repertoire – from the choice of dress to the choice of space – are parts of the “material culture” of 
a community (Pratt, 2002). Over the years, while a decidedly larger community of practice than 
Bucholtz’s ‘nerd girls’, Silicon Valley’s innovators have developed their own repertoire of 
practices, from their choice of dress, to the design of their office spaces, the organization of 
community events, and the speech practices that they share. Often these choices are made to 
construct an environment that enables creativity and the generation of new ideas or that signifies 
casual competence. 
In terms of dress, Silicon Valley modern-day innovators often have a very distinctive 
style; they are known for sporting a casual laid-back dress sense, more frequently seen wearing 
jeans and a t-shirt than a suit and tie. Observers of Mark Zuckerberg’s visit to Africa for example, 
noted his choice of informal dress throughout most of his trip (except when meeting with 
Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari). In part, like the Bucholtz’s ‘nerd girls’, this choice of 
style seemed to be a purposeful rejection of the stodgy tired approach to business that Silicon 
Valley wanted to move away from. In fact, Silicon Valley is often credited with the introduction 
of “business casual” to the wider American workforce. Last year in The Atlantic, for example, 
Deirdre Clemente wrote that “In Silicon Valley in the mid-1980s, the people weren’t interested in 
adhering to old norms. Businesses there put an emphasis on streamlining management decisions 
and shortening the lag time between planning and implementation. …Restrictive clothing worn 
for appearances’ sake was inefficient, and Silicon Valley was all about efficiency” (Clemente, 
2017). In other words, the rapid speed of innovation translated to a simple choice of clothing that 
could signify both a relaxed self-confidence and that you weren’t “wasting precious time on 
something as vain as fashion” (Q. Kim, 2014). 
This desire to break with the traditional mold of American business culture is similarly 
evident in Silicon Valley’s choice of spaces of work. The material manifestation of this has been 
the open plan office space where startup employees are seemingly able to bump into one another, 
bounce around ideas, and have space to think freely. Incubators, co-working spaces, and even the 
individual offices of more established tech companies are similarly structured in this “open 
concept” manner. Such layouts continue to be used even as companies get older and leave the 
early stage startup phase as in the case of the new office Facebook built in 2015 (Frankel, 2015). 
Seemingly a new phenomenon associated with modern digital labor at tech companies, the open 
plan office in Silicon Valley actually dates back to the 1980s, described in Rogers and Larsen’s 
description of the Valley as helping growing tech companies retain their “entrepreneurial spirit” 
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(1984). Andy Pratt, in his study of the culture around spaces for new media production, describes 
some of the buildings of the technology companies in California that he visited. “There was 
clearly attention given to the aesthetics of buildings,” he wrote. “The stock aesthetic was of 
‘industrial chic’, or ‘raw space’; in other words, an un-redecorated industrial building. The 
common layout was an open plan office scattered with grouped open desks upon which 
individuals’ computers were placed” (Pratt 2002, p.41). 
Other ways of doing things that make up Silicon Valley’s repertoire include its events, 
trainings, and spaces, including things like conferences and trade shows (e.g. South by Southwest, 
Tech Crunch Disrupt and Developer Week), incubators (Y-Combinator), accelerators (AngelPad), 
and coworking spaces (WeWork). Each of these are sites where Silicon Valley technology 
innovators can meet, network, get mentorship and training, raise funds, pitch ideas, and build 
their companies. Like Nairobi’s Tech Week, such events have gradually become what 
communications scholar Lilly Irani has called “transnationally legibly emblems of innovation” 
(Irani. 2015, p. 801), spaces where the community’s members learn and reaffirm the community’s 
norms, values, and practices.  
Shared	repertoire:	Communicative	ecology	
Of all the practices in the shared repertoire of those in Silicon Valley’s community (of which 
there are many beyond those I’ve sketched out above), the ones I now want to pay particular 
attention to – and where I believe this research can most contribute to communities of practice 
theory – are the communicative. In Wenger’s 1998 publication, he added depth to their earlier 
definition of the shared repertoire, notably adding more communicative dimensions beyond just 
the “words” and “stories” he had earlier included. This new extended version included: “The 
rapid flood of information and propagation of innovation within the community,” “local lore, 
shared stories, inside jokes, knowing laughter,” “jargon and shortcuts to communication as well 
as the ease of producing new ones,” and “a shared discourse reflecting a certain perspective on 
the world” (Wenger 1998, p. 125). Linguists have understandably built on Wenger’s work and 
studied the very detailed speech patterns – the inflections, the accents, the slang – that help to 
differentiate members of one group from another. Penelope Eckert, credited as one of the first to 
bring the community of practice framework to linguistics, for example, showed how groups of 
high school ‘jocks’ and ‘burnouts’ used subtle differentiations in speech patterns to signal which 
community they belonged to (Eckert, 1989), while Cecelia Cutler showed how a white upper 
middle class New York teenager adopted the speech patterns and clothes more common of black 
hip hop culture in the process of negotiating his identity and figuring out where he belonged in 
New York’s diverse metropolis (C. A. Cutler, 1999). 
 Like these high school communities, members of Silicon Valley’s CTI use language to 
differentiate themselves from other communities of practice. Often this takes the form of jargon. 
Jargon can be an especially clear determinant of who is inside and who it outside of a 
professional community. Someone outside of the medical profession, for example, can easily get 
lost in all the aspirating, coding, and irradiating, the hysterectomies, the biopsies, and the 
laparoscopies that take place on a daily basis. Jargon in Silicon Valley has become so ingrained, 
that with all the “pitching,” “exiting,” and “disrupting” that goes on, it can be challenging to 
make sense of conversations in the community without them. Even for those in overlapping 
fields, like management and computer science, the jargon can be impenetrable at first (Kopp & 
Ganz, 2016, loc 112).  
Yet while such micro-communication patterns are fascinating, I echo other 
communications scholars in arguing that they are insufficient in order to fully understand the role 
communications plays in communities. Instead, the diverse array of media and mediums, speech 
patterns and speech styles, in-person contact, and community narratives must be incorporated in 
order to begin to understand how communities operate (Davison, Ou, Martinsons, Zhao, & Du, 
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2014; Klaebe & Foth, 2006). Media anthropologist, Jo Tacchi, and her coauthors, call this whole 
suit of communicative tools and methods at a community’s disposal its “communicative ecology” 
(Tacchi, Slater, & Hearn 2003). They suggest looking beyond traditional media outlets and at 
“everything that could count as a medium of communication” (Tacchi, Slater, & Hearn 2003, p. 
16). 
That is, not just press, broadcast or telecom but also roads, buses and trains, 
visits to neighbours, and public and private places where people meet to 
communicate. …to look at how people combine different media. We do not 
use media, including internet, in isolation, but are very skillful in using them 
together (Tacchi, Slater, & Hearn 2003, p. 16) 
In Silicon Valley’s community of practice, this communicative ecology can include 
emails sent to colleagues or pitch decks sent to potential investors, inspirational speeches given at 
TED conferences or rumors spread across open plan offices. It can include chats about code on 
GitHub, interviews given around a new product release to Tech Crunch, or memoirs offering 
advice for aspiring entrepreneurs. It is comprised of not just the mediums of communication, but 
also the audiences, forms, styles, genres, and content. In a community of practice, the community 
and the process of jointly negotiating the enterprise in which it is engaged can influence which 
medium and genres are considered acceptable forms of communication, by whom, to whom, and 
for what purpose. 
In research around communities of practice, the integration of communications into the 
theoretical models have tended to be dominated by linguists and a focus on the more micro-
communication tools of jargon and slag to signal community membership. In this research, I want 
to broaden the scope of analysis of the communicative elements that make up a community of 
practice to look holistically at the communicative ecology. In particular, I want to incorporate 
Wenger’s inclusion of “stories” and  “a shared discourse reflecting a certain perspective on the 
world” (Wenger 1998, p. 125), the latter of which has been largely overlooked by communities of 
practice researchers. As I hope I will make clear throughout this dissertation, I believe that the 
shared stories and narratives in both Silicon Valley’s CTI and the more global community of 
technology innovators play a crucial role in shaping the practices that define that community and 
the legitimacy of the communities’ newest members. To do so, I believe the communicative 
dimensions of communities of practice theory will be greatly strengthened by the integration of 
narrative theory. Going forward, I will introduce the concepts from narrative theory that I would 
like to integrate – namely stories and narratives – and illustrate the role that they play in Silicon 
Valley’s CTI. While Wenger talked about ‘discourse’ rather than ‘narrative’, I have opted to use 
narrative, because I believe that narrative allows for more analytical precision. I will begin with 
the simpler of the two concepts: stories. 
Stories	
I define stories as the particular tales, true or untrue, that individuals or organizations tell about 
themselves or others and what they experienced. Stories usually have a beginning, middle, and 
end, a “story” arc, a hero, a lesson. This definition is taken in part from the work of the 
community narrative scholar, Julian Rappaport and his frequent coauthor Eric Mankowski. For 
them, stories are also individual accounts, though they focus on true stories—personal accounts 
people tell about “their own life experiences” (Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000, p. 482). I also 
take inspiration from David Herman, a prominent narrative theorist, who, unlike Mankowski and 
Rappaport, also looks at untrue stories, tall tales, fables, or fictionalized accounts of the world. 
While retaining the individual level definition, stories for Herman are, regardless of their truth, 
ways in which we come to understand the world around us. They are “basic human strategy[ies] 
for coming to terms with time, process, and change” (Herman, 2011, p. 1-2)  
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In many ways, the art of storytelling is at the center of how technology innovation is 
currently being practiced in Silicon Valley. The venture capital-dominated nature of its approach 
to innovation means that in addition to having an exceptional product and a solid business model, 
innovators need to get the attention of both prospective customers and prospective investors in 
order to make it. “Tension and struggle, heroes and villains,” Carmine Gallo writes in Forbes, 
“are the stuff of great movies. As it turns out, they are also key to selling one’s ideas” (Gallo, 
2015). Scholars as well have looked at the role storytelling plays in the work of entrepreneurs. 
Ethnographer, Ellen O’Conner, for example, found how crucial it was to the success of startups 
for their founders to master the art of telling personal stories that allow them to “justify the 
existence of the company” and that “convince others to devote funds and other key resources to 
the company” (O’Connor, 2002). The personal stories, she wrote, “build credibility for both the 
success of the entrepreneur as an individual and for the success of his idea as a compelling market 
entry” (O’Connor 2002, p. 42). She found storytelling to be particularly instrumental for early 
stage companies that don’t yet have tangible products or sales to prove their worth. In such cases, 
it falls to the story and the delivery of the storyteller to “convey determination” and “inspire 
confidence” (O’Connor 2002, p. 42). In a community where thousands of new startups seem to be 
born every day, mastering the art of storytelling can mean the difference between gaining 
legitimacy, funding and success, and being ignored, overlooked, and excluded.  
 Iconic Silicon Valley innovators have long been aware of the power of telling a “good 
story” to shape more than just investor expectations. Among them Steve Jobs is perhaps the best 
remembered for his beliefs about the important role of storytelling in his work. A Kenyan Indian 
entrepreneur I came to know during my fieldwork forwarded the following story about Jobs to me 
on WhatsApp in May 2016, but it was originally posted to the online discussion site, Quora, by a 
former employee of Jobs, Thomas Higbey, in 2013. The story goes as follows: 
Worked at NeXT the summer of 94. I was in the break room with 2 
colleagues when [Steve] Jobs walked in and started making a bagel. We were 
sitting at a table eating ours when he out of the blue asked us ‘Who is the 
most powerful person in the world?’ I said Mandela since I had just been 
there as an international observer for the elections. In his confident fashion he 
stated ‘NO!...you are all wrong…the most powerful person in the world is the 
story teller.’ At this point I was thinking to myself ‘Steve, I love you but there 
is a fine line between genius and loco…and I think I’m witnessing this right 
now’. Steve continued, ‘The storyteller sets the visions, values and agenda of 
an entire generation that is to come and Disney has a monopoly on the 
storyteller business. You know what? I am tired of that bullshit, I am going to 
be the next storyteller’ and he walked out with his bagel. (Higbey, 2013) 
Even if Higbey’s story does not reflect the exact way in which events really unfolded (as 
stories rarely do), it does draw attention to Job’s awareness of the importance of storytelling, as 
well as his reputation as a good storyteller. Over the years, as he told stories around the product 
releases of the iPod and the iPhone and so one, his reputation grew. He has been described as a 
“master storyteller” (Winfrey, 2016) and the “world’s greatest business storyteller” (Gallo, 2015), 
able to craft a story to motivate his employees and inspire consumers. 
Storytellers	–	Techno-Visionaries	
In addition to storyteller, Jobs seems to be most frequently described as a “visionary” (Winfrey, 
2016). In fact, along with innovator, and entrepreneur, visionary seems to be one of the most 
common descriptors used in his obituaries in 2011. The visionary who “led a mobile computer 
revolution” (Giggs, 2011), the visionary who was “one of the greatest American CEOs of his 
generation” (Robertson, 2011), the “visionary and creative genius” that Apple lost (Siegler, 
2011). This label is no accident. Jobs led a company that built products that have fundamentally 
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changed how many in the US and elsewhere around the world interact with their communicative 
ecologies in a way that few people could have predicted. But through the stories he told, Jobs 
seemed to be doing just that: predicting the future.  
I believe that techno-visionaries like jobs play a particularly important storytelling 
function in Silicon Valley’s CTI.  
Beyond Jobs, many of the most iconic Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are often also 
characterized as visionaries – or sometimes futurists and dreamers – telling the public stories of a 
future only they know is possible. And many of the entrepreneurs themselves seem to believe it. 
Elon Musk, for example, frequently speaks about futures most people assume are impossible or at 
least the stuff of science fiction, made real only for generations hundreds of years in the future. 
Colonizing Mars, fully electric cars taking over the American automotive market, a tunnel under 
Los Angeles to ease traffic. Musk is frequently out in the public eye arguing that technological 
advancements are not only important for progress, but are necessary to save the human race; and 
he is not shy about seeing himself as the man with the vision. “I say something, and then it 
usually happens. Maybe not on schedule, but it usually happens” (L. Kim, 2016).  
The stories that Silicon Valley techno-visionaries like Musk and Jobs tell are frequently 
about the future, a decidedly technological future at that. Self-driving cars, transporters, hover 
boards, 3D printers, virtual reality, artificial intelligence, space ships, rockets that can land back 
on earth, and internet connectivity for all, many of the technologies that feature in the stories they 
tell (and sometimes eventually build) are seemingly indistinguishable from those that feature in 
the decidedly fictitious accounts of the future from science fiction. Incidentally, much of the 
science fiction literature and entertainment content swings between the utopian – Metropolis, Star 
Trek, Childhood’s End – and the dystopic – Black Mirror, Blade Runner, The Matrix – though it 
is more frequently the latter, perhaps because stories about heroes overcoming adversity or 
learning about the flawed nature of humanity tend to make more compelling plots than utopian 
ones. By contrast, the stories told by Silicon Valley’s techno-visionaries are decidedly utopian, 
persistently focused on how new technologies (their products) will improve the world around us. 
Uber talks about how its application is “creating possibilities for riders, drivers, and cities” (Uber, 
2018), while Facebook describes its platform as “giving people the power to build community 
and bring the world closer together” (Facebook, 2018). Even a company with a product as 
seemingly superficial as Snapchat describes itself as “reinventing the camera”, representing “our 
greatest opportunity to improve the way people live and communicate” (Snap Inc., 2018). 
For new entrepreneurs pitching to investors, in many ways they are expected to play the 
part of a techno-visionaries as well, telling tales of how the world (or even just a small market) 
will be changed for the better as a result of the adoption of their new technology, even if they do 
not yet have the market to prove it. Almost by definition these pitches also need to be techno-
utopian, showing how their technology will help a suburban mom cook more efficiently or will 
help a poor child get electricity to finish their homework. Telling a dystopic story about how a 
robot becomes sentient and turns on its creator may make a compelling science fiction story, but 
would hardly convince investors to fund the startup that built the robot. 
In Lave and Wenger’s original publication on communities of practice, they presented 
case studies of apprentices who were learning to become fully fledged community members 
through participation, including participation in the community’s stories (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
The most illustrative example they give of this comes from the work of Carol Cain, who used 
ethnography to examine the practices – including the storied ones – of the alcoholics recovery 
community, Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) (Cain, 1991). At group meetings, existing members 
tell stories of their own history of addiction and recovery in the presence of new members. “In 
A.A.,” she wrote, “personal stories are told for the explicit, stated purpose of providing a model 
of alcoholism, so that other drinkers may find so much of themselves in the lives of professed 
alcoholics that they cannot help but ask whether they, too, are alcoholics” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, 
p. 80). Furthermore, in the A.A. context, learning how to tell stories is also an integral part of 
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fully joining A.A. In order to becoming a full A.A. member, newcomers must complete that 
“Twelve Step process”, the last step of which is telling your own personal story of alcoholism to 
non-members, particularly non-members you suspect of being unadmitted alcoholics. Through 
listening to full member stories and engaging socially inside and out of meetings with full A.A. 
members, new members gradually learn how to tell their own stories of addiction in the 
appropriate way and to interpret their lives and their personal histories through the lens of being a 
“non-drinking alcoholic” (Cain, 1991). 
 Like A.A., aspiring members of Silicon Valley’s CTI wishing to play the important role of 
successful technology entrepreneur must embrace the practice of techno-visionary storytelling in 
order to do so. In A.A., newcomers listen to stories from existing members to learn what is 
expected of them. In Silicon Valley, the entrepreneurs read advice from authors like Vitaly 
Golomb (2018), but they also hear the stories told by the most successful entrepreneurs and 
techno-visionaries, like Jobs and Musk. Those stories how they’re told, and by whom can inspire 
outsiders to want to join the community themselves (as I will show in Chapter 2), and can provide 
a model of what a successful Silicon Valley entrepreneur is expected to look, act, and sound like 
(which I explore more in Chapter 3). The model being presented to them is one of the techno-
visionary entrepreneur, with Elon Musk and his particularly fanciful stories arguably being the 
archetype of that model. With repeated practice of telling their own techno-utopian stories over 
and over again in their own pitches, entrepreneurs learn to do more than raise money. They learn 
what successful entrepreneurs are supposed to sound like and which values they are supposed to 
share and to champion. 
Narratives	
In addition to stories, I believe that what narrative theory says about larger narratives, particularly 
community narratives, can enhance our understanding of how communities of practice are formed 
and change and how members’ sense of meaning and legitimacy are constructed. In the case of 
Silicon Valley’s CTI, I believe they have played a particularly important role in helping the 
practice formed in the Valley to gain traction elsewhere. 
Narrative research has been incorporated in a diverse range of disciplines, from 
linguistics to psychology, and even from nursing to management. Despite the breadth of this body 
of research, at the core, most of it rest on the theory of social constructivism (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1991), on a belief that narratives make up a crucial component of who we are; that as 
humans we make sense of the world through the stories we tell one another and ourselves 
(Bruner, 1991). As psychologists Dan McAdams, Ruthellen Josselson and Amia Lieblich, who 
have written extensively about narrative and identity, put it, “We are all storytellers, and we are 
the stories we tell” (McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich 2006, p.3).   
Much of this literature treats the terms “narrative” and “story” interchangeably. The exact 
definitions of these terms have been greatly contested in narrative research; I do not wish to enter 
that debate here. I am not a linguist nor am I a literary critic and arguing for a particular 
understanding of narrative is not my goal. For clarity’s sake, unlike many, but not all, narrative 
theorists, I want to treat “narrative” and “story” as two distinct terms. In contrast to stories as the 
individual tales people tell, I define narratives as the larger, more general, over-arching tales 
that shape and are shaped by our fundamental cultural and ideological views of the world. In this 
definition, narratives are a composite of the many varied individual stories a particular culture, 
community, or institution tells that have accrued over time (Geertz, 1973). As the psychologist 
Jerome Bruner wrote in his seminal piece “The narrative construction of reality,” “Narratives do 
accrue, and, as anthropologists insist, the accruals eventually create something variously called a 
‘culture’ or a ‘history’ or, more loosely, a ‘tradition.” (Bruner 1991, p. 18). What I call narratives 
here have intermittently been referred to by scholars as cultural narratives, dominant narratives, 
and metanarratives, though some of these conceptualizations are decidedly broader than mine. 
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For simplicity sake, I will continue to use the term narratives, though you will occasionally find 
me adding “community” or “dominant” to emphasize its importance to the community of 
practice. Narratives, in the definition I am using, are not expressly told themselves, rather they are 
constructed in the process of individual stories being told and retold. Through this process of 
retelling, narratives become normalized and in turn serve to legitimize an underlying ideology or 
a particular community identity. Canonic religious texts are the quintessential example of this. 
Bible tales, Roman mythology, the Hindu Vedas all represent stories told for centuries that make 
up particular narratives or lessons that serve to uphold, reinforce, and legitimize the morals and 
beliefs of that particular religious practice.  
In the context of communities of practice, just as the enterprise in which the members are 
engaged are jointly negotiate, so are a community’s narratives. In the same piece cited above, 
Bruner gave a sense of how narratives might work in communal settings. “One of the principal 
ways in which we work ‘mentally’ in common, I would want to argue, is by the process of joint 
narrative accrual” (Bruner 1991, p. 20). Embracing this social and communal constructivist 
perspective, I adopt the view that a community and its narratives are mutually constituted. They 
are constructed by the community’s members in a process of joint negotiation and over the course 
of stories being told and retold. But they in turn shape the community, influencing members’ 
perceptions of how other members should behave and what the community’s boundaries should 
be. As the narrative scholars Stephens & McCallum have written in their book on retelling 
stories, narratives can work to maintain “conformity to socially determined and approved patterns 
of behavior, which they do by offering positive role models, proscribing undesirable behavior, 
and affirming the culture’s ideologies, systems, and institutions” (Stephens & McCallum, 2013, 
p. 1-2). To the psychologists, like Julian Rappaport, a community and its narratives are 
inescapably linked.  
Shared narratives are the surrounding substance of our social world. The 
psychological sense of community can be indexed by its shares stories. People 
who hold common stories about where they come from, who they are, and 
who they will, or want to be, are a community. A community cannot be a 
community without a shared narrative [emphasis added] (Rappaport, 2000, p. 
6) 
For Rappaport and his coauthor, Mankowski, shared community narratives function 
regardless of the type of community, regardless of the location, regardless of how “tight” or 
“loose” the community’s structure is, and regardless of whether membership in a community is 
considered life-long (as in the case of a family) or temporary (as in the case of players on a sports 
team or students in a school) (Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000, p. 487). 
Narratives are also an important way of conveying and reinforcing a community’s shared 
values. In their discussion of what helps to build a community’s “sense of community”, 
psychologists McMillan and Chavis wrote about the role that “agreement with the values and 
beliefs of the community” can play in strengthening someone’s sense of community and sense of 
belonging.  
When people who share values come together, they find that they have similar 
needs, priorities, and goals, thus fostering the belief that in joining together 
they might be better able to satisfy these needs and obtain the reinforcement 
they seek. Shared values, then, provide the integrative force for cohesive 
communities (McMillan & Chavis 1986, p. 13) 
However, as I’ve shown above, one of the characteristics that sets communities of practice apart 
from other communities, and that makes it so useful for this study, is its heterogeneity. In 1998, 
Wenger argued that it was not necessary for the members of a community of practice to all share 
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the same beliefs and values. “Indeed,” he wrote, “mismatched interpretations or 
misunderstandings need to be address and resolved directly only when they interfere with mutual 
engagement. Even then, they are not merely problems to resolve, but occasions for the production 
of new meaning” (Wenger, 1998).  
Yet in most communities, shared values are communicated and reinforced through its 
shared narratives. Situated within a community’s narratives, these values are transmitted to the 
members of a community in the form of lessons, “morals”. Religious texts are a natural example 
of how narratives, in the form of canonic texts, teach community members what to believe. But 
so are children’s fables, myths, and legends. Stephens and McCallum, known for their publication 
on the retelling of children’s stories, write that “under the guise of offering children access to 
strange and exciting worlds removed from everyday experiences, [stories] serve to initiate 
children into aspects of social heritage, transmitting many of a culture’s central values and 
assumptions and a body of share allusions and experiences” (Stephens & McCallum, 2013, p. 1). 
A specific example they give is the story of Robin Hood, which for the children learning this 
iconic story, serves to convey the importance of the core values of truth and justice regardless of 
what the law at the time might say. 
However, while shared values may bring some members of a community closer together, 
in heterogeneous communities, like many communities of practice, they can become problematic. 
If certain more powerful individuals have more say over shaping a community’s narratives, other 
members with less influential positions and conflicting views may feel left out. This is 
compounded as the narratives serve to reinforce certain world views, further ostracizing members 
or aspiring members of a community of practice who do not share them. 
 
Technology	is	Good	Narrative	
If we return again to the techno-visionaries – the storytellers of Silicon Valley’s technological 
future – we can see both how communities of practice and their narratives are mutually 
constituted and how these narratives convey certain underlying world views. 
Let’s take the archetypal example of Elon Musk. On September 29, 2017, wearing blue 
jeans, a white shirt and a black jacket –together giving him a sort of hybrid engineer-investor vibe 
– he spoke at a meeting of the International Astronautical Congress in Australia about his vision 
of traveling to Mars with SpaceX. While he was speaking immediately to a room of aeronautical 
engineers, the YouTube video has a significantly larger audience of 1.5 million viewers.3 He 
began as follows: 
I’m gonna talk more about what I think it takes to become a multi-planet 
species. Just a brief refresher on why I think this is important: I think 
fundamentally the future is vastly more exciting and interesting if we’re a 
spacefaring civilization and a multi-planet species than if we’re not. You want 
to be inspired by things…you wake up in the morning, you think ‘the future’s 
gonna be great!’ And that’s what being a spacefaring civilization is all about. 
It’s about believing in the future and thinking that the future will be better 
than the past. And I can’t think of anything more exciting than going out there 
and being among the stars (SpaceX, 2017) 
As he spoke, he stood on a stage in a darkened auditorium in front of a gigantic image of 
a rocket taking off in the middle of a desert in a cloud of smoke and fire. As he continued (it 
should be added, without even having to mention the name of his company and its work on 
                                                      
3  It should be noted that, while this audience is large, in the era of music videos breaking the 1 billion 
views barrier, it is not groundbreaking for YouTube. 
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rockets), he explained that the “code name” for the rocket is “BFR”, an acronym, the audience 
rightly assumes, stands for “big fucking rocket”. After the laughter dissipated, he concluded his 
introduction by saying explicitly what he wanted the audience to pay attention to: “Probably the 
most important thing that I want to convey in this presentation is that I think we have figured out 
a way to pay for it”. 
The story he told in this introduction is undeniably about a utopian future where 
humanity is inspired by being a “multi-planet species”. The story he told over the course of the 
remaining 40 minutes is undeniably about how his company, SpaceX, is making technological 
advancements in rocket science, that are moving us towards that future. Over the course of his 
career, Musk has told a version of these interlocking stories over and over again: the future of 
humanity is brightest when we build rockets that allow us to move and to think beyond our 
planet’s atmosphere. And he has told stories about his other projects (most notably Tesla, and 
most controversially his proposal to build a 3D network of tunnels under Los Angeles), which, 
while they are not about rockets, do retain a similar message about the necessity of technological 
advancements for society’s progress. Over time, others in Silicon Valley have told and retold and 
reshaped similar stories. The same techno-utopian sentiments are embedded in Uber’s and 
Facebook’s and Snapchat’s mission statements and in the pitches of countless entrepreneurs. 
Together, they comprise what I believe to be one of the dominant narratives of Silicon Valley’s 
community of innovators: through innovating new technologies, entrepreneurs and the 
companies they’re building are fundamentally changing the world for the better. Going forward I 
will refer to this simply as the Technology is Good Narrative. 
It is impossible, I believe, to determine any kind of clear causal direction between this 
broader narrative, Musk’s individual stories, the characteristics of Silicon Valley’s CTI, and its 
shared practices and values. Musk’s story may inspire and motivate other entrepreneurs to try to 
join Silicon Valley’s CTI or may motivate existing members to become more involved in the 
practices. These actions in turn shape and strengthen the Technology is Good Narrative and 
reinforce the practices of the community. The Technology is Good Narrative may in turn be 
shaped by the community’s own underlying capitalist ideology and its imperative to continually 
grow and expand. Moreover, Musk’s performance, choice of dress, choice of backdrop, choice of 
venue and so on may have informed aspiring entrepreneurs watching him to emulate (or even 
reject) some of his choices in their own pitches later on. 
The Technology is Good Narrative is far from the only narrative in Silicon Valley’s 
innovation community. On the contrary, I believe that all communities of practice are made up of 
many such narratives. In the case of Silicon Valley’s CTI that includes narratives about what a 
successful entrepreneur does, where they came from, and how they build their company, 
narratives about failure and redemption, about winners and losers, or just about rockets. Some – 
like narratives built by stories that hype up particularly ‘hot’ startups or areas of development, 
like bitcoin, or fintech – are more temporary that others. They may be dominant one moment, 
shaping the kinds of startups investors are looking for, and then gone the next. Others, like the 
Technology is Good Narrative, I believe are more fundamental. They reiterate and reinforce the 
community’s shared values and ideologies, further integrating them into the daily practices of the 
community. In the case of the Technology is Good Narrative, these include beliefs about 
technology being a social good, or about newer technology necessarily being better than older 
technology, or the value of profit-generation and global scalability and its rooting in capitalist 
ideology.  
However, the presence of dominant narratives, like the Technology is Good Narrative, 
can lead to the (often incorrect) assumption that everyone in a community does indeed share the 
same values. This poses a particular problem in heterogeneous communities of practice. For 
example, the pervasiveness of the Technology is Good Narrative in Silicon Valley has often made 
it particularly difficult for members of Silicon Valley’s CTI to acknowledge that technology 
could create any social problems, or for those who saw the problems to feel empowered to speak 
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up. I could speculate that this may have contributed to why companies like Facebook and Uber 
have been so slow to acknowledge the potential damage their platforms had cause even in the 
face of mounting evidence.  
Bringing	together	a	theoretical	framework	for	a	globalizing	community	of	practice	
Drawing out the more critical elements of the original communities of practice theory 
makes it a more useful tool for foregrounding the heterogeneity and the hierarchies of legitimacy 
and power within changing communities of practice around technology innovation. But 
communities of practice theory alone says very little about the impact that a community’s 
heterogeneity has on its practices or members and says almost nothing about how hierarchies of 
power are experienced or what they mean for new members seeking to gain legitimacy. I believe 
that more thoroughly theorizing about the role that stories and community narratives play within 
communities of practice helps strengthen the analytical power of communities of practice theory 
in this regard. Alone, communities of practice theory is an insufficient tool with which to try to 
make sense of the complex array of power, money, identity, culture and narratives that intersect 
as Silicon Valley’s particular approach to technology innovation becomes popularized in vastly 
different cultural context around the globe. With the integration of narrative theory, however, it 
becomes significantly more useful. 
A	Globalizing	Community	
The Valley is now a global mindset, not a single geographic destination. 
While it is still hard to find an ecosystem in the world that is nearly as 
supportive or as dense as Silicon Valley, the gap between here and the 
communities elsewhere is narrowing. (K.-M. Cutler, Tech Crunch, 2014) 
In the story about Uber that I told a version of earlier, the company’s founders Travis Kalanick 
(American) and Garrett Camp (Canadian) were serial entrepreneurs who developed and tested 
their idea in Silicon Valley, invested their own money in the project, found exponentially 
increasing rounds of venture capital investment, expanding first nationally and then 
internationally, first to Paris, and eventually to Asia and Africa. But the full story is more 
complicated. Uber may be one of the most successful Silicon Valley startups ever. With current 
estimates of its valuation fluctuating between $48 billion and $72 billion depending on the most 
recent investment round (Schleifer, 2018), it has often topped the list of unicorns, and now 
‘deacorns’. But Uber is far from the only rideshare startup in the world. It isn’t even the only ride 
share startup to be a ‘decacorn’. And its fiercest rival isn’t its Silicon Valley rival Lyft, it’s the 
Chinese company, Didi Chuxing.  
Did Chuxing (also known as DiDi for short) is also a ‘decacon’ reportedly valued at $56 
billion (intermittently higher or lower than Uber’s own valuations) (Shen, 2018). It was founded 
in June 2012 (Carsten, 2016), as Uber was beginning to expand beyond the border of the United 
States, by Cheng Wei, a man with a background in administration and eight years’ experience at 
one of China’s largest technology companies, Alibaba (Forbes, 2018). By November that year, 
DiDi had received a Series A round of investment to the total of $15 million from one of China’s 
largest technology companies, Tencent (Carew, 2015). As it expanded across China’s domestic 
market over the next few years, it acquired new rounds of investment, including an impressive 
Series D round of $4.5 billion in June 2016 with investors that included Apple and China’s other 
technology behemoth, Alibaba (Love, 2016).  
In 2013, Uber tried to enter the Chinese market (Freund, 2016), but faced significant 
challenges from DiDi, eventually ceding the market and selling its Chinese operations to its rival 
for $35 billion and a partial stake in their company (Hinchliffe, 2017). While Uber has grown 
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through expanding globally, DiDi has reached a similar level without yet leaving the Chinese 
market. Even after shutting out the competition from Uber, DiDi has made moves to expand and 
further challenge Uber. In 2015, for example, it invested directly in Uber’s domestic rival Lyft, 
and in 2017 it did the same with its rival in the Middle East, Careem, both companies unicorns in 
their own right (Horwitz, 2017). By the end of 2017, Didi had even opened a lab in Uber’s own 
Silicon Valley backyard reportedly to work on driverless cars and artificial intelligence (Zhong & 
Isaac, 2017). While Uber and DiDi are by far the largest, there are other players in the various 
ride share markets around the world that compete with Uber, from Careem in the Middle East to 
Easy Taxi and 99 in South America, to Little Cabs and Taxify in Africa. Easy Taxi, for example 
was founded by two Brazilians who pitched it at a startup competition in Rio de Janiero in 2011. 
It was officially launched in 2012 and became one of Uber’s biggest rivals in South America, 
expanding to Mexico later that same year. And though it ultimately proved unsuccessful, unlike 
DiDi, EasyTaxi also put considerable effort into expanding laterally to other emerging market 
regions, opening in 2013 in Asian countries like Malaysia and the Philippines and African 
countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Similarly, Taxify, a relatively new player in African 
markets like Kampala, is originally from Estonia. 
In many markets beyond China easily overlooked by most members of Silicon Valley’s 
community, the struggle between these different operators plays out. For example, when I started 
my primary fieldwork in January 2016, Easy Taxi and Uber were already both in Nairobi. And 
while they both struggled to attract consumers away from the cab drivers many Nairobians had 
personal contacts with and trusted, Uber ultimately proved the more popular of the two in the 
price-sensitive Nairobi market with its price cutting strategy. And when Kenya’s 
telecommunications giant Safaricom launched its own rival, Little Cabs, Uber dropped its prices 
further still as it had done in many other markets around the world. By the time I left at the end of 
2016, Easy Taxi had been forced out of the market, Taxify was just getting its footing, and Uber 
was proving relatively more popular among the Kenyans techies I knew than Little Cabs for its 
more usable interface despite their desire to support a Kenyan company. 
In most of this chapter, I have sketched out Silicon Valley’s Community of Technology 
Innovators. But as this recent history of global competition in the rideshare market indicates, 
many innovators outside of California have adopted repertoires of practices that would be 
familiar to those in Silicon Valley. Brazilian entrepreneurs pitch ideas at startup competitions and 
get funding from venture capitalists, Chinese entrepreneurs grow their companies at exponential 
rates. Some of the material culture from Silicon Valley can also be seen in its counterparts 
abroad. Didi’s headquarters in Beijing, for example, has a similarly whimsical layout to 
Facebook’s own headquarters, with an open plan office space, enormous windows, emoji posters, 
beanbag chairs, and a slide (Soper, 2016; Yuan, 2017). And while Easy Taxi was ultimately 
forced out of Kenya’s ride share market, its entrance there and in other emerging markets 
demonstrates how different the directionality of technology innovation and expansion is from the 
one we might expect looking purely from the perspective of Paolo Alto. 
In urban centers all over the globe, even outside of China, many of the practices of 
Silicon Valley’s CTI are being adopted. There are co-working spaces in London, entrepreneurs in 
India, and venture capital investors in Brazil. International startup pitch competitions attract 
entrepreneurs from Nigeria, Malaysia, and Germany. In fact, some of the most successful and 
well-known startups in the United States have more international backgrounds than most 
Americans would assume. Spotify, for example, was founded in Sweden; Waze was founded in 
Israel; WhatsApp, while it was founded in Silicon Valley, was started by a Ukrainian immigrant; 
and Elon Musk himself was born in South Africa. There are many more startups, even quite a few 
unicorns, that the average American would likely not have even heard of, as many startups like 
DiDi have become very successful without even entering the American market. 
Along with this trend in practice, there has also been a gradual but important increase in 
academic work foregrounding technology innovators outside of The Valley. Takhteyev’s study of 
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software programmers in Rio Di Janiero (2012), Anita Say Chan’s study of the culture of 
innovation in Peru (2014), Aneesh Aneesh’s study of India’s transnational software programmers 
(2006), Silvia Lindtner’s work on Chinese innovation communities (2013), and Richard 
Pfeilstetter work on the promotion of startup culture in Manchester, England (2017) are all 
examples that come to mind of other ethnographers who have done this important work. There 
has been similarly important work in African contexts from scholars in multiple disciplines 
including Seyram Avle’s work on entrepreneurs in Ghana (S. A. Avle, 2014), Nicolas Friederici 
work on the role of technological connectivity and innovation hubs in Africa (Friederici, 2016; 
Friederici, Ojanperä, & Graham, 2017), and Hildaa Moraa’s work on models of innovation 
around Africa (Moraa & Gathege, 2013). But the field of research around African technology 
innovation is still quite new and I hope that this dissertation can build on this important work that 
has preceded it. In the remainder of this chapter, I will use the case of Kenya and the growth of a 
local community around the practice of technology innovation to illustrate how Silicon Valley 
practices are being adopted and adapted elsewhere and make the case for the creation of a Global 
Community of Technology Innovators. 
However, before I do I should note another important line of criticism of the communities 
of practice theory: That it has often been applied to communities that are too large, stretching the 
framework beyond its original definition. Amin and Roberts for example made this critique when 
they wrote:  
Our reading of much of this literature, however, shows that the use of the term 
[Communities of Practice] has become imprecise, having strayed far from the 
original definition of CoPs as relatively stable communities of face-to-face 
interaction between members working in close proximity to one another 
(Amin & Roberts, 2008, p. 355)  
Wenger himself seemed unconvinced by the idea of taking this framework to practices on a very 
large scale, writing that “viewing a nation, a culture, a city, or a corporation as one community of 
practice might seem like a way to capture the processes of learning that constitute these social 
configurations. Yet it would miss crucial discontinuities among the various localities where 
relevant learning takes place” (Wenger, 1998, p.125). 
However, writing today two decades after Wenger’s solo publication and nearly three 
decades after Lave and Wenger’s original Situated Learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991), I would 
argue otherwise. In fact, I would suggest that extending the community of practice framework to 
analyze innovation practices that have been adopted throughout the globe is instead a way of 
strengthening Lave and Wenger’s original framework, and modernizing it, taking account of the 
various complex ways in which our practices and communicative ecologies are globalizing and 
hybridizing. 
Since their original publications, the richness and diversity of the communicative 
ecologies of the internet-connected among us has changed substantially. The ways in which 
norms of practice are transmitted and enforced, and meaningful participation negotiated have 
evolved, while the rate at which people in vastly different locations can enter into and negotiate 
shared practices has accelerated. When he was writing, there was no YouTube, no Facebook and 
certainly no Uber, and even telephone calls internationally were often prohibitively expensive. 
Google, now one of the most valuable companies in the world and one with enormous control 
over how people around the world experience the internet, had only just been founded the same 
year of Wenger’s writing. And perhaps more so than any other aspect of a community of practice, 
its stories and narratives can now travel almost instantaneously around the world on these social 
media platforms. As such, the integration of narrative theory helps to ensure that communities of 
practice theory can keep up with the rapid pace of change in global tech work. 
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A number of scholars, largely in the field of education, management and design, before 
me have shown how the community of practice framework can be extended to virtual 
environments (Ardichvili, Maurer, Li, Wentling, & Stuedemann, 2006; Clarke, Partridge, & 
Petersen, 2017; Pitta & Fowler, 2005). Al, Erdogan, Tonta, and Ucak, for example, showed how 
initial engagements on Twitter were essential to the formation of an online community of “techie 
librarians” who were all geographically dispersed (Al, Erdogan, Tonta, & Ucak, 2010). But these 
largely still look at communities of practice as smaller units in which members come into direct 
(if not physical) contact with other members. But I believe that as technology increases our 
interconnectedness, there is great, perhaps even urgent, need to expand our understanding of 
communities of practice as they exist in larger transnational settings.  
To explain why, I want to return for a moment to one of the ethnographic cases on which 
Lave and Wenger based their original framework: Carol Cain’s work on the Alcoholic 
Anonymous (A.A.) (Cain, 1991). A.A. is not a geographically situated community, though its 
members likely experience it in geographically situated ways wherever they live. Looking at a 
page titled “What is A.A.?” on the organization’s website, the community’s definition 
emphasizes its internationality and its diversity. 
Alcoholics Anonymous is an international fellowship of men and women who 
have had a drinking problem. It is nonprofessional, self-supporting, 
multiracial, apolitical, and available almost everywhere. There are no age or 
education requirements. Membership is open to anyone who wants to do 
something about his or her drinking problems (A.A., 2018) 
A.A. has regular local meetings, regional forums, and a core text and standard format that 
are shared in community meetings around the world. Its website similarly provides access to 
“daily reflections” “PSAs” and an online bookstore. While individuals may be locally situated, 
they are welcome at meetings anywhere around the world. By way of an anecdote, I know one 
woman who participates on a regular basis in her local A.A. meeting, but when she travels, stops 
by the weekly meetings in vastly different locations and still finds the material and 
communicative environments familiar and, while there is a period of adjustment, still feels 
welcome. 
Not all communities of practice are necessarily as welcoming as A.A.; communities 
around the practice of building technology startups are certainly more competitive and 
hierarchical. While someone from Silicon Valley traveling to another site of innovation elsewhere 
on the planet may recognize the practices and stories that they see or hear, they may not always 
feel welcome. This can be even more problematically the case when the person doing the 
traveling (or the speaking) is African. This potential for prejudice and power imbalances should 
be kept in mind while reading the rest of the pages to come, even in Chapter 2, where I take a 
more optimistic tone. For now, I want to conclude this chapter by returning to the case of Nairobi 
Tech Week and Kenya’s technology innovators to illustrate how a Global Community of 
Technology Innovators is taking shape. 
 
The	Kenyan	Community	of	Technology	Innovators	
In 2007, Safaricom launched M-Pesa, the mobile payment application that helped Kenya to make 
a name for itself as the “tech hub” of Africa. That same year, a group of Kenyans created 
Ushahidi, the crowd-mapping platform that would become popular with development and 
emergency response practitioners around the world, and three years later, the technology 
coworking space (often described as a ‘hub’ or ‘community’ in itself) called the iHub opened in 
the city. While there was certainly a nascent community of people involved in technology 
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innovation before this time, these events helped to turn the focus towards the creation of startups, 
and helped to build Kenya’s own Community of Technology Innovators (CTI). 
Even the most optimistic member of Silicon Valley’s CTI would readily admit to the 
challenge posed by Chinese innovators to Silicon Valley’s dominance, but the development of 
“innovation hubs” in Africa have more often been seen as novelties than any kind of threat or 
investment opportunity. And yet, gradually some of Silicon Valley’s innovators have become 
interested in Africa’s growing technologically connected middle-class. Technology corporations 
like Google and IBM not only marketed their products to this growing consumer base, but also 
began supporting the training of Kenyan programmers and the opening of their own research labs 
hiring Kenyans –  often ‘glocal’ ones (S. Avle, 2011) – to help innovate technologies that were 
more responsive to “African problems” and the challenges of the African environment. Among 
the predominantly educated middle-class Nairobians who make up the majority of Kenya’s CTI, 
the adoption of new technologies regardless of origin has been rapid. They use American 
platforms like Gmail and Slack and Whatsapp just as readily as African ones like Sendy (the 
Kenyan motorcycle delivery application) and Jumia (the Nigerian online shopping platform), or 
South American ones, like Easy Taxi or Easter European ones, like Taxify.  
Moreover, everywhere you look now in Nairobi startups seem to be “the thing” for 
bringing about social progress, seeming eclipsing the NGO as the vehicle for sustainable 
development. There is a startup building a pay-as-you-use approach to cooking gas, a startup 
building a system to improve cash transfers between African countries, and a startup training 
women and girls in how to code. There are hundreds more. Startups that focus on getting market 
price information to farmers, on enabling the “bottom of the pyramid” to access credit, were 
particularly common while I was living in Nairobi in 2016. Startups in Kenya come in many 
sizes. Some are just two people with an idea, while the largest, M-Kopa, now has hundreds of 
employees and its own campus. The vast majority are “idea stage” startups—locally known as 
“two guys and a laptop”—while others are “early stage” with a fledgling customer base and 
revenue stream. Just a handful have managed to raise $3 million or more in funding, raising 
money from “friends, family, and fools”, NGOs and donor organizations, accelerator programs, 
venture capitalists, and angel investors. On the whole, I found few who seemed to question the 
value of the startup model for designing and building new technologies. 
Nairobi Tech Week , from the beginning of this chapter, provides a good illustration of 
the adoption of much of Silicon Valley’s repertoire of practices around the startup. From the 
ubiquitous branded stickers to the excitable speaking style of many of the moderators; from the 
presence of venture capitalists to the panels packed with entrepreneurs and “thought leaders”, 
Nairobi Tech Week, while ostensibly a conference designed to celebrate technology and the 
techies, frequently felt more like a celebration of the startup. For a session on “tech talent” in the 
tech sector, for example, all of the panel speakers were entrepreneurs or managers of some kind at 
Kenyan startups, comprised of Kenyans and foreigners, men and women. Even at a panel on data 
science, which could have just focused on the science and programming involved, the majority of 
the speakers were themselves entrepreneurs. An entire industry seems to have exploded in 
Nairobi since 2007 to support, fund, nurture, train, and house these startups. Over the course of 
2016, I saw dozens of startup competitions and startup accelerators; I saw many of the city’s most 
prominent universities open their own ‘innovation labs’ aimed at turning their students into 
startup founders; and I saw numerous consulting firms advertising their services to entrepreneurs 
or funders looking for investments. Numerous other coworking spaces also opened after the iHub 
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in 2010. At the time of writing there were at least 13 in all. 4 While they all have their unique 
character, most resemble those in Silicon Valley in their choice of open plan spaces. 
Multiple	overlapping	communities	
When members of Silicon Valley’s community of technology innovators visit the iHub, like the 
A.A. member, they will likely find much that is familiar, from the office layout, to the focus on 
the startup, from the modes of supporting startups to the styles of communication and stories they 
tell. Indeed, in many ways, the repertoire of practices that Kenyan innovators share has more in 
common with the practices of other programmers and entrepreneurs in Hong Kong or Berlin than 
with the practices of many other Kenyans from the food vendors down the road to the bankers in 
the Central Business District. And Kenya’s CTI itself is rife with international actors. From 
Google’s funding for coworking spaces and design labs, to the World Bank’s funding for research 
around programming bootcamps; from entrepreneurs coming from Harvard and Ghana to venture 
capitalists coming from Hong Kong and the Netherlands. Kenyan entrepreneurs themselves travel 
as well, attending international technology and innovations conferences like Social Capital 
Markets and South by Southwest; they travel to Silicon Valley to train at the legendary startup 
incubator Y-Combinator, to Hong Kong or Johannesburg to develop investor partnerships, and to 
London to pitch their ideas at global startup competitions like the Global Edtech Startup Awards.  
Yet the repertoire of practices is also decidedly Kenyan. Many of the most successful 
startups in Nairobi would not exist without Kenya’s unique mobile payment platform and their 
practices are influenced by the infrastructural challenges around imports and exports, by the 
interest or lack thereof they receive from Kenyan politicians, and by cultural norms that make 
Kenyan investors more cautious of the high-risk high-return model of startup investment. Many 
aspects of the material culture I observed, while clearly influenced by Silicon Valley also felt 
distinct. For example, while many of the men I knew wore jeans and branded t-shirts like their 
American counterparts, the women often dressed with far more color and style, sometimes 
incorporating Kitenge fabrics and elaborate statement necklaces to incorporate more obvious 
‘Africanness’ into their style of dress, creating a symbolic distinction between themselves and 
their Western counterparts. Over my time in Nairobi, I found myself dressing up, wearing more 
stylish pieces than when I first arrived. Many of the spaces of innovation in Nairobi were a hybrid 
of African style and Silicon Valley’s own industrial chic. One coworking space for example 
sported an ‘upcycled’ metal table in the shape of Africa with another was decorated in Kitenge 
print pillows and wooden pallets.  
Kenyan innovators are therefore part of a locally situated Kenyan Community of 
Innovators, who often share physical practices and spaces, joint virtual collaborations, and 
practices that are at times unique responses to the physical environment in which they’re 
working. But this community also shares many of its practices, and much of its material culture 
and communicative ecology, including its stories and narratives, with innovators around the 
world. Furthermore, the way in which programming new applications and funding new startups 
currently take place in Nairobi is far from geographically isolated. Many of the venture capitalists 
and other funders in Nairobi come from the United States and Europe, echoing the hierarchies of 
power embedded in the historical colonial pathways (Irani et al., 2010). 
So, like members of A.A., while Kenyan innovators belong to a geographically situated 
innovation community in Nairobi, they are also engaged in some fashion with the global 
community, membership in which often more readily satisfies aspirational desires of global 
engagement and meaning.  
                                                      
4 iHub, iLab, Nailab, Nairobi Garage, The Foundry, Pawa254, GrowthHub, Almasi, Axlr8 Coworking 
Space, The Hive…Chandaria, Odeo, Gearbox (offering some kind of co-working space even if they don’t 
call themselves by this label) 
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As I showed at the beginning of this chapter, Lave and Wenger incorporated 
heterogeneity and the potential for conflict in the process of “jointly negotiating” meaning into 
their theory of communities of practice. This is further aggravated, Wenger showed, by our 
inherent membership and participation in multiple communities, often simultaneously. “The 
nexus resulting from reconciliation work,” he wrote, “is not necessarily harmonious, and the 
process is not done once and for all. Multimembership may involve ongoing tensions that are 
never resolved” (Wenger, 1998, p. 160). 
 
Continuing to look at the practices in which Kenyan innovators are engaged as taking 
place in multiple overlapping communities of practice (rather than ‘worlds’ or ‘networks’), I 
believe, provides a useful grounding for the discussion I hope to have in this dissertation, and I 
believe helps to refocus the communities of practice theory in a way that makes it more 
analytically useful in the modern age. In retaining the term community, I hope to foreground both 
the sense of meaning and belonging that a “community” (rather than a ‘world’ or a ‘network’) 
elicits, as well as the complex and often conflictual process of jointly negotiating practices across 
vastly different geo-cultural settings and across multiple overlapping communities. 
Over time, individual Kenyan techies and entrepreneurs must negotiate the hierarchies of 
legitimacy in each of the communities of practice in which they belong. At times, they can 
converge: Being taken seriously as a technology entrepreneur may be similar in some regards in 
both a global and a Kenyan community. But they can also conflict. For example, often legitimacy 
in the global community comes from building a startup that can scale quickly and internationally, 
while belonging in the Kenyan community may require an explicit and authentic commitment to 
addressing the needs of the local community over the global one in the technology that is 
designed. Belonging (or wishing to belong) to the global community of technology innovators (as 
well as, or perhaps even instead of the Kenyan one) brings with it homogenizing pressures and 
expectations that often relegate Kenyans and other Africans to peripheral roles, push them out 
entirely (as I will show in Chapter 3), or lead Kenyan innovators to reject membership in the 
global community in favor of focusing on the Kenyan one (as I will show in Chapter 4). 
Together, a more critical application of the communities of practice theory enhanced with 
narrative theory allows for a foregrounding of heterogeneity, the hierarchies of legitimacy, and 
impact of community narratives in a community of practice, that can help to better understand the 
experiences of Kenyan techies. 
Conclusion	
In this chapter, I have used the way in which technology innovation has been practiced in Silicon 
Valley to build the theoretical framework necessary to make sense of the expansion of those 
practices to other parts of the globe and what that expansion means for techies and tech 
entrepreneurs in a historically disadvantaged region of the world. The framework that I have built 
here and that I will use going forward takes a more critical interpretation of communities of 
practice theory – focusing on the power imbalances and the potential for conflict inherent in 
heterogeneous communities formed around practice rather than identity or geography – and 
strengthens it by integrating narrative theory. I have made the case here that what narrative theory 
says about larger narratives, particularly community narratives, can enhance our understanding of 
how communities of practice are formed and change and how members’ sense of meaning and 
legitimacy are constructed. In the case of Silicon Valley’s CTI, I believe that narratives, like the 
Technology is Good Narrative (and, as I will show in Chapter 2, the Anyone Anywhere 
Narrative), have played a particularly important role in helping the practice formed in Silicon 
Valley gain traction elsewhere. 
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 I have also outlined in this chapter what I believe are some of the characteristics of 
Silicon Valley’s CTI that set it apart from other kinds of innovation or other kinds of technology 
production. These include: 1) the rapid pace of innovation and the belief in the intrinsic value of 
new technology over the old; 2) a capitalist ideology and innovations for a profit; 3) the venture 
capital funding structure and pressure to expand exponentially to a global market; 4) a focus on, 
and even a glorification of, the startups and the entrepreneurs that lead them; 5) a material culture 
that includes more relaxed business casual dress and open plan coworking spaces; 6) a 
communicative ecology that is comprised of rapid information exchanges and techno-visionary 
storytellers; and 7) community narratives, like the Technology is Good Narrative, that transmit 
and reinforce common values and create a model of the practices of a successful member of 
Silicon Valley’s CTI. 
 With both the theoretical framework in mind and a clearer sense of what I mean by 
Silicon Valley’s Community of Technology Innovators, I concluded the chapter by make the case 
that the practices in this Silicon Valley’s CTI are increasingly becoming adopted in diverse 
regions around the world, leading to the creation of not just other local Communities of 
Technology Innovators, like the one in Kenya, but also to the gradual formation of a more 
interconnected Global CTI as well.  
After years of conducting research in and around Kenyan techies, I believe that the way 
technology innovation is currently being practiced in Nairobi is part of a process of negotiating 
engagement and legitimacy with this Global CTI, rather than a process of imitation or replication 
of Silicon Valley on the Savannah. In this chapter, I have made the case that at this moment, 
roughly ten years after Nairobi’s “startup ecosystem” is generally believed to have begun, what I 
believe is taking place is a process of negotiation—a negotiation of the terms, the extent, and the 
quality of inclusion in this Global Community. With memberships in multiple communities of 
practice that each elicit their own sense of loyalty and pressure to conform, the process can be an 
extremely messy one, laden with power imbalances and road blocks. As I will show in 
subsequent chapters, most Kenyan tech innovators are as yet neither seen as “full members” of 
this Global Community nor do they always desire, or perceive themselves as deserving of, full 
integration. And existing simultaneously with the desire to be taken seriously by foreign 
technology innovators is often a profound desire to retain a particular Kenyan quality of 
innovation in Nairobi and a commitment to the local Kenyan CTI. Particularly when looking at 
the very real presence and influence of white foreigners in Nairobi’s tech community, there are 
many who see real Kenyan participation as under threat. Large-scale community events, like 
Nairobi Tech Week, held on a semi-regular basis, are often a way of reconfirming or 
renegotiating what tech in Kenya is or should be all about and how engaged it should be with the 
rest of the world. They are also usually sites of contestation over this vision. The complex 
negotiation processes will be addressed in later chapters, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5. For 
now, by focusing on the role of narratives in communities of practice, I want to look more at how 
Silicon Valley’s approach to technology innovation spread around the world. In Chapter 2, I will 
build on the work in this chapter and make the case that in addition to the financial and 
technological incentives that others have pointed to, community narratives, particularly what I 
call the Anyone Anywhere Narrative, and storytelling were also instrumental in enabling the 
expansion and the creation of a Global Community of Technology Innovators and in helping the 
Community and its practices to appeal to a Kenyan audience of networked techies. 
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CHAPTER	2:	THE	ANYONE	ANYWHERE	NARRATIVE		
In June 2016, I attended one of many events held at the iHub in Nairobi. This particular event was 
the second in a series called “#iHubSpeaks” that brought artists, musicians, and journalists to 
speak to a “techie” audience at the iHub. That night in June, a well-known Kenyan filmmaker, 
named Jim Chuchu was the evening’s main feature. He spoke at length about a project that he 
was currently working on called ‘A Fractured City’, which he described as his attempt to “bring 
light to untold places in Nairobi through storytelling.” In the eyes of this very charismatic 
filmmaker, stories were all powerful; they could build countries and start wars; they could erase 
pasts or enable conflicts, like in Kenya’s post-election violence in 2008. And they were not solely 
the possession of professional storytellers like him. In his telling, everyone was a storyteller. 
“You might not think of yourself as a storyteller,” he said, “but the shit we say to one another, 
those are stories.” 
I feel like even the idea of countries is storytelling. I feel like the American 
dream is a story. Obama was a story. The idea of change. Being patriotic is a 
story. If you look at America, I think growing up in America must be very 
interesting because you grow up in a country where you’re repeatedly told 
this is the greatest nation in the world, the greatest country on earth. There’s 
no Kenyan child who’s ever told you’re growing up in the greatest country in 
the world. It would never happen. So, for me that’s why I approach 
storytelling as doing something very powerful, very potent, something that 
even governments could invest in to change the way their citizens think about 
themselves and about the world. 
Chuchu is far from the only one to make the case for, or to appreciate the transformative 
power of, a story. In many ways, his assertions echo those made by narrative theorist and 
members of Silicon Valley’s community of innovators alike about the power of storytelling that 
we saw in Chapter 1. As Chuchu pointed out, the United States is particularly good at taking 
advantage of the power of a story –  constructing historical origin narratives that glorify the 
founders, telling war stories that position America ever on the side of good and light, and telling 
future-facing stories of possibility and perseverance that make up the larger narrative about the 
American Dream. It is no wonder that such a country would be the birthplace of the modern 
practice of entrepreneurial technology innovation, a practice that has 0at its core both a belief in 
the ability to build a better future through technology innovation, and a belief in the ability of 
individual entrepreneurs to bring about big, world-altering, social change. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that Silicon Valley’s innovation practices have come to form the 
basis of a global community of innovators. But how it came to do so is another matter. Some 
aspects of the answer to that are more apparent and have been more thoroughly studied than 
others. For one, as I showed in Chapter 1, there has long been a close and interdependent 
relationship between venture capital investments and the creation and growth of technology 
startups. Israeli management and economics scholars, for example, have even shown that a fully-
formed venture capital market was only able to emerge in Israel because if ‘co-evolved’ with the 
emergence of the country’s ‘high-tech’ startup sector (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2006). And while 
venture capital firms themselves have historically focused on companies in one geographic 
location (Haemmig, 2003) or on networks of connected individuals to promising markets in other 
countries (Madhavan & Iriyama, 2009), a number of new publications from management scholars 
have shown that the high-risk high-return nature of the relationship between venture capital 
investing and advanced technology production is leading them to look for innovators in new place 
(Agmon & Sjögre, 2016; Kenney, 2017). The reasons behind this have been explored in far 
greater detail by management and economics scholars than I intend to do here. Suffice it to say, 
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there is now a financial incentive for investors to look beyond Silicon Valley for startups and 
entrepreneurs in which to invest that can generate “VC-like returns” (Kenney, 2017, p. 26). 
In tandem of course is the improved access that peoples around the world have to 
technological products and the increasingly virtual nature of the products produced making them 
far more easily transported than the physical computers and silicon chips that were the mainstay 
of Silicon Valley in the 1980s. The virtual nature of the practice of software development in 
particular has made it far easier for people in vastly different parts of the globe to both learn how 
to code and develop their own applications without needing the vast technological resources of 
Silicon Valley. Even if finding and securing investment often still requires face-to-face contact, 
the virtual nature of the product means that innovators in Bangalore, Berlin, and Nairobi are all 
potentially able to sell the products they’ve designed directly to non-local markets. 
This chapter goes beyond factors like those above that give people in places like Nairobi 
the ability and the resources to build their own software applications, and instead asks what 
makes the Silicon Valley model of technology innovation attractive to people in Nairobi? I 
propose that at least a part of the answer to that lies within communicative ecology around Silicon 
Valley’s technology innovation practice, particularly in its stories and narratives. 
For a community so aware of the importance of telling compelling, inspiring stories, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, it feels like an oversight to look at how Silicon Valley has managed to 
expand its practices to become a global community without looking at the role that stories and 
narratives have played in making that possible. In this chapter, I hope to “shed light”, as Jim 
Chuchu would say, on this under-examined area. To do so, I will first build on the theoretical 
work I did in Chapter 1 about the role of stories and narratives in communities and will use that to 
look at how they operate in less geographically confined more imagined communities, like the 
global community of technology innovators. I will then use this framework to examine a 
particular set of stories—stories about how anyone anywhere can innovate revolutionary new 
technology—and the instrumental role they have played in helping the creation of a global 
community, including to places not traditionally associated in stories with technology innovation, 
like Nairobi, Kenya. Finally, focusing specifically on the Kenyan case, I will show how these 
stories appealed to Kenyan audiences through 1) the integration of diverse settings, heroes, and 
storytellers into the stories about technology innovation, 2) the interaction between these stories 
and real-world events, and 3) the resonance these stories have had with the pre-existing narratives 
and aspirations of Kenyan techies and entrepreneurs. I hope by the end of this chapter to have 
made a persuasive case for the important role stories and narratives played in encouraging 
Kenyans to adopt the practice of Silicon Valley innovators. 
 
Narratives	and	Transnational	Communities	
If you recall, in Chapter 1 I defined stories as both true and untrue tales told by individuals or 
organizations that come with a story arc, a hero, and sometimes a lesson. By contrast, I defined 
narratives as the larger culturally dominant tales that are formed through the telling and retelling 
of many similar individual stories. In a community, its narratives are constructed as its members 
tell their own stories or retell old canonic ones; narratives in turn come to construct the 
community, influencing members’ perceptions of how members should behave, what the 
community’s boundaries are or should be, who does and does not belong, and what membership 
and belonging should look like. In otherwise, I view a community and its narratives as mutually 
constituted. As the narrative scholar, Julian Rappaport, wrote, “a community cannot be a 
community without a shared narrative” (Rappaport, 2000). Shared narratives give communities a 
sense of coherence and their members a sense of belonging. 
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Even more so than in geographically confined communities, community narratives are 
especially important in ‘imagined’ communities. Just as American narratives about the founding 
fathers or the American Dream give Americans a sense of national identity and belonging, 
narratives can play an important part in the construction of the imagined national communities 
that Benedict Anderson so famously described (B. Anderson, 2006). They convey a sense of 
share experience when members never actually meet; they provide the basis of communally 
agreed histories and goals; they provide a sense of ‘belonging’ across physical borders; and they 
provide a guide for accepted behaviors and practices and for identifying other members. Other 
scholars have shown, for example, how shared narratives have helped build a sense of 
transnational imagined community within Asian or European regions (Bondebjerg, 2016; Sun, 
2017) or among diasporic communities (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008; Newon, 2014). 
Religion provides a particularly effective illustration of how geographically dispersed 
communities develop a sense of identity, or as McMillan and Chavis and others have called it, a 
sense of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). In an article on religion and cultural change in 
Africa published in 2010, the Nigerian socialogist Samuel Zalanga wrote “as Africans in both the 
rural and burgeoning urban centers convert to Pentecostal Christianity, they become aware that 
they belong to a new community. This new community is not built on kinship or even tribal, 
ethnic, or geographical identity. It is an imagined community that exists at the national and 
international level” (2010, p. 46). For Zalanga, one of the primary ways this imagined community 
is made real to its members is through the circulation of “goods, ideas and people” (2010, p. 46). 
For example, he argues that “through the frequent exchange of speakers from within the nation 
and internationally, the cognitive orientation and worldview of the new converts are broadened” 
beyond their national landscape (Zalanga, 2010, p. 46). These individuals often come and recount 
their own stories, frequently stories of their own conversion that help listeners to build an 
understanding of what makes up a ‘typical’ person within that particular religious community, 
and what kinds of practices, experiences, and beliefs are expected.  
In the modern manifestation of both religious and diasporic communities, new 
communication technologies have come to play an important role in how the core beliefs and 
practices that unite the community are conveyed across borders (Helland, 2007; Parham, 2004). 
Take the example of the Evangelical Christian community explored in great depth by 
anthropologist Simon Coleman in the 1990s. Through ethnographic research with one branch of 
the church in Sweden, he observed how emphatically the community had embraced the then new 
mediums of “radio, cassettes, videos, satellite and cable television programmes” (S. Coleman, 
1996), and had begun selling and distributing things like televised sermons throughout the 
transnational community. Through the distribution of this content, he wrote, “members gain 
access to an imagined, translocal community of Christians engaged in a world-wide project of 
evangelization, and their imagination is sustained by constant flows of personnel and 
commodities through an internal economy of evangelical culture” (S. Coleman, 1996). More 
recently, religious apps have become big business helping the faithful engage with their own 
transnational religious community (Bell, 2006), to, for example, identify particular passages from 
the Bible (Not Just Words), to know which direction to point to prey to Mecca (Quibla Compass), 
or to simulate the act of counting prayer beads (Virtual Japa Mala).  
Similarly, in a global community of technology innovators virtual content plays an 
important role in informing community members of the happenings throughout the globe. Online 
magazines like TechCrunch available in any part of the globe with an internet connection, convey 
stories of entrepreneurial success and failure, stories saturated with techno-visionary imagery, 
like the revolutionary power of technological advancements. Video broadcasts of the latest 
product releases from companies like Apple or of speeches from “though leaders” on the TED 
stage about driverless cars, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality provide content 
individuals around the globe can watch repeatedly to spark the imagination of members 
worldwide in an imagined community that is ever facing the future (Shandrow, 2016). Even 
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stories critical of formerly successful technology entrepreneurs, like the many stories published 
about the ongoing corruption scandal surrounding Elizabeth Holmes, the former billionaire and 
CEO of the failed health tech company, Theranos (Kosoff, 2018), help community members to 
develop a common sense of which practices should be excluded from the community.  
Books like The Lean Startup and Lead and Disrupt also serve a particularly important 
function in developing the sense of common best practices among technology innovators spread 
around the world, practices that help identify members from non-members. Like canonic religious 
texts that “communicate to members and to others what the community is like, how it came to be 
that way, and (sometimes implicitly) what behavior is expected” (Mankowski & Rappaport 
p.481), books like The Lean Startup convey what behavior is necessary in order to be successful 
as a technology innovator, particularly if an entrepreneur hopes to expand beyond his or her 
national borders. In the “acclaim for The Lean Startup” section at the beginning of Ries’s book, 
Steve Blank, a legend of Silicon Valley, an entrepreneur, and a Stanford lecturer, described it as 
“the roadmap for innovation for the twenty-first century”, while Randy Komisar, founding 
director of TiVo, wrote that “Starting Lean is today’s best practice for innovators. Do yourself a 
favor and read this book.” When key figures in a community point to a text and label it “the 
startup Bible” (Saltzman, 2014) they are telling community members that it is a text that should 
be referred to over and over again, a reference guide for how to behave and what to believe.  
Often precisely how to behave is conveyed by way of stories within these texts, news 
articles, apps, and videos. Just as the personal stories of addiction and sobriety in the Big Book—
the core text for the transnational addiction recovery community, Alcoholics Anonymous—teach 
behavior about how to stay sober by way of illustrated personal examples (Strobbe & Kurtz, 
2012), so the GCTI books like The Lean Startup tell personal stories that teach the ideal behavior 
for building a tech startup. In fact, The Lean Startup’s author, Eric Ries, even begins, in the very 
first sentence, with a personal story. 
Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. Brilliant college kids sitting in a 
dorm are inventing the future. Heedless of boundaries, possessed of new 
technology and youthful enthusiasm, they build a new company from scratch. 
Their early success allows them to raise money and bring an amazing new 
product to market. They hire their friends, assemble a superstar team, and dare 
the world to stop them. Ten years and several startups ago, that was me, 
building my first company. I particularly remember a moment from back 
then: the moment I realized my company was going to fail… (Ries, 2011) 
As his story of personal failure unfolds, Ries here conveys the lesson that anyone using 
the ‘right process’ can be a successful entrepreneur. “Startup success is not a consequence of 
good genes or being in the right place at the right time,” he writes. “Startup success can be 
engineered by following the right process, which means it can be learned, which means it can be 
taught” (Ries, 2011). For a community centered around a particular practice, like the GCTI, it is 
unsurprising that one of the most highly circulated texts is one with the express intention of 
telling people how best to practice entrepreneurship.  
At the same time, not all stories resonate equally across all audiences. The story of the 
African migrant who sailed in a rickety boat across the Mediterranean, may lead some in his or 
her country of origin to feel inspired to follow suit, while at the same time raise concerns among 
some European audiences about the ‘invasion’ of their continent by foreigners. As a result, while 
core texts that travel unaltered across borders for diverse audiences to read, like The Lean 
Startup, do play an important part in storied community identity building, so does the ability of 
stories to transform over space and time while still retaining the underlying community narrative. 
As the narrative scholar, Francesca Polletta has written, it is the ability of certain narratives to 
adapt to different cultural and ideological contexts and still resonate as ‘familiar’ with diverse 
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audiences that gives them staying power. She writes: narratives “are influential not because 
they’re told over and over again in identical form, but rather because they mesh with other 
familiar stories” (Polletta, 2009). 
In fact, the act of retelling stories that adapt and evolve over time is so important to 
community and culture building that literary scholars Stephens and McCallum, wrote an entire 
book, Retelling Stories, Framing Culture, around the role of retelling children’s stories. For 
Stephens and McCallum and others, retold stories do not remain unchanged. They evolve and 
adapt in the hands of different tellers and through the interpretive eye of difference audiences. As 
they write, “few retellings are simple replications, even when they appear to reproduce the story 
and point of view of the source. In such cases, the purpose is generally cultural reproduction” 
(Stephens & McCallum, 2013, p. 1-2). One example they give of the transcultural retelling of an 
original story is that of the Western adoption of the ‘Arabian Nights’ stories. Aspects of these 
stories that resonated particularly well in a Western interpretive context have become 
commonplace in Western storytelling, while others have been discarded. Stories of characters like 
Aladdin, Ali Baba, and Sinbad, traveling along ‘rags-to-riches’ type plots, are told and retold to 
Western audiences because the particular lessons resonated with existing Western ideology 
(Stephens & McCallum, 2013). In fact, they argue that because the context of these stories is 
unfamiliar to Western audiences, it is particularly important that they convey something familiar 
in order to make sense and resonate to such diverse audiences.  
One way to tell stories across cultures successfully is to emphasize universal values that 
appear to transcend geography and culture. For Stephen and McCallum transcultural stories are 
frequently “constructed so as to convey a sense of universal human values, moral insight, and 
some aspect of cultural tradition” (Stephens & McCallum, 2013, p. 223). Though many scholars 
have also certainly shown the problems that arise when universality is assumed, particularly by 
storytellers embedded in Western ideologies (Bradford, 2007; Szilagyi, 2010). Another option is 
to shift character perspectives while telling a story—as in the case of someone recounting both 
sides of a fight that they had observed. Through alternating point of view, Polletta explains, 
“storytellers make it possible for listeners to identify with different perspectives and, at the same 
time, to recognize each one as incomplete” (2009, p.9). Yet another tactic may be to incorporate 
local characters into a foreign tale. Such was the case when African prophets were incorporated 
into Christian missionary tales to increase the relevance of missionary sermons to African 
audiences (De Kock, 1993), or even when Hollywood movies like, Iron Man 3 (2013) or The 
Great Wall (2016), increasingly (though often unsuccessfully) incorporate famous Chinese movie 
stars into films in order to appeal to a Chinese audience that makes up a growing portion of their 
box office revenue (Schwartzel, 2016). A final important tactic is for local storytellers to take up 
the mantle of furthering the community narrative in their own stories. Again, such is the case in 
the quintessential transnational imagined communities, religions, which incorporate regionally 
based religious leaders, like Pentecostal Ghanaian pastors, into the group of approved storytellers. 
While their foreign counterparts are often better able to speak to the general universality of the 
core beliefs of the community, the local storytellers are particularly adept at conveying the local 
relevance of an intangible global community to a local audience. 
The	Development	of	the	Anyone	Anywhere	Narrative	
Not long ago, all of the major innovations came from big research labs in the 
West. And Silicon Valley not only built the core technologies but also the best 
applications of these. This is where all the amazing advances happened. We 
no longer have a monopoly on disruptive innovation. The cost of building 
world-changing technologies has dropped exponentially and made it possible 
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for entrepreneurs anywhere to solve the grand challenges of humanity—and 
disrupt entire industries. (Wadhwa, Tech Crunch, 2016) 
With the theoretical groundwork laid, I want now to look at how some of this has played out in 
practice in the context of the practice of technology on a global scale. In particular, I want to 
show how stories and narratives have helped enable the expansion of this community around the 
globe. To do this, I will focus on the evolution of a single new narrative that has emerged for this 
community, a narrative that I believe has played an important part in helping the Silicon Valley 
model of innovation become global. The narrative is embedded in the TechCrunch quote above: 
now, with access to “world changing technologies” anyone anywhere can build innovative new 
technology that can change the world. Through the telling and retelling of stories that support this 
narrative—stories told with different settings, different heroes, and by different storytellers—the 
narrative emphasizing the universality of entrepreneurial tech innovation has flourished. Much 
like global religious groups, core texts, the use of new technological mediums for storytelling, the 
emphasis on universality, and the circulation of iconic community storytellers has helped to 
further what I will call the Anyone Anywhere Narrative. While all of these aspects of storytelling 
around the Anyone Anywhere Narrative could comprise their own chapter, I will focus in the 
following pages on how a sense of global community and belonging is being made possible 
through both the addition of different settings, heroes, and storytellers, to the storytelling 
landscape, and the interaction between these stories and real-world events unfolding. As we will 
see in the final section of this chapter, I believe that in the context of Nairobi it has played at least 
a small part in persuading Kenyans to adopt these increasingly global practices.  
Different	settings	
Large Western technology companies, like Google and Facebook—companies that themselves 
spread across the globe in a search for brand ubiquity—are good examples of iconic Silicon 
Valley storytellers who have expanded the setting for technology innovation and consequently 
their audience. In the two following examples, we will see that both companies expressly situate 
their stories in a global setting while retaining their company and their product as the story’s hero. 
Below is an excerpt from a Google branded YouTube video. It was posted in 2012 to 
promote their then new venture, Google for Entrepreneurs, which was meant to help support 
entrepreneurs “wherever they are”. The video begins by panning across an open plan room with 
black and red chairs and large windows. Three young white men are visible sitting at black tables, 
headphones covering or embedded in their ears, staring at computer screens while soft ambient 
spa-ish music plays in the background. The video cuts to an Asian woman with an American 
accent named Mary Grove who we’re told is the “Head of Google for Entrepreneurs.” Grove 
narrates: 
Google for Entrepreneurs is our umbrella effort of all of Google’s programs 
and partnerships to support startups and entrepreneurs around the world. 
Today we have roughly fifty efforts live in over 30 countries around the 
world….One of my favorite programs is called Jagriti Yatra and it’s a train 
ride across rural India with about 400 really energized youth and mentors. 
They discuss and they iterate and they get off really inspired and ready to go 
out there and implement that idea. (Google for Entrepreneurs, 2012) 
In this video, Google is the story’s clear hero; Google is the one acting to support 
“startups and entrepreneurs around the world”. Grove later shifts to telling stories within this 
larger story about specific project that Google is helping to support; the excerpt above shows one 
from India. The Indians who ran and participated in the project became the subjects of this story 
within a story. “They”—the participating students in India—“discuss” and “get off [the train] 
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really inspired”. By even including an example from India (all the other specific examples they 
gave were from Western contexts) Google is providing a specifically developing country context 
to argues that the entrepreneurs they work with really are anywhere. At the same time, the 
overarching “hero” of the larger story in this particular video is undeniably Google for 
Entrepreneurs for the service it is providing in supporting all these inspired global innovators. 
A 2016 interview with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg provides a similar example from 
another Western corporate. In the video, Zuckerberg is being interviewed by a representative of 
the infamous Silicon Valley startup incubator, Y-Combinator. The video begins with Zuckerberg 
and his interviewer seated in a room encased in windows overlooking a large brightly lit space 
that seems like it could either be a coworking space or a factory floor, with all the material culture 
familiar to any Silicon Valley innovator. The way both interviewer and interviewee are dressed 
also echoes the material dress culture described in Chapter 1. In fact, the two look a bit like 
mirror images of one another: similar sandy brown hairstyles, dark jeans, sneakers, and t-shirts 
both in shades of grey. The interview is part of a series Y-Combinator has done with leaders in 
the tech field called “How to Build the Future”, a series clearly intended to give an amplifying 
platform to “tech-visionaries” who can see the future and tell a story about it in the way others 
cannot. Zuckerberg has clearly embraced this role. In the interview, he lays out three things he 
believes are central to Facebook’s “roadmap to the future”. The first and seemingly most crucial 
of these three is connectivity. He tells a story about the future to explain why he believes 
connectivity is so important: 
Connectivity, right so getting everyone in the world on the Internet. Right 
now, more than half of the world is not on the Internet and I think a lot of 
people in Silicon Valley take this for granted. The Internet…it just is not 
uniformly available. And if we want to solve a lot of the big challenges today 
they’re not problems that any one group of people or even one country can 
solve. They really involve coming together and giving everyone an 
opportunity to participate in solving them. So I think connecting everyone is 
really a key thing. It’s going to be great for people around the world. (Y 
Combinator, 2016) 
Interestingly, while still being physically situated in an office in Silicon Valley, 
Zuckerberg tells a story about the importance of global connectivity to fulfill the promise of one 
of the shared values of Silicon Valley innovators: that new technology can save the world. 
Through the addition of a very global setting in his story, Zuckerberg is using the strength of an 
existing community belief—a belief in the importance of using new technology to solve big 
problems—in order to make the case for adding a new belief, the belief that global participation is 
necessary to achieve that goal. Like other transcultural storytellers, Zuckerberg is really 
emphasizing the universality of this story. In his eyes, it really applies to everyone; everyone 
everywhere needs to be involved in this process of making the world better through technology. 
Underlying this excerpt is his inference that Facebook is an, if not the, essential component in 
providing the technology for the global connectivity that’s necessary to literally save the world. 
Like Google in the previous clip, in Zuckerberg’s story of a possible future, Facebook is the 
catalyst that will enable people around the world to participate in solving the big challenges; they 
are the real heroes, the hero behind the scenes.  
Like the corporates, some of the core texts of Silicon Valley (Forbes, Tech Crunch) have, 
over the last eight years and particularly over the last four, begun including stories set outside of 
California. For these core texts, I focus here on texts that are more likely to reach an audience 
from the majority of technology innovators across the globe. For cultivating a sense of a 
community in a national technology innovation community, national tech blogs and Twitter 
communities can play an enormous role. But in countries like Kenya they are rarely read by non-
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African audiences, unless those audiences are specifically seeking out information about 
technology innovation in Africa. By contrast, most of the Kenyan techies I worked with had 
heard of Forbes and Tech Crunch and most read articles on at least a semi-regular basis. At the 
time of writing, Forbes was also intentionally cultivating a global audience, publishing 38 
different international print and corresponding online editions of its magazine, including Forbes 
Africa, China, India, and Latin America. 
I want to take a closer look at Forbes for a moment. In 2011 (incidentally just one year 
after the opening of the iHub), a Kenyan journalist named Mfonobong Nsehe began writing a 
column for Forbes, called The Africa Chronicles, in order to, according to his bio “chronicle 
Africa’s success stories and track its richest people” (Nsehe, 2017). In March 2011, when he first 
started writing the column, both of his stories Forbes published were about African billionaires 
and did not focus on tech entrepreneurship. However, beginning just the following month two 
were. The first, “Google Funds African Tech Startups” (Nsehe, 2011b), told the story of Google 
entering the tech entrepreneurship market in South Africa in order to support its growth; the 
second, “Why Africa May Never Produce a Facebook, Groupon, Zynga or Google” (Nsehe, 
2011a), praised the potential of African tech entrepreneurs but lamented the lack of capital 
inhibiting their growth to unicorn status. Both of these are examples of stories that are situated in 
Africa, at the time something quite new for a Western news outlet talking about technology 
innovation, but did not feature African grown heroes or real “success stories” as Nsehe had 
sought out to do. That has come with time as his column has taken up the mantle of telling the 
story of a ‘rising Africa’. 
In each of these examples, the new globally situated stories were being told alongside 
real-world events. In the case of the corporates, the stories they were telling were set in a global 
community and were accompanied by (or even used to justify) real world actions they were 
taking to actively turn towards the rest of the world while at the same time trying not to turn away 
from their American origins. In the case of Forbes, it is perhaps self-evident that a news outlet 
should be reporting real news events. However, in such traditionally US- or Western-centric news 
outlets, the stories they tell can often be behind the real trends taking place, particularly when 
they take place outside of their traditional scope of interest.  
Different	heroes	
Gradually, traditional storytellers of the technology innovation community, like Forbes, have 
started to include different heroes. For example, in 2011 Forbes created its 30 Under 30 list to 
celebrate the “brightest young entrepreneurs, breakout talent and change agents in 20 different 
sectors” (Howard, 2017). In many ways, this list, and the personal biographical stories Forbes 
includes for each winner, put these winners front and center as “heroes” and shapers for future 
progress to come. For industries that value newness and youth highly, like the technology startup 
sector, focusing on people under 30 is particularly fitting. The list holds the individuals on it up as 
archetypes of their respective industries, the ideal that we should all strive to be. At the time they 
started this list, and for the following four years, it only focused on people within the United 
States. However, in 2015 Forbes launched 30 Under 30 Africa, and in 2016, 30 Under 30 Europe 
and 30 Under 30 Asia, celebrating entrepreneurs in each of these regions. Such a shift gives some 
indication that Forbes, a veritable agenda setter in the innovation and entrepreneurship news 
scene in the US, believed that there was enough entrepreneurial activity happening in those 
regions and that it would be sufficiently of interested to their audience that it was worth creating 
region specific competitions. By choosing to begin featuring African and Asian entrepreneurs so 
prominently in 2015 and 2016 respectively, Forbes included those region’s winners as new 
heroes of the global tech innovation story, allowing people from developing countries to be seen 
as archetypes of the practice of technology innovation to a global audience. 
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Yet this integration of new heroes at Forbes lagged behind real world successes. If we 
think of success for entrepreneurs around the world in the same way that Silicon Valley 
innovators would think of it, building a startup that become a ‘unicorn’ – making a substantial 
profit for the founders and investors –  would most quickly come to mind. A well-known non-
American example of this kind of success might be Waze. In June 2013, Google reportedly 
bought Waze for $1.3 billion (Cohan, 2013). The success of Waze helped establish Israel as the 
“Startup Nation” and spurred on an explosion of Israeli startups (Agmon & Sjögre, 2016; Demers 
& Yemen, 2015; Pasher, Pross, Kushnir, & Neeman, 2017). Waze was Israel’s first unicorn. But 
by the time Forbes launched its non-US 30 Under 30 editions, Waze was far from the only 
unicorn outside of the United States. In fact, in 2015 when the Africa 30 Under 30 list was first 
published, there were more unicorns coming from outside of the US than inside it (47%), a trend 
that continued into 2016 when US companied accounted for 46% of all new unicorns that year 
(CB Insights, 2017a).5 This level of success for non-US startups was, admittedly, relatively new. 
Of all of the unicorns to emerge in non-Western countries, only 3 from China and 1 from India 
reached such an astronomical exit valuation before 2014. But over the following years, gradually, 
real life, success stories seemed to be coming from places outside of the expected center of 
innovation power, the United States, and even outside of Europe and China. Israel’s second 
unicorn came in 2015; Latin America got its first two in Colombia and Argentina in 2015, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa got its in 2016 in Nigeria and South Africa. New, real life non-American 
successes, eventually meant more depictions of non-American heroes stories about successful 
technology innovators. And these different heroes often did more to expand global conceptions of 
what a successful technology innovator could look like than the earlier stories of old heroes in 
different settings. 
Different	storytellers	
The further addition of non-American, non-Western storytellers who are recognized as members 
of the growing global community of technology innovators onto platforms with a global audience 
has been another important step in building the Anyone Anywhere Narrative. If you recall from 
Chapter 1, storytelling, whether on a physical stage or a virtual one is a performative act, and as a 
result the identity, stance, behavior, accent and more can influence the way in which a story is 
received and interpreted. Just like the emergence of successful real-world technology companies 
from different parts of the globe, the addition of successful techie storytellers from ‘peripheral’ 
regions into the mainstream storytelling platforms that had historically paid more attention to 
Western storytellers appeared to give visual evidence that people from any race, gender, or part of 
the world could belong to, and be successful in, a global community of innovators. Such 
platforms include writing guest columns for mainstream news outlets about technology 
innovation, like Tech Crunch and Forbes, as well as giving talks at important innovation 
conferences like South by Southwest or TED.  
Let’s look at TED for a minute. Its audience is ostensibly even broader than those 
practicing technology innovation in its coverage of topics that stretch far beyond technology, and 
its catch phrase, “ideas worth spreading” (CITATION). But TED—which is, after all, short for 
Technology, Entertainment, Design—has played an important part in getting the stories of iconic 
Silicon Valley techno-visionaries to a much broader audience than traditional ‘techies’. Steve 
Jobs (2005), Sheryl Sandberg (2010), Elon Musk (2013), and Bill Gates (2010) have all spoken at 
TED; and their videos all have over 4 million views. Like these iconic figures of Silicon Valley’s 
innovation community, a number of figures famous within Kenyan have also spoken to a world 
stage at TED. Eric Hersman, Juliana Rotich, and Ory Okolloh are all members of the team that 
                                                      
5 The CB Insights site tracks companies that became unicorns from 2009 onwards 
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built the Kenyan crowd mapping software, Ushahidi, that provided a platform where Kenyans 
could report instances of violence during the post-election violence of 2008. They are also all 
members of the founding team of the iHub, and all TED fellows. Before that, they were some of 
Kenya’s earliest and most well-known bloggers. And while their TED videos have far fewer 
views than those of Jobs or Gates—Rotich’s video has 638,000(TED, 2013) and Hersman and 
Okolloh’s videos both have under 500,000 (TED, 2007, 2009a)—TED is one of the platforms 
where techies from Kenya have been able to tell their stories to an audience that is as global as 
most audiences get. 
Let’s look for a minute at Rotich’s talk, the most recent and the most viewed of the three. 
Giving a speech titled “Meet BRCK, Internet access built for Africa”, Rotich is immaculately 
dressed in a fitted black dress with a beaded African necklace and belt standing in front of the 
iconic red “TED” sign in an otherwise dark auditorium. She tells three specific stories about 
projects she’d been involved in—Ushahidi, the iHub, and BRCK—to paint an overall picture of 
Africans building technology. Combined, these three contribute to an overarching narrative she is 
constructing about Africans building technology to solve not only their own problems but the 
world’s. For example, at the beginning of the talk she tells the story of the success of Ushahidi 
beyond Kenya. In the course of the Ushahidi story, she gives the following personal reaction to its 
success: 
We did not imagine that there would be this many maps around the world. 
There are crisis maps, election maps, corruptions maps, and even 
environmental monitoring crowd maps. We are humbled that this has roots in 
Kenya and that it has some use to people around the world trying to figure out 
the different issues that they’re dealing with.” 
With this kind of statement placed at the end of her Ushahidi story, Rotich emphasizes 
the success they’d had of scaling their product beyond Kenya, beyond even Africa, to help people 
solve their own problems further afield. Presented this way, Rotich’s story flips the earlier 
Facebook and Google ones on their head and positions Africans as the real heroes whose work is 
empowering people in other, supposedly more developed parts of the world, rather than the 
Western corporates empowering Africans as the story more typically goes. 
Rotich concludes her talk with the story of BRCK, the new venture that she has really 
come to talk about. As she tells it, the creation of BRCK is a story of persistent blackouts in 
Nairobi interrupting the work and productivity of Kenyan coders; it is a story of how the team 
behind Ushahidi built a piece of hardware because they were frustrated with relying on ill-fitting 
Western technology. “Why,” she asks with the art of a good storyteller, “do we use technology 
designed for London and Los Angeles when we live in Nairobi and New Delhi?” “What 
happens,” she asks, “when Africans are no longer global consumers of solutions, but creators?” 
She wraps up the entire talk with this: “The building blocks of the digital economy are 
connectivity and entrepreneurship. The BRCK is our part to keep Africans connected and help 
them drive the global digital revolution.” With these words, she echoes Zuckerberg’s story of the 
importance of global connectivity to the tech enabled future that they both clearly envision. Like 
Zuckerberg, she skillfully takes advantage of an existing core belief about the role of new 
technology in bringing about social change and uses it to promote the key role that her product, 
the BRCK, and its creators are playing in bringing that about. Like Facebook for Zuckerberg, 
BRCK is positioned as Rotich’s hero that will enable the connectivity necessary to bring about 
the “global digital revolution.” The difference is that this time while the setting is still global, 
both the heroes and the storyteller are Kenyan. Because this story of an African-led techno-future 
is being told by a woman who was herself involved in the events in the story, she gives added 
credence to the narrative that anyone anywhere can and should play an active role in dreaming 
and building the future.  
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The	Anyone	Anywhere	Narrative	in	Kenya	
In the remainder of this chapter, I want to look at how the evolving Anyone Anywhere Narrative 
was seen and heard among the members of Kenya’s own technology innovation community and 
why, particularly in the early years of this decade, it resonated so much with these Kenyan techies 
and entrepreneurs. Crucially, I am not talking about the experience of Kenyans as a whole. My 
research method does not equip me to do so and Kenyan who are engaged in the practice of 
building technology startups are far from the national norm. But the in-depth nature of 
ethnography does allow me to talk in some detail about how stories around the Anyone 
Anywhere Narrative were communicated to this unique audience and how it resonated with and 
influenced them. I’ll talk first about the ways in which members of Kenya’s technology 
innovation community have been exposed to stories that support the Anyone Anywhere 
Narrative, and then about how the stories are modified and altered in the hands of Kenyan 
storytellers, and reinforced by real world events Kenyans have seen around them. Finally, I will 
look more at the ways in which Kenyan entrepreneurs and programmers that I knew and worked 
with have reacted to these stories and why they think they have resonated so much with Kenyan 
audiences. 
Virtual	storytelling	
Kenyan techies and tech entrepreneurs, like many of their counterparts around the world, are a 
particularly plugged-in group. They have a rich information ecology that is comprised of in 
person communications, traditional Kenyan news outlets, and the vast array of information 
available online. They are usually based in Nairobi and come from the middleclass, or the so-
called “rising middle-class” (Bhorat, Kharas, & Pita, 2017; The Economist, 2015); the vast 
majority is in or has been to college and has access to fast broadband internet. Import taxes can 
make getting the latest foreign products more expensive and more cumbersome than it is in the 
US; and as Rotich described, power outages are a semi-regular occurrence, even in Nairobi. But 
even during these blackouts, most Kenyans in this group can continue to consume news and 
information on the fast 4G internet on their mobile phones, and an increasing number do so on 
smart phones. They are also often particularly keen to stay up-to-date on the latest news, both 
tech related and political. Most Kenyans techies I came to know were on Twitter first thing in the 
morning, consuming news and producing content. They read Kenyan tech blogs and mainstream 
Kenyan business news, like The Business Daily; they also read other African tech blogs, 
particularly from Nigeria, as well as Tech Crunch and Forbes; they watched YouTube 
instructional videos and TED talks, and took online programming or design courses. When 
Forbes began its 30 Under 30 Africa list, they saw it; and when Samsung launched the Galaxy 
S8, they read the Gizmodo review. They watched Juliana Rotich’s speech at TED and the popular 
American pitch show, Shark Tank, even if they didn’t watch them live. This community is far 
from representative of the average Kenyan. With a national poverty rate of 42 percent (UNICEF, 
2018), and the percentage of urban poor in Nairobi increasing, these more privileged individuals 
stand apart in many ways. But they do make up the majority of the Kenya technology 
entrepreneurs. With such a high level of connectedness, this community of Kenyan innovators 
has had as much virtual exposure to the broader Anyone Anywhere Narrative as their 
counterparts in Europe and Asia. Like the members of the transnational Christian communities 
described earlier, through tech enabled hyper-connectivity, these connected Kenyans have 
become a part of a global audience of technology innovators. 
In-person	storytelling	
Also like their counterparts in the transnational Evangelical communities, Kenyan techies get 
firsthand exposure to stories that support the Anyone Anywhere Narrative through visits from 
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speakers from other parts of the global community of technology innovators, or from Kenyans 
who have experience abroad. This includes, for example, ‘glocal’ (S. Avle, 2011) Kenyans 
returning from engineering and computer science programs abroad, foreign investors, foreign 
entrepreneurs, and representatives from large corporates, and global startup competitions. 
When startup entrepreneurs and other techies visit Kenya in person, many – especially 
representatives of global startup competitions – are particularly vocal advocates of the Anyone 
Anywhere Narrative. Like Facebook, their business model depends on it. Even in the 
comparatively short history of the global community of practice around technology innovation, 
truly global startup competitions are a relatively new affair. Startup competitions that focus on 
finding entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley are hardly new, but those with a genuinely global scope 
have only really taken off since about 2013. Two prominent such competitions, Seedstars World 
and the 1776 Challenge Cup, for example, both started in 2013. 6 To get a sense of the kind of 
stories the organizers of these competitions tell, take a look at the following excerpt from a blog 
post that preceded the first regional round of a global competition called Startup World, which 
began in 2012. 
It’s inevitable there will be the next Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, Google or 
Facebook, the question is; where in the world will they come from? As the 
cost of innovation decreases and governments all over the world invest in 
startups to try and create the next Silicon Valley, entrepreneurship and startup 
culture is now a global story where more people than ever are plugged in and 
switched on… While there’s certainly advantages to building startups in 
Silicon Valley due to the sheer amount of entrepreneurs, venture capital and 
access to talent, startups and entrepreneurship are movements happening all 
over the world [emphasis added]. (Way, 2012) 
The tone is both euphoric and matter-of-fact, in the way techno-visionary storytellers are 
when they recount techno-optimist futures that they believe have already arrived. The blog post 
author, Hermione Way, portrays the rise of non-American tech titans as an inevitability, a natural 
progression of technological advances and falling production and distribution costs. Way both 
establishes the setting of her story, and the story about “startup culture” in general, as a global 
one, and, like Google and Facebook, constructs and draws on the Anyone Anywhere Narrative to 
reinforce the need for the product she is selling: The competition. In so doing, she at once wants 
to convey Startup World’s belief that anyone anywhere could become a believable hero of new 
global stories of innovation and makes the creation of a global startup competition, like Startup 
World, seem unavoidable.  
Nairobi has become a frequent destination of these global startup competitions, often 
playing host to their Africa regional rounds. When the competition organizers come to Kenya, 
they emphatically reiterate this global narrative in person, taking on the role of preachers for the 
global relevance of technology innovation. Seedstars World held one of their regional rounds in 
Kenya in 2016 and one of the competition’s representatives participated in a community event at 
one of Nairobi’s coworking spaces that I attended. There, he told stories from his travels—stories 
about how he’d been to 14 different countries in Africa alone and about how he truly believed 
that “innovation and entrepreneurship are literally everywhere”. To illustrate his point he told the 
story of a company from Algeria that had built a customer relations management software that 
                                                      
6 Oddly, the current websites of most of the competitions don’t offer much information about the history of 
these competitions, focusing almost exclusively on the current one, with the exception of highlight the 
winners of the previous year. To confirm the start dates, I used the Wayback Machine to look at websites 
for these competitions from previous years. Other examples include World Cup Tech (2015), G-Startup 
(2016) 
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was now being used by people in Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley! For him, the Algerian example 
was a success both because it was being used in the traditional core of innovation and because the 
company’s founders had brought a global mindset to their innovation; they thought beyond a 
purely Algerian customer base. To reiterate this, he told another story about Mali, a country he’d 
recently visited. “Sure,” he said, “you can start a tech company in Mali, but where are your 
customers going to come from? They’re not in Mali.” Mali, here seemed to be chosen as an 
extreme sort of example, an archetype of a place of poverty that can participate in global 
innovation only if its innovators think beyond their local environment. In so doing, he added a 
sort of caveat to the Anyone Anywhere Narrative: Anyone anywhere can participate in global 
technology innovation as long as they think globally and endeavor to scale beyond their nation’s 
borders, except perhaps the Chinese. With a population of nearly 1.4 billion, Chinese companies 
like DiDi Chuxing from Chapter 1, don’t experience the pressure to scale their products beyond 
their national borders, pressures that even American companies – with a domestic population less 
than a quarter of China’s – continue to feel. 
In addition to the organizers of global startup competitions, other visitors from Silicon 
Valley and other parts of the global community of innovators who come through Kenya often 
give talks, participate in panel discussions, and have innumerable informal conversations with 
Kenyan innovators. The stories they tell often serve to reinforce not only the Anyone Anywhere 
Narrative, but also the global community’s other underlying narratives, like the Technology is 
Good Narrative from Chapter 1. 
One notable example of this is a talk series hosted by the iHub, primarily in its early 
years (2010-2013) called “Fireside Chats”—a term itself rooted in American culture, originally 
being used to describe radio broadcasts that President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave between 1933 
and 1944 that people listened to in their homes. For these chats, an iHub representative, often one 
of the founders, would engage speakers in an informal chat, typically focusing on things like how 
they’d achieved the success they’ve had, how to develop a successful business plan, their work 
habits, their motivations, and their dreams. Some of the most prominent foreign speakers include: 
Joi Ito, the Director of MIT’s Media Lab (2014); Renaud Visage, CTO and co-founder of 
Eventbrite (2014); John Scully, who served for a time as the controversial CEO of Apple (2015); 
and first and most famously, Marissa Mayer, when she was still VP of “local maps and location 
services” at Google (2011). Marissa’s and many other Fireside Chats were free and open to the 
public to attend and were virtually circulated later on the iHub’s YouTube channel and their 
website. Through such ‘chats’, Mayer and other speakers use stories to convey to Kenya-based 
audiences both the promising new globality of technology innovation as well the prescribed best 
practices for how to go about building technology (i.e. the way Google did).  
The	Kenyans	Can	Narrative	
Foreigners visiting Kenya were far from the only ones telling such stories. Kenyan storytellers 
include, of course Julianna Rotich and other Kenyan TED fellows, but also, successful Kenyan 
CEOs, entrepreneurs, tech bloggers, politicians, and successful or otherwise prominent tech 
companies. They give their own fireside chats at the iHub, write product reviews and opinion 
pieces in blogs or Kenyans newspapers, speak on panel discussions at Nairobi Tech Week or 
Innovation Week, and visit universities and coworking spaces.  
In Kenyan hands, the stories feeding into the global Anyone Anywhere Narrative, often 
take on a narrower, more specifically Kenyan focus. Akin to Western storytellers retelling the 
Arabian Nights stories to better suit American audiences, these Kenyan storytellers are adapting 
the broad Anyone Anywhere Narrative to be more relevant to their Kenyan audiences, often with 
the express intention of inspiring future Kenyan tech entrepreneurs. While Rotich was speaking to 
a global audience in her TED talk, the story she told resembles many of those told specifically for 
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Kenyan audiences. They feature Kenyan heroes and Kenyan storytellers, and often begin with a 
Kenyan setting and at times eventually move abroad. In that way, Kenyan storytellers are not 
telling stories to inspire anyone to want to become a member of the global community of 
technology innovators, but are telling stories that point directly to their Kenyan audience and say 
emphatically and optimistically: ‘You have the potential be a successful tech entrepreneur! You 
can build revolutionary technology that can not only help solve problems around you, but that can 
help people solve problems around the world!’ 
The iHub and its representative have been some of the most prominent in Kenya to 
embrace this brand of storytelling. As I will show in greater detail in Chapter 5, they have 
proactively worked to inspire Kenyans to embrace technology entrepreneurship. In a chat over 
lunch, one of the iHub’s staff members told me about their outreach with counties and university 
students. Even in 2016 when I was conducting the majority of my fieldwork, Kenya’s community 
of technology innovators was largely confined to Nairobi with far smaller pockets in larger 
secondary cities like Mombasa in the east and Kisumu in the west. The iHub’s outreach in the 
counties, she explained during our chat, was focused on encouraging the growth of local 
technology entrepreneurship in other regions, particularly in counties where government officials 
had already demonstrated some interest in supporting tech innovation. The iHub sent 
representatives to the counties to meet with government officials, give speeches to local youth 
groups, and, in some cases, conduct trainings to help local leaders to set up local tech community 
spaces. Similarly, the iHub representatives often visited universities to help “inspire students to 
go into tech entrepreneurship” through campus based talks and training sessions. She admitted 
that most of the students who attend were typically IT students so they weren’t exposing students 
to tech for the first time so much as encouraging students already interested in tech to follow 
more non-traditional career paths outside of corporates and into startups. 
Over the last five to ten years, government officials and government bodies have also 
begun to try to tell their own versions of this story, typically with the objective of constructing a 
narrative about the country as a whole, and not just individuals, as innovative and tech-savvy. A 
good illustration of this is found in presidential speeches. In the last few years, current President 
Uhuru Kenyatta (who was controversially re-elected in 2017) has spoken about the innovative 
nature of Kenyans and the growth of Kenya as a global leader in technology innovation. In 2015, 
five years after the first event was held in the United States, Kenya became the first African 
country to host the Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES). The message that Kenyans excel at 
innovation (even if the government has not always done a good job supporting them) was the 
underlying lesson in a story President Kenyatta told during his keynote speech at the event. 
Kenya’s interest in innovation and entrepreneurship is not new. Ngugui wa 
Thiong’o [a famous Kenyan author] reminded me yesterday of a young man 
called Gacamba. Years ago, he saw a plane, and became passionately 
interested in flying. When he returned home, he patiently built his own plane, 
which flew for a short distance, before crashing. But that Kenyan ingenuity 
was not lent the support it deserved, and little more was heard from him. That 
episode reminds us of two facts we must keep in mind: that Kenya has 
ingenuity and innovation to spare, and that we have not always been good at 
supporting our innovators and entrepreneurs. 
By choosing to tell a story about a single individual, one outside of the typical Kenyan 
elites who more often are the ‘heroes’ who get the most attention in the domestic news, Kenyatta 
sought to convey the message that it is not just elite Kenyans like himself who are exceptional 
and innovative, but that all Kenyans have the potential to be technology innovators. 
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In 2016, President Kenyatta again spoke on the subject during the first annual national 
Innovation Week, hosted by the University of Nairobi. This time, he told a more macro story 
about Kenya as a nation rather than about an individual: 
We are not as rich in land as other nations you could name. But this has not 
prevented Kenya from doing better in elevating our nation’s prosperity, 
because we have applied our ingenuity to our natural gifts. Our energy and 
innovation, which is the core foundation of our people, is really the true 
wealth of our nation. That is the way a majority of the nations in the so-called 
‘first world’ have managed to achieve their socio-economic status. It is 
ingenuity and innovation not natural resources that matters most for a nation’s 
prosperity. 
Through this national level story, Kenyatta delivers the message, not that Kenyans have 
the potential to be innovative, but that their ongoing innovations are putting their country on an 
equal footing with their Western counterparts. In this version, it is not just Kenyans who can 
individually belong to a global community of innovators, but Kenya as a whole.  
Supporting	events	
Like the global Anyone Anywhere Narrative, the narrower narrative aimed at a Kenyan audience 
that one might call the Kenyans Can Narrative has gained strength because it has been 
accompanied by real world events that appear to provide evidence of its truth. In the early years 
of the growth of a community of technology innovators in Kenya, a few products gained a certain 
level of success and received even more media attention helping to provide evidence to Kenyan 
audiences that Kenyans really could design world leading technology. Ushahidi, the crowd-
mapping software described in Rotich’s TED story, is one such example, but it is only really 
known abroad among humanitarian workers, where it has been frequently used. Far more 
prominent is the case of M-Pesa. 
M-Pesa is a mobile banking platform that allows people anywhere in Kenya to transfer 
money to one another and to businesses without the need of a bank account. It was launched by 
Kenya telecommunications giant Safaricom (with the help of its British partner Vodaphone) back 
in 2007, two years before the American startup Venmo launched its own peer-to-peer mobile 
payment platform and fully seven years before Apple launched ApplePay. Domestically, M-Pesa 
had become an enormous success. By 2011, fully 72 percent of Kenyans living outside of Nairobi 
and below the poverty line reportedly used M-Pesa (McKay & Mazer, 2014), and by 2013, close 
to 50 percent of the country’s GDP reportedly “flowed through” the platform (Runde, 2015). It 
was celebrated by international and domestic media alike as a “success story of digital financial 
inclusion” (Ndung’u, 2017) that had “fundamentally altered the landscape of financial services in 
Kenya” (McKay & Mazer, 2014) and that was transforming Kenya into an “innovation and 
technology hub” (Runde, 2015). And indeed, since about 2010, Kenyans had begun building 
startups that made use of the M-Pesa platform allowing Kenyans to use their mobiles to access 
loans and to pay a variety of different vendors, from grocery stores to solar power providers to 
pay-as-you-go cooking gas entrepreneurs. And while M-Pesa has had less success abroad than 
many people expected (Fengler, 2012), it has undoubtedly reached one key milestone of ‘success’ 
familiar even to entrepreneur in Silicon Valley: ‘disrupting’ a country’s banking industry. 
Whether or not it has had enormous success abroad, M-Pesa has been so important to Kenya, and 
particularly Kenyan tech entrepreneurs, that its introduction is sometimes refer to as the “M-Pesa 
revolution”. Said one government official I interviewed: “We had the M-Pesa revolution…and 
you see it contaminates; once you are successful on something you get more confident that you 
can succeed in another. M-Pesa has given Kenyan innovators confidence that they can succeed.” 
Over the more than 10 years since M-Pesa was launched, Kenya startup scene has grown, 
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attracting an increasing number of international investors. By 2017, the total amount invested in 
startups in Africa as a whole was reportedly $560 million (Kazeem, 2018), over three quarters of 
which went to startups in just South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. In the rise of what began to be 
described as a “Africa’s tech movement” (Bright & Hruby, 2015), Kenya frequently came at or 
near the top of the list of countries to watch. 
Since the introduction of M-Pesa, a number of other things have taken place that seemed 
to provide further evidence of the veracity of the Kenyans Can Narrative. Particularly between 
2012 and 2015, there has been rapid growth in the number of technology startups in Nairobi. 
Even if the majority of these were more two guys and a laptop type of companies than a 
‘disruptive’ success like M-Pesa, their growth was still very visible to those interested in tech in 
Nairobi. Such growth seems to have been particularly concentrated in fields like agriculture, 
finance, education, and health. A handful of these companies have also had success in global 
startup competitions and in raising funds, and a similarly small handful of entrepreneurs have had 
success selling startups and being invited to conferences and events abroad. The mobile supply 
chain software, Twiga Foods, for example, placed in the African regional round of the global 
startup competition, 1776’s Challenge Cup’s in 2015 and then went on to win the entire global 
competition held in the US. Kenyan entrepreneur, Hilda Moraa, also successfully sold her 
financial technology startup, Weza Tele, for $1.7 million in 2015 (Jackson, 2015b); and a handful 
of companies, like Rotich’s BRCK, have raised funding rounds of $3 million and more. While 
many of these numbers pale in comparison to the billions being exchanged for the top American 
or Chinese tech startups, they are nonetheless markers of success. 
Since the introduction of M-Pesa, there has also been a spike in global interest in Kenyan 
technology innovation. This has included, for example, companies like Microsoft, Nokia, 
Samsung, and Google giving financial support and training budding Kenyan mobile innovators, 
and companies like intel, Philips, and IBM setting up regional offices in Nairobi and hiring the 
most highly educated Kenyan programmers and engineers. It has also included a wave of 
prominent international visitors, like Marissa Mayer and Mark Zuckerberg, as well as foreign 
investors looking to identify Kenyan tech companies worth investing in, or praising the country’s 
status as a “global leader in mobile money” (Zuckerberg, 2016). 
Concurrently, there has been an increase in the amount of coverage Kenyan innovators 
have received in core texts of the global community like Forbes and Tech Crunch. Since 2010 
when the iHub opened, international headlines about Kenyan innovation have proliferated—
headlines like “Kenya to lead technology revolution” (Cossou, 2011), “Meet the Tech 
Entrepreneurs Bringing the Digital Revolution to Africa” (Burg, 2014), and “The Rise of Silicon 
Savannah and Africa’s Tech Movement” (Bright & Hruby, 2015). Kenyans also featured 
prominently in both of Forbes’ 30 Under 30 Africa lists, signaling Kenyans, along with Nigerians 
and South Africans, as leaders of the African technology innovation community. In 2015, Kenya 
tied with Nigeria as the second most represented country (with 5 winners) after South Africa; and 
in 2016, Kenya was the most represented country with 6 winners. Through this kind of exposure, 
Kenya became in a way one of the go to examples of ‘success’ in unlikely places, helping to feed 
and reinforce the Anyone Anywhere Narrative to global audiences. Look! Even in Africa! Even 
women in Africa, like Juliana Rotich and Hilda Moraa, can be successful technology innovators! 
The	interpretation	of	the	Anyone	Anywhere	Narrative	
How has all of this been seen and interpreted by the specific audience of Kenyan technology 
innovators? Individuals in this group, like individuals everywhere, often wrestle with a complex 
set of identities, existing community narratives, beliefs, and aspirations that all influence their 
decisions and how they perceive themselves and the practice of technology innovation in Kenya 
and abroad. Earlier we saw how narrative scholars, like Francesca Polletta have demonstrated that 
stories are believable when they resonate with existing stories that we already know and believe. 
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This seems to have been the case in Kenya where important values that are shared among Silicon 
Valley’s innovators have also resonated with Kenyan techies and entrepreneurs, particularly in 
terms of both their identities and aspirations. The stories these techies told me about Kenyan 
identity and Kenya as a whole were, like many identity stories, filled with contradictions. They 
painted a picture of a nation weighed down by its colonial history filled with people who had 
internalized colonial era narratives about the inferiority of African products and a government 
that did more to help itself than its people. But they also depicted a nation that was a regional 
leader filled with tech-savvy early adopters, people who were forward thinking, self-reliant, 
entrepreneurial, and keen to take the initiative to solve their own problems despite the 
government. Through the many discussions and interactions I had with this community, I found 
that the Kenyans Can Narrative resonated in many ways with the positive side of these existing 
narratives about Kenyans, particularly their identity as forward thinking, tech-savvy, and 
entrepreneurial. I also found that the practice of Silicon Valley style technology innovation – 
particularly as it was described in the stories of Silicon Valley’s techno-visionaries – also 
resonated with the aspirations of this community, particularly the desire to be self-reliant and 
independent of both government and foreign donors, and the desire to be seen as successful, 
regional leaders, on a par with their Western counterparts. 
Identities	
Given that the community I spent most of my time working with was largely made up of self-
identified “techies”, it’s perhaps no surprise that many in this group described Kenyans, at least 
young Kenyans, as particularly tech-savvy and eager to adopt the latest new gadget. But it was a 
quality they repeated many times, often when positioning Kenya in comparison to its regional 
neighbors. One programmer at the iHub, for example, told me the following story of where he 
saw Kenya going in the next 20 years: 
I can say, if I compare Kenya with East African countries, I’d say Kenya is a 
step ahead. I have never been to Tanzania, but they’re not as developed in so 
many things, like techie things. In Kenya, we have embraced tech. With the 
coming in of things like Safaricom and M-Pesa people have had that idea that 
tech can solve things; we see tech as solution to so many things. The belief 
that tech can really take us to a higher level compared to how we were before 
is something Kenyans have embraced. You see, if you look, we’re heading in 
a good direction. In 20 years, honestly, we’ll have things like electric trains, 
robotics, and stuff. 
Note how in this response, he positions Tanzania (even though he’d never been to 
Tanzania!) as a particularly backward contrast to the strengths of Kenyans. In my interactions, 
Kenyans invoked this favorable comparison frequently. Note also how he uses the adoption of M-
Pesa as an illustration. He gives the example of M-Pesa, a real-world example, to provide 
irrefutable evidence for his characterization of Kenyans as tech savvy and early adopters. At the 
end of this excerpt, he paints a futuristic picture of Kenya that resembles echoes many of the 
characteristics depicted in techno-visionary stories from the likes of Elon Musk. 
Early adoption of Twitter was another real-world example often given to add credibility 
to the assertion that Kenyans are particularly tech-savvy. Kenya was ranked third in sub-Saharan 
Africa after Ghana and Nigeria in terms of Twitter usage in 2016, so it is indeed a Twitter loving 
country (Agutu, 2016). For one techie, such vociferous use of Twitter demonstrated their superior 
ease with technology because they would have to be “tech-savvy” in order to use what he 
described as a platform that was “not user friendly”.  Another example occasionally given was the 
eagerness with which Kenyans adopted Uber. “Kenyans like Uber,” I was told by one Kenyan 
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entrepreneur. “New tech comes in, they test it out and if it works they’ll keep it, if not they’ll 
throw it away. We are very discerning. Uber works well so we kept it.”  
Global narratives about anyone anywhere starting companies and building technology 
also seems to have resonated among this group of Kenyans because it spoke to another existing 
aspect of Kenyan identity—the entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, by the end of my most recent time 
in Kenya it became apparent that while this group of Kenyans do identify as “tech-savvy”, 
entrepreneurialism and business acumen are far more fundamental to a broader sense of Kenyan 
identity. More times than I can count, I was told that Kenyans have an especially “entrepreneurial 
spirit”. Similar descriptors, like “enterprising,” “ingenuity” and “hustling”, were also frequently 
used. In fact, this identity as people who are shrewd businessmen goes back a long way to old 
Swahili fables. When I returned to Kenya in January 2016, my new Kenyan housemate offered 
me a book from her shelf titled Myths & Legends of the Swahili (Knappert, 1970), “to help 
understand where we’re coming from”. One of the fables in the book was the story of Abu 
Nuwasi, a “trickster” hero who uses his wits to punish rich and greedy men. The following story, 
called “Abu Nuwasi Builds a House”, is a good example of how such stories convey the Swahili 
beliefs in the virtue of a shrewd, even cunning approach to business that many modern Kenyans 
pride themselves on. 
One day Abu Nuwasi built a house of two storeys. He sold the upper half to a 
merchant and lived in the lower half himself, for a long time, very peacefully. 
One day he wanted to go and live somewhere else, so he asked the merchant 
if he was interested in buying the ground floor. The merchant, however, was 
not interested. Abu Nuwasi said nothing, went away and came back with a 
dozen labourers. He warned the merchant: ‘I am having my house 
demolished, for I have no more use for it, so hold on to your own and don’t 
say I didn’t tell you.’ So the merchant agreed to buy the ground floor for the 
price Abu Nuwasi wanted. (Knappert, 1970) 
One data scientist I spoke with frequently reiterated the virtue of being a shrewd, if cut-
throat, businessman, like Abu Nuwasi, and the long history Kenyans have of doing so. From his 
perspective, building technology businesses was appealing for Kenyans not because it had 
anything to do with technology, but because it was a new thing for them to be enterprising about.  
Kenyans, by virtue of our culture, our way of life, or anything else, they are 
already very enterprising, so this tech just came as something else they could 
do…Tanzanian socialism inhibits this. I think people should be as selfish as 
possible; that’s what grows economies. I think it just goes back to your way of 
life. In Kenya, there was already an existing way of life focused on building 
businesses better than others – rearing chickens, enterprising coffee farmers, 
more radio stations than other countries. In Tanzania they watch Kenyan TV 
programs! 
In this description, the speaker is describing a nation of capitalists who are blessed with 
keen eyes for spotting good business opportunities and an ability to build them up successfully 
since long before technology had become the thing to build in Kenya. Like the programmer cited 
earlier, this data scientist also invokes the comparison to Kenya’s seemingly inferior neighbors.  
And the truth is entrepreneurs do seem to be everywhere in Nairobi, including outside of 
the tech sector. In January 2016, when I needed to move house and went to look at apartments, I 
met two Kenyan women who would eventually become my housemates, both of whom were 
entrepreneurs, though not of the tech variety. One ran a jewelry and home furnishing business 
full-time while the other, a government CPA, was building up a “life coaching” business in her 
spare time. Entrepreneurship has also long been seen as a core component of Kenya’s informal 
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economy. As David Himbara, a Rwandan political economist, has written, the entrepreneurial 
drive of Kenyans in the informal sector known as “jua kali”, a Swahili phrase referencing the hot 
sun that many laborers work under at their stands along the side of busy Nairobi roads (Himbara 
1994, p. 100), is a key driver of economic growth in the region. While not usually jua kali 
businesses, many people in the tech sector had, or were formerly involved in, non-tech businesses 
as well. One Kenyan man involved with a foreign venture capital fund also worked part-time 
running a tourism promotion company; another, who ran a tech entrepreneurs’ club had formerly 
run a camping and hiking business before turning to tech. More common still are Kenyans who 
own property somewhere and are either developing it for real estate or for agriculture. And of 
those I knew involved in the tech sector who did work other than run a company—community 
managers, researchers, data scientists—to my surprise, many told me they had actually previously 
started a tech company or planned to do so in the future. As you might notice, it is not only 
incredibly common for Kenyans to see themselves as entrepreneurial, but many are also engaged 
in multiple enterprises, a practice colloquially referred to as “hustling”. 
A few of these comments also belie another part of modern Kenyan identity: the belief 
that they are, in some way, ahead of their regional neighbors. In casual conversations, like in the 
excerpts above, Kenyan techies and entrepreneur often compared themselves and their 
compatriots favorably to their regional neighbors, particularly Uganda and Tanzania. To further 
emphasize their distinction from their neighbors, they would also occasionally liken Kenyans to 
Americans, exposing an underlying association or desire for kinship with the birthplace of the the 
global community of technology innovators. One interviewee described Kenyans as Americans 
because we’re “always questioning things”, as opposed to Ugandans who were like Canadians 
because they’re seen as “laid back” and Tanzanians who were like Cubans because of their 
“socialist history”. In another variation on this theme, I heard one Kenyan describe his 
compatriots as East Coast Americans because they were “all business” in contrast to the 
Tanzanians whose “laid back” nature was, somewhat ironically, likened to Californians. Through 
these associations with Americans, these techies were indicating an underlying belief that 
Kenyans, like Americans, are naturally inclined towards excelling at business and innovation. 
In these ways, global stories about how anyone anywhere can be successful as a 
technology entrepreneur, and Kenyan stories about how Kenyans can not only be a part of that, 
but excel at it, understandably resonates with existing perceptions of the positive aspects of what 
make Kenyans Kenyan. If your perception is that you and those around you are tech-savvy, 
entrepreneurially inclined, and more advanced than your neighbors, it is easy to begin to see how 
Silicon Valley style of technology innovation might appeal. 
Aspirations	
I also found that the Silicon Valley’s particular style of technology innovation appealed to the 
aspirations of many young networked middle-class Kenyans. In particular, I found that it 
resonated with their aspirations to be self-reliant and to bring about positive change for 
themselves and their communities in the face of an unreliable government, as well as their 
aspirations to be and be seen as regional leaders and equals with others around the world. 
There is, as I was often told, a strong desire among Kenyans to be self-sufficient. This 
seems to have come, at least in part, from a long-standing distrust of government and of those in 
power, who are frequently perceived as greedy and corrupt. Another classic Swahili story from 
Myths & Legends of the Swahili (Knappert, 1970) demonstrates how long this kind of perception 
has been around. This story is called simply “The Stick” and resembles a vast number of such 
fables that depict sultans, chiefs, and other kinds of leaders as both foolish and greedy and depicts 
poor laborers and peasants as justified when they trick or otherwise defeat greedy leaders. It goes 
as follows: 
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A trapper found a stick in his trap. ‘What shall I do with a stick?’ He shook it, 
and a piece of silver fell out. The trapper went back to his village and he 
bought all the food he wanted. The chief heard that the trapper had a stick that 
vomited silver, so he came to the trapper’s house and said ‘Give it to me.’ The 
trapper called: ‘Stick, stick, they are coming to take you!’ The stick flew into 
the chief’s face and beat him. The chief fled from the village and never came 
back. The people made the trapper chief. If only we could all find a stick like 
that. 
The representation of the chief in this story as greedy is very much present in modern day 
perceptions of Kenyan leaders. A good illustration of this is in the case of the proposed ICT 
Practitioner Bill that came before the Kenyan Parliament in 2016. The introduction of the draft 
made particularly angry waves among many I knew in the tech sector. If passed, it would have 
required every individual defined under the bill as “ICT practitioner” to pay an annual fee of 
KSH450,000 (US$450). The document defined ICT practitioners in such broad terms almost 
anyone could potential fit under its purview; an ICT practitioner was anyone who engaged in “the 
practice of ICT as the case may be, for a fee or gain either in kind or cash” (Duale, 2016). For 
many in Kenya, even among the wealthier techies, this US$450 sum is significant, particularly if 
you run a company employing multiple “ICT practitioners”. The introduction of the bill was seen 
by many in Kenya’s community of technology innovators as a confirmation of two things: the 
government’s lack of real understanding of what tech innovation needs and its greed and desire to 
profit from the growth of an industry it saw but did not fully understand.  
There was sometimes such distrust for government among the tech entrepreneurs that 
there was often an active attempt to distance themselves from it. For example, when I attended 
Innovation Week – the innovation conference where the president came to speak – few tech 
entrepreneurs I knew came with me. Many told me they thought it would be a waste of time. One 
of the few who did come told me afterwards with a tone of resignation that even though the 
President’s speech at Innovation Week seemed to imply he would be making innovation a 
priority, nothing would change.  
One particular criticism of the government voiced repeatedly to me—though usually in 
whispers—was that of corruption. Corruption was pointed to as the reason for the introduction of 
the ICT Practitioners Bill and for the willingness of government representatives to voice support 
for the tech sector but then fail to deliver. For many in the Kenyan tech sector, the perception of 
government corruption was very real. One entrepreneur summed up many of the concerns I heard 
when he exclaimed: 
With anything on government…there’s corruption all around…When you talk 
to [government] people individually, they say ‘Wow!’ ‘This is amazing! We 
need more of this!’ But then it just stops there. And if they do agree to give 
you support, by the time the money gets to you there are so many mouths 
waiting to take a bite of it that there’s little left by the time it gets to you. 
Here, a “bite” is a reference to an extremely common Kenyan metaphor of “eating” used 
to represent corruption.  
As a result of these and innumerable similar sentiments, most people in the tech sector I 
met have a real belief—a similar belief, in fact, to those in Silicon Valley—in the power of the 
private sector to solve problems that the government has not or will not. One Kenyan venture 
fund representative told me about all the problems he saw that the government should be helping 
with—education, healthcare, unemployment—that he believed the private sector was doing a 
much better job at addressing. He explained that it was “a matter of trust”. While he had lost faith 
in the government, he trusted the private sector—and the ability of startups in particular—to 
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actually do something about the very real problems he saw. In fact, this perception of the 
government as corrupt and an unreliable problem-solver seems to have gone hand in hand with 
the Kenyan proclivity for entrepreneurship. When the government is unreliable, people turn not 
only to the private sector, but also to themselves.  
In the midst of a disheartening political climate, the Kenyans Can Narrative seemed to 
offer a reason for optimism. In representing average Kenyans as the heroes of their own stories of 
progress, it seemed to offer hope in the face of an inept and adversarial government; it seemed to 
offer hope that average Kenyans can turn away from their government, turn away even from 
donors and international NGOs (discussed more in Chapter 3), and, relying only on themselves, 
be the ones to bring about change in their communities. In the course of a much longer 
conversation, one Kenyan techie told me about the tone of optimism and possibility that the 
growth of the startup tech sector in Kenya seemed to have brought about. 
Right now, Africans are more comfortable with their countries, with who they 
are and where they come from, but not with how things are. That makes them 
believe more in themselves. People are building stuff, having conversations, 
collaborations. So, for me, of course, if those things work, then it’s good, it’s 
great; but for me, the fact that people are believing in themselves to do it, 
that’s what matters. Maybe I think this because of the space I am in. But 
because of employment and stuff, people are starting to see startups as an 
option for them. The tech sector has played a role in creating the confidence. I 
find Kenyan women more empowered now. And for me a sign for progress is 
how far women have pushed things. So, when I see a woman telling the 
president to shove it, freedom of expression and the belief in opportunity are 
in a healthy place. 
The proliferation of stories told by Kenyans about Kenyans building technology startups 
that have a real impact seems to have helped to inspire people in this community to believe that 
progress was not only possible, but that they could build it themselves. It spoke to a longing for 
hope and possibility that has rarely been present in stories about Africa or Kenya. 
The Silicon Valley model of technology entrepreneurship, and belonging to a global 
community of practice, also seem to have appealed to this group of Kenyans, in part because it 
appeared to offer a new path towards equality with the West, equality at both individual and 
national levels. The falling costs of production and distribution of software products seemed to 
offer a new real opportunity for Kenyans to compete on level ground with the West.  
At the national level, this led to a push for Kenya to take advantage of this opportunity, to 
train future innovators so the country would not be “left behind”. Weighed down by the history of 
Kenya’s perpetual state of being a “developing” country, ever behind the West, technology 
innovation that could seemingly be done by anyone and then sold to anyone seemed to offer 
Kenya a real chance to catch up. This fear was frequently on display in Kenya’s innovation 
community, including at a conference on 3D printing I attended in August 2016 held at Kenyatta 
University in Nairobi. The keynote speaker—one of the few who’d both been in government and 
was respected and trusted by Kenyan techies—spoke of his hope that “Kenya doesn’t become a 
laggard” in the development of 3D printing, and encouraged the students in attendance to become 
innovators and leaders and no longer followers. A representative from the university articulated 
this fear when he announced the creation of the university’s new “African Center for Technology 
Studies”. “It is our responsibility,” he said, “to prepare our students for this new world for 
technology not merely as adapters and followers but as innovators and leaders. Africa should not 
be left behind. It is with this in mind that Kenyatta University in partnership with the African 
Center for Technology Studies, that is ACTS, have embarked on a unique project to establish a 
center for excellence on 3D printing technology for Africa.” 
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Moreover, I also found that the interrelationship between the Kenyans Can and Anyone 
Anywhere narratives also appeal to many individual-level desires to be equal to the West. As one 
Kenyan entrepreneur explained:  
Kenya’s a very aspirational country. I think it’s part of…You know the tech 
scene in Kenya is driven mostly by the middle-class and emerging middle-
class and they have the aspiration to be on par with their western counterparts. 
So, a lot of what they see in the West they will take on, imitate, frankly. I 
think they feel they want to have the same cool quotient as their counterparts 
anywhere in the world. 
For this entrepreneur, the desire to be equal to those in the West was particularly strong 
among middle-class and emerging middle-class Kenyans, who typically had the greatest exposure 
to Western media and Western ways of life. For many others, it was not just a desire to be equal 
but to be recognized as equal. As one iHub employee explained to me: 
We always want to be the lead in most things, especially to be the lead in East 
Africa…so we can say: ‘Yes we did it!’. We always want to be first. So, I 
think I’d describe Kenyans as having a combination of high aspirations and 
pride…Comparing us to other African countries, we like to brag a lot about 
being better than others. That I know for a fact. We’ll make sure we’re 
aggressive enough to overtake them. We want to be the first. 
In this comment, we can see both a desire to be first and to be recognized for this 
accomplishment. Stating explicitly that Kenyans like to say “yes we did it!” and to “brag a lot” 
emphasizes that it is both the accomplishment itself and the acknowledgement that matter.  
Conclusion	
Larger narratives and individual stories that we hear and tell play an important, if often 
unrecognized, role in informing both how we understand ourselves and how we engage with the 
world. In the modern manifestation of the information society, where news and other stories and 
the products of advanced technological labor can all seemingly be disseminated instantaneously 
to people across a planet connected by high-speed internet, it is no wonder that inspirational 
stories about how anyone anywhere can become a technology entrepreneur have circulated just as 
rapidly. Existing research tells us that such narratives can play a key role in validating a 
community, encouraging a sense of community among members, and reinforcing the 
community’s norms of practice and belief. It also tells us that, like in transnational religious 
communities, core narratives can play a particularly important role when the community is more 
imagined than tangible and more global than local.  
In the case of the global community that has emerged around the practice of technology 
innovation, the development and dissemination of a new community narrative—the Anyone 
Anywhere Narrative—seems to have helped people in diverse locations to feel like involvement 
in this high-tech global community of practice, traditionally associated primarily with the United 
States, was a realistic possibility for them. I am in no way arguing that the growth of this 
narrative was the sole factor in the adoption of a Silicon Valley style approach to technology 
innovation around the globe. Economic factors like the falling cost of production and distribution 
in this industry, the falling cost and improving speeds of internet access, and an investment model 
that emphasizes global scalability have all been instrumental. But with the success of technology 
innovators outside of Silicon Valley, and the proliferation of stories about them that included 
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diverse settings, heroes, and storytellers, people outside of the US have begun to see people who 
look and sound like them in the success stories. 
In the Kenyan context, stories around the Anyone Anywhere Narrative took on a more 
specific, more Kenyan focused tone in the Kenyans Can Narrative, conveying the message not 
just that anyone can become a technology entrepreneur, but that Kenyans are particularly well 
suited to it. This message seems to have resonated with the aspirational hyper-connected Kenyan 
middle-classes and helped to inspire more Kenyans to try their hand at technology startups. The 
Kenyans Can Narrative did not immediately allow Kenyans to become full legitimate members of 
this global community instantly, but it did allow many to believe that it was possible and inspired 
them to try. Evidence from my time in Kenya shows that the stories that helped to construct the 
narrative were able to do so because their underlying message of hope and possibility resonated 
with both pre-existing beliefs this community had about Kenyan identity, particularly the Kenyan 
proclivity for entrepreneurship and for regional leadership, and their goals and aspirations, 
particularly the desire to be self-reliant and perceived as equal with their counterparts in the West. 
Like the stories of many global technology innovators, including the techno-visionaries, 
the story I’ve told in this chapter is a positive and optimistic one; it’s a story about how people in 
Kenya have, through access to high-speed internet and exposure to inspirational stories, been 
motivated to adopt the the practices around Silicon Valley’s model of innovation. But that story is 
only one piece of the whole; it is only the most visible part of the larger experience of Kenyans 
turning to both the global practice of entrepreneurial technology innovation and the larger global 
information society. While such narratives may have helped inspire people in Kenyan to join and 
to try their hand at technology entrepreneurship, they have not proven sufficient to help them be 
seen as fully legitimate members of this global community. The larger story is, as every real 
story, a far more complicated one; it includes a struggle under immense pressure to conform to 
the norms of a global community that was formed in Silicon Valley not in Silicon Savannah, and 
perseverance under the weight of existing sticky narratives about a continent that receives rather 
than produces and needs help rather than helps others.  
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CHAPTER	3:	BARRIERS	TO	LEGITIMACY	AND	BELONGING		
I want to recount a different story now. If Chapter 2 told the story of inspiration and hope, of how 
entrepreneurial ambitions were incubated, and how global success as innovators of new 
technology began to feel within the reach of a Kenyan audience, Chapter 3 will—in the words of 
the tech entrepreneur—pivot. I will endeavor here to recount, as accurately as I can, some of the 
many stories of real Kenyans that I came to know as they worked to gain legitimacy and be taken 
seriously both at home and abroad as technology innovators in 2016. Being inspired and actually 
being taken seriously are not one and the same. Hearing stories of successful African tech 
entrepreneurs and actually living in the world behind those stories, actually joining this expansive 
diverse Global Community of Technology Innovators (GCTI) as full legitimate members, able to 
pitch ideas, raise money, and build something that people actually want or need and (importantly 
for the GCTI) are willing to pay for, those are unfortunately quite different things. Below are just 
a handful of stories from the real people that I met and got to know in Nairobi and their 
experiences trying to join this global community. In some, I have changed their names and details 
about their businesses in order to preserve anonymity. But all the other little details, the optimism 
and the struggle, the expectations and the lived experiences, are all real. 
The GCTI is made up of an enormous number of diverse positions—from investors to 
public relations specialists and corporate sponsors to researchers and programmers. But for this 
chapter I have focused exclusively on individuals playing the role at the center of any community 
around the practice of technology innovation, the technology entrepreneur. As I showed in 
Chapter 1, of all the different roles in the community, the tech entrepreneur is the one around 
which all the others revolve. While programmers and developers are equally indispensable to the 
practice of technology innovation in general, building for-profit startups around the design, as I 
argued in Chapter 1, is what set Silicon Valley style technology innovation apart from other ways 
in which technology is experimented with and built. As a result, each of the four stories that I will 
recount in this chapter will revolve around a Kenyan entrepreneur. Some of these entrepreneurs 
are also engineers or software developers, but they are all trying to build companies around these 
designs. 
Paul:	Success,	Failure,	and	Barriers	to	Legitimacy	
In July 2016, I met Paul in the back garden of a small and slightly shabby corworking space on 
one of the quieter dustier streets of Nairobi. He wore black pants and a burgundy polo shirt and 
his hair was trimmed short. Paul was an entrepreneur who ran a small hardware startup, though 
he preferred to describe himself as an engineer. He had a calm, pensive, and professional 
presence despite his young age. As a child, Paul had done the tinkering with his parents’ 
electronics typical of a future engineer. As an undergraduate at the University of Nairobi, 
Kenya’s preeminent public university, he connected with others who had also developed 
childhood tinkering habits in student groups and in a larger group of “tech enthusiasts” called 
Skunkworks. Soon after, he heard about the iHub through other members of Skunkworks and was 
excited to see what was going on there and to meet the people behind the Ushahidi fame. So, he 
started going to the iHub’s community space to work. It was further from home than campus and 
cost him more time and bus money to get there, but it had faster internet and was, at the time, 
filled with the energy of other tech enthusiasts. He attended workshops and discussion groups 
there about open source software, and voice over IP, and listened to talks from people like the 
head of MIT’s Fablab and Bitange Ndemo, Kenya’s then-ICT Minister and key figure in Kenya’s 
tech scene. 
A year later, a 3D printing expert from the UK came to talk to students at his university 
and that was it. The idea of being able to make something from his imagination, to make for 
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himself the pieces he needed for his latest tinkering project? He was hooked. Even though he was 
nervous, he entered the startup pitch competition at the university that followed the talk; he 
placed as a finalist. That win got him additional training in how to pitch his idea to investors and 
a ticket to London for the competition’s final. In London he failed to place, but eagerly watched 
all the other startup pitches, at least the ones after his, he’d been too busy rehearsing his 2-
minute script to pay attention to the ones before. London turned out to be productive for him in 
other ways; there, Paul became friends with an American entrepreneur who placed in the final 
and who worked with him to get Paul’s own idea for 3D printed medical parts off the ground. 
Soon after, Paul was able to get a small round of seed funding from British investors 
linked with the competition and began research and development to perfect his product. “At the 
time”, Paul told me, “I really felt like we could do it—we could build something people in Kenya 
really needed.” Talking with Paul that day in July, his desire to help people around him—to fix 
the things that the government wouldn’t or that NGOs couldn’t—was as clear as Nairobi’s 
changing skyline. For Paul, the purpose of his startup was “first and foremost to help the 
community. Everything else is secondary. We believe the money will follow…I honestly think if 
you tackle one of these social issues there’s a lot of money in it. Rather than making money out of 
a crazy profit margin you can make it out of the scale at which you sell.” 
Meanwhile others began to see something in Paul’s idea as well. His startup was covered 
in international tech news, he was invited onto television stations in Europe, and to speak at 
conferences and events all over the world. Pakistan, Berlin, Barcelona and even back to London 
for Mozilla’s open internet conference, Paul was getting noticed not just for running a startup 
using 3D printing, but for running one in Africa. His company was hailed as “having the 
potential to change the landscape of Africa” and “reducing Africa’s dependence on imported 
goods”.  
But as the coverage glowed, over time Paul’s key investor had become more cynical. 
“He’s working in the 3D printing space in Africa, he’s a rock star. It’s tech saves the world 
Africa edition. What’s not to love about that story? And yet, his business is struggling. The gap 
between the froth and reality can be so stressful.” By the time we spoke in July, Paul’s business 
really was struggling. After their initial seed funding, they’d run into problems raising additional 
rounds of investment, particularly problematic for a hardware company with expensive product 
development needs. Unlike software innovation more common in most Kenyan startups, hardware 
innovation is far more cost-intensive requiring expensive equipment, reliable material sources, 
and a larger physical space to build and store prototypes. With donor support, Paul had 
managed to get an American business advisor to come to Nairobi temporarily to help them with 
their business. She advised him to consider equity investment, where an entrepreneur gives away 
a portion of the company’s ownership and often board seats in exchange for funding. Paul was 
reluctant to do so. “Maybe it’s come to that [taking equity], but I don’t want to give away 
something that I built. A friend of mine got an equity investment last year and didn’t do enough 
due diligence and was kicked out of his own company by the investors. Maybe I’m on the extreme 
end, but because of such stories, I don’t want to give up anything.” 
For both Paul and his investor, one key missing piece at his company had been prior 
experience running a startup. “I don’t really have trouble building the product,” Paul recalled. 
“But learning what a successful business model looked like? No, I’m not good at that. I don’t 
know anything about business.” “The reality of what he’s trying to do is difficult,” his investor 
explained. “At the end of the day, he’s a young guy. He’s never run a business. His confidence 
ebbs and flows. Often when he hits a problem it’s the first time he hits that problem. So beyond 
financing, we’ve been doing a bit of coaching and technical training, which I think is helping. 
Paul would say I bang on about this, but for me it’s about what I would describe as creating a 
quality culture. One of the biggest struggles we’ve had with the work we’ve been doing with the 
startups in Africa is developing an understanding of service and quality. By that I mean, how do 
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you move somebody’s mindset from it’s good enough for Africa, to actually this is the best 
product we could build full stop?”  
At the end of our discussion, despite recounting all the troubles his startup was having 
and its uncertain future, Paul described himself as “super lucky” to have gotten the small 
funding that he did and to have gained the experience that he did. Yet his tone still barely hid his 
incredulity at the future of both his own startup, and those younger than him aspiring to become 
entrepreneurs too. “There are so many great ideas out there. But there just isn’t the money. Or 
they’re not getting what money there is. Many people have brilliant ideas but they can’t afford to 
experiment”. 
~ 
Paul’s story, while unique to him, echoed in others I met. Around Nairobi, I saw younger Paul in 
the tentative and hopeful faces of students at Kenya’s universities, in Nairobi’s startup 
bootcamps, at the iHub. Many had read the news stories about Kenya being the “tech hub of 
Africa” or heard from someone who heard from someone about the excitement around Kenyan 
made tech like Ushahidi, or simply about its perceived money-making potential and wanted, 
sometimes quite desperately, to be a part of it. I could picture Paul nervously presenting his first 
startup pitch in the posture and uncertainty of the new crop of aspiring entrepreneurs under the 
spotlight of the new round of startup competitions. Some looked nervously at the ground as they 
spoke while others spoke passionately about the farms or schools or hospitals that their product 
was going to help, but uncertainly about how it could help others beyond Kenya. In the incubators 
and co-working spaces, I found echoes of the media coverage of Paul’s startup, of his optimism 
when seed funding and invitations to conferences came, of connections made during travels 
abroad and his conviction to use what he built to help people around him. And with increasing 
frequency over the course of the years that I’ve been going to Nairobi, I began to hear the doubt 
in Paul’s voice that July as he talked about the uncertain fate of his startup in my conversations 
with others, particularly other entrepreneurs who had seen some preliminary success, but like 
Paul, had struggled to progress much further.  
Lave and Wenger, the two scholars responsible for the community of practice framework 
I introduced in the first chapter, might, if they heard his story, describe Paul, and the other 
aspiring entrepreneurs around Nairobi, as legitimate peripheral participants (Lave & Wenger, 
1991, p. 14) of the GCTI. Unlike most of their predecessors in the field of education who focused 
largely on the internal, cerebral processes that govern learning, Lave and Wenger argued that all 
learning – both inside and outside of formal classrooms – was inherently a social process in 
which learners – legitimate peripheral participants – learn a new practice through participating 
with existing practitioners, full members of a community of practice, thereby getting exposed to 
the norms, practices, and expectations of a community they were trying to join. The most 
fundamental example of this is that of a child, a preteen, and eventually a teenager who, through 
co-participation with their family and other individuals in the world around them learns how to 
act and how they are expected to behave in the adult social world. By integrating this concept of 
legitimate peripheral participation with the community of practice framework, Lave and Wenger 
provided a tool that allows us to examine the social dimensions around how people like Paul do 
and do not gain access to a community of practice like the GCTI. 
Through this lens, Paul could be described as going through a process of learning “what it 
really takes” to be a technology entrepreneur in the Kenyan Community of Technology 
Innovators and the GCTI through his experiences, even his failures. He is learning what is 
expected of a GCTI “tech entrepreneur” not simply through the pitch coaching trainings he sat in 
on or the talks at the iHub he listened to, but through his interactions with his investors, other 
Skunkworks or the iHub members, other startup competition competitors, successful 
entrepreneurs and investors he met at the competitions and conferences he attended abroad, and 
through all his failed attempts to raise funds.  
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But Paul’s peripherality to the GCTI makes his position, and the position of others like 
him, a precarious one. There are no guarantees that years of co-participation, of absorbing the 
practices and beliefs of the community, will lead to access in the end. As Lave and Wenger wrote 
“as a place in which one moves toward more-intensive participation, peripherality is an 
empowering position. As a place in which one is kept from participating more fully…it is a 
disempowering position” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 36). Years later Wenger introduced a more 
useful way of making the distinction clear between the empowered and disempowered at the 
peripheries of communities of practice with the concept of a marginal participant (Wenger, 
1998). Unlike a legitimate peripheral participant, who after training and practice based 
experience eventually makes his way into the community, a marginal participant either maintains 
a position on a community’s margins or ends up on an entirely outbound trajectory. For Wenger, 
the glass ceiling, preventing women and minorities from accessing higher levels of white collar 
professions, is an example of the problems of marginal participation.  
So, the question is whether Paul and those like him around Nairobi are indeed legitimate 
peripheral participants or in fact marginal ones. Is there a path ahead for them that leads to full 
GCTI membership, to Kenyan entrepreneurs being taken seriously by core community members 
back in Silicon Valley, or are they facing their own glass ceilings preventing them from accessing 
the community, and progressing up within it? 
Despite all the initial excitement at the potential for technology innovation to take off in 
Africa, despite the proliferation of the Anyone Anywhere Narrative on the TED stage or in the 
pages of Forbes, more often than not, with important exceptions, the startups I saw and the 
entrepreneurs I met in Kenya were struggling. There are no Kenyan “unicorns”, no billion dollar 
valuations, and only a handful of successful exits. But “struggling” does not necessarily mean 
they are marginal rather than peripheral participants. In fact, as Silicon Valley investors are often 
quick to explain, a part of becoming a serious and successful tech entrepreneur seems to require 
fetters and failures. Failures and pivots, restarts and rebrandings, and the ability to overcome 
them through sheer force of will, dedication, and a lot of all-nighters--these are the things that 
often make up the stories in the community’s narratives about successful entrepreneurs and about 
how successful startups in Silicon Valley are built, what I call the Dominant Identity Narrative. 
Failure turned ultimately into a success is such a common refrain in the stories about successful 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs that many have written about Silicon Valley’s obsession with the 
“redemption narrative” (McGowan, 2016). As one journalist wrote, “you haven’t really 
succeeded until you’ve failed, or at least come very close. Failing—or nearly failing—has 
become a badge of pride.” (McGowen, May 12, 2016). Every successful tech entrepreneur in the 
Valley seems to have a story about how their first venture collapsed amidst their ignorance and 
arrogance, a sad but necessary step towards their eventual redemptive success. Such stories, like 
the one told by Eric Ries in The Lean Startup, have become so commonplace that some kind of 
failure or struggle—and a good story to go along with it that fits into the Redemption Narrative—
almost seems a prerequisite for becoming a real GCTI tech entrepreneur, an integral part of the 
community’s Dominant Identity Narrative.  
Indeed, many of Paul’s stumbles resembled the typical Silicon Valley ones. He had little 
prior experience running a business and despite his enthusiasm and the media attention he 
received he failed to raise enough money to build his company up. Echoed in this is the story that 
Ries tells of his own first failure in The Lean Startup: “The dot-com bubble had burst, and we had 
spent all our money. We tried desperately to raise more capital, and we could not…It remains a 
painful memory. The company limped along for months afterward, but our situation was 
hopeless” (Ries, 2011, p.12). But unlike Ries, Paul’s story does not fit in the Redemption 
Narrative, he has not yet redeemed himself with an ultimate entrepreneurial success. 
In the literature on communities of practice, there are many kinds of barriers that restrict 
access to a community or progress within it. For Lave and Wenger, most barriers that prevent a 
marginal participant from becoming a legitimate peripheral one are a result of a lack of sufficient 
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exposure to the practices of the community that would enable the “newbie”, as they call them, to 
become fully socialized. New participants must have access to existing full members, to those 
who have been in the community a long time, to people in various different positions within the 
community, and to the full extent of the “information, resources, and opportunities for 
participation” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.100). Without that exposure, it is difficult if not 
impossible to learn the ins and outs of how to behave that would enable them to participate in the 
full extent of the practice that binds the community. 
Exposure to a community’s practice is restricted through a number of mechanism, 
including, to begin with, the structure or hierarchy of the community itself. In their original 
publication, Lave and Wenger cite an interesting example of this from an ethnographic study 
conducted by Hannah Meara Marshall, who looked at the experience of butchers’ apprentices in 
the 1970s. To obtain the certificate necessary to join the butchers’ union, they needed to both take 
trade school classes and participate in on-the-job training in a butcher shop. However, the 
experience of many of these trainees demonstrated that the butcher shop often kept them isolated 
from the more advanced practices they needed to learn in order to become a master butcher, 
choosing instead to place them in repetitive tasks that would prove more efficient for the 
company, but less effective for training (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Marshall, 1972). Because of the 
isolating structure of the apprenticeship system, many of these trainee butchers never learned the 
skills necessary to advance very far in the profession, in other words, they became marginal 
participants ever on the periphery.  
Other studies, particularly from linguistics have shown how high school cliques are 
examples of communities that are particularly difficult to access, often due to their hierarchical 
structure. In her 2005 article, the linguist Bethan Davies demonstrated how access to the tightly 
guarded ‘jock’ communities of practice in American high schools was often controlled by those at 
the top who had greater authority than any other community member to determine who was 
‘trendy’ enough to join (B. Davies, 2005). Moreover, because membership in the jock community 
was highly desirable and exclusive, access was extremely competitive and membership of those 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy quite tenuous. By contrast, joining a ‘burnout’ community in 
the same schools—a community of practice that embraced failure and rejects ‘trendy’ culture—
was much easier as it was less rigid and hierarchical, and membership in it is less desirable.  
Like the high school jocks, the GCTI is hierarchical and competitive. Though it embraces 
failure like the ‘burnout’ community, it only does so if the entrepreneur has subsequently 
succeeded. The most iconic tech entrepreneurs, like Mark Zuckerberg, the wealthiest investors, 
like Jim Goetz, sit at the top, while tens of thousands of techies and entrepreneurs try to gain 
access by pitching their ideas at startup competitions or participating in acceleration or incubation 
programs across the globe. Also like the community of high school jocks, for many like those 
pitch competitors, membership in the GCTI—particularly the money and fame that appear to 
come with it—is highly coveted. It is, as I believe Lave and Wenger would argue, a natural part 
of communities with such structures that few who try are actually able to enter, or advance very 
far. 
Despite the hyper-connected communicative ecology of the GCTI, despite the numerous 
visits from investors and entrepreneurs and techies from abroad, the plethora of startup 
competitions and accelerators that resemble those in Silicon Valley, some Kenyan entrepreneurs 
are beginning to worry that like the butchers’ trainees, situated in Nairobi they are too isolated 
from the real heart of the global community that they are seeking to join. Some are concerned 
that, even with the quickening internet speeds making GCTI content online so accessible, the city 
that they love may not afford them enough exposure to the ‘real’ action, the ‘real’ networks, and 
the ‘real’ investors, who understand how things really work in the heart of the GCTI. Many of the 
entrepreneurs who have already had some success domestically in Kenya, have, for example, 
begun applying for the Y-Combinator business incubation program in the United States, because 
as the birthplace of success stories like Dropbox and Airbnb, it seems to provide far more 
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immediate access to inbound trajectories to GCTI legitimacy that what is currently available in 
Nairobi. 
Beyond a community’s structure, individuals or organizations can also act as gatekeepers 
restricting or enabling community access for newcomers and shaping what participation looks 
like for them in the future. The individuals at the top of the jock community pyramid have 
enormous influence over the borders of their desirable communities. Master apprentices, like in 
the case of the butchers, preside over both the training of new apprentices and their admission 
into the community. In fact, their role in granting legitimacy to new recruits is perhaps even more 
important than their role as trainers (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.92). 
Like with apprenticeships, organizations and individuals already regarded as legitimate 
members of the GCTI who preside over training or mentorship of the new entrepreneurs can act 
as gatekeepers. Accelerator or incubation programs, for example, where fledgling entrepreneurs 
are coached and their businesses slowly grown can confer legitimacy, particularly when such 
programs have a reputation for spotting success stories early on. Y Combinator is well known as 
the kingmaker of startup business incubators. Startup pitch competitions can also perform a 
similar role. Like the incubators, their ability to confer fledglings with real community legitimacy 
is related to their own reputations; winning Tech Crunch Disrupt is far more likely to lead to 
GCTI access than winning a small university level pitch competition. And at the very top, 
community heroes like Mark Zuckerberg can confer legitimacy just through proximity. During 
his August 2016 visit to Nairobi as I described in the introduction, Mark Zuckerberg was 
photographed meeting with the founders of a small startup. The photograph was subsequently 
posted to his Facebook news feed and the founders subsequently inundated with inquiries from 
interested investors, crashing their beta website. Similarly, investment itself can confer legitimacy 
on a new startup. Investors can give early seed funding that gives entrepreneurs the vital space to 
experiment with their technology and improve it before bringing it to market. Later, larger 
investments like series A or B or more can spotlight a startup as the one to watch leading to larger 
investments or higher valuations or company expansion or, for the select few, million or even 
billion dollar acquisitions.  
Looking at the case of individual investors, if we consider them to be important 
gatekeepers to the GCTI and advancement within it, the question becomes: What motivates the 
choices of investors? What influences who they decide is worthy of their investment? Investors 
are not forced to explain their motivations to every entrepreneur they reject, but neither are they 
typically shy about making the profit maximizing motivations of venture capital known. The 
amount that other investors brings, that a company is worth, that it has the potential to make, the 
global scale that a company has the potential to reach leading to even higher profits, all can help 
persuade an investor that an entrepreneur is worth taking a risk on.  
Unsurprisingly, this priority was corroborated by my interactions with many of the 
investors in Nairobi from those that lived in Nairobi to those who flitted through the city on their 
whistle stop tours of the GCTI periphery. In one event I attended, the American CEO of a startup 
competition (and head of the competition’s seed investment fund) was presiding over a two-day 
training for competitors who had come from all across Africa. With the succinct confidence of 
someone already a full GCTI member, he presented the competitors with a bullet-point 
breakdown of what the judges (and therefore investors and community gatekeepers) would be 
looking for at the competition the next day, making little secret of the financial motivations of 
their would-be investor audience. 
What will the judges tomorrow be looking for? One: a compelling idea. Ok? 
You’ve gotta have an idea that sticks. Two: an actual product that solves a 
specific problem for a particular target customer. Three: A highly scalable 
business. As a venture capitalist, it’s not just taking a risk on your investment; 
it’s taking a risk on not going for other investments. The great thing is many 
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of you in Africa have unique problems and you need to really think how that 
is relevant beyond Kenya. Okay, what else are we looking for? Four: How do 
you make money? We certainly care that your startups are going to make an 
impact but we’re not going to invest in it if it’s not gonna make us a lot of 
money.  
As the excerpt from this investor’s speech made clear, the potential to “make us a lot of 
money” is often linked with a startup’s potential to scale beyond Kenya. Unlike American 
entrepreneurs with a domestic market of over 320 million consumers, Kenyan entrepreneurs 
focusing domestically could only reach 48 million even if they reached every single Kenyan, a 
near impossible task. Even the most renowned technological innovation in Kenya, M-Pesa, only 
has a subscription base of 31 million (Donkin, 2017). As a result, where American entrepreneurs 
have the luxury of focusing primarily on the domestic market of a country whose culture they 
know very well, first, and then scaling abroad, as we saw with Uber, Kenyan entrepreneurs, even 
in the very early days of building their startups, are frequently pushed to think beyond the 
familiar borders of their country, and to demonstrate how their idea could compete at a global 
scale. In a good illustration of this, one European investor I spoke with told me the following 
story about a startup from Ghana: 
mPedigree developed a system where you put a code on medication packages 
and you can use that code to text into their system to see if it is a legit 
medication or not. They were from Ghana and had problems with bootlegged 
meds that made people sick, so they built this awesome company. So now, the 
mistake most entrepreneurs make is that after succeeding in Ghana they 
would try to expand to their neighbors in Nigeria. Instead, these entrepreneurs 
look at the next biggest market that had the same problem, not Nigeria, India. 
I very much believe in the potential to build local companies from Africa, I 
do, but only, only if you find a problem here that isn’t just here, that’s global, 
but that the world doesn’t know exists yet. 
Beyond looking at the numbers, how do investors, particularly those providing seed 
funding and looking at very early stage startups with entrepreneurs who are still learning the 
skills and practices of GCTI innovation, determine if an idea has the distant potential to make 
them “a lot of money”? One mantra that was often repeated to me by investors and experienced 
entrepreneurs alike was that investors “invest in entrepreneurs not in startups”, that the human 
element, the strength of the team at the head of a startup mattered more than the product they 
were currently developing. This was certainly true of Paul’s investor. He talked of seeing promise 
in the young eager but inexperienced engineer and wanted, like a master apprentice, to help him 
develop the skills needed to build a startup in the GCTI style. But time and time again, focusing 
on the human element seemed to lead to an oft-repeated refrain from investors that Kenyan 
entrepreneurs lacked experience. He doesn’t know how to develop a business plan. She has no 
idea how to reach out to potential business partners. They failed to take the time to understand 
their user’s experiences with their product, to make decisions quickly, to think outside of the box, 
to manage her team effectively.  
This brings us to our second story. Unlike the other stories in this chapter, this next story 
is both widely known and widely debated in Kenyan tech circles and in the blogosphere. Most of 
the details that follow are publicly available or at least publicly contested. As a result, while I 
have concealed the sources of my information, I have chosen not to disguise the names of the 
company or those involved, so easily identifiable to any Kenyan reader. 
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Angani:	Experience,	Exposure,	and	Subconscious	Bias		
Angani refers to a Kenyan cloud computing company founded in 2013. Its name means “air” or 
“atmosphere” in Kiswahili. It had been so named following the trend of Kenyan startups 
adopting Swahili terms popularized by the success of companies like Ushahidi (“evidence”) and 
M-Pesa (M-“Money”). In 2012, two Kenyans, Brian Muita and Phares Kariuki, sub-let a 
bedroom in Nairobi to use as an office to experiment with their idea of providing outsourced IT 
infrastructure and services to local companies. They incorporated the company in June 2013 and 
began beta testing soon after providing virtual machines and virtual storage—the “cloud”—to 
local companies initially free of charge. By January 2014, they began charging for their services, 
with Phares as CEO and Brian as CTO. An increasing number of local tech companies began 
hosting their data in Angani’s “atmosphere”, and Angani began building up its network 
infrastructure to support the increasing demand. In May of that year, Riyaz Bachani, an Indian 
Kenyan with a degree from MIT, was brought on as the new Chief Operating Officer to help 
Angani “scale its operations and expand its presence across the region”(Kariuki, 2014). By 
February 2015, Angani landed its first round of seed funding for an undisclosed amount. The new 
investors included Savannah Fund, a local VC firm headed by Erik Hersman, a white Kenyan and 
a prominent member of Nairobi’s tech sector through his role in the founding teams of the iHub 
and Ushahidi who Phares and Brian knew from their earlier work with those companies, and a 
foreign VC firm headed by American Miguel Granier. At the time, Angani received both media 
attention and public praise. It became known as “the first fully automated cloud infrastructure 
company in East Africa” (iAfrikan, 2015); for some, it became a symbol of how successful 
companies built in Kenya could grow and attract even international attention. In a post on the 
company’s blog announcing the new round of investment, Phares wrote that the funding was 
proof that “it is possible to build an internationally attractive infrastructure business in 
Africa.”(Kariuki, 2015) It was praised as a key part of the solution to slower internet speeds that 
plagued African internet access (Bram, 2015) and as instrumental for economic growth in Kenya 
freeing up the time and money companies had previously devoted to in-house IT (Jackson, 
2015a). However, a few months later in October 2015 a pivotal board meeting was held after 
which both Brian and Phares left the company and Riyaz took over Phares’ former role as CEO. 
By November 2015, the fallout from this controversial board meeting had become public when 
the company’s servers failed leaving customers across Kenya’s tech sector without access to their 
data forcing them, in some cases, to wait weeks before service was restored, ensuring that 
speculations about what really went down were on the tips of tongues across the Nairobi tech 
scene. As in the course of any story where stakes in the truth of what really unfolded are high, at 
this point stories diverge and contradict one another, and they have led many in Kenya’s tech 
sector to take to one of two sides.  
The version of the story from those on the side of the entrepreneurs usually begins by 
depicting the entrepreneurs as too naïve, willingly giving up their majority stake in the 
company’s equity to investors that they shouldn’t have trusted. It depicts the investors as “vulture 
capitalists” who took advantage of the trust of the entrepreneurs and orchestrated a “hostile 
takeover” in the pivotal board meeting pushing Phares out as CEO, with Brain choosing to leave 
in protest at the ousting of his friend and co-founder. Many tellings in this camp go further and 
assert that Phares was ousted specifically because of issues around race or nationality. Others 
don’t explicitly blame racial prejudice but still believe the investors knowingly took advantage of 
the entrepreneurs.  
By contrast, the story as told from the side of the investors firmly denies that “white 
investors are abusing their money and privilege to push out black Kenyan founders of a company 
to steal it” (Hersman,  2015) and deny accusation of racial prejudice. Instead, advocates of this 
version blame the events on the “inexperienced management” (Hersman, 2015) and a lack of 
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professionalism and experience on the part of Kenyan entrepreneurs. They attribute the 
departure of Phares to declining revenue that reflected a need for better management, and the 
unwillingness of Phares and Brian to compromise and find an amicable way through the 
disagreements on the board.  
~ 
When I first started going to Nairobi for this study in 2013, I heard almost no mentions of 
concerns about discriminatory investment practices. But I was new to the sector, not to mention 
white and foreign, hardly the most obvious of confidants for latent concerns about racial 
prejudice. Moreover, the sector itself was still very new; few Kenyan entrepreneurs had enough 
first-hand experience to validate fears of injustice in the system, and even those who might have, 
did not speak out publicly. Over time, after being a present part of the daily lives of some of 
Kenya’s techies, a few did begin to articulate such fears, though typically they came in the form 
of whispered conversations in loud bars or at quiet corner tables in cafes at lunch. In one such 
conversation, I heard about a Kenyan entrepreneur who’d gone through a startup acceleration 
program and been awarded funding from the internationally managed investment fund at the helm 
only to be pushed out of his company months later. In another, I was told the story of a Kenyan 
entrepreneur who lost a funding opportunity to a rival company run by a white foreign 
entrepreneur who’d moved to Nairobi. In those early years, while those who spoke to me did so 
expressing genuine concern, few of the accounts I heard were first-hand.  
By the time I came back in 2016, the debate about investor bias had been flung wide open 
following the very public undoing of Angani at the end of 2015. While most of the prior concerns 
about such injustices lingered in the rumor mill of bars and cafes, here was a story that was 
unavoidably public. From the perspective of those on the side of the entrepreneurs in the Angani 
Saga, this story seemed to prove that, as Africans, they faced unique barriers to participating fully 
and equally in global tech innovation. To many, those barriers, those glass ceilings, seemed to be 
a direct result of biases based on either their race or nationality. Over the course of 2016, I 
watched as such biases became the topic of open public discussions, tense debates on blogs and 
social media, and private conversations with friends and colleagues. For many, Angani was proof 
enough that investors should be regarded with suspicion. Paul’s hesitation to take equity 
investment in his company from this chapter’s first story, was a direct result of the stories he had 
heard about the Angani Saga.  
The topic became a key point of heated debate at a discussion forum I attended at a 
popular coworking space in May 2016. With the kind of bluntness employed by those resigned to 
a reality they do not want to face, one entrepreneur there said, “if you’re a white founder, you’re 
bound to get more money.” For emphasis, he pointed at me, the only white foreigner present who 
did not in some way represent access to funding, or, admittedly, much talent for coding, and said, 
“if I had Eleanor on my founding team, I’d get money more easily.” Another entrepreneur 
pointed to the trend of foreign white entrepreneurs coming to Kenya as a primary cause for 
concern. “What’s happening is a lot of foreigners come in and you have no idea what’s going on 
locally and you can get funding but local people can’t get the same idea funded”.  
There were echoes of these concerns throughout my other observations as well. While I’d 
initially been excited at the sheer number of Kenyan startups that seemed to fill Nairobi during 
my first visit in 2013, over time I learned that many of the startups I had thought of as “Kenyan”, 
many of the companies that had received the most funding and the most media attention, actually 
had a foreigner in the founding team or a foreigner as CEO. Often, they were foreigners who’d 
lived in Kenya for a few years; in conversations with them, many expressed a commitment to 
Kenya and intentions to support the growth of the local community, but to many Kenyan 
entrepreneurs, they were foreigners all the same. Later that year a study released by Village 
Capital, one of the venture capital firms operating in Kenya but with its headquarters in 
Washington DC, added more evidence to these observations; they found that 9 out of every 10 
startups funded not just in Kenya but in East Africa between 2015 and 2016 were headed by at 
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least one European or North American founder (Strachan Matranga, Bhattacharyya, & Baird, 
2017) . In 2014 a similar study from GSMA, a global telecommunications association, found that 
startups in Kenya that have foreigners in their team are able to raise money more quickly 
(GSMA, 2014). This is not just a Kenyan phenomenon. Andela is perhaps the most famous 
African tech start-up. It is a tech training and programming outsourcer that launched first in 
Lagos Nigeria in 2014, raised a $24 million Series B round of funding from the Chan Zuckerberg 
Initiative in 2016 and a Series C round of $40 million from other investors in 2017. Associated 
with Nigeria, and often seen as Nigerian, it was founded by a team that included American 
entrepreneurs. 
In my discussions with Kenyan entrepreneurs there were a number who spoke favorably 
about having foreign entrepreneurs in Nairobi. Echoing Lave and Wenger’s argument for the 
importance of extensive exposure to the full range of a community’s practices, one entrepreneur 
declared, “I think it’s a good thing personally. I think if they bring in their own ideas, it raises, 
you know, it brings in new thoughts and new ways of thinking, new experiences. I think the more 
cultures meet and the more you can bring ideas from where you were, and the more I can 
compete with that, the more universal our product will be.” Another entrepreneur professed,  
I love the foreigners here! I think it’s a positive thing….I see the bulk of the 
funding that has come into Kenya has gone to foreign companies in Kenya, 
and it has created resentment from the Kenyan entrepreneurs going ‘so all you 
guys are here to do is fund Americans and Europeans in Kenya rather than 
funding truly Kenyan entrepreneurs?’ The flip side of that is that a lot of 
Kenyan entrepreneurs are not qualified for funding. They are not. There’s a 
lot of charlatans that have come into the sector because it’s cool, it’s hip, and 
people smell a lot of money around it. They see all these foreigners and they 
think they can come and get into this scene and date exotic women. So you 
get trash coming in that doesn’t deserve to be funded. So there’s two sides to 
the equation and both sides are failing if you ask me.” 
Both of these entrepreneurs (who had both received small seed rounds of funding for 
their own startups) acknowledged that the bulk of the venture capital funding in Kenya was still 
going to foreign-led startups. But to them, this wasn’t the outrage it seemed to others, or at least it 
wasn’t entirely outrageous. In fact, they actually seemed to see it as a small way to help solve 
Nairobi’s problem with distance from the center of the GCTI and exposure to the norms of how 
tech entrepreneurship was being practiced in that center. By bringing experienced American and 
European entrepreneurs to Nairobi it increased Kenyan exposure to the received practices of the 
GCTI. By being forced to compete with these more experienced entrepreneurs, it raised the bar, 
forcing them to develop the expertise to build their business in order to do so.  
Many of the people I spoke with in Nairobi expressed a strong belief that the solution to 
the problem of foreigners getting the bulk of the venture capital funding was to have more 
Kenyan investors, more people who understood the local market and who were more permanently 
rooted in the local community. But oddly, there seemed to be some evidence that even among the 
few Kenyan investors in the sector, there has been a preference for investing in foreign 
entrepreneurs. As one participant at the discussion forum pointed out, even at Safaircom, Kenya’s 
mobile telecom giant that had recently launched a million-dollar seed investment fund, “none of 
the companies that have gotten funding from them have 100% Kenyan founders”. Similarly, I 
observed a number of small hackathons turned startup competitions in which in addition to the 
judges’ determinations, participating entrepreneurs were asked to vote on the winning startup. On 
more than one occasion, the participants actually voted for a startup that had been pitched by a 
foreigner. A 2017 Harvard study into pitch competitions and investment practices in the United 
States has given some indication that a preference for investing in white males in the GCTI is not, 
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in fact, exclusive to white male investors. In the study, the researchers found that “venture 
capitalists posed different types of questions to male and female entrepreneurs; they tended to ask 
men questions about the potential for gains and women about the potential for losses” (Kanze, 
Huang, Conley, & Higgins, 2017, p. 3). This in turn influenced how much money those female 
entrepreneurs were able to raise over time in turn affecting the success and longevity of their 
businesses. What’s intriguing about this study is that the difference in how male and female 
entrepreneurs were treated by prospective investors was not a result of intentional (and illegal) 
gender discrimination, but a result of subconscious bias that led investors, including even female 
investors, to expect success from the male entrepreneurs and to question the potential of the 
female ones. Another study found that investors in Silicon Valley had similar subconscious biases 
against entrepreneurs who had a ‘nonnative accent’. The study looked at 90 entrepreneurs’ 
pitches in 3 prominent US startup competitions held over 3 years and found that having “a 
nonnative accent reduced the chances of receiving funding for entrepreneurs in new venture pitch 
competitions”. Interestingly, the study also found that this investor bias was not a result of the 
entrepreneurs’ race or an assessment of their communication or collaboration skills as a result of 
being foreign, but instead entrepreneurs with nonnative accent were perceived as having less 
“political skill,”, meaning that they were perceived as being less “persuasive, dominant, and 
socially aware.” (Huang, Frideger, & Pearce 2013, p. 1011). It is impossible to say at this time 
whether Kenyan investors suffer from the same subconscious biases about Kenyan entrepreneurs 
as the female investors in Silicon Valley do with female entrepreneurs. The female investors in 
the first study were still predominantly based in California, while the few Kenyan investors 
beginning to pay attention to technology startups come from a very different socio-cultural 
community, but may still be subject to internalized negative stereotypes about the inferior quality 
of African made technology that will be explored further in Chapter 4. Either way, I would 
venture to guess that introducing Kenyan investors, while beneficial to the growth of the sector as 
a whole, will not be the catchall solution to investor bias that many expect it to be. 
Returning to the Angani story, the investors have denied that any conscious decision 
about the entrepreneurs’ potential for success were based on their race or nationality. Instead, 
they echo Paul’s investor and point to Phares’ “lack of experience”. To them, this lack of 
experience was a simple and specific problem that jeopardized the future growth and stability of 
the company and that could be easily solved by replacing Phares as CEO. But like Paul, David 
and Phares do not deny that they lacked experience, in fact they readily acknowledge it. In 
contrast to the investors, however, for them this lack of experience was symptomatic of a 
systemic failure, a structural issue, like in the case of the butchers, that made it difficult for them 
and Kenyan entrepreneurs in general to get exposure to the real practices GCTI tech innovation 
and thereby to build the skills necessary to protect against “vulture capitalists”. 
Over time, this “lack of experience” argument became a common refrain in my 
interactions with investors. Even Kenyan investors, like those at Safaricom, pointed to the lack of 
experience in their explanation for why they had more frequently invested in foreign-run startups. 
For example, one investor explained to me that they had really wanted to invest in Kenyan 
entrepreneurs but simply found that the foreign-run startups had better “governance structure” 
and that the Kenyan-led endeavors were more “bootstrapped” and “less professionally 
developed”. 
When pushed to elaborate on what they meant by “lack of experience” many of the 
investors I spoke with pointed to Kenyan culture and its educational system as inadequate for 
preparing them for the demands of GCTI entrepreneurship. And even with increased exposure to 
GCTI practices, some asserted that ingrained cultural norms might still make it difficult for 
Kenyans to adapt to such a different business culture. As one investor explained:  
Kenyans are unlikely to be risk takers, though there are exceptions. When I 
first came here I was looking for startups to invest in; I was disappointed by 
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how hard it was. There’s a lot of talent here but not the business sense of the 
experience…that’s because the educational system has flaws. They’re the 
kind of flaws that make it harder for someone to come out and kick ass in a 
startup setting.  
Another foreign investor, one who had lived in Kenya for many years, offered more 
specificity about what he believed was holding back Kenyan entrepreneurs from ‘kicking ass’ in 
startups.  
In Kenya, a lot of things continue to be driven by this ‘big man’ idea. A lot of 
the system is set up to teach people to do as they’re told and follow directions 
and not ask questions. A lot of the foreign driven companies really react 
strongly against that and really want people to voice their opinions…Many of 
the Kenyans leading companies know they need to be more like this to get 
investment, to encourage “out of the box” thinking on their team. But really, 
many just pay lip service to that idea or have trouble implementing it simply 
because they’ve grown up in Kenya, in the Kenyan system. 
Over time, I realized that the “lack of experience” most of these investors were referring 
to, wasn’t really about a lack of experience in business management, or in a particular 
programming language, or even in the distinct challenges of running a small business; what they 
were really talking about was a lack of exposure to the very American style of small business 
management on which the GCTI was built. In the language of Lave and Wenger, that would be a 
lack of sufficient exposure to full members, information, and practices that make up the GCTI, 
the kind of exposure that could mean the difference between being a marginal or a peripheral 
participant. As we saw earlier, despite the hyper-connected communicative ecology of the 
software industry, many of Kenya’s entrepreneurs attribute this lack of exposure to the physical 
geography of being so removed from the ‘real’ heart of the GCTI. A frequent critique of Angani’s 
investors, for example, was that despite being American, they too lacked experience in building 
companies and used the claim to authority that seemed to come with their nationality to take 
advantage of unsuspecting Kenyan entrepreneurs.  
When investors say they are investing in “entrepreneurs not startups” or “people not 
products” they are actually demonstrating how personal, and indeed how subjective, the decision-
making process of the gatekeepers can be. Rather than looking exclusively at the numbers—the 
prospective growth figures, the market size, the return on investment—particularly for investors 
looking at very early stage startups, they are also, consciously or subconsciously, assessing a 
specific individual’s experiences, as well as their personalities and cultural backgrounds and, like 
investor biases against female entrepreneurs and those with nonnative accents, using that 
information to determine what their future ability to succeed in the GCTI will be.  
In much of the existing literature on communities of practice, it is quite normal for those 
patrolling a community’s borders to look for prospective newcomers to have the same 
experiences, skills, and background as current members. When granting legitimacy to new tailors, 
master tailors look for those who demonstrate an adeptness with pattern crafting, with stitching 
and fitting. When granting access to the ‘jock’ community in American high schools, those at the 
top often look to find the habits of trendiness and popular personality types that are common to 
existing jock members. Similarly, gatekeepers of the GCTI look to find existing successful traits 
in their new prospective members. Yet while gatekeepers’ ideas about these ‘successful traits’ do 
come, in part, from their personal experiences—from the people they have known personally and 
the practices, experiences, and personalities they have seen that have made entrepreneurs 
successful—I contend that they are also, at least in part, informed by the stories that make up the 
community’s narratives. As narrative scholars Eric Mankowsi and Julian Rappaport have argued, 
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“narratives mark collective identity by serving a ‘gate-keeping’ function that enables the 
community to include and exclude those who do not fit its vision”(Mankowski & Rappaport, 
2000, p.488). Such narratives, particularly narratives around members’ identity—about “where 
they come from, who they are, and who they will, or want to be” (Mankowski & Rappaport, 
2000, p.6) —play a role in shaping the identities of a community’s members, and provide a model 
of what a good community member looks like both to prospective members and to a community’s 
gatekeepers. Sadly, this tendency to look for the replication of such community identity narratives 
in new peripheral members takes on a problematic sheen when a community’s identity narratives 
have historically been embodied in one particular gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic, national, 
racial, or religious group. For example, Rodriguez and Ouellette have shown how troubling many 
traditional Christian community narratives can be for the identity of gay and lesbian Christians 
(Rodriguez & Ouellette, 2000). Similarly, in the GCTI the existing stories of individual success 
that feed into the larger Dominant Identity Narrative about what entrepreneurial success in the 
GCTI looks like, have disproportionately revolved around white American males. Zuckerberg, 
Jobs, Musk. The genius Jobs tinkering in his parents’ garage; the socially awkward Zuckerberg 
who dropped out of Harvard to found a billion-dollar business; the visionary Musk willing to risk 
everything on a future that involves colonizing Mars. Such iconic stories have informed an 
overarching narrative that depicts the successful tech entrepreneur as a genius, someone who’s 
business-minded as well as technologically adept, an ass-kicking risk takers, or perhaps a socially 
awkward risk-taker, willing to fail and persevere, to stick his neck out on a crazy idea that just 
might, and ultimately does, change the world. As we saw earlier, it also often includes a story of 
redemption, of initial failure that paved the way for eventual success. 
The promotion of the Anyone Anywhere Narrative discussed in the previous chapter was, 
and continues to be, an attempt to push a new narrative about what GCTI success can look like. 
But a community’s existing dominant narratives can be hard to change, and can remain embedded 
in the subconscious biases of a community, continuing to shape who is and who is not able to 
progress up the community’s hierarchy through the decisions of its gatekeepers. Such narratives 
were operating, I would argue, when the female investors in the Harvard study subconsciously 
doubted the potential of the female entrepreneurs. And, I content, they have played a part in 
informing the decision-making processes of some of the investors and other gatekeepers looking 
to East Africa for new investments. Like the female entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, Kenyan 
entrepreneurs can, at times, face narrative fueled subconscious biases. But unlike the female 
entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, they also face the physical hurdle of being so far removed from 
the GCTI’s geographic and cultural core, making it even harder for them to build the skills and 
experiences necessary to climb over barriers built by subconscious biases rooted in a 
community’s Dominant Identity Narratives. 
This brings us to our third story. Like Paul’s story, I have changed the names and 
company details in this story to preserve anonymity. In fact, to fully ensure the privacy of 
entrepreneurs who are better known in Kenya than Paul, this story is actually a composite of 
stories taken from two different moderately successful fintech entrepreneurs in Nairobi. 
Sam:	Narratives,	Expectations,	and	the	Social	Impact	Story	
When I started, I knew, ‘I wanna run a business. I just need to figure out which one.’ But I knew I 
needed some experience and I needed to be exposed. My Mum runs a bar and restaurant and I 
knew I didn’t want to go and start doing that. I was like, ‘I have all this knowledge, I need to do 
something with it, to help some people. I need to find some way I think I feel I’m being useful 
that’s driving me. Then I was driving one day and it occurred to me, financial transactions are 
still so frustrating, even with MPESA, why can’t I fix that? I was like, that’s it! That’s exactly 
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what I’m gonna do. I thought, ‘You know what? Solving that would really help a lot of people. It 
would really help businesses here in Kenya.’  
So, we [my business partners and I] started off our startup when we—all of us—were 
working full-time. So, we would moonlight. We used to say we were ‘9-5-9 people’, we worked 9-
5 on our jobs, and then 5-9 on our startup. We bootstrapped a lot. We bought things with our own 
money, we built our own technology pretty much out of our own pockets. And I was lucky, I had 
friends, family, and fools. I have several of those. Most Kenyans don’t have those, or they don’t 
have friends and family foolish enough to give like mine did. I had a friend who ran an office 
space and he said ‘Sam, come, I’ll give you some space.’ So, we had an office, we had a 
computer, so we would just go in and work. But we were completely clueless. There was nobody 
to go to. There was nothing. We got a lot of our information from online. And so, we messed 
around the first year and everything. Then towards the middle of the following year we had a 
product that we had tested. And we were like ‘Hey, finally we have a product that’s working!’ 
Remember, we’ve been working on it for 1 ½ years. We really thought we knew how to solve this 
problem in financial transactions. But it was a bad idea. We had been working on our product 
with one of the banks for 10 months. The bank, they told me, ‘You do the integration, you do 
everything’. They kept telling us to go back and change this or change that. And then, you know 
what? In the end, they said no. And now it’s been 2 ½ years since we started and we have to 
completely change our product. And since we’ve changed it, we made it simpler, we targeted a 
different market, and we managed to get our first round of funding. 
My company means more to me than the money. I’m on my own clock. Eat, sleep, dream, 
everything. I’ll wake up in the middle of the night and jump on the internet because my brain just 
thought of something and I want to check it. You know? I find it very hard to switch off my care 
switch. I don’t think I could live in this world and not make a real—not a superficial, not a paper, 
not an imaginary—not make a real contribution towards making things better for people. I 
wouldn’t be able to live with myself. So, I think entrepreneurs should be mission driven. You 
should be out there trying to accomplish something and the financial success etc. should be a 
byproduct of solving something meaningful. But that’s hard for Kenyan entrepreneurs, you 
know? Funding is harder to come by than in America. We can’t just go and live in a garage for 2 
years while we build our company. We have friends and family too, yes, but when you say to them 
‘eh nataka kwanza bizna hapa’ (‘I have a great business idea here!), they don’t always help 
because they don’t understand tech. Kenyan investors mostly don’t understand tech. They don’t 
understand the risk. They want a sure thing. They want to put their money in land or real estate. 
Or they won’t give entrepreneurs enough money to get through the 2+ year runway that they 
need to get their business going. I was lucky. Friends, family, and fools. 
And the foreign VCs can be difficult here too. They’re not the same as VCs elsewhere. 
These guys are always asking how something is going to influence the BOP [bottom of the 
pyramid]. If it doesn’t influence the BOP? You can’t get funding. If you can’t show data to prove 
that it’s influenced that market then people here aren’t interested in financing it. And they’re all 
focused on how you measure impact. They’re social impact investors really. And that makes it 
hard, you know? They want to fund solar farming or turning waste into energy, they don’t want to 
fund a B2B [business to business] venture. There are a few who get it. Maybe there’ll be more 
eventually as entrepreneurs here succeed, but we’re not there yet. Investors talk about social 
investing, making an impact. But, honestly, if you’re talking about what’s really needed, I don’t 
see enough people actually building the things that are really needed. I haven’t seen any apps 
telling me where is the nearest national dispensary with a particular medicine or helping me 
book some medication online for my kid because the nearest dispensary is 20k away and I don’t 
want to just travel all the way there and find it empty and have to come back tomorrow. Where’s 
the app for that? I haven’t seen it. But I have seen an app selling the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th Uber 
clone. For what? For 3 million Nairobians out of 41 million Kenyans? Let’s face it, the Uber 
users are Nairobi; that’s a Nairobi demographic. Outside urban Kenya who uses Uber? No one. 
	 89 
All the entrepreneurs around here, the Kilimani [a relatively affluent Nairobi suburb where the 
iHub is based] entrepreneurs, they live in this first world bubble. It’s not just the American 
entrepreneurs coming in who don’t get it. I bet you there’s more than 20 million Kenyan who 
don’t have access to basic healthcare. Where’s the app for that? Things don’t reflect local 
priorities. 
My company may not be solving basic healthcare, but I’m not making an Uber replica 
either. I’m solving a problem that I know how to solve. I know how to make financial transactions 
better. In 5 years, I want to be taking our product all through sub-Saharan Africa. That’s what I 
hope we’ll do. I hope to get more partners and to help more financial businesses. I hope our 
company will help the businesses here retain their edge even with the big corporations, the 
multinationals coming in; I want it to help African companies compete. That’s what I hope will 
happen. And I hope in 10 years maybe I’ll have built a company that someone wants to take over 
or buy it or maybe we will be moving on and bringing better products and better solutions. 
~ 
In some ways, Sam’s story echoes those that make up the Dominant Identity Narrative about the 
GCTI’s successful technology entrepreneurs. At a young age, Sam was driven to start a company 
that could use technology to help people, and relied on the support of friends and family (and 
“fools”) to get through the early stages when the company was far from making revenue. Sam 
and cofounders worked extremely long hours out of a determination to make their product work, 
but soon enough faced failure in the form of a bank’s rejection and a difficulty fitting their 
product to their original target market. So, they pivoted and eventually got a round of seed 
funding to continue building and experimenting with their idea.  
But the context in which Sam was trying to build a company was not the same as the one 
in which the iconic entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley, like Dropbox’s Drew Houston or Uber’s 
Travis Kalanick, have flourished. Even after getting their first seed investment, Sam’s company 
struggled to get further financial support, and often came up against investors who were looking 
for startups that had more of a “social impact” than a company working on corporate level 
financial transactions. Even though Sam believed that their product would eventually make a real 
contribution to the efficiency and competitiveness of East African business, that was not the kind 
of “social impact” investors seemed to be looking for. As one local investor who knew Sam 
lamented, “We’ve spoken to those guys [Sam and cofounders], but very few VCs are interested 
because it’s such a commercial B2B solution as opposed to small holder farmers in Kisii [a small 
town in western Kenya] trying to get to market.” And Sam’s company is not alone. I lost track of 
the number of entrepreneurs, including foreign entrepreneurs, I spoke to over my time in Nairobi 
who expressed frustration with the landscape of investors in the city. One entrepreneur who’d 
come from Harvard and was building an application that he believed would help streamline the 
transportation industry in Nairobi, was struggling to find takers despite having more connections 
to international investors than most Kenyans. “Investors who come here are setting you up for 
failure,” he said. “They want last mile delivery to the BOP [Bottom of the Pyramid], but that’s 
not what my business does and that’s not what I want it to do.” 
Moreover, many of the investors I spent time with in Nairobi readily admitted that while 
they were, of course, interested in getting a return on their investment, they were also particularly 
interested in startups that had a social impact. One investment firm representative (who was, 
incidentally, born in Kenya but had lived abroad for the previous 15 year), said quite bluntly: 
“Each of us individually are here for the impact. If I want to just make money, there are much 
easier and much less risky ways of doing that than investing in startups in Africa.” Many of the 
funds operating in Nairobi had catch phrases explicitly focused on the social impact objective. 
“Acumen catalyzes entrepreneurship to tackle the problems of poverty;” (Acumen, 2017) “The 
Skoll Foundation drives large-scale change by investing in, connecting, and celebrating social 
entrepreneurs and the innovators who help them solve the world’s most pressing problems” 
(Skoll, 2018); and “Village Capital finds, trains, and invests in entrepreneurs solving real-world 
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problems”(Village Capital, 2018). The popularity of startups with a “social impact” in Nairobi 
seemed further reinforced by the large number of NGOs and development organizations getting 
into the mix as well. At the time of writing, DFID, Mercy Corps, Omidyar Network, and 
countless more are all involved in funding startup ventures in East Africa. The NGO Mercy 
Corps, for example, has a project they call Mercy Corps Social Venture Fund with the goal of 
looking for “new ways of funding international development that promotes the flexibility and 
experimentation required to test new models—models that could deliver social benefits to 
millions of people in the developing world.” (Mercy Corp, 2014).  
If we assume that GCTI ‘gatekeepers’, like investors, are solely judging new 
entrepreneurs by the community’s Dominant Identity Narrative about successful entrepreneurs, 
then it seems odd that these investors might prefer a tech startup working with small-holder 
farmers over one with the business model and potential to scale that Sam’s seemed to have. If we 
assume that many investors, even those who come to Kenya, emphasize publicly the need for 
entrepreneurs to be able to demonstrate an ability to make investors “a lot of money”, then why 
have startups like Sanergy, which claims to be able to turn human waste into energy, or like 
Mobius Motors, which claims to be designing and building cars in Africa for Africa, both been 
able to raise multiple rounds of funding without being able to build a successful product that 
generates a stable revenue stream? This, I would argue, is not (or is not only) a matter of investors 
looking for entrepreneurs and startups who fit in with the GCTI’s Dominant Identity Narrative as 
we saw in the previous section, but also a matter of looking for project that fit in with broader 
narratives about Africa. 
Some, though by no means all, of the stories that reinforce narratives about Africa to an 
audience of foreign investors come from the international media coverage of the continent. There 
is no shortage of academic research about the historic failings of this coverage, about how it 
focused disproportionately on conflict and famine over business and finance (Adegbola, Skarda-
Mitchell, & Gearhart, 2018; Mel Bunce, 2015; Carruthers, 2004; Fair, 1993), or how it often 
overlooked the complexity of the continent (Martins, 2011; Ogunyemi, 2011) in favor of the 
“single story” (TED, 2009b) of a poor struggling continent in need of help, or more damningly 
how it served to perpetuate post-colonial inequality. Such media coverage has historically 
contributed to the perpetuation of a narrative about Africa that depicts it as a failed continent in 
need of help, what could be called the Failed Continent Narrative. Even among those traveling to 
or through Kenya’s modern-day technology sector, I still came upon those who brought 
expectations of Africa that focused on its problems and rested on a belief that outside help was 
necessary in order to solve them. I met at Israeli student who came on a class trip through 
Nairobi’s largest slum, Kibera, and decided that he knew, after just a few days, exactly how to 
solve their sanitation problems; I watched an American pop icon who also visited Kibera and 
posted a photo of a sewer to her Instagram feed implore her followers to “help these people get 
clean water”; and I listened to a Dutch techie who came to Kenya because it was a place she 
could have an “adventure” and “make a real difference”. All, no matter how well-intentioned, 
saw a continent that couldn’t help itself alone. 
In recent years, along with the rise of the Anyone Anywhere Narrative, the tone of the 
coverage of the continent has begun to change. This transformation is most iconically represented 
by two covers of The Economist published more than 10 years apart; the first, published in 2000, 
depicts Africa as “the hopeless continent”, the second, published in 2011, proclaims “Africa 
rising”. The two covers—the former depicting a fighter carrying a shoulder mounted heavy 
artillery weapon, the second depicting a child running with a rainbow-colored Africa shaped kite 
flying high in the air—could not be more different. In many ways, this shift seems to have been a 
response to the “single story” critique that followed the famous Nigerian author, Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie’s TED talk, an attempt to acknowledge and rectify the previous failings by 
depicting a continent on its way up rather than one perpetually stuck and in need of help. 
Suddenly, feel good stories of success in Africa in Western media started to increase (Mel Bunce, 
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2015), and the Africa Rising Narrative began to take off. And nothing sells a story of “pivoting” 
from failure to success quite like technology innovation. In many ways, the popularity of the 
Africa Rising Narrative as a solution to the Failed Continent Narrative has been irresistible for 
members the GCTI. It is the ultimate redemption story, of problems turned on their head through 
the skillful application of new technology. As a community with a core narrative about how new 
technology innovation can bring about positive social change, where better to prove that than on 
the continent with the most seemingly intractable problems? Where better to prove that 
technology can turn a story of failure on a continental scale into a redemptive story of ultimate 
triumph?  
There has been a noticeable increase in the number of Africa Rising stories in major 
Western news outlets like Forbes and the New York Times beginning about seven years ago, and 
more noticeably five years ago. Many such stories focus on mobile and internet penetration rates 
as a sign of Africa “leapfrogging” through development, or on technology startups solving some 
previously intractable problems. MFarm, the app that’s getting market price information to 
farmers; BRCK, the company that’s putting tablets in schools; Sangery, the company that’s 
turning human waste into energy; MKopa, the guys who are helping poor people access solar 
energy on a pay as you go system; and the iHub, the organization that’s helping to grow African 
startups. By far the most iconic—and now cliché—photo of this entire trend has been the Masaai 
warrior standing on the savannah in front of a setting sun holding his mobile phone high up in the 
air.  
By 2016, many Kenyans in the tech sector expressed frustration to me about the tone of 
this coverage. Yes, in many ways it was better than the Failed Continent Narrative, but to them it 
was no less reductive. Journalists were still looking for a “single story” but this time it was a story 
of success, especially of success through technological solutions to Africa’s prior “problems”. 
“Tech in Africa is sexy,” said one entrepreneur with an almost sarcastic tone. “Tech is sexy in the 
US, but look at what it can do on a continent with so many problems!” “All they want to write 
about now is social impact stories,” said another. “But that limits what people see or expect to see 
here when they do.” Many are especially tired of the cliché that focuses on the “sexy cool things 
helping poor people do X” rather than stories about good business models and the everyday work 
of ordinary struggling entrepreneurs, that for them was the real lived experience of Kenyan tech 
entrepreneurship.  
While the way Africa is portrayed abroad bothers many people in Nairobi, what troubles 
them more specifically is that such stories seem to influence what kinds of investors come to 
Kenya, and to inform the expectations of those who do, ultimately shaping the landscape of 
funding and experiences available to Kenyan entrepreneurs. As one prominent Nairobi figure told 
me, “Even some of the VCs [venture capitalists] that operate in Silicon Valley, VCs that treat 
their investments in the Valley very seriously, they come here as just a side project. They want to 
have a fun impact story that they can tell at the dinner table back home.” “There’s a vitamin 
assumption,” one American investor who’d been in Nairobi a long time told me. “You should do 
it because it’s good for you. We never use clean energy in the US but Africans will. We don’t 
want energy made from human waste but Africans will!” What is fundamentally at issue here is 
that all of this coverage, the sexiness of tech in Africa, the popularity of the Africa Rising 
Narrative, the persistence of the perception that Africa is filled with “problems” that need 
“solving”, all result in a feeling that African entrepreneurs are somehow being treated differently 
than their counterparts in other regions of the GCTI.  
As we saw earlier, Kenyan entrepreneurs already face challenges in meeting the 
expectations set by the GCTI’s Dominant Identity Narratives about the successful technology 
entrepreneur. But with the added influence of broader overarching narratives like the Failed 
Continent Narrative or the Africa Rising Narrative, entrepreneurs in Kenya often find themselves 
stuck between contradictory expectations. On the one hand, they are expected to build “social 
impact” startups in order to meet expectations about Africa that many investors bring with them 
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and in order be attractive to most of the funders who’ve come to Nairobi. On the other hand, in 
order to progress much further and become ‘successful’ in terms of the larger GCTI, they are 
expected to conform to the Dominant Identity Narrative about success and build a company that 
can scale beyond Kenya and make its investors “a lot of money”, all while social enterprises have 
been notoriously hard to scale. 
Ironically, many entrepreneurs I know in Kenya, like Sam and Paul, genuinely care about 
having an “impact” with the companies that they were building. But they want to decide what 
impact should look like for themselves. And they don’t want investors to judge them and their 
work by standards that are any different than the ones they use elsewhere. While some Kenyan 
entrepreneurs are, as Sam once told me, “living in a 1st world bubble”, unaware of the real 
problems of the majority of the population around them, many, like Sam, are patently aware that 
Kenya has many very real problems that need addressing. They see the problems with access to 
healthcare, or with inequality in slums like Kibera or Mathare, or with a clogged and inefficient 
transportation system in Nairobi, or with an inefficient financial system that makes trade among 
African countries difficult, and they want to address them, or they want someone to address them.  
Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and a handful of investors in Nairobi seemed frustrated 
at the way in which these expectation investors brought shaped the quality of startups that 
received funding. As Paul’s investor once said to me, “A lot of investors aren’t doing their due 
diligence. Companies get investment because tech in Africa is hot, because farming apps etc. are 
hot, but they’re not asking the hard questions about their business models.” By focusing so much 
on wanting to fund projects with a “social impact”, an array of entrepreneurs has sprung up who 
know how to work that system but who aren’t focused on building really sustainable technology 
venture. A foreign investor I spent a significant amount of time with, put it this way: 
If the only way the startups here can access funding is to tell a social impact 
story, then they will gear their startup towards having a social impact story to 
access that funding. And to me that actually created a whole generation of 
startups that have built companies to access those funds. They hear ‘we need 
to turn waste into energy, into fuel, into, into furniture! Waste is huge. Energy 
is huge. A product that addresses both, oh my God, can you tick more boxes 
than that? I feel like there are many entrepreneurs out there that think ‘ok 
look, this is where they wanna put their money, so let’s make a company that 
involves waste and energy!’ They will get funding. And this is the problem. 
The problem is that the external investors have validated this system that 
doesn’t really produce anything truly useful. 
It is no secret to those in Kenya’s tech sector that entrepreneurs who can tell a story that 
fits with these particular social impact expectations, are likely to get, at least, preliminary rounds 
of funding. Sometimes it is more about creating the perception that you and your startup fit in 
with the dominant influential narratives about Africa and entrepreneurs than it is about actually 
being what people expect you to be. And it is this point, this role of entrepreneurial storytelling 
that bring us to my fourth and final story. Again, as in previous stories, I have changed the names 
and some of the details about the entrepreneur’s company in order to preserve anonymity. 
Faith:	Storytelling,	Perception	and	the	Social	Construction	of	Success	
I first met Faith in 2013 at the iHub on my first research trip to Kenya. Dressed in a well-fitted 
cap sleeve button-down shirt and black pencil skirt, she struck me at the time as simultaneously 
kind and cautious, warm and reserved. She was a recent graduate of one of Kenya’s most 
prestigious private business school, Strathmore University, and was in the midst of deciding 
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for her master’s degree. During her undergraduate, she’d completed an “industrial attachment”, 
or internship, at a large multinational company and built a small app based on that work which 
she later presented at a similarly small pitch competition at her university, where she was 
awarded first prize. By 2011, she had connected with her co-founder and they began building 
their fledgling company at one of Nairobi’s business incubators. The incubator offered office 
space, free internet, and connections to local and international mentors for a small fee. By the 
time I met her in 2013, the startup had acquired its first round of seed funding, an equity 
investment from a local Kenyan investor, and had placed as a finalist in a prominent regional 
pitch competition. Her company was beginning to gain traction, but you would never have known 
it to talk to her at the time. She spoke modestly about being an entrepreneur and about her 
uncertainty about the future of her small business and whether she should put it on hold to go 
back to school for a master’s degree.  
By the time I returned in 2016, Faith was widely known in Nairobi’s tech scene. By 2014, 
her company had won an award as one of the best startups in the finance sector on the continent. 
By 2015, it had been sold to a large African institution and made headlines as one of Kenya’s 
first startups to be successfully acquired, the gold standard of success for any GCTI 
entrepreneur. Soon after, she was listed among the entrepreneurs to watch at one of the core 
publications of the GCTI and was invited to speak at prominent international conferences on 
entrepreneurship. When I met her again in person that year, she seemed little changed. She still 
carried the same air of kindness and reticence and still lived modestly despite her newfound 
wealth. What had changed however was her public presence. With the recent acquisition, Faith 
and her story frequented domestic and international news, public stages in Nairobi, Cape Town, 
and Boston, the blogosphere, and bookshelves of Nairobi. On many of these platforms she spoke 
ardently about how important she believed it was for Kenyan entrepreneurs to” tell their 
stories”, to “change the narrative” about what was possible on the African continent. Fitting 
nicely into the Africa Rising Narrative, Silicon Valley’s Redemption Narrative, and the Anyone 
Anywhere Narrative from the previous chapter, Faith has spoken publicly and frequently about 
the challenges she’s overcome, her mistakes, and the steps she took that led to her eventual 
success. For someone who values storytelling so greatly and performs it so frequently, I have 
chosen to include below a portion of her story in her words. The following paragraphs are in 
Faith’s words, told through an amalgamation of excerpts from her many public appearances, 
writings, and interactions with me. 
“Back in school I was very hungry and looking for problems and looking for solutions to 
those problems. With that hunger and passion to provide solutions and create change, then I 
found myself on the path to entrepreneurship…I was lucky enough from a young age to be 
assertive enough and go in and ask where do I belong and who can hold my hand… I’m sitting 
here and you might think I’ve made it but I’m still learning a lot. I surround myself with the right 
people and the right mentors. And they told me… ‘you need to get out of that place and go this 
direction’. They gave me the direction and of course I had to believe in myself before someone 
else would. 
“The goal was let’s grow this business, let’s do it for value and impact and let’s scale, 
even beyond Kenya. And of course, that is still the same same picture even after the acquisition. 
The thing investors look for: people people people. I can’t emphasize enough the importance of 
people…Our investors told me that the reason he invested in the business was not because he 
found the product ready and the customers paying. He said it was because he saw in us a team of 
focused and talented individuals. 
“Running a startup can be a lonely world. I lost a lot of friends during this time too as we 
barely kept in touch. I spent most of my time with my team and so I considered them as close 
friends…But part of this journey, the journey of an entrepreneur, is gonna be failures…Failure is 
a forbidden word in the African culture. If you fail, there is no sexy thing about it, no glory, only 
shame. Unlike in the West where failure has been appreciated as opportunities for learning for 
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most of the successful startups we have heard of…There is need for more failure stories in the 
African tech ecosystem to inform startups that failure did not start with them and it was part of 
those who succeeded as they chose to learn from their failures. 
“At the beginning one of my biggest fears was raising money…I remember during initial 
competitions and events where I had to present my team, I was very inexperienced at standing in 
front of a large crowd…what I wish I had, were the right skills and knowledge of negotiation and 
understanding the details of shareholding structures…negotiation and pitching skills are vital. 
The best way I learnt to pitch and negotiate is by practicing it and getting tips from peers who 
had done it. I am still not perfect at it. Spend time watching Shark Tank to learn from the sharks 
and read Paul Graham posts on Y Combinator. 
“Silicon Valley has taught us, and we can borrow a number of things from them 
especially when it comes to telling startup stories, irrespective of whether they are successes or 
failures, for these stories act as guideposts for budding entrepreneurs… I want to tell our story. 
For untold are the stories of many young entrepreneurs and startups in Kenya that could impact 
and lead to the development of an integrated tech ecosystem… It is by sharing our stories and 
lessons in our way, that we will inspire generations to come and create positive change and 
success in the ecosystem”. 
~ 
Unlike the other stories, Faith’s ended in success, in legitimacy in the eyes of many existing 
members of the GCTI both inside and outside of Kenya. For a community that so values the 
profit-making potential of its technological products, first the investment, and eventually the 
successful acquisition of Faith’s startup, were stepping stones to an inbound trajectory into the 
GCTI. But Faith took other steps that have set her apart from other Kenyan entrepreneurs, steps 
embedded within the story that she tells. 
So far, this chapter has covered the role of individuals like venture capitalists and 
organizations like incubators acting as gatekeepers to the community legitimacy of people like 
Faith. But that is really only one step towards being seen as a legitimate tech entrepreneur. Faith’s 
ability to convince one investor to take a chance on her company and her idea was just the first 
part of the process. In her ethnographic study of two individuals attempting to learn an indigenous 
Ecuadorian language known as Quichua, the linguist Michele Back reminds us that “the co-
construction of learners as legitimate or nonlegitimate participants in a target culture or 
community plays a role in the acquisition of any type of knowledge” (Back 2011, p.1055). In 
other words, Faith’s ability to become a “real” (or successful) technology entrepreneur is a 
result not just of her perceived legitimacy in the eyes of individual gatekeepers, but in the eyes of 
both herself and the broader community. A closer look at Back’s study helps to illustrate this. In 
it, she looked at two individuals who were both trying to learn Quechua, one was ultimately 
successful at learning the language while the other was not. Back argues that the first was 
successful in part because he was a “heritage learner” of the language with historic family ties to 
that community while the other was not. As a result, the second “perceived himself as 
marginalized from the community—a perception that was…reinforced by community perceptions 
of him—which hindered him from fully participating in the community and learning Quechua” 
(Back 2011, p.1041). In fact, the idea that community legitimacy is socially constructed between 
the learner and members of the community itself is a natural extension of Lave and Wenger’s 
argument that the learning process is a social process rather than one that takes place entirely or 
even principally in the mind. Along the path towards becoming a successful tech entrepreneur, 
Faith needed not only to adopt the practices common to other successful entrepreneurs, and to 
gain the approval of individual gatekeepers, but also to build an identity for herself as a 
successful entrepreneur, one that would be credible for both her and existing community 
members. 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, a community’s broader identity narratives can be 
instrumental in shaping both what is expected and valued in a community and who is allowed in 
	 95 
and who is not. In earlier chapters, I have demonstrated the important role that storytelling and 
narrative construction have come to play in the communicative ecology of the GCTI, including in 
crafting inspiring techno-visions of the future, and in constructing new narratives to attract new 
members and expand the community’s boundaries. Here, I will narrow in on the impact that 
storytelling and narrative construction have played in the experience of a single individual and, 
like in the case of the Quechua learners, constructing an identity narrative for herself as a 
legitimate tech entrepreneur from Kenya. Like the iconic entrepreneurial storyteller, Steve Jobs, 
Faith has gone beyond adopting the tangible practices of the GCTI—like exiting her company, 
prioritizing scalability, and learning from failure. She has also welcomed the role of storyteller. 
Through both the story she tells and the way she tells it, Faith is campaigning to be taken 
seriously in the GCTI, and to be noticed even by GCTI members far away.  
Faith’s story echoes those of other successful tech entrepreneurs. As she tells it, in the 
early stages, she demonstrated the sort of drive and assertiveness common to confident American 
entrepreneurs. She chose mentors who helped guide her, a co-founder who inspired her, and an 
incubator that provided direction and mentorship as well as just office space. In later stages, her 
company failed in one direction and pivoted to a different product, and focused on scaling that 
product beyond Kenya, rather than staying committed to a Kenyan market. She gave up much of 
her social life, a future academic life, and alternative career paths, and worked long hours 
dedicated to building the company. Eventually, her company was acquired by a much larger one 
and Faith and her investor and cofounders profited. Despite being a Kenyan woman with no 
physical experience in the United States, Faith’s story bares a strong resemblance to the GCTI’s 
Dominant Identity Narrative of the successful entrepreneur. By building up a narrative for herself 
that largely conforms to the Dominant Identity Narrative, Faith is working to shape how she is 
seen. 
But beyond the content of her story, Faith is also working to embody that Dominant 
Identity Narrative by embracing the role of storyteller itself and through her choice of storytelling 
techniques. As I have shown in Chapter 1, In an industry where thousands of new startups seem 
to be born every day, mastering the art of storytelling can mean the different between gaining 
legitimacy, funding and success, and being ignored, overlooked, and excluded. As one investor in 
Nairobi told an audience of entrepreneurs participating in an international startup competition: 
“Don’t lose your audience. This is about telling a compelling story. As judges, listening to 30 
pitches, we really only remember ten of them after half an hour. So, make it memorable, okay?” 
But how does it work when your intended audience is not immediately in front of you as they are 
in startup competitions or as they were for the Quechua learners? The members of the GCTI who 
come to Kenya only represent a very small segment of the larger GCTI community. In-person 
interactions and storytelling may gain an entrepreneur legitimacy in the eyes of the Kenyan 
community of technology innovators, but what about the eyes of those community members 
further afield? 
I would argue that just as early stage startups anywhere in the GCTI must rely on the art 
of storytelling to get their idea noticed, as we saw in Chapter 1, so do even more established 
startups based great distances from the community’s Californian origins. We have seen in 
Chapter 2 how geographically dispersed communities like the GCTI rely more heavily on shared 
narratives and stories to give their members a sense of belonging more readily accessible for 
members of smaller communities who interact in person on a daily basis. We also saw how the 
community’s rich communicative ecology is employed to help share and disseminate these 
stories, as in the case of transnational religious groups adopting television and mobile apps to 
connect community members. Similarly, beyond embodying the successful tech entrepreneur by 
telling her story to new recruits, Faith’s story needed to break through all the other noise in a 
chaotic hype-driven trend-obsessed industry; she needed to get her story heard and ensure that it 
would be remembered. She needed to not only be able to tell a good story in person or on the 
stage of a startup competition or in conversation with investors, she also needed to know how to 
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take advantage of the full breadth of the communicative ecology at her disposal to facilitate her 
story’s dissemination throughout the global community. Faith has adopted sundry communicative 
platforms in order to tell her story. She has taken to stages in Nairobi, given talks at universities, 
launched Kenyan entrepreneurial groups on social media, given local and international media 
interviews, written personal blogs, written a book, been written about in prominent GCTI media 
outlets, and traveled to other parts of the GCTI to tell her story in person there.  
Another technique she embraced with zeal was speaking to students in Kenya who are 
not yet a part of the GCTI. In fact, on university and community stages around Kenya is where I 
have most often found Faith speaking publicly. Oddly, in some cases the audience one must 
speak to in order to gain legitimacy in a community of practice, is not always existing members, 
but rather a broader audience, an audience of ambitious hopefuls you can inspire to join the 
community through your story. This is particularly true for communities that seek growth and 
expansion. The community of Alcoholics Anonymous needs to expand in order to help all the 
alcoholics who have not yet acknowledged their illness. The GCTI similarly needs to expand in 
order to incorporate new innovators with brand new ideas on which the industry relies. In fact, I 
would argue that just as telling your story to an alcoholic in denial and bringing them into the AA 
community is the last step to being seen as a full AA membership, so is telling your success story 
to aspiring entrepreneurs a key step in becoming a legitimate tech entrepreneur in the GCTI. In 
this way, storytelling aimed at prospective newcomers is, for both communities, as much a part of 
an individual’s path to community legitimacy as it is a part of the community’s own path to 
expansion and growth. In the GCTI, this is personified in the techno-visionary, the individual 
who inspires not just through telling their own story but through telling the story of the future 
made possible through technology, and making their audience believe they can be a part of that 
future. The details of Faith’s story rest primarily on the past, on her company’s history and her 
own experiences, but when she speaks publicly she almost always tells it with an emphasis on 
believing in the power of technology for the future and inspiring others to take up the mantle of 
tech entrepreneurship, to sacrifice their social lives and alternative career paths for the promise of 
belonging to a larger community and for the potential of building something that can really 
change their community. By talking to unknown students, outsiders to the GCTI, Faith is 
embodying the visionary entrepreneur and in turn enhancing her own legitimacy within the 
community. Through her practices, through the story she has told, and through the techniques she 
has employed to tell it, Faith has been able to construct an identity for herself as a legitimate and 
successful technology entrepreneur that is seen and believed by members of the GCTI, even those 
abroad. 
New entrepreneurs in any part of the GCTI around the globe face these storytelling 
pressures. They have to break through the noise. But my time in Nairobi indicates that 
entrepreneurs in Kenya, or in Africa in general—at least those in the early stages of building their 
company—often face the added pressure of needing to demonstrate, as we saw in Sam’s case, 
that their startup has a “social impact”. Unlike assessing a startup’s financial status and prospects 
for generating revenue and a return for their investors, assessing whether a startup has a social 
impact is an inherently subjective and qualitative process, as subjective and varied, one might 
argue, as judging a startup by its people, by the potential of its founders rather than by its product. 
What a social impact is can vary just as widely depending on an investor’s perspective and 
values, from providing children with access to healthcare, or villages with potable drinking water, 
to providing employment through a company’s growth. How to measure that social impact once a 
goal is identified can be equally as idiosyncratic and elusive. As a result, compelling emotive 
stories are often the way entrepreneurs in Kenya work to demonstrate their social impact in order 
to attract the social impact investors that populate Nairobi’s investment landscape. This technique 
draws on a long tradition in the development sector of telling emotional stories of the poor who 
can be saved with “your donation,” told to a guilt-ridden Western public. As one Kenyan 
representative for an investment firm observed to me, “We have a lot of impact investors in our 
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network, and impact investors are constantly out there looking for the narrative, for the story that 
sticks.” Many aspiring entrepreneurs in Kenya are well-aware of this. And because of the 
prominence of the Africa Rising Narrative and the broader appeal of testing out and proving the 
validity of the GCTI’s core beliefs even in Africa, many startups in Kenya employing the “social 
impact story” strategy have done moderately well. Some have even, for a time, gained the 
attention of those outside of Nairobi.  
But riding the “tech in Africa is sexy” wave will only get an entrepreneur so far towards 
building an identity as a legitimate GCTI tech entrepreneur in the eyes of the broader community. 
And while demonstrating that technology can save the world in Africa may be a compelling story 
that touches at a core GCTI community narratives, it is insufficient. It ignores the fact that the 
belief in the ability of the free market to build and sustain new technology innovation through the 
generation of profits is just as fundamental to the GCTI as is the belief in technology itself. 
Entrepreneurs who rely on the social impact story to gain notoriety, even those who have received 
investments and attention, often still struggle in constructing their identity as a truly legitimate 
GCTI tech entrepreneur because many members of the broader community are unable to take a 
startup seriously that appears to prioritize social impact over profit and financial sustainability. 
Faith’s experience was somewhat unique in that she was able to build a successful startup in 
Kenya without focusing on its social impact. She was fortunate to find an investor who was both 
Kenyan and had worked for a large multinational technology company bringing a certain amount 
of knowledge about the local ecosystem and experience in what it might take for Kenyan 
technologists and entrepreneurs to be taken seriously abroad. 
Conclusion	
In Chapter 2, I showed how a new overarching narrative—a narrative about how anyone 
anywhere on the planet could innovate new transformative technology—became popular and 
resonated with Kenyan techies in its aspirational middle class. By contrast, in this chapter I dove 
into how different the lived experiences of many Kenyan entrepreneurs are from what the Anyone 
Anywhere Narrative led many to believe. Through Paul, Angani, Sam, and Faith, I hope to have 
shed some light on both how and the reasons why the lives of real entrepreneurs in Nairobi are so 
different from the tales told to inspire.  
Existing literature shows how learning to join a community of practice involves an 
extensive period of co-participation, of engagement with existing community members, learning 
their habits, their norms, their speech and storytelling patterns, in order to learn how to behave 
like, and eventually become, a full community member. But not all people who want to join a 
community are “legitimate peripheral participants”, many are marginalized through their 
construction—by both themselves and existing community members—as outsiders who don’t fit 
in. Others are excluded from the social practices and exposure necessary to learn how to become 
a community member as a result of a community’s isolating structure, its competitive nature, or 
the subconscious biases of individuals gatekeepers. I hope this chapter has enriched this literature 
by adding an awareness of the narrative dimensions embedded in many of these barriers and an 
examination of how storytelling may be used to overcome them. 
In the case of the Global Community of Technology Innovators, Kenyan entrepreneurs, 
like Phares at Angani, come up against barriers linked to the community’s Dominant Identity 
Narratives. These narratives, about what a successful GCTI entrepreneur looks, acts, and sounds 
like, influence expectations of individuals like judges at startup competitions who act as 
preliminary community gatekeepers. The stories that support these narratives often depict the 
successful tech entrepreneur as a genius who sacrifices everything to make it, who fails but 
perseveres and is ultimately successful in raising money and scaling because of the innovative 
brilliance of their product or their business acumen. They also, more often than not, depict a 
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white American male at the helm. Such narratives operate at the subconscious level, acting as a 
yardstick against which all new entrepreneurs are measured. In the worst cases, this leads to an 
individual’s racial, gender, or national identity influencing determinations about their suitability 
for joining a community or their potential for success once they do. Most investors in Nairobi I 
spoke with deny the influence of such demographic factors, but foreign white entrepreneurs who 
start businesses in Kenya still do receive the lion’s share of the available funding. 
Kenyan entrepreneurs, like Paul, also face challenges as a result of their geographic 
location in Africa. Despite the rhetoric about global connectivity, about the speed of transnational 
digital work, geography still matters, in-person connections still matter, it still comprises an 
important part of the GCTI’s communicative ecology regardless of how virtual much of the 
community’s practices have become. Kenyans, like those in many countries far removed from the 
traditional centers of GCTI power, struggle to access the full breadth of the community’s 
experiences that would better prepare them for GCTI membership.  
In Africa, as Sam found out, this seems to be aggravated by broader narratives about the 
continent that shape which GCTI members choose to come to Kenya and what they expect to find 
when they do. A narrative about Africa as a failed continent in need of outside help still lingers 
leading many who come to Kenya to make the trip in order to “make a difference” and have a 
“social impact.” Additionally, the transformation of Africa’s media narrative in recent years from 
the “failed continent” to the “rising” one has proven very attractive to GCTI investors. This 
transformation echoes the stories of failure turned into success that makes up many successful 
GCTI entrepreneurs’ stories, but on a continental scale. Where better to prove that technology 
innovation really can save the world than on the Failed Continent? As a result of these 
overarching narratives, foreign investors who have chosen to come to Kenya are not 
representative of the full range of investors in the broader GCTI. This gives aspiring 
entrepreneurs in Kenya a warped view of what membership in this global community looks like 
and it creates pressures to prioritize “social impact” over financial returns that may lead to 
success within the local community but may limit their integration into the broader community. 
Together, these various narratives often make it difficult for Kenyan entrepreneurs to 
construct a believable identity for themselves as a successful technology entrepreneur. Instead, 
many acquiesce to the popularity of social impact in Africa and tell their stories and shape their 
businesses to fit these expectations. Some are even able to use the prominence of the Africa 
Rising Narrative to gain attention for their businesses overseas. But in doing so, they often trap 
themselves in a social impact corner and limit their ability to gain full GCTI legitimacy beyond 
the role of a marginal social entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurs, like Faith, have gone further and have demonstrated how the GCTI’s love 
of storytelling can be used to overcome some of these barriers to entry. Faith not only worked to 
embody the identity of the successful GCTI entrepreneur, but she frequently told that story with 
an eye to inspiring future generations. Furthermore, while other entrepreneurs in Nairobi told 
stories to appeal to the social impact investors in Nairobi, Faith, with the support of an 
experienced and understanding investor, told her story with an eye to a much broader audience. In 
doing so, she demonstrated the ability to bypass Nairobi’s geographic barriers, to get noticed in 
the clatter of other eager entrepreneurs, and to gain access to new experiences and networks 
abroad. More importantly, it also helped her construct an identity for herself and her company as 
a serious technology entrepreneur rather than just a social entrepreneur. 
In the attention economy (Davenport & Beck, 2001) that dominates this global 
community, the media and storytelling can play a far more influential role in gaining attention, 
and later legitimacy in the eyes of community members than existing research on communities of 
practice would suggest. Taken together, storytelling for people who want to join the GCTI is not 
just about reaching that one gatekeeper, that one master apprentice who can decide to grant 
legitimacy to their wide-eyed apprentice, it is about constructing and narrative about one’s 
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entrepreneurial identity as a legitimate member of the GCTI and persuading the broader 
community to see you as such.  
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CHAPTER	4:	RESHAPING	A	COMMUNITY	OF	LOCAL	TECHNOLOGY	
INNOVATORS	
It’s near the end of February 2016 and I’m sitting in a large theater. My seat is plush and comfy 
and reclines slightly. The walls are windowless and bathed in a bright pinkish-purple light that 
makes the room feel like it’s glowing. Upbeat pop music plays as the audience slowly filters in 
from the pre-event reception, glasses of wine and bottles of beer in hand. The stage at the front of 
the room is currently empty except for a large projector screen at the back held high above the 
stage. Below it, a turquoise colored map of the world sits in the center surrounded on either side 
by white posters with the number 1776 stamped repeatedly on them in blue and red. Two bright 
white spotlights land at the center of the stage, and at the very front sits a small black 
teleprompter, barely visible. I’m in the Kenya National Theatre in the Central Business District 
(CBD) of Nairobi; it’s the finals of the Africa Regional Round of the Challenge Cup Competition 
run by the DC-based startup incubator named after the American revolution, 1776. After two 
days of practicing and coaching from 1776 official mentors, thirty startups from eight countries 
across the continent, including ten from Kenya, will each have two minutes to pitch their ideas in 
front of this growing audience, and more specifically in front of a panel of investor judges. 
The event’s host, a peppy energetic American named Andrew, comes onto the stage to 
start the event only a bit behind schedule. He’s wearing dark blue jeans and a bright red branded 
1776 Challenge Cup t-shirt. He jumps around the stage working up the audience, bam bam bam! 
“Are you excited for these innovators?!” Bam! “Are you ready for ideas that are gonna 
revolutionize your life?!” Bam! 
Soon the pitches start. The presentations vary widely. Some are slick with fancy graphics 
and confident speakers. Some play to the crowd like the one who waves his hands in the air to 
pump them up. Some deploy humor to get noticed like the one who announced: “The cost of cow 
feed is too damn high!” then paused for a beat longer than you might expect, and finishes with 
“…until today”, eliciting a roar of knowing laughter from the crowd all too aware of the clichés 
of the startup world. Some are focused exclusively on their company’s growth metrics and speak 
with laser focus directly to the judges, while others seem intimidated by the judges or the crowd 
or the bright lights or the insanely short time they have to get noticed and are painfully, 
obviously, nervous.  
Of them all, the speaker who garnered by far the biggest reaction from the crowd was a 
French-Cameroonian named Stéphane Eboko representing a Kenyan traffic mapping startup 
called Ma3Route. Ma3Route crowdsources information provided by its users and delivers 
updates about traffic accidents and jams around Nairobi through Twitter or its application. Its 
name derives from Sheng, the Kiswahili-English hybrid slang that evolved in the urban 
environment of Nairobi. The “Ma3” from Ma3Route is a Sheng word bus. It plays on the 
similarity between the Kiswahili words for bus—matatu—and for three—tatu. 
By the time of the 1776 competition, Ma3Route’s app had been downloaded 40,000 times 
and they had in excess of 400,000 active users, representing approximately 10 percent of 
Nairobi’s population with some 2,000 posts about traffic per day(Green, 2016). Just the next 
month they would have 500,000 active users and a new $25,000 round of “pre-seed” investment 
(Jackson, 2016),  and eight months after that they would launch a new updated application with a 
smoother interface providing a live map of the traffic reports akin to Waze. Over the years that 
I’d been going to Nairobi, Ma3Route was often mentioned as an example of a small startup that 
seemed immensely popular with those in the Nairobi tech scene, one of the few Kenyan apps that 
people in the space seemed to use themselves on a regular basis. 
So when Stéphane walked onto that 1776 stage, he did so with the casual confidence of 
someone who knew he was among fans; he was in familiar territory. Without saying a word, the 
crowd exploded with excitement at just seeing Stéphane and the familiar blue, red, and yellow of 
	 101 
the company’s logo on his black t-shirt and on the projector screen behind him. The judges, 
however, seemed unconvinced. Just a year prior, the two giants of the traffic mapping world, 
Google Maps and Waze had both launched in Nairobi (E. Wainaina, 2015). To the judges, it 
seemed as if Ma3Route would soon become obsolete or even if it didn’t, it had little hope of 
scaling beyond Kenya. And confronted by both a global giant of the tech world and an Israeli 
unicorn, the hero of the ‘anyone anywhere’ movement, Ma3Route indeed faces a challenge, 
especially if it wants to grow beyond Kenya. 
The judges grilled Stéphane with suspicion. Yet he seemed almost dismissive of their 
concerns. “Waze doesn’t know the Kenyan market. At Ma3Route we know the city because we 
live here, we know where the roads have problems and which shortcuts the matatus use; we know 
this city the way Waze can’t. Our users know we are committed to Kenya.” In a room, at an 
event, hosted by a company that all seemed to glorify the ideals of a Global Community of 
Technology Innovators (GCTI), Stéphane stood clearly and confidently in defiance of one of those 
ideals: the pressure to scale globally. When asked similar questions, the vast majority of the 
startups pitching that night all seemed desperate to demonstrate that they had a growing and 
expansive future, that they could be relevant to people far from Nairobi, and that they had the 
potential to make some ‘real money’ for their investors. But in his response, Stéphane, took a 
stance and presented a company that seemed to prioritized the people of Nairobi – prioritize them 
over other countries and over the financial support and attention that might come with winning 
the competition, over even legitimacy in the GCTI. Instead, he was focused on solving a problem 
that seems universal – traffic – but that manifests in a particular way in Nairobi using a hyper-
local solution that listened to its users both in crowdsourcing and in its approach to building a 
business. At the end of the night, Ma3Route did not win the African Regional Rounds of the 1776 
competition; they didn’t even place. Three months later, however, they did succeed in receiving a 
small $25,000 round of seed funding from a venture capital firm called EchoVC Partners, with 
ties to both Nigeria and the United States, though its future is still very much uncertain 
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With the pressures on tech innovation to expand, to grow, to pivot or fall by the wayside, the 
approach that Ma3Route took on that competition stage in defiance of such pressures may signify 
that it will one day become obsolete, overpowered by the billion dollar valuations of its 
competitors and an industry that wants its champions to solve global problems and not just local 
ones. But it also represents a push among some in Kenya’s own community of technology 
innovators (Kenyan CTI) to move away from the Silicon Valley model of innovation and the 
conforming pressures of the GCTI.  
In the previous chapter, I showed how many Kenyan entrepreneurs working to become 
GCTI members and successful tech entrepreneurs have often found that the reality differs greatly 
from the stories they had heard and the expectations they held. I recounted the stories of some of 
those as they struggled in the face of this discrepancy and in the face of constricting narratives 
about Africa and about what a successful technology innovator should look, act, and sound like. 
Frustrated by such barriers, I found many in Nairobi, like Stéphane at Ma3Route to be 
pushing back against the pressures. Some are pushing back in small ways making individual 
choices, like the programming student who chooses to go to church instead of working through 
Sunday on her coding homework; like the startup that moves to a small traditional office in 
Nairobi’s CBD instead of staying in the open plan coworking space in the hip affluent suburb; or 
like Paul whose story I told in the previous chapter and who chose to turn away from venture 
capital funding altogether after the unfolding of the Angani Saga. Other pushbacks, however, 
come on a larger scale or on a more public platform. Stéphane’s very public resistance to 
prioritizing a global market over a local one is one such example. While it was indeed an 
individual move for an individual company, it was performed on public on stage, offering a clear 
critique of one of the core components of the GCTI’s shared repertoire of practices. Throughout 
my fieldwork, I found others making similar moves to Stéphane. But where Stéphane’s was a 
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critique of the GCTI system, some others are making more purposeful movements to change the 
broader way in which technology innovation in Kenya’s own CTI is practiced and understood, 
even if it means moving away from the GCTI. In this chapter, I will explore a few of these forms 
of resistance. I will begin first by discussing the particular dominant practices of GCTI style 
technology innovation that are being targeted and then move on to some of the techniques, 
particularly the narrative techniques that are being employed to reconfigure which practices 
Kenya’s CTI wants to keep and which it wants to reject. 
Rejecting	Practices	
Funding	&	‘vulture	capitalists’	
In Chapter 3, I retold the story of the Angani Saga—the case of the popular cloud storage startup 
embroiled in controversy between its Kenyan founders and its funders, some of whom were white 
and foreign—to illustrate some of the challenges Kenyan entrepreneurs are facing. Rightly or 
wrongly, this case came to be associated by many in the Kenyan tech sector with the term 
“vulture capitalism” (Loewenstein, 2014). In the United States, ‘vulture capitalism’ has 
historically been used to refer to venture capitalists who invest in struggling companies in the 
hopes of turning them around. Now, that definition has almost been completely supplanted by the 
more popular derogatory slang understanding of the term,7 referring to venture capitalists who 
come in using their wealth and power to takes advantage of more disadvantaged groups. In the 
startup context, this is typically seen as depriving founders of their legitimate claim to their 
company. Until the Angani Saga in 2015, I did not once hear the term ‘vulture capitalism’ 
employed in Nairobi; afterwards, it arose more often, though at times with hesitation (E. 
Wainaina, 2016).  
The publicness of the discourse around this quite high-profile incident, and the growing 
fear of the potential to have an adversarial relationship with an investor, led many Kenyan 
entrepreneurs I knew to change their behavior. For example, some saw it as a singular problem 
with the investors at Angani, and said they would never accept an investment from them again. 
Others drew a broader conclusion and swore never to accept foreign funding in general. In fact, 
some of the most successful entrepreneurs I knew, including Faith (highlighted at the end of 
Chapter 3) grew their companies while purposefully only accepting investments from Kenyan 
funders. This position echoed the calls I observed in 2016 to grow a culture of local investors, 
high net-worth Kenyans who knew the local environment and didn’t bring the same narrative 
baggage as foreign investors. Over the course of 2016, I observed a handful of Kenyans who had 
become successful entrepreneurs, including many of those involved in the founding of the iHub, 
choose to invest some of their profits back in Kenyan startups. But that pool is still very small, 
and many I spoke with complained about the difficulties of building a local investment culture 
beyond those few. Most of the high net-worth individuals in Kenya have been accustomed to a 
more assured approach to investment, where returns may be more linear, but more assured. One 
prominent figure in Kenya’s CTI explained how her conversation with Kenyan investors had 
historically gone. 
The conversations I’ve been having with some local investors have been: 
‘Why don’t you stop building bad apartments and give this entrepreneur 
10mil shillings? It’s like nothing!’ They go, ‘That’s fine, how do I get my 
money back?’ They expect a sure thing. Joe Muchero has done a few 
                                                      
7 Used famously in the United States to refer to the corruption in the financial sector associated with the 
excesses that led to the 2008 economic crisis. 
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investments. But we need more local investors at the entry level. Whether it’s 
debt or equity, because then we solve this problem of equity and having to do 
a song and dance for the expat investors. 
However, by 2016 and 2017 foreign funders were no longer the only ones associated with 
the risk of ‘vulture capitalism.’ For example, Phares Kariuki has been an outspoken critic of the 
excessive valuations for tech startups and the exponential growth that is expected of them that 
come with venture capitalism. “You do not need all that capital” he explained in a 2016 interview 
with the popular Kenyan tech blog Techweez (E. Wainaina, 2016). Instead, he often encourages 
entrepreneurs to develop partnership with existing Kenyan ‘enterprise’ tech companies (larger, 
more established companies), rather than seeking out funding from venture capitalists who bring 
with them such high risks. Similarly, in follow-up interviews I conducted in 2017 after my 
primary fieldwork was complete, a handful of entrepreneurs described having experienced 
problems, even with Kenyan funders.  
By far the most prominent and most frequently criticized of the Kenyan investors was 
Safaricom. Safaricom is Kenya’s largest telecommunications company by far. According to the 
most recent report from the Kenya Communications Authority, Safaricom accounts for just under 
72 percent of the country’s telecom market (Communications Authority of Kenya, 2017). It is 
also the parent company for M-Pesa, the mobile money application that skyrocketed Kenya to 
international attention in the global tech space, and around which many Kenyan financial startups 
are built. While individual staff and representatives of Safaricom that I interviewed often seemed 
to express sincere interest in building up the country’s startup space, the company’s reputation 
among entrepreneurs and techies in Nairobi was decidedly negative. More than a few people 
referenced Safaricom’s reputation for “killing its companies”. This was typically in reference to 
individuals who claimed to have gone to Safaricom to pitch an idea only to find that idea 
launched independently by Safaricom itself while receiving neither compensation nor credit 
themselves. Below is an excerpt from a focus group discussion I moderated in December 2016, 
that gives a sense, I believe, of the intensity of the debate around Safaricom.8 
Participant 1: Ok, so I feel…I feel that Safaricom has an undeserved 
reputation [referring to its reputation to kill companies]. 
P 2: [Interrupting person 1] Really?! 
[Many other participants attempt to jump in at the same time] 
P 3: Nooooo! 
P 4: No! Fully deserved! 
P 5: They stole ideas! 
P 2: They have 5 ideas they stole! 
                                                      
8 All of the focus group participants in this excerpt are Kenyan and are either entrepreneurs themselves or 
worked for startups in Nairobi. The content of this excerpt has received minor edits to improve clarity and 
ease of reading. 
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P 4: M-shwari?9 They stole M-Shwari from Faulu Kenya.10  
P 1: Yeah but M-Shwari’s technically the same as other companies like Tala, 
like Branch11 [both also mobile based loan companies]…like… 
P4: My point is, if M-Shwari was owned by Faulu Kenya today, they [Faulu] 
would be a much bigger bank… 
[People in the group laugh] 
P5: But also before there were the big ones like Tala and Branch, there was 
the idea of paying your rent via M-Pesa. That was a startup, a proper startup. 
They pitched to Safaricom. Gone. 
P6: Gone! 
P5: Then there was also Kopo Kopo.12 Kopo Kopo was disabled by the fact… 
P1: [relenting] Ok, ok. Safaricom deserves its reputation! 
Moderator [myself]: Is the legal structure at fault here…? 
P1: Are you going to take Safaricom to court for the next 10 years? 
P3: You don’t have the money! 
P4: You don’t have the time. You’d be dead before they resolve anything. A 
Kenyan court system is actually…Kenyan courts are places where cases go to 
die. 
P6: Yes! 
In this excerpt, the individual, P1, who is not affiliated with Safaricom, spoke first attempting to 
defend Safaricom, but was quickly shot down by the other participants who cited examples of 
ideas and companies that they believed Safaricom had stolen. Outside of this focus group I also 
heard rumors that the idea for M-Pesa itself was stolen from two guys who originally pitched the 
idea to Safaricom. As you may recall from Chapter 3, Safaricom has also been the focus of 
controversy around preferential treatment for funding startup led by foreign entrepreneurs. It is 
perhaps inevitable that the behemoth of Kenya’s CTI would be the focus of so many rumors, so 
much discussion about fears of injustice, corruption, and manipulation. However, what is more 
                                                      
9 M-Shwari is a mobile savings platform launched by Safaricom using its M-Pesa platform in partnership 
with the Commerical Bank of Africa in 2012. Faulu Kenya, a microfinance company claims publicly that 
Safaricom stole the idea from them and took Safaricom to court. The following articles prove more detail 
of the accusations and the court case: http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Safaricom-stole-our-idea-to-roll-
out-M-Shwari/996-1641900-121ul3jz/index.html; http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/89460/  
10 Faulu Kenya is a deposit-taking microfinance bank 
11 This is a similar argument to the one made by Safaricom in court, that Faulu Kenya was not the only 
company to come up with the idea for a mobile savings platform. 
12 A startup created by three American entrepreneurs that helped businesses accept mobile money using M-
Pesa 
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important for the purposes of this analysis than whether or not such transgressions actually took 
place, is how such fears are shaping the way Kenyan entrepreneurs behave. Like with the Angani 
investors, many entrepreneurs in Kenya have chosen to actively avoid Safaricom as a result. 
Perhaps even more so than the Angani investors, Safaricom is seen to be far more powerful than 
the many small startups that dot Nairobi’s tech scene. In both cases, a fear of being taken 
advantage of by powerful funders abounds, strengthened by the belief that even if wronged, there 
is little chance of legal justice for the singular entrepreneur. 
Combined with other incidents of entrepreneurs being taken advantage of, the cases of 
Safaricom and Angani have led to a sense of wariness about investors in general, not just foreign 
investors. Paul, as I mentioned earlier, cited the Angani Saga as a reason why he was unwilling to 
accept equity investments of any kind that might jeopardize his claim to his company. Similarly, 
others told me that they were reluctant to pitch their ideas to potential partners or investors for 
fear of losing their company. Take this excerpt from later on in the discussion from the same 
focus group cited above: 
Participant 4:13 …sometimes we are not willing to call a spade a spade. 
There’s integrity problems in Kenyan culture. 
Person 1: Testify! 
Person 4: There really are. So you go and you pitch an idea, a product you 
came up with and you can see the IT manager thinking: how can I steal this 
for myself? 
Person 2 [interrupting]: Not even for myself…but do I have a cousin? Do I 
have someone else who can create that company? 
[Group laughter] 
As this excerpt makes clear, foreign investors are not the only potential funders and partners 
many Kenyan entrepreneurs are rejecting. Many have also become more secretive as a result. 
From a national-level CTI that had previously often been described to me as “communal,” 
“supportive,” and “collaborative”, many entrepreneurs in Nairobi in 2016 were opting instead to 
be more secretive, to keep their ideas to themselves for fear of having them stolen. Echoing the 
sentiment from the focus group discussion, one staff member at the iHub that I came to know 
quite well, explained why she believed people in the Kenyan CTI had become less willing to 
collaborate.  
“We in Kenya we have a lot of issues to overcome,” she started.  
“Like what?” I asked her.  
“Corruption! Every time you want to do something, someone else will go and 
make his own because he has a few shillings more than you. That’s why 
people don’t like to collaborate a lot. They’re worried someone is going to 
steal their ideas. But in the tech space, collaboration should be one of the 
things we focus on, especially at the iHub. We convene people. We should 
encourage collaboration more.” 
                                                      
13 Continuing the participant numbers from the previous excerpt 
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These examples depict not only the rejection of specific individual actors – from both within 
Kenya and abroad – but also call into question the role of the investment practices that are 
fundamental to the way technology innovation is practiced in the GCTI. For some, this extended 
into a frustration with the whole fixation on entrepreneurship, frustrations that touched at the very 
core of the GCTI’s main enterprise: building startups. One prominent figure in Kenya’s CTI and a 
co-founder of Ushahidi and the iHub, Ory Okolloh, has become a particularly vocal advocate for 
the reevaluation of the fixation on entrepreneurship and startups. In a talk at Quartz Africa 
Innovator’s Summit in September 2016, Okolloh eloquently summed up much of this frustration: 
I’m concerned about what I see is the fetishization around entrepreneurship in 
Africa…Like, don’t worry that there’s no power because hey, you’re going to 
do solar and innovate around that. Your schools suck, but hey there’s this new 
model of schooling. Your roads are terrible, but hey, Uber works in Nairobi 
and that’s innovation…We can’t entrepreneur our way around bad leadership. 
We can’t entrepreneur our way around bad policies…We have to question 
why is there this big push for us to innovate ourselves around problems that 
our leaders, our taxes, our policymakers, ourselves, to be quite frank, should 
be grappling with…And the same people who are pushing this 
entrepreneurship and innovation thing are coming from places where your 
roads work, your electricity works, your teachers are well paid…No one is 
trying to innovate around your electricity power company. So why are we 
being made to do that? (Kuo, 2016) 
In this and other appearances, Okolloh is not arguing for the wholesale rejection of 
entrepreneurship, but rather more careful attention and reflection about when it is employed and 
why.  
Space	&	the	focus	on	new	technology	
Other, perhaps less fundamental aspects of the GCTI repertoire of practices are also being 
brought into question and challenged. Some, like the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ that prioritizes round 
the clock dedication to innovation, are challenged out of necessity. Many of the young 20-
something innovators I encountered in Kenya, for example, were married and had families, 
requiring a more balanced-life approach to innovation than that taken by, and expected of, their 
counterparts in Silicon Valley. Others – like the choices around the physical spaces of innovation 
and the need to constantly build and find new innovations – are being rejected quite purposefully.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, the GCTI’s material culture often includes the latest design 
features and aesthetics, and open-plan office spaces combining work and play, meant to 
encourage creativity and collaboration. Spaces like the iHub and other coworking spaces in 
Nairobi are frequently in line with this with their large windows and ‘hot desks’, bouncy ball 
chairs, and open-plan spaces. As I showed in Chapter 1, like their Silicon Valley counterparts, 
such spaces in Nairobi are an explicit rejection of traditional office life seen as stifling for 
innovation. Yet, I found a number of Kenyan innovators to be purposefully turning away from 
them, and at times back towards more traditional office spaces. 
One such example is a Kenyan online magazine called Ghafla!, an entertainment and 
gossip magazine that one entrepreneur described to me as “Kenya’s TMZ”. Ghafla! was an early 
entrant into Kenya’s startup scene placing as Runner Up in a startup competition hosted by the 
iHub back in 2011. Soon after, an Africa-focused Danish investment group, 88mph, invested 
$25,000 in Ghafla! in return for 25 percent equity in the company. Soon, 88mph opened their 
own coworking space in Nairobi (what would soon become Nairobi Garage) not far from the 
iHub and invited the founders of Ghafla!, Sam Majani and Lyosi Mwedekelito, to move in. They 
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offered free access14 in return for being an early investee of 88mph. But Majani and Mwedekelito 
rejected the offer. The travel to 88mph’s coworking space in the relatively affluent suburb of 
Kilimani, was time consuming and cumbersome, requiring two separate bus trips. Instead, they 
decided to lease a more traditional office space in the CBD. Being in the center of town, it was far 
easier for their small staff to get to work than Kilimani, and in their estimation, well worth the 
overhead they had to pay for the physical space. Having a private space allowed them to build up 
a real community sense with their staff and a seriousness for their growing business that they felt 
a coworking space lacked. Originally housed in the coworking space, Nailab, they felt they had 
outgrown Nailab’s other early stage startups and needed to “get down to business” in a “real” 
office. 
Majani and Mwedekelito were not alone. Even founders of startups based in the 
coworking spaces often told me that as soon as they could afford it, they would move to their own 
private office, sometimes elsewhere in Kilimani, sometimes in another affluent suburb of 
Westlands, and sometimes, like Ghafla! in the CBD. That said, it is a normal part of any 
technology startup in the GCTI, including those in Silicon Valley, to move into a private office as 
soon as they’ve outgrown the communal coworking spaces. Some, like MKopa Solar, a very 
successful startup in Kenya that connects Kenyans to solar power through a pay-as-you-go 
system, clearly embraced the approach of their American counterparts. Not only did MKopa 
Solar move to a private office once they were large enough, but they also adopted much of the 
architectural style that marks the typical growing technology company in Silicon Valley. They 
constructed a purpose built private campus for the company’s office in Kilimani, around the 
corner from the iHub, filled it with lush green outdoor spaces and grey and white and glass 
building constructions filled with open plan offices and couch-filled comfortable corners 
encouraging collaboration. Somewhat ironically, like the Silicon Valley companies before them 
that adopted more casual dress styles to signify that they were paying more attention to 
innovation than to superfluous things like fashion, some of Kenya’s innovators, like those at 
Ghafla!, have begun purposefully rejected these stylistic choices, seeing them as superfluous to 
“getting down to business”. One entrepreneur I spent a great deal of time with, I’ll call him 
Vincent, spoke at length to me many times about his frustration with the norms of office spaces in 
the tech community and the pressure to conform to them. I quote from him at length below 
because he not only articulated so eloquently his frustration with tech spaces in Nairobi, but his 
sentiments echoed those of many others I spoke with. 
“Truth be told, and I know it’ll make me sound like a very doer and boring 
person, but I think that sometimes the startup culture can get ahead of itself. 
And it’s not just in Kenya. I’ve seen even on YouTube and stuff the way 
startups all are trying to compete about who will have the zaniest and coolest 
and most hip and progressive nutcase-y office. You know? It’s nice. But how 
much of it is really real? You know? And then I stumbled across an article 
where it was talking about programmers and the programmers are saying how 
they hated open coworking spaces. And it’s been taken as a, it’s almost a 
truism, no, it’s an orthodoxy now. You know, ‘open plan is all the future’, 
‘open plan means open ideas and communication’. But it also means 
distraction; it means lack of privacy; it means running away every time you 
want to make a phone call or talk to your girlfriend or your hubby or your kid 
or something that might be personal, that you don’t want the whole office to 
hear. And also taking away an element of people’s individuality. So, when I 
look down the road at our own startup and our plans and how we’re planning 
                                                      
14 Unlike the iHub at the time, Nairobi Garage charged for the use of its space 
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to grow and we’ve been looking forward to that, I think that I don’t know 
whether we’ll end up doing an open plan or not but I decided that for sure 
everyone is going to get their own desk. You’re not going to be a hot-desking 
battery chicken! Everyone’s going to have their own desk, with some space 
around them and you know a place they can call their own and identify as 
their own and personalize. I think you still have to let people be human 
beings. And it’s not all about the organization, it’s also about their happiness. 
I’m not going to do the crazy zany office thing. We’re gonna have a sane 
office. I don’t need handcrafted things from Gikomba [a popular market in 
Nairobi], or recycled bicycle rims from Cape Town. We don’t need to and 
we’re not gonna do it. I’m going to try and brake the coolness mold and just 
be a normal office for a change .” 
“Where do you think this came from?” I asked him. 
“I think it’s a Silicon Valley thing,” he explained. “I think Google started it 
and before long everybody was supposed to be skateboarding or riding bikes 
indoors and you know bouncing around on bouncing chairs and doing the 
work lying down. There was a cool wave and like all waves they tend to 
overshoot and so I remember reading an article about how before Erick 
Schmidt came to Google they had all manner of crazy things, annual ski trip 
for the entire company. I think that’s what happens. Waves come and then 
things overshoot.” 
Of course, in a community that has grown to a global scale, people in different parts of the world 
will approach the work differently; no matter how entrenched the community’s accepted practices 
and material culture, people often adapt global practices to suit their personal local environment. 
The Kenyan entrepreneurs with families I mentioned earlier are examples of people adapting their 
approach to innovation to fit their individual environments. By contrast, in the above excerpt 
Vincent makes it apparent that his choice to reject the ‘trendy’ office style, is not a matter of 
chance; it is not an adaptation of the larger GCTI’s material culture to his particular environment. 
Instead, it is a purposeful rejection of an unnecessary trend that he sees as promulgated by GCTI 
icons like Google. Vincent and a handful of others I met believe that the pressure to build hip 
spaces for tech startup offices is a distraction, something to focus on aside from the substance of 
the product being built. In the case of the iHub, for example, when they were looking to build a 
new office in 2016, the staff were engaged in a ‘participatory’ process to design the new space; 
many, however, participated reluctantly wondering if it was worth taking them away from the real 
work they would otherwise be doing. In their and Vincent’s eyes, so much time and money seems 
to be spent on unnecessary space design among Kenyan startups overshadowing the real work 
necessary to build a company. Ironically, in the trendy coworking spaces like the iHub, many of 
the “quirks” that seem to symbolize Silicon Valley’s CTI’s own push to break with American 
conventions about work place culture—the balance ball chairs in the Nailab, the foosball table in 
the iHub, the private call space in the shape of a British telephone box at Nairobi Garage—
frequently go unused. One iHub member, who’d been working from the coworking space for 
years, confided to me that he’d only ever seen people playing on the foosball table once. 
Similarly, every time during my early visits to Nailab in 2013 and 2014, the balance chairs sat 
unused lining the wall, while the tables were all full of people sitting on ordinary stationary, 
though brightly colored, chairs. By 2016, there were no balance chairs in sight. 
Such frustration with trendy offices represents something more than just a frustration 
with the pressures around the material spaces of innovation that have become common in the 
GCTI. It also represents an exhaustion with innovators’ and investors’ infatuation with the latest, 
	 109 
newest, hippest technology. As we saw in Chapter 1, prioritizing the newest most advanced 
technology is often a fundamental part of GCTI’s practices, a necessary practice in order to avoid 
falling behind in the fast-paced world of developing the newest most state of the art technological 
product. But as Vincent so eloquently explains, “sometimes the startup culture can get ahead of 
itself”. This emphasis on the new can become problematic when applied to things like offices 
which don’t necessarily need to be new in order to be effective sites for programming. Despite 
evidence that programmers don’t actually like open-plan coworking spaces (Collins, 2016), it 
became a trend (or what Vincent called a wave) that started in Silicon Valley and spread to 
Kenya. To people like Vincent, what’s on a particular wave, what’s trendy at the time seems to be 
more about image than substance. And this applies equally to trends about space as to trends 
about technology itself. Since the start of my fieldwork in Nairobi in 2013, trends in what was 
‘hot’ in Kenyan technology innovation have gone from mobile phone apps to agri-tech startups to 
transportation startups and most recently to fintech startups, particularly those employing original 
algorithms. Each change in trend wasn’t necessarily due to the latest technological advancements 
as was historically the case in Silicon Valley (Rogers & Larsen, 1984), but more often to 
whatever investors were interested in funding or whatever had gotten the most media coverage. 
The trend around mobile apps for example coincided with a wave of interest from global 
technology companies – Microsoft, Samsung, Nokia, and Google most notably – around 2013 in 
funding developments on their respective hardware of mobile operating systems, leading to, 
among other things, funding earmarked for training Kenyan programmers on different platforms 
or for providing physical handsets on which designers could test out product. Vincent and Ghafla! 
and others in Kenya’s tech sector are, often in quite small ways, attempting to reject some of 
these pressures to follow whatever is trending, to look beyond what is being hyped, at a particular 
time in the GCTI or in the Kenyan branch of it. But in rejecting such trends as lacking in 
substance, some in Kenya’s technology sector are rejecting another mainstay of the GCTI: 
storytelling and the hype around particular things that it helps to build. 
Storytelling	&	‘hype’	
“It was just hype.” “There is this perception that it is over-hyped”. “I think 
Kopo Kopo was over-hyped.” “There was always a lot of hype about the 
iHub.” “There’s a lot of hype around innovation innovation innovation.” 
“They really hype you up and then expect too much”. “So many VCs come 
here because of the hype.” “It’s hard to say we’re hype if there’s substance 
like Kopo Kopo.” “We are never hype.” 
Hype. The frequency with which I heard this word thrown about during my time in Nairobi 
played no small part in influencing my decision to focus on the role of storytelling and narratives 
in Kenya’s tech sector to begin with. Connoting a story that has run away from the truth, an 
exaggeration of reality, the term, hype, as some of the quotes above make clear, was often 
employed by members of Nairobi’s technology sector to convey frustration with unrealistic or 
misguided expectations that had been created by an inflated or misleading story. Like the trend 
celebrating open-plan coworking spaces for innovation, stories that build hype are often seen as 
celebrating something that it subsequently turns out has not earned the attention. At times, 
particular companies (like the iHub, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, or Kopo Kopo) 
were accused of being “over-hyped”; at other times, it was particular narratives (like the 
Technology is Good Narrative from Chapter 1); and other times still, it was Kenya’s entire tech 
sector. One of the biggest complaints I heard about hype was that it created unrealistic 
expectations. Some pointed to the unrealistic expectations brought by foreigners coming to 
Kenya. “So many VCs come in here because of the hype only to reach here and look at ideas 
being pitched and they look half-cooked” (Interview with a Kenyan investor). Others pointed to 
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the unrealistic expectations of wide-eyed Kenyan students hoping to become entrepreneurs. “So 
many students from campus come here [to the iHub] and think it’s easy to build a startup. It looks 
glamorous and exciting. But so many of them end up struggling. They’d be better off going to 
work for a company like Copy Cat Group [an example of what Kariuki called an enterprise 
technology company]” (From a conversation with one of the iHub’s staff members). While the 
subject of this derisive adjective often varied, the common denominator was its use to indicate 
some kind of a “gap” between a story and reality. Sometimes the reality was a product that was 
ineffective, or a company that was unprofitable, corrupt, or unable to sell its products. Sometimes 
the reality was a practice (like cool offices) that had become popular but was actually quite 
ineffective at its stated purpose (making workers happier and more productive). Sometimes the 
reality was simply more complex and multi-faceted than the story most often told.  
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, startup entrepreneurs today operate in a 
very saturated communicative ecology, that offers the double-edged sword of access to a wealth 
of information from a variety of different sources about how to write code or how to manage 
staff, but also a wealth of competition, making it particularly difficult for entrepreneur to get 
attention for their design. The “hype cycle” (Linden & Fenn, 2003) has become an intrinsic part 
of this process of this. And crucially, hype is not just something experienced in Kenya’s 
technology sector, but as anyone who follows GCTI core news outlets will know – take, for 
example, the current popularity of blockchain– a symptom of the way technology innovation 
through startups is currently practiced. As far back as 2008, the media scholar David Silver wrote 
succinctly about the media hype that had helped to make “Web 2.0” popular, despite what he 
viewed as the lack of any substantial changes to the way the internet was structure (2008).. He 
used the story as a warning against what he called “corporate hype”. “Don’t believe corporate 
hype,” he wrote. “Corporations exist to make profits, not public goods. Usually, when they say 
‘community’ they mean ‘commerce,’ and when they say ‘aggregation’ they mean ‘advertising’”. 
Heeding such warnings, below are a few examples of companies, practices, and narratives that 
many Kenyan techies described to me as being “hyped” or “over-hyped”. 
Hackathons	
Some of the things accused of being ‘hyped’, like the trendy office design, are common in the 
broader GCTI and are not exclusive to Kenya. One example of this is the hackathon. After 
speaking at length with a number of people involved in organizing hackathons in Nairobi, many 
felt that, while funders (particularly in this instance non-profit funders) continued to want to 
sponsor hackathons, they were in fact seen as largely ineffective at reaching their goals. One 
organizer, named Evelyn, described hackathons to me as “cooking up ideas from our asses”. 
Elaborating, she said: “You’re put into a room and made to work with people you don’t really 
know on a project that sometimes seems like an arbitrary assignment. Is this really a way to start 
a business?”. By many accounts outside of Kenya, the hackathon has indeed gone the way of 
Google Glass. Journalists have written about how it’s over (Gapusan, 2017), how it’s bad for 
innovation (Sastry & Penn, 2015), and how some individuals subsist on jumping from hackathon 
to hackathon without really producing anything new(Broussard, 2015). 
Tech	can	save	the	world	
Similarly, particular community narratives from the broader GCTI were often categorized as 
over-hyped. For example, the Technology Is Good Narrative from Chapter 1 – the narrative about 
how technology can save the world, that reinforces fundamental shared community belief – was, 
by 2016, met with exhaustion by some in Kenya, seen by then as being “overplayed”. Vincent, 
for example said explicitly: “’Tech can save the world’—I hate that story with a passion. It’s like 
the fancy chairs in the office. It’s a distraction.” Similarly, at the annual meeting of the Kenyan 
Internet Governance Forum, a Kenyan techie that I was sitting with rolled her eyes in an 
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exaggerated gesture when a Facebook representative spoke about the work that they were doing 
to “make the world a better place” and to “improve access to the internet in Africa”. For her, as 
she later explained to me, such rhetoric was “all talk”, necessarily insincere. Even if Facebook 
was trying to improve access to the internet in Africa, she said she knew it wasn’t because they 
wanted to “make the world a better place”, but because they wanted to “make money”. These and 
other more established members of Kenya’s tech sector felt frustrated, at times insulted, at the 
persistence of such narratives because of how inconsistent they were with their own lived 
experiences. 
M-Pesa	
Other stories being rejected as over-hyped were unique to Kenya. For example, numerous people 
I spoke with described M-Pesa as over-hyped. In this case, the label of “hype” is applied not to 
describe something that is completely ineffective, but rather to describe a story that is over-told. 
Few people I spoke with deny that M-Pesa is a useful product that has enabled mobile money 
based technology innovation that was not possible in countries without a similar platform. But 
many are frustrated with the frequency with which the M-Pesa story is told, at the expense of 
other, less well-known, stories about Kenyan innovators. A Kenyan manager of one of Nairobi’s 
community spaces for tech entrepreneurs articulated his frustration with the “single story” of M-
Pesa in the following way:  
People know about M-Pesa. So the M-Pesa story becomes over told and it’s a 
narrative that everybody knows. So people see you and they ask, ‘where are 
you from?’ ‘Oh, I’m from Kenya’ ‘Ah! So you know M-Pesa?’ People don’t 
even know Safaricom, but people know M-Pesa. And Safaricom is the mother 
of M-Pesa! So I think the international coverage only focuses on M-Pesa. And 
I know, M-Pesa is good. It’s great; it’s opened up a lot of opportunities for 
this ecosystem. But we, as the people in tech, we just need a fresh idea, a 
fresh story. 
To him and others, the reduction of this complex ecosystem that they live in every day to a 
“single story” of M-Pesa, no matter how important that product was to the growth of the 
ecosystem, had become tiresome in a way that funders and others coming in from abroad didn’t 
seem to understand. One of the iHub’s communication staff, for example, recounted a story to me 
of working with a large international donor that came into Kenya and wanted to work with the 
iHub to put together a media piece on “mobile money and M-Pesa”. Instead, he helped them to 
restructure it, advising them to “try to cover more of mobile money than M-Pesa”. 
Other	Kenya	narratives	
While M-Pesa is the most well-known, there are other “over-hyped” narratives about technology 
in Kenya that also cause frustration. For example, there’s the narrative about how Kenyan 
startups are primarily mobile phone applications (“Apps are not that big anymore. They’ve not 
been big for the longest time, like the last two years”); or the narrative about how technology 
designed for Africa needs to be rugged for the challenging environment (“There’s a whole bunch 
of people coming to do things for Africa and it’s always a reduced version of something that 
already exists. It’s always a lighter version or a rugged version and people don’t want that shit”). 
Even the moniker adopted to describe the Kenyan tech sector, Silicon Savannah, is a source of 
frustration (“Silicon Savannah. It’s a misnomer. There’s no silicon here. We don’t build chips. 
We build digital technologies!”).  
To some of the people living and working in Kenya’s CTI, simplifying it to any of these 
narratives is not only irritating or even insulting, but it can also have tangible and detrimental 
effects on the work they can do. Like the reductive narratives about the broader continent 
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described in the previous chapter (the Failed Continent v. Africa Rising) that seem to pigeonhole 
many Kenyan entrepreneurs into “social entrepreneurship”, these one-dimensional narratives 
about Kenya’s tech sector can curtail what funders are looking for. For example, many of the 
entrepreneurs I knew were frustrated with the dominance of the M-Pesa story because it 
heightened the popularity of funding “fintech” or “mobile money” startups over other kinds of 
projects.  
Kenya	as	the	tech	hub	of	Africa	
But of all the narratives about Kenya’s technology innovation community, the one that seemed 
the most controversial was: the narrative about how Kenya was leading the continent in 
technology innovation.15 Many acknowledged that the traction this story received in the 
international press (particularly in 2010-2013, as I will show in Chapter 5) contributed in some 
way to the initial growth of the sector. But by 2016, many entrepreneurs that I came to know 
believed that it had been too early to tell that story. One entrepreneurs I spoke with said it misled 
people coming to expect a more developed tech sector when it really was still in its fledgling 
stage; another said it misled many Kenyan IT graduates to believe that there were more 
opportunities for them in tech entrepreneurship than there were. The iHub’s entrepreneur mentors 
reiterated these sentiments during an interview: “People [referring to Kenyan students] thought, 
‘all these companies are being formed. Let me get in on this’. Now what we’re realizing is there 
needs to be a lot more emphasis on quality and a lot more realism. …We need a lot more focus 
not just on entrepreneurship, but on the quality of the craft and not just build startups for the sake 
of startups.” Another entrepreneur I spent a great deal of time with articulated the double-sided 
nature of the impact the popularization of this particular narrative has had.  
“Those stories,” he explained, “…people came with money looking for things 
to invest in and maybe didn’t find those things. Some people came here to 
work for startups that didn’t go anywhere. You could see Harvard and Yale 
degrees all over the place. On one hand, some people put money into other 
things; on the other hand, some people left saying this was all bullshit and 
never came back”.  
Representative of 88mph (the Dutch investment firm that had provided the initial funding for 
Ghafla!) famously said that Kenya’s tech sector was “over-hyped” and decided to move its 
startup acceleration program to Nigeria  (Analo, 2015) and turn its Nairobi office into a 
coworking space (Nairobi Garage, 2015). By contrast, one American, I’ll call her Kate, I 
interviewed had chosen to stay. She described to me how she’d moved to Kenya to work for a 
startup called Mobius Motors, that claimed it was manufacturing a car, and went by the tagline 
“Designed for Africa. Built in Africa” (Mobius Motors, 2018). Over the course of my fieldwork, 
many people cited Mobius – as well as Sanergy, the startup claiming to turn human waste into 
energy – as an example of a startup that had gotten loads of attention from investors but had 
produced very few results. Incidentally, Mobius is another example of the companies that make 
ample use of the African branding, but are in fact predominantly controlled by non-Kenyans that 
were discussed in Chapter 3. By way of illustration look at the organizations “Team” page on its 
website, the photographs of show a sea of entirely male, and majority white faces. Only one is 
Kenyan and another of South Asian descent. After arriving in Kenya to work for Mabius, Kate 
said she quickly realized that it was “over-hyped”, so she left, working first for a local startup 
                                                      
15 A narrative that was in fact originally promulgated by people in Kenya, especially, as we will see in 
Chapter 5, people at the iHub 
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investment fund and then joining a popular Kenyan transportation startup in the management 
team, where she still worked at the time of this writing. 
Storytelling	
Critically, as it turns out, it is not just individual narratives and stories like these that are being 
brought into question, but, for some, it is the practice of startup storytelling itself. Over the course 
of my fieldwork in 2016, it became apparent, through interviews and my observations, that many 
entrepreneurs wanted to “get down to business” instead of focusing on the public relations 
apparently necessary to get their product noticed. Some entrepreneurs described time spent on 
public relations as contributing to the “fluff” and spoke disparagingly about companies (including 
the iHub as I will show in Chapter 5) that were seen as spending too much time on their images 
and not enough time on the “substance”. One startup community manager explained this 
sentiment to me in an interview. “There is this school of thought, especially of local 
entrepreneurs, who are like ‘You know what? We are doing this. We are making some money. 
Let’s just do it. We don’t need to spend time talking about it, or talking about how we are 
changing the world. Talk doesn’t pay the bills”. Repeatedly, when I asked entrepreneurs about 
their “communication strategy” in interviews, many responded by saying that they didn’t have 
time for a communication strategy, or they didn’t think it was important, or they wanted to build 
their product up more first. This sentiment seemed to even be held by some of the foreigners who 
had joined Kenya’s tech sector and chosen to stay. For example, one of the American founders of 
a startup based in Kibera that helps disadvantaged youth access new technology, I’ll call him 
John, spoke disparagingly about organization like the iHub, that have spent a great deal of time 
on their media appearance. “They care too much what everyone thinks. And yet what have they 
built? What have they really built?” By contrast, I saw very little media coverage of John’s 
organization and only heard about it when I met him at a conference where he was critiquing the 
culture of “vulture capitalism” and “toxic apps” during the Q&A for a panel on venture 
capitalism.  
John and other entrepreneurs in Nairobi are choosing to do exactly the opposite of what 
we saw Faith do in Chapter 3. Through storytelling, Faith purposefully crafted an image for 
herself as a successful entrepreneur in line with GCTI dominant community narratives and 
expectations while also building up her company’s product. But for other entrepreneurs like those 
cited above, that approach was often characterized as “self-promotion” and distracting from the 
real work that needed to get done. Sometimes it’s not just startup storytelling that’s rejected, but 
the storytellers as well. Just as particular organizations were singled out for their focus on their 
image and their story over their product, so have particular individuals associated with “hype” 
stories often been singled out for critique. Some of the individuals involved in the founding of the 
iHub (as we will see in much greater detail in Chapter 5), are an example of this. 
What became apparent over the course of my time in Nairobi is that the frequency with 
which many of the narratives mentioned above turned out the be false or misleading (hype) has 
contributed to an overall sense of malaise with the act of storytelling, with the media, and even 
sometimes storytellers among many entrepreneurs and technologists in Kenya’s CTI. Like the 
moves I outlined earlier rejecting other received practices of the GCTI like the venture capitalist 
funding model and the material culture, the moves questioning the value of entrepreneurial 
storytelling and the value of the focus on the newest and hottest product challenge existing 
assumptions in the broader GCTI about the best way to build, fund, disseminate, and understand 
new innovations.   
As a result, a small but important minority of the members of Kenya’s own community 
around technology innovation that I interacted with were not just complaining about these 
problems or critiquing the pressures and barriers they experienced, they purposefully working to 
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change the way technology innovation was being practiced and talked about in Kenya’s own 
community of innovators.  
Reshaping	Practices	
I’d like to return for a moment to the works introducing the community of practice framework 
with which I began this dissertation, particularly Etienne Wenger’s book Community of Practice 
(1998). In it, as I explained in Chapter 1, he writes explicitly about what differentiates a 
community of practice from other communities, namely: “mutual engagement, a joint enterprise, 
and a shared repertoire” (Wenger, 1998, p. 73). It is not enough for people to all share the same 
repertoire of practices, the same open plan coworking spaces, the same model of investment. 
They must be engaging one another in the community’s shared enterprise (building technology 
through startups in this case), and in turn jointly negotiating what those practices should be 
(Wenger, 1998). This process of joint negotiation and mutual engagement was very important to 
Wenger and I believe it’s particularly important to return to now. For him, engaging didn’t simply 
mean co-participating in the community’s practices (though that was an important part of learning 
to become a full members), it also required that participants were “being included in what 
matters” (1998, p. 74). As a result, participation in a community of practice can have a positive 
effect creating a “sense of community” (McMillan & Chavis, 1986) and shared meaning, when 
individuals are fully engaged in “what matters”, in shaping the norms and values of the 
community. But, when individuals are not involved in this joint process of meaning-making, it 
can also be detrimental, leading individuals to feel excluded or like they do not belong. This gets 
at older understandings from the field of psychology about what it means to be a member of any 
kind of community, which have shown that if an individual feels like they have invested 
themselves or sacrificed in some way they will believe they have the right to belong (Aronson & 
Mills, 1959; Buss & Portnoy, 1967), and that when members only feel a “sense of community” 
and belonging when there is “a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members 
matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met 
through their commitment to be together” (McMillan & Chavis 1986, p. 9). Put more plainly, 
members are more drawn to communities in which they feel like they are or can be influential.  
What I hope to have shown over the course of this and the preceding chapter are the ways 
in which some Kenyan innovators did not feel influential or understood within the global 
community of practice around technology innovation. After putting in considerable time and 
effort sacrificing alternative career paths or financial security, many Kenyan techies and 
entrepreneurs found that they were denied community legitimacy or recognition even when they 
felt like they’d done everything they were supposed to. And that as a result, many of the 
innovators discussed in the first half of this chapter were choosing to turn away, were choosing to 
de-prioritize the international GCTI audience in their search for meaning as technology 
entrepreneurs. As the linguist Bethan Davies write, “the flipside of legitimacy is choice” (Davies 
2005, p. 567). As I showed above, some of chosen to reject some of the financing practice, the 
material culture, and the communicative practices expected of GCTI members.  
Recall as well from Wenger’s writings, that all individuals participate in multiple 
communities of practice throughout our lifetimes, or even simultaneously (Wenger, 1998). These 
Kenyan innovators are not just negotiating their terms of engagement in the GCTI, but in the 
Kenyan CTI as well, but with one key difference: Many of them have more of an influence in 
“what matters” in the Kenyan CTI than the global one. And while they have often found that this 
“negotiation” process with the GCTI has been rather one-sided, some, as I will show in the 
remainder of the chapter, have found such negotiations more productive at the national level. One 
of my favorite parts of the community of practice framework is that it conceptualizes the 
community not as a stagnant entity, but as an active one, in a mutually constitutive process with 
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its many varied members. That is, in a healthy community of practice, the practices of the 
community, and the community itself should co-evolve (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  As Lave and 
Wenger have written: 
The move of learners toward full participation in a community of practice 
does not take place in a static context. The practice itself is in motion. Since 
activity and the participation of individuals involved in it, their knowledge, 
and their perspective are mutually constitutive, change is a fundamental 
property of communities of practice and their activity. (Lave & Wenger, 
1991, p.118) 
While the experiences of most African innovator have seemed to have little influence 
over the accepted practices and material culture of the broader GCTI, in the remainder of this 
chapter I will show one way in they have been able to influence the Kenyan CTI and that is 
through telling counter-stories and constructing counter-narratives. Intriguingly, I have found, as I 
will show, that in order to change community practices, it became to also challenge dominant 
narratives both about technology innovation in general and about how technology innovation in 
Africa is understood and valued, a process that involved engaging with storytelling practices that 
some, as I showed above, had rejected. Just as Faith used storytelling to reshape her personal 
narrative and portray an image for herself acceptable to the GCTI, so too have others in Kenya’s 
technology sector employed storytelling strategies to work, sometimes in small ways, to reshape 
broader narratives about how technology innovation is understood and practiced specifically in 
Kenya and to draw attention to the perceived injustices and inequalities in the national level 
community. To do so, as I will demonstrate, advocates for changing approaches to innovation in 
Kenya often moved away from more mainstream forms of storytelling and instead employed 
more subversive elements of their communicative ecology, rejecting, for example, the traditional 
media and even blogs in favor of personal stories, rumors, humor, discussion forums, and social 
media platforms, particularly Twitter. 
Reshaping	Narratives	
Stories are important. They keep us alive. In the ships, in the camps, in the 
quarters, fields, prisons, on the road, on the run, underground, under siege, in 
the throes, on the verge—the storyteller snatches us back from the edge to 
hear the next chapter. In which we are the subjects. We, the hero of the tales. 
(American activist, Toni Cade Bambara, 1985, 41. 
We saw in Chapter 2 how narratives and individual stories can work in mutually reinforcing ways 
to influence people to adopt a particular new practice (in this case technology innovation) or to 
aspire to join a particular community of practice (in this case the GCTI). On the other hand, in 
Chapter 3, we saw how they can serve to constrain what people are able to do or how successful 
others can imagine they could be at a particular task. Yet in addition to reinforcing dominant 
cultural norms and overarching narratives, research has shown that storytelling can also play a 
part in resisting them, and even changing dominant practice (Ashe, 1988; Delgado, 1989; 
Richardson, 1990). This has most clearly been shown to be the case in the study of social 
movements (Dimond, Dye, LaRose, & Bruckman, 2013; Razack, 1993). The feminist scholar, 
Lena Wanggren, for example, has argued that “storytelling and narrative creation have long 
played a part in social change and social movements, allowing people to learn, exercise, agency, 
shape identities and motivate action” (Wanggren 2016, p. 402). Through the telling of stories that 
are not often told, or counter-stories as she calls them, she argues that social movement can 
challenge the accuracy of dominant narratives. In her study of the “Hollaback! Movement” to end 
street harassment in the United States, Wanggren illustrated how the telling and sharing of 
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individual stories of diverse kinds of street harassment challenged the “patriarchal narrative” 
about street harassment being exclusively sexualized and gendered. Instead individual stories 
revealed the frequency of anti-Islamic and homophobic street harassment for example. Like in 
Wanggren’s work on the Hollaback! Movement, the use of storytelling in social movements is 
predominantly characterized in the literature as telling individual stories that illuminate an 
inaccuracy in the received dominate narrative about an issue. Small stories told in particular ways 
by particular people in particular contexts are characterized as having the power to change 
received or ingrained narratives. “Since anyone can tell his or her own story,” the narrative 
scholar, Francesca Polletta has written, “…personal narratives are a way to discover and 
communicate that which is shared in individual experiences” (Polletta 1998, p. 425) and are seen 
as particularly appropriate tools for challenging the status quo.  
As in the case of the Hollaback! Movements, counter-stories are particularly adept at 
challenging the status quo when they are believed to be true, and targeted at inaccuracies, 
falsehood, mischaracterizations, or stereotypes in dominant narratives or norms. Given that one of 
the main critiques of many in Kenya’s tech sector has been the role of ‘hype’ and ‘over-hyped’ 
companies, telling counter-stories, has become important in the moves to change the narratives 
about how technology innovation is and should be practiced in Kenya. Take, for example, one of 
the earlier dominant narratives about technology innovation practices in Kenya: that venture 
capital, including foreign venture capital, was helping to support and nurture fledgling 
entrepreneurs and their startups. Stories that strengthened this narrative have been told over and 
over again in GCTI and other big international media outlets. Take this excerpt from a National 
Geographic feature titled “How Africa’s Tech Generation is Changing the Continent”. While 
praising many of the Kenyan innovators themselves, the piece also highlighted the role of the 
investors: “During the past few years, tens of millions of dollars in venture capital has flowed 
from the West into such countries as Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, and South Africa. The result is a 
generation of innovators whose homegrown ideas could, in the manner of SafeMotos, improve 
the lives of their fellow Africans” (Jazbec, 2017). 
Rumor	
Over the years, counter-stories, or rumors opposing this narrative gradually spread among 
Kenyan innovators – rumors about ‘vulture capitalists’, recounting bad experiences with investors 
who took advantage of novice entrepreneurs. Yet few people were willing to name names or to go 
on the record with their accusations. As I was often told, most people with such a story to tell 
were too scared to speak out publicly, scared of losing their jobs, scared of losing the prospect of 
future jobs or of future investments. As ‘Winnie’, one of the more prominent voices in the move 
to change Kenyan innovation culture, described to me, “I don’t think anyone was brave enough 
before Angani to speak out. It was tightly controlled. …There were lots of people who knew what 
was going on but didn’t want to get maligned.” In such a context, a rumor can be a powerful tool 
to help those who are also struggling to feel a sense of comradery, believing that others are 
struggling too (Samper, 2002). Yet while they remain in the form of rumors, it can be difficult for 
stories to successfully challenge or change dominant narratives, like the one above, as they can be 
easily dismissed as ‘heresay’ or, of course, just ‘rumors’.  
Things changed after the very public unfolding of the Angani Saga at the end of 2015, 
when the entrepreneurs involved stepped into the spotlight with their story. By doing so, they 
brought a conversation about investor behavior that had previously lingers in whispers and 
rumors, out into the public, forcing a very engaged, and at times acerbic conversation about both 
what the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs in Kenya’s CTI really looks like and 
what it should look like. Crucially, the entrepreneurs’ version of the story, as recounted in 
Chapter 3, seemed to reinforce so many of the rumors that had spread around Kenya’s tech sector, 
making it easy for many of the people listening to believe it to be true. At the same time, the 
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investors similarly began to tell their contrasting version of the story publicly, describing the 
entrepreneurs as inexperienced and their actions as necessary to preserve the company. In the end, 
only the investors and entrepreneurs involved know what actually happened and even they 
probably interpreted the events and one another’s actions differently. Stories are by their nature 
recounted away from the events they describe making it difficult for the audience to discern 
whether or not they are a true and authentic representation of events, a warped version of reality, 
or entirely false. The important thing in the Angani case, is that many believed the entrepreneurs’ 
story of events to be true that it forced even those in powerful positions in Kenya’s CTI to answer 
questions and to defend or question for themselves the dominant narrative about the role of 
venture capital in Kenya’s technology sector. As David Samper showed in his research on rumors 
in Guatemala, when those in power address stories, even rumors, even when they are only 
addressing them to deny them, they “serve to legitimize the rumor by giving it ‘official’ status.” 
(Samper 2002, p. 25). Winnie explained to me in an interview how the rumors and counter-stories 
around the Angani Saga changed the discussion in the following way: 
It’s good that there were frank conversations this year [2016]. It’s unfortunate 
that it took Angani’s collapse to do so. I always tell Phares [Angani’s CEO 
and one of the founding entrepreneurs], it was a gift. But it was also a shame. 
I think that the saddest thing is really that they were a good company that was 
solving problems. It had the potential to be great. Everyone had criticized 
them. ‘What’s innovative about this? How can you ensure the data is secure?’ 
And they’d managed to address all of these things. What’s really sad to me is 
that in some ways its reinforced the worst of how we build technology here. 
There’s so few companies like them and it’s reinforced that if you don’t play 
well with the expat community then you get burned…After Angani, all of a 
sudden, I was part of a call for people to come with their own stories of what 
happened. 
As she characterizes it, Angani opened up a conversation within Kenya’s CTI that people 
had been previously too afraid to have publicly and paved the way for others, including herself, to 
add their stories about problems they’d faced in the sector, forcing people in the Kenyan 
technology sector to begin the process of authentic negotiation – important to any well-
functioning community of practice (Wenger, 1998) – around what role foreign investors should 
be allowed to play in Kenya’s CTI. Yet to her, the unraveling of Angani was also a shame, not 
just because a promising company collapsed, but also precisely because it reinforced many of the 
rumors. Despite the public debates around the Angani investors, Winnie told me of many 
investors she knew who engaged with investees in an ethical and transparent manner, and she 
worried about the new tendency for entrepreneurs to approach every investor with suspicion 
curtailing a culture of openness and community that she believed added strength to the early years 
of the growth of Kenya’s CTI. After the Angani Saga, Winnie spoke out publicly and frequently 
on these issues. For example, in one blog post she wrote the following: 
The idea that either individuals or organizations are ‘too big to fail’ or that the 
tech and start-up sector is somehow different is wrong. If we want to protect 
those working in these areas, or anywhere else, we need to protect the values 
of respect, equality and openness, not specific organizations or people. The 
start-up eco-system in Kenya is no longer nascent, it can and must handle the 
hard work and tough conversations that will happen in the coming weeks and 
months. 
In this excerpt, Winnie sets out clearly her priorities for the values and practices that the Kenya 
CTI should have going forward. Respect, equality, and openness should all be prioritized and 
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individuals who take advantage of others should be held to account. Discriminatory investment 
practices should not be tolerated. But interestingly, the most important point she makes is one that 
Wenger would welcome: That the Kenyan CTI needs to have “tough conversations”, speaking 
plainly about the community’s practices, in order to help the community evolve in a way that 
reflects that values of its members. 
The	challenges	of	counter-story	telling	
As the tendency for stories about investor abuse to linger in rumors demonstrates, it can be 
particularly difficult for counter-stories to be both heard and believed by the larger community. 
Unlike stories that reinforce dominant narratives, counter-stories by definition challenge them, 
clashing with the stories that the larger community expects to hear. As a result, they often require 
a higher burden of proof in order to be both heard and believed. In the case of Angani, a sufficient 
number of rumors about vulture capitalist had spread throughout the community before the 
Angani Saga that at least that sub-set of Kenya’s tech community were readily prepared to 
believe it. 
In fact, as research has shown, the burden on social movements storytellers can be even 
greater still. As Polletta has persuasively argued, the very format of storytelling may make it 
more prone to reproducing dominants understandings, even when used by marginalized or 
insurgent groups (Polletta, 1998, p. 420) than other discursive approaches. Stories depend, she 
has argued, on “a limited stock of possible story lines” that exist in any given particular cultural 
community. There is agreement among narrative theorists, she continues, that “stories not 
conforming to a cultural stock of plots typically are either not stories or are unintelligible” 
(Polletta, 1998, p. 424). In other words, those attempting to change the status quo are often forced 
to work within dominant conceptualizations of how stories should be structured and told and by 
whom in order to get their stories heard, restricting the kinds of stories they can tell. Sociologists 
Brett Smith and Andrew C. Sparkes have shown how this can happen on an individual level to 
devastating effect in their study of a rugby player who suffered a paralyzing spinal cord injury 
(2013). After the injury, he became connected to dominant cultural narratives about recovery 
from such an injury, narratives that depict a hero who may be ill currently, but who will recover 
“one day”. Yet because of his body’s physical inability to “recover”, the rugby player eventually 
rejected this dominant narrative and instead adopted one of despair and hopelessness. But, as 
Smith and Sparkes write, “to despair, to lose hope, are frowned upon as strategies for dealing 
with disease and cancer” (Sparkes & Smith, 2013, p. 218), leading many, including the player’s 
wife, to turn away from him, perpetuating his feeling of hopelessness. On a larger scale, Polletta’s 
own work examining the invocations of the memory of Martin Luther King Jr. in the American 
Congress has shown how the telling of stories about Dr. King by Congressmen on special 
occasions had the unintended effect of serving to reproduce and reinforce existing power 
structures in the legislature through confining stories of Dr. King to the symbolic during special 
occasions instead of the substantive work done during other Congressional sessions. 
Paradoxically, Polletta write, “the commemoration of dissent reproduces a view of Congress’s 
policy deliberations as substantive rather than symbolic, since the symbolic work of 
commemoration takes place, and only takes place, on occasions reserved for it” (Polletta, 2009, p. 
438). While many of the Congressmen had intended to invoke Dr. King as a way of being 
subversive and drawing attention to how unfinished his fight was, in the end their storytelling 
helped to sustain the dominant institution rather than subvert it. 
Because of such pressures, social movement storytellers are often forced to find 
alternative methods of telling and disseminating their stories, like the case of the rumors 
discussed above. Such methods include adopting alternative storytelling platforms – like off-the-
record discussions, protests, anonymous pamphlets or even social media – or alternative 
storytelling genres with alternative storytelling norms – like humor, science fiction, or fantasy. It 
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is little wonder that stories of vulture capitalists in Kenya started as rumors among friends or 
trusted allies and not as newspaper articles or public speeches. They were not stories that 
members of Kenya’s CTI, so hopeful about the prospect of being the ‘tech hub of Africa’, or 
about the potential for growth, had previously been ready to hear. While many of these 
techniques have been employed in Kenya to tell counter-stories, I will focus on two that I found 
to be central to the work of building counter-narratives about who and what practices belong in 
Kenya’s CTI: humor and social media. 
Humor	
There is a small but important body of literature about the role humor can play in affecting social 
change. Researchers have shown, for example, how humor has been used in political movements 
in Norway (Johansen, 1991), or to bring down authoritarian leaders like Slobodan Milosevic 
(Sorensen, 2008) or even as coping mechanism while imprisoned (Henman, 2001). It can be used 
to strengthen movements and enhance the sense of collective identity of its members or to 
encourage new members to join (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014). As Bernal has demonstrate in the 
case of Eritrean dissidents, humor can be a useful tool for minorities or those in less powerful 
positions because it “allows for an oblique engagement with power rather than a directly 
confrontational one and so is well suited as a ‘weapon of the weak’” (Bernal, 2013, p. 306). 
Kenyans have deployed humor frequently in their own political commentary, often 
drawing attention to the hypocrisy of their political leaders or the international community. The 
famed Tanzanian political cartoonist, Godfrey Mwampembwa, known as ‘Gado’, and known for 
his poignant and biting cartoons in Kenya, is a good example. Take a cartoon he published 
immediately after the March 2013 election in which Uhuru Kenyatta was elected president with 
his running mate William Ruto, both of whom were being tried for war crimes related to the post-
election violence in 2008 (Mwampembwa, 2013). In it, he depicts Kenyatta and Ruto jovially 
playing football with ball chains labeled ‘ICC’ attached to their ankles, showing both their 
disregard for the international organization and the international organization’s inability to hold 
them to account. Gado himself has been involved in other forms of humorous political 
commentary, including a satirical puppet show called “The XYZ Show” that uses puppets to 
ridicule the political establishment (BuniMedia, 2018). Similarly, another show, a ‘mockmentary’ 
ridiculing the NGO sector in Kenya, called “The Samaritans” raised money initially from a 
Kickstarter campaign to fund its programming depicting an ineffective NGO called “Aid for Aid” 
with an inept British leader (Xeinium Productions Limited, 2018). This proclivity for humor as 
political commentary has also become common among Kenyan commentators online. Take Ory 
Okolloh, a well-known blogger and activist and prolific tweeter, who has frequently criticized 
President Kenyatta through sarcastic Tweets mocking his decisions like: “selfies with students @ 
state house is cool. Working to find ways to resolve current crisis affecting students is not cool” 
or “sugar bailout is costly but necessary. Paying teachers is costly but apparently not necessary.”  
Humor is a particularly good tool for highlighting this kind of hypocrisy because, as 
Bernal explains, it operates by juxtaposing contradictory situations or statements or by 
exaggerating an original statement or proposition to reveal its absurdity” (Bernal, 2013, p. 304). 
In fact, one of the most prominent theories about humor, incongruity theory, emphasizes humor’s 
ability to draw attention to difference. It is this that makes humor a particularly good tool for 
drawing attention to hype or to the gap between a story and reality. Parody and sarcasm are 
particularly effective genres of humor for this, genres that comedic political commentators, like 
Gado, have been very effective at deploying. Take for example a classic segment from an 
American political satire show called the Daily Show, hosted at the time by Jon Stewart, in which 
he draws attention to the absurd complexity of the American electoral process, branding it 
‘Indecision 2000’. Or another of Gado’s cartoons where he depicts recently reelected President 
Uhuru Kenyatta walking along a red carpet accompanied by a vulture and a pig dressed in a suit, 
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proclaiming “Gentlemen, you did well with the elections, now let’s print money…!” 
(Mwampembwa, 2018) 
As these two examples may already make clear, a joke’s ability to truly resonate relies on 
the identities and cultural situated-ness of both the audience and the teller. If the audience is not 
embedded in the cultural context that the joke references, it is likely to fall flat. In these two 
cases, at least a passing knowledge of the problems with the countries’ respective elections is 
necessary in order to ‘get’ the joke. As humor scholar, Kutz-Flamenbaum wrote, “humor is a 
cultural product that relies upon shared norms and ideas. In order for a joke to make sense it 
needs to reference recognizable cultural symbols and ideas that are shared by both the joker and 
the audience” (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014, p. 296). Similarly, the jokes may have been interpreted 
differently had the identity of the tellers been changed. Had Gado’s cartoon been created by a 
white foreigner, for example, it might have been interpreted as racist or stereotyping of Africans 
as corrupt. As Ridanpaa has written, “who the teller and the audience of a joke is can determine 
whether it acts as a tool for sustaining oppression or resisting it. Jokes told by the powerful, 
relying on stereotypes, for example, of minority groups can serve to sustain the status quo and 
legitimize the oppression of a minority group” (Ridanpää, 2014, p. 704). 
Most importantly for our purposes here, humor is not only a tool to chip away at the 
legitimacy of a leader, but also at the legitimacy of dominant narratives, in particular through the 
juxtaposition of reality with perceived inaccuracies in the narrative. Humor, and in particular 
parody, can work as “narrative tools through which prevailing regional stereotypes and insulting 
preconceptions directed at ethnic minorities can be contested and rewritten” (Ridanpää, 2014, p. 
704). Take a recent example: After the current American president, Donald Trump, was heard 
referring to African nations as “shithole countries” in early 2018, a group in Namibia produced a 
parody of a Namibian tourism video imploring viewers to “come to shithole Namibia. One of the 
best shithole countries out there” (Gondwana Collection Namibia, 2018). The video was a clear 
critique of the ignorance of prevailing negative narratives about Africa and of Donald Trump’s 
own ignorance. Humor’s ability to highlight the ridiculousness of inaccurate narratives by 
juxtaposing them against known reality also makes it an excellent tool for drawing attention to 
hype. 
Like their counterparts critiquing the political establishment, Kenyans seeking to critique 
dominant practices around tech innovation have frequently used humor to make points that they 
might not otherwise have been able to make directly. Take even some of the examples given 
earlier in this chapter. When Evelyn referred to hackathons sarcastically as “cooking up ideas 
from out asses” or when Vincent referred to programmers in coworking spaces as “hot-desking 
battery chickens”, both were using humor to articulate criticism about dominant practices in 
Kenya’s technology sector, to point to how different the reality of the practice was from how that 
practices was generally portrayed. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I found humor to be a frequent tool of those, like 
Evelyn and Vincent, who were frustrated with the status quo or of those seeking to highlight the 
absurdity of dominant narratives. A particularly prominent example of the latter is the use of 
humor to highlight the inaccuracies of the dominant narratives about Africa and African, 
particularly with respect to their engagement with technology. Like the video proclaiming “come 
to shithole Namibia”, humor has been used by those seeking to show how different the reality in 
Africa is from the way it has been represented. A classic example of this is the short piece written 
by Kenyan scholar Binyavanga Wainaina entitled “How to Write about Africa” advising 
prospective authors to, among other things, “never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on 
the cover of your book, or in it, unless that African has won a Nobel Prize,” and to include in 
your description “The Starving African, who wanders the refugee camp nearly naked, and waits 
for the benevolence of the West” (B. Wainaina, 2012). In recent years, a few Kenyans have, in 
their blog posts, adopted Wainaina’s sarcastic style to critique the narrow characterizations some 
have used when writing about the technology innovation is being practiced across Africa. Take 
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for example, a 2015 post on Medium called “On Writing about Tech in Africa”, from Nanjira 
Sambuli, who describes herself as a “Technologist. Curious observer. Thinker. Worker bee. 
Kenyan”(Sambuli, 2018). Addressing herself to an audience that consumers news about 
technology innovation in Africa, she asks: “Read an article (on international media) lately about 
some tech startup or innovation in Africa? Have the words ‘disrupt’, ‘revolutionise’, or phrases 
like ‘the next big thing’ appeared? Have you found yourself believing there’s a ‘tech revolution’ 
across the continent (country) of Africa?” (Sambuli, 2015). Unlike, Wainaina, some way into the 
post she adopts a more serious more direct tone.  
“All that aside,” she writes, “my contention really is with the tech 
determinism that is created in framing a nascent endeavor as ‘the next big 
thing(s)’. …Forward thinking is always welcome, but creating a false 
determinism, especially given the oft missing context of operational 
environments is, in my opinion, tainting the outlook on tech in Africa, by 
Africa, for Africa.” (Sambuli, 2015) 
After having used the humor at the beginning of the piece to highlight the absurdity of using 
Silicon Valley jargon like revolutionize and disrupt to talk about very early stage endeavors, she 
switches to the real point she wants to make – the real counter-narrative she hopes to build – 
about how overblown the dominant Africa Rising media narrative has become. 
In 2016, another blogger and former employee of the iHub that I came to know very well, 
who writes goes by Ahntify online, wrote a similar piece entitled “How to Write about Tech in 
Kenya…and Africa” (ahntify, 2016), that was published on the iHub’s blog, and that pokes fun at 
the overuse of the term ‘Silicon Savannah,’ the obsession with mobile phones, and 
representations of their use with a Maasai herding his cows while “hold up a phone in an attempt 
to access that ever elusive signal,” and the infatuation with “hubs” like the iHub that should be 
the Western journalist’s “first port of call after leaving the airport” (ahntify, 2016). A few months 
later, a Kenyan entrepreneur, Wiza Jalakasi, wrote a lengthier blog post about what his typical 
day as a technology entrepreneur in Nairobi was like. While most of the content was a serious 
representation of his life he titled it “Life Suck in Africa…my typical day in tech on the dark 
continent” pointing to the discrepancy between his life and the African life more often depicted in 
foreign coverage of the continent. 
Each of these authors employed humor as a way in which to approach their chosen topic 
obliquely (Bernal, 2013), in order to avoid coming across as too confrontational. Through doing 
so, they were able to tell counter-stories drawing attention to the ridiculousness of the ways in 
which technology and its production have been characterized on the continent.  
Social	media	
Historically, another method of getting a critique out there for those in more marginalized 
positions has been using alternative media or alternative dissemination platforms, like the 
internet. Where a dominant discourse is seen to be controlling mainstream media, social 
movements have long turned to alternative publications. In the United States for example, many 
strands of political thought that deviated from the norm have historically found homes in the 
alternative printed magazines like The Nation and Mother Jones. In more recent years, the 
internet has taken precedence as the dissident’s medium of choice, allowing what many 
academics have described as a more democratized space for political discourse, giving platforms 
to those who previously struggled to be heard (Dahlberg, 2001; Loader & Mercea, 2011; M. 
Poster, 1997). In the last 10 years, academic excitement about this revolutionary power of the 
internet led to a plethora of research around the role of the internet, and social media in particular, 
in bringing about revolutions under authoritarian regimes, most notably around the Arab Spring 
(Heeks & Seo-Zindy, 2013; Tarrow, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). But subsequent less 
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celebratory research began to question whether new media had really been the revolutionary 
linchpin that it was lauded as and instead argued that it merely enhanced what social movements 
were already doing in the ‘real world’ (Brunner, 2014). Even with this more modest view of the 
power of the internet, few question its role in disseminating dissenting stories and connecting 
those with dissenting opinions, be they neo-Nazis in the American Alt-Right (Elliott, 2018; 
Jakubowicz et al., 2017) or student protesters in South Africa’s #FeesMustFall movement 
(Luescher, Loader, & Mugume, 2017) or broader national-level categories like Kenyans on 
Twitter (#KOT). 
In the particular case of Kenya, researchers have found the internet to be an alternative 
site for the production of popular culture in Kenya (Ligaga, 2012) and for the expression of 
alternative political viewpoints (Tully & Ekdale, 2014). As the Kenyan literary scholar, Dina 
Ligaga, has explained, this came about because of how dominated Kenya’s most influential 
mainstream media outlets have historically been by those in power. She writes:  
Public information was always controlled by those in whose interest it was to 
remain in the good books of the state. The state, for its part, depended on 
mainstream media to build its identity and kept a close watch on various 
activities. This arrangement quite obviously meant that the ordinary Kenyan 
was heavily policed and that anything that was deemed subversive or that had 
the potential to undermine the nation-state would be edited out of public 
discourse. (Ligaga 2012, p. 3-4)  
As a result, the adoption of the internet by Kenyans “destabilized the information 
infrastructure that had been built around the nationstate" (Ligaga 2012, p. 4) and “provided space 
for politicians to be critiqued, ridiculed, and dismissed in a way not previously possible” (Ligaga 
2012, p. 6-7). 
Social media, and Twitter especially, have played an important role in the dissemination 
of alternative views in Kenya. In the early days, to distinguish themselves from other Twitter 
users across the globe the hashtag, #KOT (and its longer predecessor, #KenyansonTwitter) 
became popular connecting Kenyans and discussions about Kenya. Kenyans were such prolific 
tweeters that by 2013 they reportedly produced the third largest volume of geo-located tweets in 
all of Africa behind only South Africa and Egypt (Portland Communications, 2014), despite 
having a smaller population than both. And while Nigeria, with its population more than triple the 
size of Kenya, has overtaken both Kenya and South Africa (Portland Communications, 2016) on 
that list, Kenyan remain vociferous Tweeters. For example, Winnie, the blogger and activist from 
earlier, clocked over 13,000 tweets posted in 2015 alone.16 Specific hashtags, often far narrower 
than #KOT, have become “spaces for Kenyans to express themselves politically, exchange 
alternative viewpoints, and share humorous takes on contemporary issues” (Tully & Ekdale, 
2014, p. 70). Tully and Ekdales for example, found that specific hashtags like #SickAt50 and 
#MPigs were used as ways to voice critique of Kenyan politicans and the state of the nation while 
others like #SomeoneTellCNN and #TweetLikeaForeignJournalist were used to question and 
ridicule the inaccuracies in dominant foreign narratives and media representations of Kenya( 
Tully & Ekdale, 2014). 
For members of Kenya’s community of technology innovators seeking to challenge the 
dominant practices, the internet and social media may seem like a natural choice. And in many 
ways, it was. In fact, the birth of Kenya’s modern CTI itself can be linked to this proclivity to use 
the internet to provide a space for alternative voices. The now iconic Kenyan platform Ushahidi 
(tellingly meaning ‘testimony’ in Kiswahili), for example, was created, as the organization states 
                                                      
16 Working with a quantitative colleague of mine at Annenberg, we scraped all of her tweets, including 
retweets, over the course of 2015. 
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on its website, to help people “raise their voices” during the post-election violence of 2008 and to 
“map reports of violence” that were otherwise being overlooked (Ushahidi, 2018a). Continuing to 
market its crowdmapping platform, Ushahidi’s current tagline is “Read the Crowd. Don’t just get 
the data. Get the whole story” (Ushahidi, 2018b). Similarly, Ma3Route, the startup Stephane 
represented in the beginning of this chapter, crowdsources its information about the condition of 
Nairobi’s roads and the traffic in it not just on its app, but on Twitter. Many of the original 
founders of the iHub also got their start as bloggers, like Eric Hersman (who blogged as 
“WhiteAfrican”) and Ory Okolloh (who blogged as “KenyanPundit”), disseminating views online 
that were often controversial by mainstream Kenyan media standards (as I will show in greater 
detail in Chapter 5). 
Connections through social media and other internet-based groups were also instrumental 
in getting some of Kenya’s earliest techies together. As one of the iHub’s former CEO’s, Josiah 
Mugambi has written, “the now burgeoning tech community in Kenya started in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s with the beginning of the Kenya Linux User Group. …Communication was 
frequent however, on a mailing list, with regular physical meetings augmenting the online 
interactions” (Mugambi, 2016). That group later grew into another virtual group called 
Skunkworks, which, again, circulated information and communication primarily through a very 
active mailing list and blogging platform, supplemented by in-person meetings. 
Yet the central role of the internet and social media platforms in the formation of Kenya’s 
community of technology innovators, poses a problem for those seeking to critique or challenge 
its received practices. Unlike in Kenyan national politics, the internet is a primary medium of 
communication for Kenya’s CTI, not an ‘alternative’ one. In many ways, in addition to the in-
person interactions in and around places like the iHub, it comprises the central medium of the 
Kenyan CTI’s communicative ecology. And many of those using the internet to critique Kenyan 
political figures from the margins, are themselves mainstream figures in Kenya’s technology 
scene.  
Even so, I found many of those attempting to challenge the received practices in Kenya’s 
CTI telling their counter-stories via blogging platforms and Twitter. For example, around 2015-
2016, a Twitter conversation began to develop around an emergent hashtag, 
#BlackFoundersMatter, in an attempt to draw attention to the large number of foreign startup 
founders in Kenya’s CTI. Like many of the most globally influential hashtags associated with 
social movements (e.g. #BringBackOurGirls, #SomeoneTellCNN, #BlackLivesMatter), 
#BlackFoundersMatter has the structure of a story, presenting the movement’s argument within 
the hashtag itself in the form of a sentence (Yang, 2016) Following the #BlackFoundersMatter 
hashtag, as Yang demonstrated in the case of #BlackLivesMatter, the tweets employing it unfold 
temporally.  
Often the conversations on Twitter that challenged the received practices in Kenya’s CTI, 
grew through their interaction with related blog posts or off-line events. In the case of the Angani 
Saga, #Angani was used, predominantly by tweeters coming down on the side of the Kenyan 
entrepreneurs, as part of the movement to call out vulture capitalism. Many Twitterers used the 
hashtag not only to voice support for the founders they believed to have been maligned, but also 
to draw attention to related content from blog posts and the ‘real world’ that were often used as 
evidence of the posters argument. For example, one post from December 2015, just a month after 
the controversy began, included a photo of Mbwana Alliy, a Kenyan investor who was the 
founder and managing partner of one of the firms that invested in Angani. The photo and the 
accompanying caption imply that he was at an event where the Twitterer asked him difficult 
questions about the events. The caption reads “We’ve just put him on the spot regarding #Angani 
and other startup governance matters”. Another post from May 2016, six months after the events, 
includes a photograph of a document as evidence. The document appears to be the agreement that 
was signed between the Angani founders and the investors during a meeting in October 2015, 
which, the poster claims, is evidence that the investors had agreed to compensate the outgoing 
	 124 
investors for their shares in the company, but had yet to do so. On a Twitter, a medium that was 
frequently a central discursive platform of the Kenyan CTI, these Twitterers worked to connect 
their views to apparent real-world events in order to add evidence to the counter-narrative they 
were hoping to build about the misdeeds of the Angani founders, and to make the case that 
discriminatory treatment of Kenyan founders was more than just rumor.  
This tactic of connecting tweets to blogs and other documents to provide evidence for the 
construction of counter-narratives was used again to a far more intense degree when a new 
controversy erupted in 2017 around the alleged sexual misconduct of the sitting director of one of 
the founding companies of Kenya’s CTI, Ushahidi. On July 20, 2017, after the scandal had 
already become public, Angela Kabari, the woman accusing Ushahidi’s executive director, Daudi 
Were, posted a lengthy and extremely detailed blog post on Medium, a blogging platform popular 
in Kenya, giving evidence for her side of the story. Most notably, in the post she provided a link 
to a Google document called “Detailed Chronology of Events” in which she listed all of the 
events that had taken place between her, Were, and Ushahidi’s board, from the alleged 
misconduct in January 2017 to her submission of the complaint to the extended time that it took 
Ushahidi’s board to respond. The document includes links to all of the complaints she’d 
submitted, email conversations she’d had with the board and with Were’s legal representatives, 
her letter of resignation, the board’s inquiry report into the incident, and links to all the blog posts 
and news articles that had been written about the subject. It is exhaustive. In many ways, I believe 
the almost obsessive way in which Kabari provided evidence for her claim throughout her blog 
post was a direct response to the concerns around ‘hype’ in Kenya’s CTI and an intentional move 
to avoid any such accusations about her claims.  
In the end, the scandal around one of the founding companies of Kenya’s CTI made 
significant waves within the community and spurred on a movement to end discrimination and 
abusive behavior in the community. By early July of that year, rumors about the incident had 
begun to circulate through the exclusive WhatsApp group of prominent members of Kenya’s TCI. 
Two days afterwards, Ory Okolloh a prominent figure in the Kenyan CTI and one of the founders 
of Ushahidi who had left the company in 2010, wrote her own blog post, titled “No Sacred 
Cows”, rebuking the lethargic response Ushahidi’s board had taken to Kabari’s complaints. In it 
she also signaled ‘real-world’ events that were taking place in the community to have a public 
and purposeful conversations about sexual misconduct and to create a new code of conduct for 
organizations and individuals within Kenya’s CTI (Okolloh, 2017). Around the same time, the 
story began to gain traction in mainstream Kenyan news and international tech news. By July 22, 
Daudi Were had been dismissed from his post at Ushahidi. Four days later, a group of women in 
Kenya’s CTI posted their own blog post on Medium called “The road ahead in building the 
Kenyan tech ecosystem: Perspectives from #WomenInTechKE,” celebrating Kabari and 
condemning Were. In the post, they invoked the events as a call to action to reevaluate what kind 
of CTI Kenyans wanted to have going forward. “We believe,” they wrote, “that these events offer 
us all important lessons to carry forward as we continue to collectively work on realizing the 
visions, hopes and aspirations of a thriving, diverse and inclusive Kenyan technology ecosystem” 
(Women in Tech Kenya, 2017). 
My purpose in telling this story it to show the ways in which social media platforms are 
being used in Kenya to bring about changes to the ways in which technology innovation there is 
being practiced. Individuals leading these movements are still using the platforms that are central 
mediums of communication to the CTI to disseminate their counter-stories, but by closely 
connecting online posts with real world events and evidence, they are taking steps to avoid 
accusations of hype that have plagued Kenya’s CTI. And through the combination of online 
content and hashtags as well as off-line discussions and actions they are working to build counter-
narratives about Kenyan innovation practices and to bring about change in how technology 
innovation is practiced in Kenya. 
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Conclusion	
In Chapter 3, I showed how some Kenyan entrepreneurs faced unique challenges in their work to 
become legitimate technology innovators and to be seen and accepted as members of a globally 
engaged practice around innovation. In this chapter, I hope to have shown what some have 
chosen to do in the face of such challenges. Like Ma3Route at the beginning of the chapter, some 
have chosen to reject certain parts of the GCTI’s repertoire of practices. In the case of Ma3Rotue 
it was choosing to focus on local needs regardless of the company’s scalability. For others, it was 
rejecting the GCTI’s material culture like open plan office spaces, or its communicative ecology, 
like the centrality of storytelling and its proclivity for hype. While for others it was working to 
build a local culture of investing in startups to reduce their reliance on international investors.  
 But the practice of technology innovation in Kenya is neither locally isolated nor 
exclusively global. Kenyan entrepreneurs are engaged in a locally situated community of 
technology innovators unique to Kenya while at the same time they are negotiating their role in 
the global one. And while some entrepreneurs struggled to gain attention and a sense of meaning 
in the global community, they often found they were better able to engage in what matters in the 
Kenyan community. 
In 1998 Wenger wrote: “The kind of coherence that transforms mutual engagement into a 
community of practice requires work. The work of ‘community maintenance’ is thus an intrinsic 
part of any practice” (Wenger, 1998, p. 74). For Wenger, that work, that constant joint 
negotiation is a part of what makes up a community; participating in that process is part of what 
helps the community’s members to feel like they belong. Moreover, it is part of what makes up 
the community and helps it to evolve over time in a way that is responsive to the needs and values 
of its members. In his publication with Lave, they explain this in more detail and I believe it is 
useful to quote from it at length here: 
We must not forget that communities of practice are engaged in the generative 
process of producing their own future. Because of the contradictory nature of 
collective social practice and because learning processes are part of the 
working out of these contradictions in practice, social reproduction implies 
the renewed construction of resolution to underlying conflicts. In this regard, 
it is important to note that reproduction cycles are productive as well. They 
leave a historical trace of artifacts—physical, linguistic, and symbolic—and 
of social structures, which constitute and reconstitute the practice over time. 
[Emphasis added] (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.57) 
In this way, negotiations that emerge around community conflicts, like the ones around 
Angani and Ushahidi, can be important moments to spur on the reconstruction of the community 
going forward in line with the important values that have become apparent around moments of 
conflict. I hope to have made a convincing case in this chapter that the Kenyan community of 
technology innovators is undergoing an important phase of this negotiation process, moving from 
a fear of speaking out and a reliance on rumor to disseminate counter-stories, to the adoption of 
humor and social media to build important counter-narratives about the unacceptability of sexual 
misconduct or discriminatory investment practices in the community’s mutually agreed repertoire 
of practices. Moreover, as I will show in greater detail, many of these ongoing debates about the 
future of the GCTI revolve around how engaged it should or should not be with innovators abroad 
and how beholden it should be to the globally accepted practices even when they do not appear to 
take into account the values and experiences of Kenyan innovators. In the following and final 
chapter, I hope to bring together many of the arguments I have made over the course of this 
dissertation and show in a very detailed way how they’ve played out in the context of a single 
organization: the iHub.  
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CHAPTER	5:	THE	IHUB	CASE	STUDY	
On March 3, 2010, the iHub opened in Nairobi. It was a large open plan space on the top floor of 
a commercial building called, the Bishop Magua Centre, situated just off the busy Ngong Rd. in a 
moderately affluent neighborhood of Nairobi known as Kilimani. Three large walls of windows 
surrounded by a terracotta balcony gave the space a serene view out over the green neighborhood, 
the taller buildings of the central business district barely visible. Overhead hung a vaulted ceiling 
painted glossy white, supported by three gleaming pillars of bright yellow. The remaining 
windowless wall was painted a deep navy and sported the company’s logo printed in large white 
font: *iHub_. Aside from the large mass of people who’d come for the launch, the space was 
otherwise empty. Over the following months, a large hand painted mural depicting a map of the 
neighborhood would gradually cover a remaining wall, and the space would be filled with an 
elevated platform to host events, white tables and bright green chairs at which people could work, 
a small coffee nook and couches where they could socialize, and a foosball table and beanbag 
chairs where they could relax. 
 Over time, the Bishop Magua Centre became the home of a plethora of other 
technology companies and for many symbolized the home of Kenya’s community of technology 
innovators. While, as I discussed in Chapter 4, virtual platforms of communication had played an 
instrumental role in shaping the growth of this national-level community, the physical space 
provided the meeting group for the face-to-face communications that continue to shape how even 
innovators in Silicon Valley still make deals and build companies (Saxenian, 2007). In a blog 
post that preceded the opening, Josiah Mugambi, one of the iHub’s founding members, and its 
CEO for much of my fieldwork, wrote the following: 
Skunkworks [a community of Kenyan techies that preceded the iHub] was 
conceived with the idea of bringing together Nairobi (and Kenyan) techies 
and really kicked off in early 2007. From the onset, we had the idea of having 
a central location where guys could come in and utilize fast internet, access 
local servers to test out their applications while bouncing off ideas with each 
other. The goal was to create an environment where (hopefully) cool world 
class products could be developed and sustained. There are many great 
developers around but many complain about access to bandwidth and servers. 
In addition to this, many business people looking for software are sometimes 
at a loss when it comes to tracking down good developers. The iHub will be 
the place for all these people. (Mugambi, 2010) 
This idea of “bringing together Nairobi (and Kenyan) techies” was for many the start of 
technology innovation practices in Nairobi that resembled those in the larger global community 
of practice. While techies and entrepreneurs had certainly existed in Kenya well before, as 
Mugambi’s post makes clear, the opening of the iHub coincided with growing attention towards 
building for-profit startups around technological solutions to Kenyan problems. As a result, as I 
will show, the iHub itself is closely intertwined with that community, frequently emphasizing its 
commitment to it, and reflecting on how best to serve it. In the early years, the mutually engaged 
way in which the iHub and its members operated and influenced one another would have 
resonated with the scholars who originally introduced the community of practice framework, 
Lave and Wenger (1991). For Lave and Wenger a sense of shared meaning-making even amidst 
conflict and disagreement was integral to the functioning of a healthy community of practice. But 
as time passed, the growth of that community beyond and outside of the iHub and the Bishop 
Magua Centre created new pressures on that community engagement.  
My intention for this chapter is to use the case study of the iHub to build on the work 
done in the preceding chapters and further problematize the mutually constitutive relationship 
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between communities of practice, their members, and their community narratives. In the first 
section, I will draw attention to the role that the iHub played in constructing narratives that 
positioned Kenya as the tech hub of Africa and the iHub as the home of it. In the second section, I 
will turn to look at the ways in which those narratives and new emergent counter-narratives about 
the iHub in turn shaped the iHub and the perception many in Kenya’s growing Community of 
Technology Innovation (CTI) had of it. Finally, in the last section of the chapter, I will show how 
the iHub’s response to these changes positioned it in opposition to those in Chapter 4 who were 
working to make Kenya’s CTI more distinct from the GCTI and more reflective of Kenyan values 
and problems, and in favor of moving it towards a more Silicon Valley style of innovation. 
The	iHub	1.0:	Building	the	Narratives	
When we started saying in 2010: ‘Kenya’s the, you know, tech innovation 
center of Africa,’ was it true? Eh, arguably, probably not. But it became true, 
because enough people believed in it and built around it. And said okay, yeah, 
that can be true. (Interview with a founder of the iHub, May 2016) 
In all the conversations I’ve had or blog posts I’ve read, the stories about what the iHub was at 
the beginning and why it was founded are surprisingly consistent and echo Mugambi’s original 
post: The iHub was created to be a physical place where Kenyan techies could come together, 
share ideas, and collaborate. That there is consistency in this iHub origin story is no coincidence. 
Many of the iHub’s founders are well-known for being skilled storytellers. Ory Okolloh, Erik 
Hersman, and Juliana Rotich, three of iHub’s most prominent founding members had all 
previously come to a certain level of fame within Kenya’s existing technology community as a 
result of their blogs,17 where since at least 2005, they’ve written about topics ranging from 
climate change and organic farming to domestic and international politics and of course tech 
news. They reported from technology conferences and gatherings they’d attended, reviewed the 
latest startups to emerge, and commented on the coverage of African technologists in 
international media. All three had previously been involved in one way or another with the earlier 
success of Ushahidi, and all three were invited to become fellows at TED, each speaking at a 
TED conference in 2007, 2009, and 2013 respectively. They were no strangers to constructing an 
image through digital storytelling.  
In the first few years of the iHub’s existence, as I will show, its founders drew on these 
skills to construct the iHub on a discursive level by building two interconnected narratives around 
it: 1) That Kenya was becoming the tech hub of Africa, and 2) that the iHub was at the center of 
that hub. For any country outside of Silicon Valley, getting attention for being a center of 
innovation is a steep hill to climb. For a sub-Saharan African country burdened by generations of 
a Failed Continent Narrative, it can seem even more unrealistic. But in order to attract the new 
entrepreneurs and investors that they believed would be necessary to strengthen the existing 
technology community in Kenya, I will show how the founders of the iHub decided to adopt the 
role of the techno-visionary storyteller common in Silicon Valley in order to persuade both 
domestic and international audiences that Kenyans could be the heroes of their own home-grown 
stories of technology innovation, and to gain legitimacy for the iHub as a real member of the 
GCTI. They wanted not only to convince more established members of the GCTI that Kenyan 
innovators should be taken seriously, but also to show Kenyans themselves that they had the 
means and the potential. I will begin by showing how these two narratives evolved in the 
                                                      
17 Ory Okolloh blogged as Kenyan Pundit, Erik Hersman blogged as White Africa, and Juliana Rotich 
blogged as Afromusing 
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international media, next I will outline the communications strategies that the iHub team used, 
including adopting the role of the techno-visionary storyteller, and then I will demonstrate how – 
as in the construction of the Anyone Anywhere Narrative – they attempted to use ‘real world’ 
examples and events to reinforce the media stories they told. Taken together, the communication 
strategy adopted by the iHub team embodies the storytelling practices at the core of the GCTI, 
embodying the quintessential techno-visionary who tells stories of a future that has not yet come 
to pass. 
Media	narratives	
To begin, I want to give a sense of the narratives about technology innovation in Kenya that 
emerged over time as they presented in the international media. In order to do that, I conducted 
archival searches of the coverage related to technology innovation in Kenya in 19 major 
international media outlets,18 including Forbes, BBC and The New York Times. In them, I found 
103 articles published on the subject between 2010 and 2017. While the audience that mattered 
for the iHub was both domestic and international, for simplicity sake I have chosen to focus here 
on just the international coverage. Similar stories were written in domestic Kenyan news outlets 
like The Daily Nation and The Standard, but they were largely only read by Kenyan audiences, 
while both Kenyan and international audiences read many of the international news outlets 
included in my search. 
The first thing that emerges from the media coverage is an increase – at first gradual, and 
then more dramatic – in stories about technology innovation in Kenya, following the successes of 
the mobile payment platform, M-Pesa (launched in 2007), the crowd-mapping non-profit, 
Ushahidi (launched in 2008), and the opening of the iHub in 2010. While I found just 3 articles 
related to technology innovation in Kenya in 2010 and 5 in 2011, that number spiked to 15 and 22 
in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Looking more closely at the example of just one publication – The 
Guardian – before the launch of the iHub, I found just 7 articles in total related to technology 
innovation in Kenya between 2002 and February 2010, while I found that number in 2015 alone. 
Of the articles published before the opening of the iHub, the majority (6) were about broader 
trends around people using or building some kind of technology in Africa, in which Kenya was 
invoked only as one of many examples. The remaining article was a profile of M-Pesa and how it 
had grown in Kenya. Intriguingly, of the seven Guardian articles published even before the 
opening of the iHub, Erik Hersman, a white Kenyan who become one of the founders of the iHub, 
was referenced as a key source in two, talking in one about how important the underwater fiber 
optic cables would be for mobile development in Africa, and in another his technology news 
website, AfriGadget is cited as the “best place” to start looking into “Africa’s do-it-yourself 
development culture”. None of the 7 referred to Kenya as any kind of “technology hub” (K. 
Anderson, 2009). 
In fact, in all the articles I collected from all 19 sources, the first ever instance I found of 
Kenya being described as any kind of hub or center of technology innovation was actually in a 
quote from Erik Hersman himself. In a December 2010 article in the BBC about a larger and 
older Kenyan technology company called Craft Silicon, Hersman was quoted saying the 
following: “We are getting to the point now, that if you want to be involved in tech in East Africa 
then you have to come to Nairobi” (Fildes, 2010). While I cannot say that this instance was the 
first in any media outlet to describe Nairobi this way, there was a notable increase in such 
references in the years that followed, beginning particularly in 2012. In June 2012, The Sunday 
                                                      
18 I looked at only major international news, and limited my search to these few: Tech Crunch, Financial 
Times, Sunday Times, the Guardian, NPR, Newsweek, New York Times, Mashable Entrepreneur, Inc, 
Bloomberg, Forbes, 60 minutes, Quartz, Christian Science Monitor, The Observer, Washington Post, BBC, 
& CNN  
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Times (UK) (Victoria, 2013) described Africa as “the fastest growing technology market in the 
world” and Kenya as “reaping the lion’s share of the boom”; in October 2012 The Guardian 
declared that “if there is such a thing as an African version of California’s Silicon Valley, the 
country that is arguably leading the race to the future is Kenya” (D. Smith, 2012); and in 
December 2012, NPR (US) aired a show describing Nairobi as “a growing tech hub for the 
African continent” (Warner, 2012). Starting in 2013, Nairobi even began to appear on lists of 
rising startup hubs around the world to watch in news outlets like Entrepreneur (Pullen, 2013), 
Mashable (Munford, 2013b), and CNN (Shadbolt, 2014). And while some of these lists focused 
on startup hubs in emerging markets, in others, Nairobi made the list as the sole African city 
alongside GCTI heavyweights like Berlin and Tel Aviv. And of all the 103 articles I collected 
pertaining to technology innovation in Kenya from 2010 to 2017, all but six characterized the 
situation favorably. They described Nairobi’s startup scene as “on the rise” “improving” and 
“worth paying attention to” and Kenyan startups as worthy of praise or at least a closer look by 
investors. A narrative was beginning to emerge in which the city previously known as 
‘Nairobery’ was becoming known instead as the ‘Silicon Savannah’. 
 Along with this came an increase in coverage about the iHub itself. Of the 74 articles in 
my search about technology innovation in Kenya that were published between 2010 and 2015, 59 
of them, or almost 80%, mentioned the iHub. Two years after its launch there was a notable spike 
in the number of articles in my 19 sources that referenced the iHub, rising from 2 each in 2010 
and 2011 to 14 in 2012 and 19 in 2013. In articles like those cited above that celebrated Nairobi 
as a startup hub, I found that the iHub was frequently cited as an example of why. For example, 
the 2012 Guardian article above, described the iHub somewhat modestly as “a part of Kenya’s 
booming tech industry” (D. Smith, 2012), while the NPR broadcast that same year described 
members of the iHub as “trying to rethink geek culture”  (Warner, 2012). Other articles 
characterized it as no less than “Kenya’s unofficial tech headquarters” (Munford, 2013a) and a 
“model for innovation hubs in Africa” (Sengeh, 2013) that was being replicated in “places like 
Nigeria and Ghana” (Bright, 2013).  
The iHub’s founders or managers, particularly Erik Hersman, were themselves very 
visible in this coverage. In the 59 articles that mentioned the iHub between 2010 and 2015, 34 
(57%) included citations from either Hersman or other leaders of the iHub like Mugambi, Rotich, 
or Colaço, They were shown giving tours of the space (Africa Business Report, 2010), modestly 
brushing aside questions about being one of the “people helping to shape a new image of Africa” 
(Carnwath, 2012), showing off new projects they were working on (Chonghaile, 2012) or talking 
about how good African “problems” are for inspiring innovation (Burg, 2014). 
Hersman alone was cited in 22 articles. He appears so frequently in international media 
coverage about technology innovation in Kenya (first in connection to his blog, then Ushahidi, 
then the iHub, and a range of other organizations in which he was involved) that one would be 
forgiven for thinking that he was in some way leading it. The Observer, for example, described 
Hersman in a September 2013 article as “one of the most effective evangelists for the 
technological future of his adopted country”. He even guest authored a July 2012 post for the 
BBC titled “From Kenya to Madagascar: The African tech-hub boom”. Furthermore, Hersman’s 
identity as a white man with American citizenship who sounded American but had grew up to 
American missionary parents in Kenya and Sudan meant that he fit in with the dominant Identity 
Narrative of the GCTI, making him the kind of storyteller that the GCTI was accustomed to 
listening to. 
In his July 2012 article for the BBC he described how as founders of the iHub they “sit at 
the center of Kenya’s technology community, where our role is to serve as a connection point and 
support the phenomenal hi-tech growth in the country”. Such stories about “phenomenal hi-tech 
growth” in Kenya and about the organization at the heart of Kenya’s “technology community” are 
typical of his and other iHub leaders’ appearances in international media. In fact, across their 
wide array of media appearances, the stories they told were remarkably consistent: a locally-
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generated technological boom in Nairobi, and a small community center at the heart of it. The 
repetition of such stories combined with Hersman’s hybrid identity helped to build two 
interlocking narratives that foreign members of the GCTI might actually pay attention to. The 
frequent appearance of iHubbers in the international media and the consistency of their stories 
similarly help to reveal a purposeful involvement in the process of constructing those narratives. 
Strategies	
Communication	strategies	
So you wanna know why the iHub is so well-known and so big? It’s because 
we’re good at communication. We had no skillset beyond that to use. That’s 
what we were good at. And that’s what built Ushahidi; that’s what built the 
iHub – our ability to communicate. …We were bloggers. We knew how to 
talk. That’s all. We knew how to communicate with people. Whether it’s on 
stage, whether it’s in writing, whether it’s in proposals. If you can 
communicate you can raise money. If you can communicate you can get 
people excited about things, and you can lead teams and you can, you know, 
build partnerships. All those things. (Interview with a founder of the iHub, 
May 2016) 
This is an excerpt from an interview I conducted with one of the iHub founders in 2016. It and 
many other conversations I had during my fieldwork indicate a keen awareness of the role that the 
iHub was playing in narrative construction around the iHub and Kenya. As this founder tells it, 
they drew on their existing skillset of communication and storytelling to draw others into the 
iHub, be they prospective funders, prospective members, or those eager to replicate the iHub’s 
success. In many ways, the media presence – that exciting and sometimes blinding spotlight – has 
been ever present at the iHub. As one foreign investor said to me, “when I first got here, you 
couldn’t go 50 yards without hitting a cameraman”. While that was likely hyperbolic, even three 
years after the founding when I first arrived at the iHub, visitors interviewing the iHub’s staff, 
members, and entrepreneurs, going on tours, recording events, or photographing “techies” were 
all regular, if not daily occurrences. In addition to engaging directly with the international media 
as we saw above, the iHub team adopted a number of other communication strategies that brought 
the iHub and Kenya directly in the spotlight, including personal blogging, Tweeting, developing 
the iHub’s own blog and official online content. 
Many of the founding members continued to blog after the opening of the iHub. During 
the launch, many involved blogged frequently – about the community meetings and conferences 
that had inspired the iHub, about the construction process for the community space, and about the 
launch party itself. After the launch, they continued to write, this time about media appearances 
they’d done, the TED talks they’d given, the BBC articles they’d written. They wrote advice 
columns from their visits abroad (“you can either be an afro-pessimist or afro-optimist. Either 
way you’d better be hustling” [Rotich, 2012b]) and retrospectives about “what the iHub has done” 
(Hersman, 2013) (an exhaustive and exhausting list of all the events they held, entrepreneurs that 
met their cofounders and new iHub initiatives during the first three years). They even wrote 
expressly about narratives and the hype cycles around new technological products (Rotich, 
2012a).  
They also went to work developing the iHub’s own blog, with board members, 
management, and staff all writing posts about events they’d hosted or a new partnership with 
IBM or a training they were running, or spotlighting an up-and-coming entrepreneur. After the 
iHub’s launch party, for example, countless photographs went up on the iHub blog along with 
links to at least four other local bloggers who had covered the event. The iHub team put so much 
time into the company’s blog that in three separate years they received the award for “best 
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corporate blog” at the prestigious Bloggers Association of Kenya awards (2014, 2016, & 2017). 
This was supplemented by the organization’s YouTube page. Their earliest YouTube video 
featured the iHub’s founders and members explaining what the iHub was and constructing the 
space, including footage of people installing internet cables, building the coffee shop, and 
painting the mural that adorns the wall. Later, along with the regular newsletters that went out to 
all of the iHub’s members, the YouTube channel became a key platform for disseminating videos 
of anniversary celebrations, interviews with successful entrepreneurs, and ‘fireside chats’ with 
guest speakers who came to visit the iHub, including, within the first year, Marissa Meyer, Vint 
Cerf, and Bob Collymore. The years after the launch of the iHub also coincided with an increase 
in activity by Kenyans on Twitter, a platform that the iHub Board Members like Ory Okolloh 
took to with ease, and the iHub staff members checked and updated daily both for the iHub’s 
official account and for their own personal ones.  
Physical	space	
As I tried to show in some of the previous chapters, persuading audiences to buy into new 
narratives takes more than storytelling, no matter how widely dispersed online; if it is not echoed 
in reality, the strength of the narrative can wane. In additional to the online communication 
techniques described above, practice in and around the iHub evolved – sometimes led 
purposefully by the iHub, sometimes organically by others – to embody the stories the iHubbers 
had been telling. First and foremost, among those practices was the relationship to the physical 
space. 
Providing a physical space for people interested in technology in Kenya to congregate, 
was, as most iHubbers tell it, the original purpose of the iHub – an “Open Space for technologists, 
investors, tech companies and hackers in Nairobi”, as their original website says. In my 
discussions, iHubbers frequently talked about how important it had been for them to have a 
physical space where people could meet in person. One of the managers I interviewed in 2016, 
for example, spoke passionately about his views of the importance of in-person interaction. “In 
order to have a thriving community,” he argued, “you need to have both offline and online 
engagement.” Another explained that while they could “always get connected to each other online 
through email, Whatsap, Facebook or whatever…you need physical spaces to find each other in 
person too.” Musing a bit on why this might be, he added “I think that’s maybe even more 
important in places like Kenya where trust is built on face-to-face connections. That’s really why 
we built the iHub.” For the iHub, in-person interactions helped to build a sense of community 
locally among Kenya’s pre-existing community of techies, and also served to reinforce the media 
narratives they had constructed internationally. 
Having a physical space meant that members could not only meet peers and future 
colleagues, but they could also attend the many events that the iHub held in its space. In the first 
year alone, organized events in the iHub space included a “creatives meetup” where artists could 
come and collaborate with techies, a Microsoft ‘Open Door’ event, where members could hear 
about Microsoft’s latest technology, a legal session on the importance of confidentiality 
agreements and the role of IP law for startups, and weekly meetups for mobile developers. 
Through such frequently held events, initial members of the iHub got exposure not just to 
programming techniques and legal advice, but to the whole world of the GCTI face to face. With 
speakers like Marissa Meyer, then with Google, who came in 2011, followed in later years by Joi 
Ito, the Director of MIT’s Media Lab (2014); Renaud Visage, CTO and co-founder of Eventbrite 
(2014); and John Scully, who served for a time as the controversial CEO of Apple (2015); the 
iHub members got face to face exposure to the members of the GCTI and heard them speak about 
their work. As I showed in Chapter 2, this kind of in-person connection and storytelling plays a 
part in enhancing the sense of community for transnationally dispersed communities.  
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Moreover, providing access to the space for free meant that anyone with the means to get 
to the Bishop Magua Centre could conceivably come in and use the space, thereby increasing its 
exposure to a local audience. It meant that anyone with an email account could join their mailing 
list, and that anyone could come to the events they held. Over my time at the iHub, I spoke to 
many members who said emphatically that they would not have been able to come if the space 
had not been free. 
Having a physical freely accessible space also made it a natural landing ground for 
international journalists looking for new companies to write about. Quickly, as one founder 
recounted to me, it was “easy to become best friends with all the BBC and The Guardian and 
CNN and Time when you run the iHub. You’re the biggest target to hit.” It also made it a natural 
landing spot for other international actors who were curious about what was going on in the 
technology world in Kenya. Of all the foreigners, I interacted with in Kenya’s tech sector over the 
course of my fieldwork, everyone talked about stopping by the iHub – at least initially – to “see 
what all the fuss was about”, as one investor explained. “Like it or not,” as one of the iHub’s 
founders said, “the iHub is where people come. So, if you want to connect to people in the 
market, investors, media, you’ll end up coming to the iHub at some point.” 
As time went on, the iHub and companies affiliated with it began to expand into more of 
the Bishop Magua building. In addition to the main community space on the 4th floor, the 
Ushahidi office was located on the 1st floor and the iHub soon opened a staff office on the 2nd 
floor. Later, the m:lab, an offshoot of the iHub that was to operate like a more structured 
incubator, opened on the 3rd floor. Later still, Hersman’s new hardware company BRCK opened 
on the 1st floor and a hardware coworking space linked to the iHub, Gearbox, opened on the 2nd 
floor. The building also quickly attracted others. Soon after the iHub opened, another coworking 
space, Nailab, opened, just across the hall, while a few floors down many other technology 
companies that wanted to be near the traffic at the iHub opened shop as well, from GSMA to 
Frontline SMS or Akirachix. As startups that began in the iHub coworking space began to grow, 
like M-Farm and Kopo Kopo, they eventually opened their own offices in the building too. 
During my interactions with other building tenants, I was frequently told directly that they had 
opened their office there because they wanted to be near the iHub. At the time of my first visit in 
2013 there were at least 16 different companies somehow related to Kenya technology sector that 
had opened in the Bishop Magua Building. This enhanced the iHub’s media narrative about being 
at the center of Kenya’s technology community. The iHub became so closely associated with the 
center of Kenya’s CTI and the Bishop Magua building in particular, that people frequently 
referred to the building as a whole as the iHub. During my stay, for example, I saw multiple 
tweets posted during events in other offices in the building that were tagged as being “at the 
iHub”. And in countless conversations I had in Nairobi outside of the tech community I found 
myself repeatedly clarifying that, in fact, no the iHub is not actually the Bishop Magua building, 
and no Ushahidi and the iHub are not the exact same company, though, yes, they are related and 
share some of the same founders. 
Different	audiences	
While emerging from a pre-existing locally-situated community of techies, the iHub also, through 
the narratives it constructed and the plethora of international visitors it attracted, operated at 
multiple levels and spoke to multiple diverse audiences, some representing the GCTI, others part 
of the growing community of technology innovators unique to Kenya. With such a wide reach, it 
is inevitable that the audiences the iHub was speaking to would interpret its messages differently. 
Being experienced communicators, the iHub team were often keenly aware of their audience 
diversity – Kenyan IT students who want to be entrepreneurs, regional governments interested to 
see whether the iHub model would be worth copying, international investors looking to see 
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whether Kenya was worth considering for investment, and so on, often tailoring some of their 
message to reflect particular audience interests. 
Kenyan	&	regional	audiences	
For a Kenyan audience, for example, the goal for the iHub was to attract new members – to 
inspire Kenyans to become technology entrepreneurs and to persuade them that the iHub was the 
right place to pursue that goal. In those initial years, the iHub conveyed this in particular through 
an emphasis on stories about the importance of “community,” – be it the immediate community 
of techies at the iHub, or the broader communities of Kenyan or African innovators – and a 
strategy of local and regional outreach reinforced with a practice. 
Focus	on	community	
The earliest iterations of the iHub’s website, the one that describes it as “Open Space for 
technologists, investors, tech companies and hackers in Nairobi”, also includes the byline: “iHub: 
technology, innovation, community”. As much as technology innovation seemed to be at the core 
of what its founders were trying to do, so did the ‘community’ – supporting it, building it, 
listening to it. As the opening excerpt from Mugambi’s early blog post may make clear, the 
original idea was to support the community, and to help it to grow and professionalize by 
providing a physical space. As another of the founding members explained to me in an interview, 
“That’s what the iHub was built on, a group of people who were looking for the whole tech 
community in Nairobi to get better.” 
In fact, the ‘community’ seems to have been so integral to the iHub in those early years, 
that many claimed, in discussions I had with them, that the iHub would not have existed had there 
not already been a nascent technology community in Nairobi. As one entrepreneur who was 
around when the iHub was founded said to me, “Something like the iHub doesn’t work if there’s 
no existing community. You see that in many countries that have tried to copy it and failed. But 
here in Kenya, there was already a community, that’s why the iHub worked initially”. 
When you speak with iHub founding members, they will readily acknowledge how 
important this early community was to the iHub’s growth. For example, in a chapter he wrote for 
Ermacora and Bullivant’s 2016 book on the importance of open source software around the 
globe, Mugambi describes in detail those early years of Nairobi’s technology community and its 
role in shaping the iHub. In the 90s and early 2000s, he explains, well before the iHub opened, 
Kenya’s technology enthusiasts – primarily, he says, people from the ISP industry and software 
companies – would share mailing lists, and gather for in-person meetings and small community-
driven conferences on things like Linux and other kinds of open source software. It was not, he 
recalls, until one of these small conferences in 2008 that “the idea behind the iHub was first 
born”. It would be a place where the interactions they’d been having “could take place, but on a 
continuous basis” (Mugambi, 2016). 
iHubbers similarly talk about how important listening to the community was for the 
iHub’s original mission. Take for example, this excerpt from an interview I conducted with 
another of the iHub’s founding members in June 2016:  
We brought the community in from the beginning. Even at the very 
beginning, I was 1 of 5 people to vote on anything. There was an advisory 
board who are known people, who are trusted by other people in the 
community, who would be a proxy for big decisions. And they knew that 
there was a real voice there. And the thing is, we even brought in the 
community constantly – to help design and engineer and come up with new 
ways to do this and that. If you truly have a place that’s community oriented, 
like the iHub has always been, and still is, and will be in the future, then 
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you’re not gonna ever hurt for ideas. You’re always going to be relevant and 
be the right space for people. 
Some of the practices the iHub engaged in also served to reinforce the importance of 
community. Frequent networking events, programming trainings, or regular discussion groups 
like the Entrepreneurs’ Forum, Mobile Mondays, or Wireless Wednesdays, helped to reinforce to 
members that the iHub was an active buzzing community and that they belonged. iHubbers also 
frequently left the iHub space and ran events like the “Kids’ Hacker Camp” or university campus 
visits to “inspire students to go into tech entrepreneurship”, as one of the iHub’s staff member 
told me.  
This emphasis on community was also reiterated in the iHub’s media messaging, 
particularly in blogs. Take this excerpt from a blog written by Erik Hersman for the iHub’s blog 
to celebrate the organization’s one year anniversary in 2011. “You helped us build and design the 
iHub layout, the logo and have defined it’s use. Its success is due to how the community has 
owned it and made it what it is. In a large part, the team of Jessica, Tosh, Joshua and myself only 
served as foundation providers, where you built the house on top” (Hersman, 2011). 
By grounding the organization in the local community, and drawing attention to it in their 
communication strategy, the iHub was setting itself apart from other organizations, like 
international NGOs and big international corporates in particular, that came in from the outside to 
help and didn’t understand the context. iHubbers would often emphasize how connected they 
were to the community and how important that was for relevant innovation. Hersman, for 
example, often took particular pains to emphasize his and the organization’s commitment to the 
community. In a 2013 video interview with Duarte, he explained the origins of the iHub in the 
following way.  “So it’s got a little bit of a history. First and foremost I’m the cofounder of 
Ushahidi and so we come from Kenya and I grew up in Kenya so that’s home and we’re a big 
part of that tech community” (Duarte, 2012). Hersman and others, particularly Rotich would often 
emphasize in the public appearances how important it was to be in Kenya and understand Kenya 
when designing technology for a Kenyan market, setting themselves apart even from Google and 
Facebook as an organization better able to make technology that understand local needs. 
A	Movement	
A perhaps unintentional side effect of such a strong emphasis on the local community and 
its identity as a grassroots rather than a top-down entity was the iHub’s eventual characterization 
as leading a kind of “movement”. By 2016, some media coverage – domestic, regional and 
international – referred to the iHub or Kenya in this way. For example, the former permanent 
secretary of ICT, and a close ally of the iHub, Bitange Ndemo, wrote in his column in a major 
Kenyan publication, The Nation, that year that “the tech revolution in Kenya may have started 
well before the iHub was founded in 2010, but no other space in Kenya has embodied that 
movement so well” (Ndemo, 2016). Similarly, a Zimbabwean online publication, BDlive declared 
that “the origin of Africa’s tech movement” could be “traced back to Kenya, which was home to 
several major technological innovations between 2007 and 2010.” And even Tech Crunch 
published an article in which the iHub was described as having “helped spur Africa’s tech 
incubator movement” (Bright, 2016).  
While no one I spoke with at the iHub ever described using the language of a 
“movement” as part of their intentional communication strategy, they did acknowledge that what 
evolved around the iHub did feel like a movement. For example, one of the original members of 
the iHub explained it in this way in a discussion we had in December 2016: 
Kamal [the CEO at the time of the interview] describes the iHub as a social 
movement, which, actually when I think more about it, is quite accurate. That 
is what it was. In fact, even before the iHub the social movement aspect was 
there, a movement of people in technology who directly meet together and 
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hopefully create companies. …The iHub itself was a social movement, or at 
least it became an essential part of the last seven years of that movement. 
To him, the iHub was in the center of a social movement supporting Kenyans designing 
their own technology and building their own companies around that.  
Intentionally or not, some of the actions of those at the iHub further reinforced and even 
embodied its role as leading a kind of movement to grow technology production on the continent. 
In particular, the work they did to train others, in Kenya and in other African countries served this 
function. They would often travel to other places on the continent to help others in following 
iHub’s model and setting up their own technology hubs. One of the iHub’s Board Members, for 
example, told me about his own involvement with newer hubs in both Kenya and further afield:  
I spend a lot of time with the guys who started Lake Hub [a hub in Kisumu, 
Western Kenya] and Swahili Box [a hub in Mombasa, Coastal Kenya] and sit 
on their advisory boards of a lot of the guys across the continent, CCHub in 
Nigeria or BongoHive in Zambia who are doing the same thing…You can 
probably name 10 different hubs across the continent that we spent hours with 
on the phone or in person, or they visited us and stayed here for two weeks to 
figure out how to set up their own place.  
Even in 2016, the iHub’s staff members were still doing this kind of work, training 
Kenyan county-level governments or others in more remote regions with an aptitude for IT, in 
how to design an effective community space. iHubbers also often appeared on panels at major 
local, regional, and international conferences – like the local and regional Internet Governance 
Forum Conferences – positioning the organization as a sort of orator for the movement. For the 
broader GCTI, the iHub’s role in helping to expand the growth of technology entrepreneurship on 
the continent also meant that the iHub was playing the important function of help the GCTI to 
expand even further.  
International	audience	
For an international audience, the primary goal for the iHub was to build a reputation for Kenya 
and itself as a site worthy of investment or other kinds of funding, and draw attention to this 
amidst all the other noise and hype that populates GCTI media. 
Providing	physical	access	
As for Kenyan audiences, in person interactions were important for reinforcing media 
narratives to an international audience. Take for example the 2011 visit from Marissa Mayer. Her 
visit exposed her, albeit briefly and perhaps even superficially, to the on the ground activities at 
the iHub, adding depth and detail to the story she may have previously heard. Her presence, and 
the presence of others like her, may also have served as markers that the iHub and Kenya were 
important new sites of innovation for broader international audiences. Why would Marissa Mayer 
go to Kenya if there was nothing there? Why, in particular, would she go to the iHub, if it wasn’t 
the best place in Nairobi to get a sense of the community? Such questions became louder as other 
high-profile figures came to visit Kenya and the iHub, like even Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
and Facebook Founder Mark Zuckerberg.  
Early on, the iHub also adopted a culture of giving tours to anyone who came by and 
requested one, increasing the number of people who could say they’d seen the iHub. As one of 
the iHub’s staff members told me in 2016, “back in the day everyone used to give tours. Two 
people would be assigned to work from the fourth floor (the main community space) for a week 
and would be responsible for giving tours that week. Even Erik did it back then.” When I first 
arrived in 2013, I was similarly given a tour by the then community manager who showed me 
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around the iHub community space, as well as to their other offshoots of the iHub in the building, 
including Ushahidi, the m:lab and iHub Research’s office. By the time I left at the end of 2016, 
that tour had extended to include BRCK and Gearbox. In my own time in the iHub, I have 
witnessed countless people on tours of the space, from members of the Gates Foundation or the 
World Bank to representatives of the Somali or Ugandan governments, even to Mark Zuckerberg. 
On more than one occasion I was even asked to give such tours myself to newcomers (“she 
knows her way around”). In fact, tours became such a frequent occurrence that the iHub staff 
members would often complain to me about feeling like “monkeys in a zoo” when the tours 
would stop by their office. 
Furthermore, such visitors could in turn go back to the US or wherever they had come 
from and retell the story about the iHub and the technology innovators they had met themselves. 
And many of the most high-profile visitors did just that. During Ki-Moon’s visit to the iHub in 
2014 he spoke on the record about how impressed he was with what he saw. “I am very happy to 
visit this Ushahidi/the iHub this morning,” he said. “Today is my last day in Kenya. I wanted to 
come here and witness myself. I am feeling that I am seeing the future of Kenya, the future of 
many women, and the future of Africa.” A year later, Obama came to Kenya to attend the Global 
Entrepreneurship Summit (held for the first time in an African country) and while he wasn’t able 
to visit the iHub due to security concerns (“it’s Obama,” one iHubber explained to me, “If he’d 
come the whole of Kilimani would have shut down”) he spoke at the Summit praising Kenya’s 
leadership on the continent around technology. “Young people like you are harnessing 
technology to change the way Africa is doing business…and the country that’s hosting us today is 
setting an important example – Kenya is leading the way”. Another year after that, when Mark 
Zuckerberg came and toured the iHub, he posted to his personal Facebook page about how 
“inspiring” it had been “to see how engineers here are using mobile money to build businesses 
and help their community.” By getting such significant international figureheads to visit and then 
speak publicly about the iHub and/or the growth of technology innovation in Kenya, they were 
able to add alternative, apparently more authoritative, storytellers reinforcing the narratives about 
the iHub and Kenya that the iHub itself had been constructing.  
Fitting	into	dominant	narratives	
One reason I believe that stories about Kenya being a tech hub and about the iHub being 
at the center of it and at the head of a ‘movement’ took hold in the early twenty-tens is because 
they fit in with what people wanted to hear at the time. As narrative scholar Francesca Poletta has 
written, audiences have an easier time absorbing stories if they fit within an expected narrative 
framework (Polletta, 2009). This, she demonstrates, is true in terms of the content of a story as 
well as its format, its heroes and its storytellers. The creation of the iHub occurred at unique 
moment. In terms of narrative content, the old narrative about a failed continent was being 
replaced by a new one about a “Rising Africa”, while the old narrative about Silicon Valley being 
the best place to practice technology innovation were similarly being supplemented (though not 
replaced) by a new narrative about how Anyone Anywhere could build the next unicorn.  
Scholars (Melanie Bunce et al., 2016; Nothias, 2014; Ojo, 2014) have shown how the 
tone of the media representation of Africa began to be more positive in the early twenty-tens. The 
most iconic moment in this transformation was when in 2011 The Economist published a now 
infamous cover with a child running with a rainbow-colored kite in the shape of Africa with the 
words ‘Africa Rising’ blazoned on the cover. Similarly, in Chapter 2 I demonstrated how the 
Anyone Anywhere Narrative was taking hold in the minds of techies all around the world. The 
African manifestation of this was itself retold by members of the iHub, like Juliana Rotich when 
she gave her TED talk telling a story about Kenyans drawing on the unique context around them 
to design technology that she believed someone in Silicon Valley would not be able to do. Rotich 
also added illustration to expansion in the GCTI around who could tell and star in compelling 
stories about successful technology innovation. So when Rotich and other iHubbers began to tell 
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the story about Kenya being a technology hub for the continent it resonated with a moment in 
which many Africans as well as those abroad wanted to be Afro-optimists rather than Afro-
pessimists, a moment in which they wanted to believe the uplifting stories they heard featuring 
African protagonists told by African storytellers. Stories about the children of Kenyan farmers 
designing a mobile phone app to improve farmers’ access to information (mFarm), or about a 
Nigerian made e-commerce website taking off for the continent (Jumia), or about Nigerians 
training a new generation of programmers (Andela), or a Kenyan IT student building a recycled 
affordable 3D printer (AB3D), or even about a community hub that allowed people to come 
together free of charge to build up such projects. And after the successes of Ushahidi and M-Pesa 
audiences were willing to believe that Kenya might be the center of this new Africa. 
Again, I found members of the iHub’s founding team to be keenly aware of the 
interaction between their stories and these larger narratives. One in particular, as the following 
interview excerpt demonstrates, echoes the sentiments of narrative scholars like Polletta: 
A lot of communication is fitting into existing narratives or defining new 
ones. But it’s easier to sculpt and flow. It’s easier to sculpt a narrative if 
you’re already moving with the flow of a narrative. So, a lot of what was 
already happening – tech was becoming a bigger thing in Africa. We were 
building something really interesting that was bringing more of those tech 
people together. Therefore, if you’re looking for a story on the Africa Rising 
space, on the technology side, where do you go to find the stories? …when 
you run the iHub, you’re the biggest target to hit. And so, of course, we did 
that. 
This excerpt is very revealing of the iHub’s early media strategy. Not only were they 
purposefully crafting narratives about Kenya being the tech hub of Africa, but they were doing it 
in a way and at a time that resonated with audiences that were now willing to believe stories 
about promising African innovators. At a time in which narratives about a Rising Africa and 
about how Anyone Anywhere could be a startup entrepreneur, coupled with the apparent growth 
of a movement around designing and producing technology for Africans in Africa, the iHub hit a 
very sweet spot with its storytelling strategy. 
The relationship between the iHub’s purposeful communication strategy and the reality 
on the ground is a complicated one. Elsewhere, I have made the case that the way technology in 
Kenya was being built and designed and the narratives about that practice are mutually 
constitutive, influencing and shaping one another. I believe that to be the case with the iHub. The 
iHub team constructed media narratives about the importance of the work going on in Kenya’s 
CTI and in the iHub in particular, but in order to reflect reality and to create it. It is clear that 
many in the iHub team believed that their work around narrative construction did play some part 
in drawing people in. Take this revealing excerpt from an interview I conducted with one of the 
founders: 
So when we started saying in 2010, Kenya’s the, you know, tech innovation 
center of Africa, was that true? Eeeeeh, arguably, probably not. But it became 
true, because enough people believed in it and built around it. And said okay 
yeah that can be true. This is the biggest lesson I learned, when you’re 
building something, most people can’t envision it, so you have to build that 
future for them. That reality can become true it’s just that it’s not necessarily 
true at the beginning. 
This founder made his belief clear that the work they did to construct a narrative about 
Kenya being the tech hub of Africa, at least in part, enabled it to happen, that by reiterating a 
story about how great Kenyans were at technology innovation in a believable way, they were able 
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to help actualize it. This excerpt also belies a view of storytelling very much in line with 
dominant beliefs about entrepreneurial storytelling in the GCTI, a belief that in order to be 
successful, entrepreneurs needed to excel at telling believable stories about a reality that did not 
yet exist, but that could be reached through the adoption of their particular product. Over the next 
few years after the iHub opened, through the mutual construction of narratives and practice, the 
iHub did become, for some, what its media narrative claimed it was, a gathering place where 
techies could find others like them and build cool new products. For many others, it also became 
a symbol of Kenya’s growing community of practice around technology innovation. 
The	iHub	1.5:	Building	Counter-Narratives		
Soon, everyone remotely interested in technology in Kenya was talking about the iHub. The iHub 
members told their friends on campus; event attendees told their coworkers; and entrepreneurs 
told their nieces and nephews up country who were thinking about going into IT all about this 
weird new space off Ngong Rd where you could meet other cool people who wanted to build 
things too. Foreign speakers told their investor friends; visiting Harvard grads told their Harvard 
friends; and foreign journalists told everyone about this open space on the fourth floor of a funny 
office building that was becoming Kenya’s unofficial tech headquarters and maybe even a 
promising place to find investment opportunities.  
A few years after the launch of the iHub, the tone of some of the conversations about the 
iHub among members of Kenya’ technology innovation community began to shift. Disgruntled 
members told their friends over glasses of koinange or bottles of Tusker; fly-by investors told 
their buddies back home over dinner; and struggling entrepreneurs told other entrepreneurs who 
told aspiring entrepreneurs about how the once cool iHub was really just the hyped-up place that 
everyone knew it was all along. Even as just one person coming in and out of Kenya, in and out 
of the iHub, I have heard more varied takes on the iHub than there were people to speak to. 
Everyone had an opinion. Frequently more than one. They had opinions about the space, about 
the culture, about the people, about how much money it was or was not making and how much of 
an impact it was or was not having. Below are a few of the countless things I heard and saw 
people say about the iHub. I heard them in person, in interviews, in speeches, in whispers, or 
while bragging. I saw them written in blogs, on Twitter, on Slack, on WhatsApp, and even once 
typed discretely onto my computer so no one else could see or hear it.  
It’s such a cool space. I love the view. I love the energy. I love the culture of how you 
can just experiment every day! It’s an incubator. It’s an accelerator. It’s the whole building. It’s 
just a glorified coffee shop, right? It’s like a mall for the tech sector, right? It’s just for drinking 
coffee and bourgeoisie shit. For high school project. For downloading videos to watch over the 
weekend. For meeting new people. It’s all expats or people from rich families. It’s all two guys 
and a laptop, no one’s working on real companies up there. The space is bright. Energetic. 
Accessible. Rundown. Unwelcoming. Needs a coat of paint.  
It has an open access ethos. A real relaxed culture. A real elitist group. A cult of 
personality. I don’t feel welcome. I don’t get anything done. I don’t want to leave. I have 
nowhere else I can work. It’s grounded in the community. Turning its back on the community. 
Too focused on the community. Too focused on money. Too dependent on donor money. Doesn’t 
know how to make money. Rolling in money. Sitting on a pot of cash. Rich. Unsustainable. 
Broke. 
There are no companies that have gone to the iHub and grown to success. What kind of 
disruption have they brought? What kind of tech has ever come out of there? What have they 
really built? We got funding because of the iHub. I met my cofounder at the iHub. I got my start 
at the iHub. None of you would be here today if it weren’t for the iHub. People forget what the 
iHub did for them. People forget that the iHub isn’t perfect. That it can’t be everything. That 
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everyone is there. That no one is there anymore. People don’t want to admit that it doesn’t have 
any industry connections. That it’s too focused on apps. That its Wi-Fi isn’t all that. That it’s 
over.  
“We’re the iHub,” one staff member said to me once. “We’re sort of famous.” 
As I endeavored to show in the first portion of this chapter, this fame – the fame that 
drew attention to the iHub like laughter in a quiet room – was, in many ways, of the iHub’s own 
making, and fit into larger GCTI narratives about how anyone anywhere could be a successful 
technology entrepreneurs. Like many other storytellers of these narratives and like GCTI techno-
visionaries, the iHub’s stories were unabashedly optimistic, foretelling a bright future ahead for 
Kenyan innovators. Yet, like the broader Anyone Anywhere Narrative, iHub’s techno-optimistic 
vision of the future created unrealistic expectations for some, expectations that led many to feel 
frustrated and disappointed at the very different reality with which they were confronted (as in 
Chapter 3) and eventually to reject the stories and the storyteller as merely ‘hype’ (as in Chapter 
4). 
By the time I started my extended fieldwork in January 2016, it was obvious that fame 
had become a mixed blessing for the iHub. Many of the criticisms above had begun to take hold 
and the critical stories people told about the iHub began to construct new counter-narratives 
critical of its place in Kenya’s community of technology innovators. The most stinging and sticky 
of these revolved around two central critiques: 1) That the iHub was really all hype and no 
substance; and 2) That it was more focused on – and useful for – international visitors than it was 
on the local Kenyan community of innovators that had helped to create it. In this section, I will 
expand upon these two counter-narratives and draw on some of my own observations in and 
around the building to explore what they meant for the iHub. I will make the case that the initial 
narratives that the iHub had played a central role in creating eventually evolved to restrict and 
constrain their creator, drawing it into the center of a new narrative battle that would transform 
the iHub from the symbol of a grassroots movement around African innovation, to a symbol 
against which a new grassroots movement would rail. 
The	iHub	is	all	hype	
I have lots of friends in the tech sector and sometimes I would ask them ‘ati 
(‘say’ in Kiswahili), why don’t you come and launch your project at iHub?’ 
And their feedback is that iHub is a hype piece. ‘What good startup came 
from iHub?’ they would ask. So there is this perception that it is over-hyped, 
that it’s more talk and less work. I hear this all the time when I go talk to 
people who know the iHub but don’t work from here. (Interview with an 
employee of the iHub, March 2016) 
In chapter 4, I talked about how pervasive accusations of ‘hype’ were in and around 
Kenya’s technology sector in 2016. I often found the iHub to be at the center of such critique. 
Like the other accusations of hype I covered in Chapter 4, those leveled at the iHub focus on the 
discrepancy between the story that it had told and what people believed was really happening in 
that 4th floor corworking space. Many such accusations, like in the interview excerpt above, 
focused on the lack of successful startups that had ‘come out’ of the iHub. In fact, in one of my 
very first conversations with an entrepreneur outside of the iHub after my return to Nairobi in 
January 2016, I was told flatly that “there’s no technology coming out of the iHub.” Over and 
over again I heard this refrain. “What good startup came from the iHub?” “What kind of 
disruption have they brought into the industry or innovation space?” “You have no companies 
that have gone to the iHub and grown to success”.  
Other accusations about the problem with the reality behind the iHub story focused on the 
amateurish level of the startups that worked there (and sometimes the organization itself) and how 
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inconsequential the iHub had become to ‘serious’ entrepreneurs. I met entrepreneurs who 
described the startups at the iHub as “high school projects” and pointed to the “huge gaps” 
between them and the “guys running successful companies like Ghafla! and Hellofoods.” In one 
very scathing critique, a data storage entrepreneur talked about how little the iHub team itself 
actually knew about building companies, describing them as “inexperienced investors”, who had 
“never built a real company,” were “operating in a silo,” and were “disconnected from serious 
businesses in Kenya” – like ‘enterprise’ technology companies. Some tempered their critique by 
saying that the iHub may have been useful in the beginning, but they and other more established 
entrepreneurs had “developed way beyond the iHub”. They accused it of continuing to focus on 
“idea stage” startups, instead of evolving with the sector and providing more useful services for 
more advanced startups. As one fintech entrepreneur said during a discussion forum on Kenya’s 
tech sector, “I don’t need networking anymore. I have WhatsApp, I have my own connections. 
What I need is support services, accounting, and legal”.  
I found this line of criticism – boiled down to the belief that the iHub wasn’t good 
enough, or wasn’t as good as it claimed to be – to be a source of immense frustration for many of 
the iHub employees I came to know. Frequently in conversations, the staff would complain about 
the unrealistic or misguided expectations they believed people held about the iHub and how 
difficult it made their work as a result. One talked about the problems with the expectations that 
the iHub should be building more companies: “How many huge companies have come out? Ok, 
not many. But if you want to talk about smaller companies there’s a ton, mFarm, Kopokopo, etc. 
…People think that we’re supposed to be building these huge businesses – it’s literally, that’s not 
what we do.” Another, over a lunch together, expressed similar frustration to me with the 
misconception that the iHub is an incubator. “iHub was never an incubator,” she said. “It was 
always a ‘pre-incubator’, a space to generate ideas”. A third said simply “that iHub has a lota lota 
lota money. That’s the number one misconception.” For at least one employee, all these 
misplaced expectations about the iHub were at fault for the constant barrage of critiques she felt 
they got, that caused problems and distracted them from the work she felt they needed to do.  
Everyone has all these expectations and opinions about what we should do. 
It’s difficult when it’s a blank script that’s always adding up. Anyone will 
come on to the timeline and say iHub should be doing this. …People need to 
be clear on what iHub does,” she said. “So people don’t just say ‘iHub does 
this,’ and us guys are like ‘no!’ That’s why there’s always a blame game. And 
we’re tired of these conversations.  
It is somewhat of a coincidence that I happened to come to Kenya to do my primary 
fieldwork in 2016, a year in which the counter-narratives critiquing the iHub seemed to mount 
and its defenders seemed to be slipping away or drowned out. For the iHub staff members 
working through this time, they often seemed to struggle under the weight of the iHub’s heavy 
reputation, not because they were somehow inferior to the staff at the beginning, but because the 
expectations for the iHub had climbed so high and so diverse. As the head of a visiting startup 
competition said to me in July 2016, “I’ve spent a week here and I think at some point everyone 
has had something to say bashing the iHub. …People want the iHub to be everything: a coffee 
shop, an investor, an accelerator, a date, someone to marry”. This statement, while clearly 
hyperbolic, gets at how wide-ranging people’s expectations were about what the iHub was or 
should be. One of the iHub’s employees really got at the root of this issue when she said: “People 
think iHub is perfect…We forget that iHub is still run by individuals, by normal people who 
sometimes don’t know what the fuck [whispered] they’re doing.” I found this to be true in my 
own observations. People had superhuman expectations of the iHub. It should be producing 
globally relevant startups. It should be self-sustainable. It should continue to provide access for 
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free. It should continue to be there for, and relevant to, members of the Kenyan CTI, whether 
they’re just starting out or just receiving their first round of Series A capital. 
In the reality as I perceived it, the iHub was still many things in 2016, but it was not 
everything. The 4th floor space was still accessible for free. But they often held sponsored events 
that were not always directly relevant to those working in the space and were often scheduled at 
prime work times throughout the day, forcing members to cram into a corner and turn up the 
volume on their headphones if they wanted to continue working. They tried to target more 
advanced startups with events around legal and accounting, like people had requested, but such 
events seemed sparsely attended. They began to focus more on their incubation work, even 
halfway through 2016 integrating m:lab – the actual incubator – back into the iHub and making it 
a prime focus of their work. It also still operated as a focal point of the tech community to some, 
but the community had expanded significantly and while you might have been able to fit 
everyone in the community in the iHub in 2010, you certainly no longer could in 2016. They had 
even built up their services branch, hoping to provide specific services that startup entrepreneurs 
said they needed – coding consulting, programming and business management training, a design 
laboratory, and research services. But I still found people saying that more talented programming 
support or more targeted developer training programs could be found elsewhere. And finally, it 
still sat physically in an important place, a neighborhood with a lot of tech companies in a 
building with even more of them, and still did attract a number of international visitors, including, 
most notably, Mark Zuckerberg in 2016. But the iHub’s physical space had begun to deteriorate 
particularly in comparison to the often-brand-new spaces of many of its competitors, something 
that the iHub staff were keenly aware of. The following, for example, is a very telling excerpt 
from a conversation among employees on one of the iHub’s private Slack channels about how 
they were reluctant to invite a prospective client in for fear of the impression the space gave. 
Person 1 @10:52am: look around you, your office [referring to the staff office 
on the 2nd floor] kwanza [‘first’]. Does that look marketable? 😝😂😂😂 
Person 2 @10:53am: He can see the 4th floor. You know when it’s full of 
people 
Person 1 @ 10:53am: When we revamp our shit, perhaps we can make a case 
for why we should be part of the Brank Kenya spiel.  
And tattered bean bags? Hai please. If anyone thinks the 4th floor can still 
wow people, you be lost in the sauce and the game (to quote Zola). 
Person 3 @ 11:01am: That’s so true. I hope the 4th floor will also get hiyo 
[‘that’] revamping… 
The entrance says it all, worn-our floor, old tables… 
Person 2 @ 11:08am: That’s why I said full of people, the people are 
distractions (😝) 
The staff members that I came to know, including those in the Slack conversation above, 
often felt embarrassed about the state of the iHub space in 2016. It wasn’t just other coworking 
spaces that shined in comparison, but even ‘friends’ of the iHub, like Gearbox and BRCK and 
much newer, cleaner, and hipper office spaces. 
In short, the reality at the iHub was…complicated. Over time, organizations evolve and 
turn into something that they were not to begin with. Over time, narratives and reality as it is 
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experience co-evolve, influencing one another. In the case of the iHub, the organization seemed 
too often to evolve in order to try to meet the expectations of the Kenyan CTI from which it had 
come, expectations that, as the Kenyan CTI had grown and expanded, had expanded as well, 
expecting the iHub to be everything for everyone with an interest in technology startups in 
Kenya. From the beginning, the organization had branded itself as “from the community” and 
committed to the local community’s needs. As I have shown elsewhere, real engagement in a 
community of practice involves joint negotiation about the practices of that community. Because 
of the iHub’s commitment to its community in practice and in rhetoric, it amplified members 
exepctations that it would continue to have a say in the iHub and its operations. Moreover, in the 
iHub’s case, those expectations were, I argue, a direct result of the narrative-building work the 
iHub team had done since its inception.  
Furthermore, the very public role the iHub had played in this narrative-building also 
amplified the accusations leveled at it for being over-hyped. Not only did it not meet 
expectations, but, the argument went, it didn’t meet expectations because it was too focused on its 
image and not on the real work. In this vein, I heard the iHub described as “all talk,” “more talk, 
less work,” “money hungry,” “image focused,” “too image conscious,” and focused on “big 
catchy things rather than helping or improving the greater good.” As one quite disgruntled 
entrepreneur said, “running a company, it’s not a blog post.”  
As I showed in the case of the construction of a counter-narrative calling out sexual 
misconduct at one of the Kenyan CTI’s flagship companies, Ushahidi, practice is often invoked to 
legitimize a story, to demonstrate that it’s grounded in truth, that it is somehow ‘real’ and not a 
fantasy. And for a while, that is precisely what was happening at the iHub. There was Ushahidi, 
there was some new promising startups like mFarm and Kopokopo. And in the beginning the 
iHub drew on such examples to support the narratives they were building, to demonstrate that 
what they were doing was ‘real’. But eventually, six years later, ‘real world’ events were being 
used instead as part of the construction of a counter-narrative about the iHub as being all hype. 
This time, mFarm and Kopokopo and others became examples of startups that hadn’t grown as 
much as everyone expected. Their struggles, the lack of Kenyan ‘unicorns’, even the history of 
iHubbers as bloggers all seemed to be drawn in as evidence of practices that proved the iHub was 
not what it had claimed to be. Practice, this time, was being used to de-legitimize the iHub’s 
narratives and its claim to being at the heart of Kenya’s CTI. 
The	iHub	is	too	international		
One of the underlying themes from the counter-narrative about the iHub being all hype revolved 
around the community, namely the perceived discrepancy between the iHub’s rhetorical 
commitment to the community that had helped to create it, and its commitment in practice. To 
many, the direction in which the iHub had evolved was decidedly more internationally focused 
than locally invested. For example, at a public event I attended at another of Nairobi’s coworking 
spaces in July 2016, a conversation about the future of Kenya’s CTI evolved, as they often did, 
into a targeted conversation about the iHub. While some of the critiques echoed those above, 
others focused on the disproportionate number of foreigners in the space. One fintech 
entrepreneur present talked at length about this.  
It has an open access ethos, but it’s not very open. …People I know take the 
bus to iHub, but it’s hard to get the bus fair and it’s hard to spend all that time 
in Ngong Rd traffic. Is it worth it? To me? No. Most of the people there, they 
were from very rich families or they were expats trying to see what was going 
on. There weren’t any people like me. 
Other discussions I had echoed this. One entrepreneur who runs tech-centric trainings for 
people in Kibera, for example, talked to me about how many of the students he worked with 
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wanted to become entrepreneurs but didn’t go to the iHub, because they didn’t feel comfortable 
there. Similarly, one of the iHub’s staff members told me about how part of the reason his tech 
friends no longer came to the iHub was because it was all “bourgeoisie shit”. Even one of the 
foreign entrepreneurs I met had picked up on the expat reputation of the iHub. He told me about 
how he’d opted to launch his company out of the Nailab (the competing coworking space across 
the hall) because he said “Nailab felt more Kenyan.” “At Nailab,” he explained “I was sitting next 
to Kenyans building companies, whereas the iHub seemed very American, no offense”.  
 To some, the perception that the iHub was filled with foreigners (including me, it should 
be noted) was symbolic of its betrayal of the local Kenyan CTI that it had come from and that it 
was supposed to benefit. I found that this view was held even by some in and around the Bishop 
Magua Centre. One of the founders of a tech company that resided in the building, for example, 
talked to me in 2016 about how in the early years, she felt the iHub had been instrumental in 
bringing the community together, hosting events and things and really being engaged, but that 
recently it seemed to be more interested in getting foreign money than in supporting the 
community. I even found myself in the center of this when the iHub staff advised me to disguise 
my iHub affiliations when I went to talk to people elsewhere to avoid being perceived as “just 
another foreigner at the iHub”. 
 In my observations, the iHub’s approach to the community seemed…again, complicated. 
Yes, there had been a lot of foreigners working from the 4th floor when I first visited in 2013, but 
in 2016 the space felt decidedly more ‘Kenyan’ with at most only 2 or 3 ex-pats in the space at 
any one time. There were still events held for the most immediate members in the community – 
the green members who worked there daily – like mock pitch sessions where they could practice 
or one-on-one mentoring sessions. But as I mentioned above, there were also countless events run 
by foreign NGOs or companies – like hackathons, or panel discussions about technology and 
government accountability – that, while interesting to me, were not always directly relevant to the 
green members. But I also found that some staff members went to great lengths to support the 
green members. One, for example, had launched a program called “night shift” where for a few 
days a week he would stay at the iHub through the night keeping it open for people who needed 
to get projects done on a deadline. Once, on a Friday night in February 2016 after a group outing, 
I even saw this individual head back to the Bishop Magua Centre to open the space for members 
who were desperate to finish a project. Tellingly, when I asked him later why he’d gone back so 
late even on a night off, he responded that it was a way for him to help the iHub “meet the 
expectations of the community”. 
 By contrast, another staff member at the iHub found these expectations unrealistic and 
stifling, particular in the context of the financial difficulties that had gradually taken over the 
iHub.  
People keep saying the iHub isn’t doing enough for the community. But it’s 
not practical. The community isn’t even structured like a service that we can 
charge for. And people think that we get money from this black hole that we 
keep on digging. I don’t think they understand what it takes to maintain that 
space. …From our side the community is where we kind of give back. And if 
you think about it, we really wouldn’t focus on that if our existence is on the 
line. People need to appreciate that. And with the funding problems we’ve 
been having, we need to figure out if the community is something that we will 
continue to put front and center. 
This staff member was far from the only one with such sentiments. Even some of the new 
leaders who were brought in to ‘save’ the iHub financially in 2016 believed that they needed to 
de-prioritize the community because it didn’t bring in much revenue, something that seemed 
untenable for a financially struggling organization. The role of the community in the iHub’s 
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mission became such a point of contention that at least one staff member chose to resign 
believing that new management would move away from its community origins and would begin 
charging for access to the space. The staff member in question told me about how his primary 
concern was the “green members” who come and work on their startups from the 4th floor space 
on a regular basis. To him, these green members really depended on the iHub.  
If the iHub collapsed, it would be a real struggle for them. Many of them 
cannot afford the fees at coworking spaces in other parts of the city. …The 
community is really at the core of what iHub represented at the very 
beginning. But it has lost that. I see many of the community members are 
disappointed in what iHub has become. Now the iHub ignores the community 
because it has not been a main avenue for profit generation. 
In the end, the strength of the narratives that the iHub helped to create in the first place, 
helping them to reach not just Kenyan but international audiences, by 2016 caused problems for 
its claim to local relevance and commitment. All the international visitors, like Marissa Mayer, 
who had helped it to amplify the iHub’s narratives abroad, as well as all the stories about other 
African countries trying to replicate the iHub, undeniably turned it into a first port of call for 
many foreigners, myself included, coming to Kenya with an interest in tech. The interaction of 
the narratives it constructed and the reality that evolved around it created an image of an entity 
that had one foot in and one foot outside of Kenya, an entity that may have been physically based 
in Kenya but was fully facing the outside world, at odds, to many, with the organization’s 
rhetorical commitment to local techies. 
The perceptions of the iHub as more invested in the global community than the local 
community were compounded by the organization’s close connection with Erik Hersman. For 
good or bad, as I demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, Hersman was at the forefront of 
the media coverage of both the iHub and Kenya’s technology sector. As even people who worked 
for the iHub acknowledged, over time Hersman’s position in the spotlight led to a reputation that 
he and the iHub were inseparable, even when he went off to found BRCK. One of the iHub’s 
long-term staff members described for me the problem with this tangled reputation. “The fact that 
the iHub is Erik and Erik is the iHub was probably one of the contributing factors to the problems 
we had. So, if people had difficulty with Erik, they would have difficulty with the iHub, which 
shouldn’t have been like that. It should be…they should be very distinct entities.” 
As long as no one had a problem with Hersman, the strong reputational connection 
between him and the iHub was not problematic. By 2016 however, in part due to his involvement 
in the Angani Saga, in part due to the dominant role he played in Kenya’s CTI as a founder of the 
iHub and a key shaper of the community narratives, and in part due to his hybrid identity, 
Hersman had become a target for many frustrated at the perception of investor bias and elitism in 
Kenya’s CTI. In such a climate, the inextricability of the reputations of Hersman and the iHub 
became decidedly more problematic for the iHub adding fuel to the fire, evidence to the new 
narratives critics were building about the iHub being more interested in foreign investors than 
local entrepreneurs, more concerned about its international reputation than its local one, more 
concerned about legitimacy in the global GCTI than the Kenyan one.  
In the case of both of these lines of criticism – that the iHub is all hype and that it is too 
elitist and too international – existing narratives that the iHub had built in its early years came 
back to haunt it. Initially helping it grow Kenya’s tech sector and the iHub’s place within it, these 
narratives later became evidence used by critics to signify its failings, particularly the inefficacy 
of its work and the hypocrisy of its founder. Furthermore, the storytelling approach the iHub 
adopted, as well as the identity of its most visible storyteller, eventually ended up also being used 
as further evidence to build counter-narratives about its failings. That leaders at the iHub had 
initially put so much effort into narrative creation became used as evidence of how the iHub’s 
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priorities focused more on image than on substance. And that the primary spokesperson in that 
process of narrative creation had been a man with complicated identity politics meant that the 
iHub’s reputational fate and his were intertwined. 
The	iHub	2.0:	Dueling	Loyalties	
The iHub’s mission is to catalyze the growth of the Kenyan tech ecosystem, 
and so it remains. However, the Kenyan tech ecosystem of today is not the 
one we had in 2010. We have more tech spaces that have grown up, including 
Startup Garage, Nailab, Growth Hub, The Nest, Pawa 254, Swahili Box, Lake 
Hub and others. There are more options for co-working, many more investors 
at all levels, and multiple incubation opportunities around just Nairobi, and 
more across the country. What then should the iHub do? What should it be if 
it is still to fulfill its mission? (Hersman, 2016) 
When I returned to Kenya to continue my fieldwork in January 2016, I found a technology sector 
that had changed considerably, and an iHub that seemed lost, unsure of how it should fit into a 
new environment that it had, in part, helped to build. As Hersman wrote in the blog post excerpt 
above, the sector around the iHub had changed. Not only were there countless new coworking 
spaces like the ones he listed, but there were many more advanced startups with more diverse 
needs than before. For example, by 2016, M-Kopa Solar, a company that provides pay-as-you go 
solar power energy, had acquired $52 million in venture capital funding, and a small handful of 
entrepreneurs had successfully exited their companies, including Hilda Moraa, who sold her 
fintech startup, WezaTele, to an African financial services group for US $1.7 million in 2015 and 
got her start at the iHub. Investment in African startups was on the rise. According to a report 
from a San Francisco-based venture capital firm, Partech Venture, investment in technology 
startups in Africa totaled US$366 million in 2016, with Kenya ranked the third most desirable 
investment destination after South Africa and Nigeria, and accounting for US$92.7 million of that 
(Kazeem, 2017). But also, as I showed in the previous chapter, important new debates were 
beginning to take over what practices should and should not shape the Kenyan community of 
technology innovators going forward. Is startup innovation crucial for the future of Kenyan 
growth or is it being fetishized as a catchall solution to Kenya’s problems? Is the purpose of 
designing and building technology in Kenya to solve Kenyan problems and stay focused on local 
needs or to solve global problems and reshape global views of what Africans can do? Was it 
really a ‘Kenyan’ innovation if the entrepreneur leading it or the investors funding it were 
American? And what should be the future role of international actors in the sector anyway?  
 By January 2016, Nairobi’s technology community had grown far beyond fitting into the 
iHub space, and to many, as we saw above, had outgrown it entirely. Thanks to its prominence in 
the spotlight and the complicated storyteller role that Hersman himself has played, the iHub was 
also squarely in the middle of many of these national-level community debates and had become a 
symbol, as I showed in the previous section, of some of the problems with Kenya’s tech sector. 
As I wrote in my fieldnotes in January 2016 “the iHub as it currently is feels overshadowed by 
the iHub people believe that it is”.  
What then, as Hersman asked in the blog post, should the iHub do? “What should it be if 
it is to still fulfill its mission?” – a mission, as he described it, “to catalyze the growth of the 
Kenyan tech ecosystem.” According to at least one manager at the iHub (or ‘team lead’ as they 
were sometimes called), these were not new questions for the iHub. In a February 2016 
conversation, she explained that they were questions that the iHub had revisited every year since 
its inception. To me, that sounded like a good thing for a company to do, a way for it to 
reevaluate if it was on the right track. But to her it was frustrating. “Every year,” she said, “there 
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are conversations and meeting and reports sent around, but it rarely materializes.” She explained 
that this time seemed different only in that the leadership seemed to want to take a very 
“community-driven democratic approach” to running the iHub, meaning, she felt, that this 
process of musing over what the iHub is, was taking longer than usual and was more taxing on 
the rest of the staff. One of the board members I spoke with corroborated this, explaining that the 
board had purposefully taken a hands-off approach to allow the iHub to be what the staff wanted 
it to be in early 2016. “We’ve purposefully stayed in the background,” he explained to me in July. 
“Whether that’s good or bad, all of the changes etc have come from the iHub staff.”  
However, unlike previous years these questions about what the iHub should be became 
more urgent in 2016, a year that would ultimately see many big changes, including new investors, 
a new CEO, and the announcement of a move to a new building. In this final section, I will show 
how these changes generated heated internal debates that reflected many of the debates being had 
in the Kenyan CTI more broadly. I will make the case that the iHub’s unique position as a kind of 
hybrid entity at the crossroads of two communities – the Kenyan CTI and the GCTI – made its 
choices more difficult because it meant that in order for the iHub to answer the question “what 
should the iHub do?” it needed to first answer in which community it most cared about belong. 
Furthermore, I will argue that taken together the changes the iHub ultimately made in 2016 
signified a new path for the iHub more closely aligned with the values and received practice of 
the GCTI than with the nascent Kenyan community that it had come from. 
New	investors	
The first big change of 2016 was new investment, announced in the March 11 blog post above 
that written by Hersman. Despite the organization’s high-profile status, in recent months the iHub 
had been struggling to cover its costs. Some of the funding sources that they had previously relied 
on, like grants, were no longer as prolific as they had previously been. As one of the iHub 
managers explained to me, “grants were drying up all over the place…we realized you can’t rely 
on grants forever”. And the paid-for services that they had ramped up were not yet making up the 
difference. Explaining the move in his post, Hersman wrote: “First and foremost, we recognize 
the need to make sure that we are 100% self-funded.” In other words, they needed to reevaluate 
their business model so they could sustain their business from the work they were doing, rather 
than relying on external funding like grants. In a large staff meeting on the same day the blog post 
was published, the management at the iHub explained the justification for the changes to a 
bemused staff. One manager chose to explain the transition metaphorically: “The iHub has been 
very sick. It was really really bad. The patient is not in the ICU, but now the recovery will be a lot 
of work.” Another spoke more specifically: “We had a really shitty time over the last 9 months. 
But it’s like any organization; you go through troughs. But going forward we need to make sure 
we’re sustainable. We need to work like a well-oiled machine.” 
Taken at face value, this decision seems quite straightforward. An organization that had 
been struggling financially, took funding and was reevaluating its business model to become 
more efficient and more profitable. What’s more, taking investment, including foreign 
investment, had become a very common occurrence among Kenyan startups. But the iHub was a 
different kind of entity. Throughout its entire existence – and as a direct result of its 
communication strategy – the iHub had been, and had been seen as, a community-focused non-
profit. For such an organization, this move seemed like quite a striking shift. In an interview with 
me, one of the iHub’s managers explained the change in direction as the iHub trying to find a 
“more sustainable” way to continue to have the social impact it had always had, rather than a shift 
entirely away from the social. Intriguingly, to do this he referenced a TED talk from a Harvard 
Business School professor, Michael Porter.  
Look at Michael Porter’s shared value thesis. He doesn’t talk about impact. 
His mindset is really on the business side. Take a look at his TED talk. It 
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captures really how businesses should not just think in terms of making 
money or social, but how can I do both? From the point of view of 
development – and yes, I think we’re in the development game – the most 
sustainable way of doing development is to take a business approach. 
In this explanation, I found someone trying to resolve conflicting pressures on a unique 
organization. Like any organization, the iHub needed to find a way of sustaining itself, but unlike 
other organizations it had become a symbol of a growing social movement around designing and 
building technology in Africa. This symbolic role meant that the iHub faced greater challenges in 
persuading the local community that in adopting a more for-profit business model it was not 
abandoning its social purpose. The invocation of the shared value thesis above shows an attempt 
to walk this very fine line. In a second interview at the end of the year, the same manager spoke 
more explicitly about the impact of the iHub’s unique place as a social movement: 
It’s true, the iHub has been a kind of social movement. And if you’re a social 
movement, you pretty much operate as a non-profit, like Ushahidi. It’s good, 
but it’s not easy. But you need to be ruthless to sustain an organization, and to 
do that you need a business mind. Running a social movement versus running 
a business are two different things. And maybe you can have them both, but 
we needed to be a business for a while. 
Among the staff, I found trepidation and confusion about what the new investment would 
mean for them and for the organization. Despite the above manager’s attempt to walk the line, I 
found some of the staff concerned that the move would mean they would lose their focus on 
having a social impact. “It’s really confused about where we’re going. We’re a private entity 
now. But I don’t know if we’re owned by those new investors. Someone said they bought us! So, 
I guess they get to decide if we’re social or profit focused from now on.” This concern ultimately 
revolved less around whether the iHub would be more focused on social impact or profit 
generation, and more around who ultimately got to decide the direction the iHub would take, who 
got to call the shots, who, as Wenger might describe, was really engaged and had a say in the 
things that matter. In the past, as an organization that had focused so much on listening to the 
community of innovators around it, such decisions had historically been made, or at least 
informed by, the local Kenyan CTI, the staff included. If new investors had “bought” the iHub as 
this staff member feared, then they would ultimately get to decide something over which the 
community had historically had significant influence.  
Over the course of 2016, I witnessed many attempts to make the members of the Kenyan 
CTI – particularly the most immediate green members – feel included in the decision-making 
process of the iHub. For example, in June 2016 the iHub staff held an event called “iHub: The 
Next Chapter – Getting Involved” where they offered the community a chance to influence how 
the iHub would evolve. Speaking for the staff, then CEO Mugambi said “This forum is a way for 
everyone to get engaged and involved in shaping that path at the iHub because the iHub is a 
unique organization.”  
Further complicating this move was the identity of the new principal investor, Miguel 
Granier. While Hersman’s March 11 blog post had mentioned three other investors, all Kenyan - 
Bitange Ndemo, Beck Wanjiku, and Ken Mwenda –Granier, a foreigner, was the most 
controversial. In the staff meeting announcing the new investors on March 11, Granier, a Boston 
native and a young confident looking man with a beard and an American accent smiled a lot and 
spoke about his motivation for investing. He had been a “fan” of the iHub since 2012, he 
explained, and he wanted to help it build companies that he could, in turn, invest in. Many of the 
iHub staff seemed to be cautious of his involvement, perhaps because he had previously been an 
investor in Angani. Already associated with the Angani Saga through their relationship to 
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Hersman, some iHub staff worried that by bringing in a foreigner associated with Angani, they 
would be validating concerns that the iHub was seeking foreign funding at the expense of the 
needs of the local Kenyan CTI. Furthermore, with concerns that the iHub was courting 
international funding at the expense of the local community, Granier’s identity seemed to hand 
over the decision-making power about the future of the iHub to no just a foreign investor, but to 
one who already had a problematic reputation among members of Kenyan’s CTI. 
New	CEO	
On June 6, 2016, after three years as the iHub’s CEO and one of its founding members, Josiah 
Mugambi, announced in a new blog post that the iHub was looking for his replacement. 
One of the key roles that we are looking to hire for is for a seasoned Chief 
Executive Officer that can support me and the team as we grow towards our 
ambitious new goals. We are looking for an experienced executive with a 
proven track record building tech-oriented companies, including business 
development and fundraising (Mugambu, 2016) 
Continuing to appeal to both the iHub’s international and local community audiences, 
Mugambi further wrote that “This person will provide strong leadership by working with global 
customers, investors, and donors while demonstrating a passion for innovation and innovators.” 
The management was keenly aware of the pressure on the iHub to find someone not only with 
experience running a more for-profit business for the new direction that they were going, but also 
who understood the iHub’s community roots. As one of the managers at the iHub explained to me 
in a July 2016 interview, they wanted someone with strong experience building companies, but 
who also “understands the culture of the iHub.” Demonstrating an awareness of recent criticism 
about the iHub’s commitment to the local community, he also added that they had a “strong 
preference for a Kenyan.” 
In the end, the new CEO, Kamal Bhattacharya, announced publicly in a blog post he 
authored on August 26, 2016, was not Kenyan. He was born in India, grew up in Germany where 
he’d done his PhD in Physics, and spent most of his career working for IBM, for which he’d 
moved to Kenya a few years prior to help IBM set up its first Research Lab in Africa in Nairobi. 
He certainly had the for-profit technology company experience that the iHub had been looking for 
and that fit the new direction the investors had signaled. When I first met Bhattacharya, he gave 
the impression of an individual with a structured corporate mindset keen to help the iHub – one of 
the organizations that, he said, had led IBM to choose Nairobi for its first African Lab – improve 
and sustain itself. In his first appearance in front of the iHub staff on August 12, he wore a blue 
checkered shirt, a grey jacket with shoulder patches, and jeans, quite different from the jeans and 
a t-shirt Silicon Valley uniform popular among the likes of Zuckerberg. While he struck me as 
quite no-nonsense in his leadership style, he also had a very calm and even calming demeanor 
when he spoke. 
After the announcement of his appointment, right away, as anticipated, some of the staff 
expressed apprehension about his identity. In an informal chat we had over lunch, one pointed to 
the debate taking place in the broader Kenyan CTI as cause for his concern. He explained that he 
believed in the previous year and a half that the “tide has really turned against ex-pats running 
companies,” and that this “Africa for Africans mentality” was “becoming popular in our tech 
community”. As an example, he pointed me to the Twitter hashtag #BlackFoundersMatter that I 
discussed in Chapter 4. One way or the other, he believed that Bhattacharya’s appointment could 
“really influence perceptions of the iHub”. A few weeks later I asked him and one of his 
colleagues if his concern about the new CEO had changed over time. He answered that his initial 
skepticism of an outsider coming into the iHub hadn’t gone away. Both he and his colleague 
agreed that it felt suspiciously like he was trying to turn the iHub into “a more international 
	 149 
company”. In particular, they were both wary of his desire to “bring in experts”, which to them 
was “code for bringing in foreigners”. 
By contrast a number of staff members I spoke with seemed excited about the new 
appointment. After being uncertain about the new direction that the iHub would take, many 
seemed relieved to have a new CEO who spoke frankly about his plans for the iHub with a clearer 
direction than before. Not everyone seemed to care whether or not he was Kenyan. Team leaders, 
in particular, seemed to speak about him favorably. One, for example, talked to me in November 
about how important his new networks would be for the future of the iHub. 
One of the things that excites me about having Kamal on board is that he 
comes in with this whole new group of people that we didn’t have access to 
before or that we didn’t consider talking to. …So if you mix in this new 
network that he comes in with, with some of our old networks, most of whom 
are actually still relevant, then we have a whole new world to play around 
with. 
Another, in December, spoke about Bhattacharya’s extensive experience and his 
objectivity, and how important that was for dealing with the many varied stakeholders from the 
iHub’s community. 
The fact that he is older than most of them [the members of the iHub 
community]. He is mature. He has worked at a very senior level and he is able 
to be objective. He is able to spend time chatting with all these guys… but 
then is able to still make objective clear decisions about the iHub. He is able 
to detach the person from the profession, which people unfortunately can’t 
most of the time. 
As Bhattacharya took time to assess the iHub and develop a plan for where it should go, 
the relationship between the iHub and the community around it became a topic of much debate 
within the organization. In his first blog post for the iHub, Bhattacharya made his own stance 
clear. Instead of an abstract notion of “community” that the iHub should support, he argued that 
they instead needed to clarify what they meant by the term – to him, instead of focusing on the 
iHub’s “community” it should see them as “customers”. “The essence in our shift,” he wrote, “is 
from serving a somewhat abstract community to serving customers that make up our 
community.” Through the tone he took in the rest of the post, it was clear both that the decision 
he’d made wasn’t up for debate and also that he recognized that the topic of “community” was of 
great importance to many people around the iHub. He even opened the post citing all the ways in 
which the iHub was important to, and connected with, different communities, locally, regionally, 
and internationally. 
The iHub has played a significant role in creating and defining the tech 
community in Kenya. It has become a guiding light to many regions on the 
continent and beyond. The iHub serves as the first point of entry to those who 
want to reach out into the local community, tap into local knowledge, or just 
hang out for a while with like-minded people. 
But who were the customers that Bhattacharya was talking about? Were they local, 
regional, or international? Were they entrepreneurs or investor, or even innovators outside of the 
startup model? As he rightly pointed out in the post, the community around the iHub had changed 
significantly in the six years it had existed, and was no longer a small group of techies 
experimenting with open source software that it had been at its inception. “The mission 
embedded in the mantra of technology, innovation, community,” Bhattacharya wrote, “never 
changed at its core. What changed is the community”. In staff meetings, Bhattacharya made it 
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clear that the community they should focus on going forward should be those that could pay. At 
the same time, the iHub’s public relations material continued to emphasize the “community”. 
Though the “technology, innovation, community” mantra had been replaced with the new and 
more corporate “Connect. Build. Invent.”, the organization’s new website, continued to 
emphasize community. It described the iHub, for example, first and foremost, as an organization 
that “serve[s] the tech community [emphasis added], by connecting organizations and people, 
building market relevant solutions and being ahead of the curve of innovation.” 
Among the staff, I found many divergent opinions about which community they should 
focus on going forward. One manager, for example, talked to me in December about how well-
known the iHub was internationally and how they really needed to focus more on their local 
community. 
More people knew about the iHub outside of Kenya than inside. …it should 
be the other way around. You’ve got something that’s really about supporting 
entrepreneurs in Kenya first and then across the continent. It should be known 
very well locally, then it can be known internationally. But, I mean, now you 
have to live with the fact that it’s a global name. 
By contrast, Bhattacharya often emphasized the need to focus beyond Kenya. In a speech 
he gave to conference on ICT4 Social Innovation co-organized by the iHub, he explained that his 
“main goal” for the iHub was “to set out our new strategy to make it more relevant not just for 
Kenya but also for the sub-Saharan and ideally African region. For others, the community that 
mattered was far narrower – just the “green members”.  
Over the course of 2016 however, I observed some consensus emerging around the view 
that the iHub’s focus should be on the portion of the community that was “building serious 
businesses”. While this sentiment echoed Bhattacharya’s emphasis on thinking of the community 
as customers, I heard a version of this expressed even before Bhattacharya’s appointment. For 
example, while announcing the new investment to the staff in March, one of the managers 
explained that the new goal should be to “make sure there’s more serious guys on the 4th floor,” 
and to “make sure there’s a clearer line for their growth”. In July, another manager explained to 
me in an interview that the iHub needed to “focus on helping companies scale”. When I asked 
him why, he explained that this focus would be of benefit to “everyone”. “If they’ve scaled they’d 
be more able to pay for services from the rest of the iHub and the funders would be happy 
because part of what they’re hoping to do is build more companies so they can invest in them.” 
For one of the team leads, this focus was good because it would lead to increasing the iHub’s 
visibility among “more established companies in the country”. “Now,” she explained “people 
who are interested or who know about the iHub are younger,” but with their new focus, she 
believed that could change. 
For many, this emphasis on “serious businesses” was less practical, less about whether 
companies could pay, and more philosophical, more focused on the attitude of the entrepreneurs. 
Were they serious about building products and businesses or were they just using the space to 
download movies? In November, one of the managers summed up this view to me in one of our 
interviews: 
The people that I hope we still are able to serve are the guys who honest to 
God truly just want, or need, to come in everyday just breaking their brains 
for turning their ideas into that solution that everyone needs. For them the 
iHub isn’t just a place to be, it’s actually, ‘this is my livelihood and am trying 
to make this thing work because I really believe in it and am hoping I can 
eventually reach that breaking point where I can scale it. 
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For all of its history, access to the 4th floor space had been free, and to many on staff, this 
desire to help the people who were serious about building companies necessarily meant that 
access to the 4th floor space needed to stay free. Throughout 2016, I found many of the iHub’s 
staff members emphasizing how important this was to them, but I also gradually saw the language 
with which it was discussed shift. In June, for example, in a presentation made by the staff to the 
green members, one of the team leads emphasized their commitment to keeping the space free. It 
was important, he explained, to keep the space free, “to make sure that anyone can still come in”. 
By July, however, one of the managers explained in a one-on-one interview that they now wanted 
to keep the 4th floor space “pretty much free”, but, he added, they would rebrand it as “sponsored” 
instead of “free,” because “people have expectations of entitlement when something is free. 
…This way, the green members will know it does take money to maintain the space.” By 
September, under Bhattacharya, the new plan was to charge for the space, but provide a few 
sponsorship opportunities where serious entrepreneurs who couldn’t afford access could 
individually be sponsored. I spoke at length about this topic with one of the iHub managers in 
November. She had at first been very resistant to the changes Bhattacharya was proposing to the 
community. By November, she seemed to see the need for the changes in practice, but also still 
seemed conflicted about them in spirit. 
I think the point where I switched was when I began to understand what the 
benefit of the changes were to the community. Initially I was on the defensive 
and immediately the question would come into my mind “where does this 
leave our community? Where does this leave our members? So, now there is a 
payment model, where does that leave the guys who can’t even afford lunch? 
You know? But we aren’t a bottomless money barrel. We can’t afford to let 
people have the iHub for the day and do whatever they want and not charge 
for it. Those were really sweet things the iHub did. And I wish we could still 
continue to do that as before, but we need to be sustainable and I need to 
remove myself from the situation where, you know, I want to just do nice 
stuff for nice people. 
Providing access to the space for free was, I believe for many at the iHub, a sort of code 
for prioritizing the local over the global community. Foreign visitors could most likely easily 
afford any cost that the iHub implemented. But the earliest entrepreneurs, the IT students looking 
for ideas or looking to learn about startups or programming, or the serious entrepreneurs who 
hadn’t yet generated revenue would all potentially find it more difficult. This move to begin 
charging for the space drew attention back to the question that had first appeared with the new 
investors: Is the iHub giving up its social function in favor of sustainability? In his first blog post, 
Bhattacharya was keen to preempt any concerns on the matter. After his statement about treating 
the “community” like “customers”, he immediately addressed the question of the organization’s 
social obligation: “This should not be misconstrued as a transition from doing good to making 
money. Commercial viability is essential for the iHub to continue to do good and the better we 
will do commercially, the more we can reinvest into our people and the community we serve.” 
Here, he echoed one of the iHub managers’ earlier invocations of Michael Porter’s shared value 
thesis: The best way for the iHub to “continue to do good”, he argued, was for it to become more 
sustainable and more efficient. They were not, he assured the audience, turning away from do-
gooding altogether. 
New	Location	
On February 4, 2017, in a blog post called ‘iHub Relocating to Senteu Plaza”, the iHub formally 
announced the decision to move out of the Bishop Magua Centre (Ombati, 2017). More so even 
that bringing on new investors, changing the business model, or hiring a new CEO, moving from 
	 152 
the building in which Kenya’s startup community had grown in and around the iHub seemed to 
confirm speculations that the iHub was withdrawing from its commitment to that community.  
The decision to move had been made months before this announcement and progress in 
this direction had started in earnest in September 2016 while I was still conducting my fieldwork. 
When the rumors about the move began circulating around the iHub, many people express their 
frustration to me about the decision. One entrepreneur, who had had notable success abroad with 
his CRM software, lamented the move and expressed to me his concern that the very early stage 
entrepreneurs who couldn’t afford to move would suffer the most. Another, who ran a technology 
startup that had opened in the Bishop Magua Building after the iHub, saw it as a sign that the new 
CEO didn’t “care about the community”. While the new leadership at the iHub had expressed 
their desire to have companies like hers move with them, she explained that the cost associated 
with such a move – costs like ending the lease in the old building, constructing and furnishing an 
entirely new office, and the higher cost of rent – all made the move prohibitively expensive for 
her company. Yet others actually seemed pleased that the iHub would be moving and saw it as a 
sign of progress not just for the organization but for the community it was meant to serve. For one 
entrepreneur, for example, the move would be a way for the community to “move beyond the 
restrictions of this tired old building”.  
In the blog post announcing the move, on the February 4, 2017, the iHub employed 
language about its continued commitment to the community as a way of addressing some of the 
critiques that had been spreading as rumors within the Bishop Magua Centre. 
 We look at this new location as the start of another chapter of iHub 2.0. The 
move to the new space is driven by the need for iHub to expand its services 
and be able to reach and serve a bigger community. The new office will have 
plenty of space for entrepreneurs to work from, meeting rooms and event 
space. The new space will enable iHub to increase the capacity for the 
community as well as services that it will offer…We want you our 
community to be part of this move! (Ombati, 2017) 
Within the organization it was clear that they were trying to walk the line between 
finding a way to make the organization financially self-sufficient and continuing to support a 
locally-situated but increasingly diverse community. Language employed like “you our 
community” attempts to highlight how inextricable the iHub is from the community and how 
continually committed they are to it. Nonetheless, the move, only added to the impression already 
brought on by a new investor, a new CEO, and a new for-profit business model: That the iHub 
was symbolically turning away from its local community roots.  
Conclusion	
In the end, many of the very same debates that we saw in the broader KCTI in Chapter 4 were 
reflected in the internal debates that I observed at the iHub. What should the iHub be? Who 
should it be for? What should its core values be? Probably more so than any other technology 
related entity in Nairobi, the iHub sits very publicly and at times problematically, at the 
crossroads of multiple communities of practice, from the immediate one that uses its space on a 
daily basis, to the wider Kenyan community as well as the global one. And while each of these 
communities revolve around the same core practice of technology innovation, they differ in their 
values and stakeholders and commitments. 
In the first portion of this chapter, I show how the iHub and those that founded it used 
their expertise with storytelling to construct interlocking narratives about Kenya as a tech hub of 
Africa and the iHub as the center of it, and used their commitment in practice and in rhetoric to 
the local community to emphasize the organization’s local authority and to invoke a sense of 
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belonging and community ownership in the entrepreneurs and programmers who came to use its 
space. 
In the second portion, I showed how the international acclaim the iHub received in part 
through these narratives eventually became problematic, leading to the creation of a narrative 
battle about what the iHub was and should be. Particularly prominent counter-narratives that 
emerged focused on the iHub being over-hyped and too elitist or international. For many in 
Kenya’s CTI, the iHub became seen as too focused on legitimacy in the GCTI, not sufficiently 
Kenyan, not sufficiently committed to the Kenyan CTI, and more interested in international 
praise and attention than affecting any real change in Kenya. Over the course of five years, the 
iHub had gone from being a prominent shaper of the narrative about its own organization and 
about Kenya and its community of innovators, to being overwhelmed by counter-narratives 
questioning its local commitment. By bringing on new investors and a new CEO, implementing a 
new business model, and physically moving out of Bishop Magua Centre, the iHub was 
symbolically re-exerting itself in this narrative debate. 
Looking at the case of the iHub is an excellent way in which to understand how actors on 
the GCTI periphery are coping with being caught between multiple communities of practice, and 
multiple, often conflicting legitimacy burdens, and the choices they’re making when in the end 
they can’t be everything to everyone forever. In the case of the iHub, those who wanted to focus 
on financial self-sustainability and to provide services for more established technology innovators 
in both the global and the Kenyan CTIs won out over those who wanted it to continue to be the 
support for those fledgling entrepreneurs that it had helped to support at the very beginning.  
In Chapter 4, I showed how a group of Kenyan innovators were working – through both 
practice and narrative – to push the Kenyan innovation community in a direction that diverged 
from prescribed Silicon Valley practices and better reflected Kenyan values and priorities. By 
implementing the recent changes that it did, the iHub seemed to be staking out an opposing 
position for itself in this broader narrative debate, one that pushed Kenya’s innovation community 
closer to the global one rather than further from it. Yet, while the iHub has long held a close 
connection to innovators outside of Kenya, its original manifestation – as a non-profit community 
space at the front of a social movement – notably differed from most of the normal practices in 
the GCTI. For an organization that was frequently seen as an example of how innovators in 
Africa were designing and building technology in a different and locally relevant way, the 
symbolism of this transformation should not be underestimated. 
 
 	
	 154 
CONCLUSION	
It’s June 2016m and I’m sitting on a couch in the open-plan coworking space of the iHub on the 
4th floor of the Bishop Magua Building. The couch is blue, almost a faded denim color with a 
square chocolate brown table in front of it. To my right is a small coffee bar with white tiles and 
a yellow-green wall, called Pete’s Coffee. Today the space feels buzzing and warm. The sun is 
finally out after a few days of English style cloud cover and the room is surrounded by full-length 
windows, filling the space with light and energy after the rain. Around the space sit about 25 
different individuals, most working at laptops with headphones on and coffee cups or water 
bottles nearby, while others are engaged in discussions with their neighbors. Some I know to be 
entrepreneurs working on small startups, others are freelance developers working on code for 
contracts, others are students participating in ongoing coding bootcamps, while a handful are 
employees at the iHub. I’ve been away for a week doing some data collection in Mombasa so my 
time quickly fills up catching up with colleagues and friends. A British man running a small 
technology NGO comes to tell me about his recent work trip to South Sudan helping a group 
there figure out how to use a new SMS program to report conflict. One of the iHub’s 
communication officers gives me an update on how their communication strategy has changed in 
the week I’ve been away. I send him links to some YouTube videos I think might help with their 
new strategy. A freelance blogger I know asks about some photographs that I owe him for a piece 
he’s doing on Safaricom in the tech space. The space’s community manager chats with me about 
the stresses involved in organizing a startup competition, DLD Tel Aviv Innovation Festival, 
that’s scheduled to take place the next day. And one of the entrepreneurs who regularly works in 
the space comes by to ask my “non-developer” opinion about the new user interface for a music 
application he’d been developing. 
~ 
It has been five years since I first visited the iHub and started this ethnographic process. And over 
the course of that time, I have had many days like the one described above. Most days there were 
filled with constant conversations and face-to-face interactions with the iHub’s staff, with the 
entrepreneurs that they hosted, and with many of the Kenyan and international visitors who 
passed through the space. Some days were more active, like when the space was taken over by 
startup competitions, like the DLD Tel Aviv one mentioned above, or by a TED cocktail event to 
recruit new fellows. Some were much quieter and were spent simply working on my laptop on a 
particular project, often related to the iHub’s communication strategy, while seated next to the 
iHub’s staff. But regardless of how busy, every day served as a reminder of how the day-to-day 
lived experiences of the people around me were not just locally-grounded in the physical space in 
Nairobi in which we were situated, and in the geographically located communities in which they 
belonged, but were also intricately engaged with “multiple elsewheres” (Mbembé & Nuttall, 
2004), in other parts of Kenya, Africa, and across the globe. Even from my first visit to the iHub, 
it was readily apparent that it was a physical space full of “flows, of flux, of translocation, with 
multiple nexuses of entry and exit points” (Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004, p. 351).  
Mbembé and Nuttall wrote in a 2004 special edition of Public Culture that both the 
popular and academic representations of Africa continued to describe the continent as “apart from 
the world” (Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004, p. 348). The field of ethnography certainly shares some of 
the blame for this with its historic conceptualizations of bounded isolated African fieldsites 
distinct and apart from the world that the researchers inhabited, combined with the reluctance 
many of us have about generalizing beyond the unique fieldsites that we study (Ferguson, 2006). 
Quite the contrary, as Mbembé and Nuttall have argued, Africa, and particularly its cities, have 
long been “embeddedness in multiple elsewhere” (Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004, p. 348), and 
continue to be “places of experimentation for engagement, the terms of which are not exclusively 
fixed or determined in advance” (Simone, 2001).  
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With technological advancement and the pace of economic and cultural engagement from 
such elsewheres increasing, urban studies scholars like AbdouMaliq Simone have shown how 
Africans, like people elsewhere, are even more closely interconnected with people and ideas from 
around the world than before (Simone, 2004, 2010). Ethnographers too have explored more 
frequently in the last 10 years the multiple “elsewhere” in Africa and their connections to the 
globe through the production of media content (S. Avle, 2011) and in their use of the internet 
(Jenna Burrell, 2012), how those connections complicate the processes of meaning making and 
identity construction among urban Africans (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). But to date, I believe 
there has still be insufficient research into how Africans negotiate these complicated processes 
through their participation in the production of new technologies, the very platforms through 
which we experience and engage with one another online. The African theorist Herman 
Wasserman recently wrote that “historical narratives about the internet have tended to foreground 
the development of technology itself rather than the experiences of its users” (Wasserman, 2017, 
p.129). The development of new histories and understandings of the internet needs to include not 
only the experiences of the users, but also the experiences and subjectivities of the producers, 
from those writing the latest data mining algorithms at Facebook to those developing a new 
privacy enhancing application in Mombasa. And while a wealth of new research is emerging that 
looks at technology producers, particularly in the field of Human Computer Interaction, we need 
more research in this area. Especially with how interconnected and often hierarchical I found 
work in the Global Community of Technology Innovators (GCTI) to be, we need more research 
that looks at the experiences of designers, programmers, engineers, and entrepreneurs in diverse 
contexts like Kenya or from diverse socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. Such research 
could be crucial for helping to understand the quality of access that diverse individuals have or 
don’t have to participate in the important technological development processes shaping 
everything from how we communicate to how we send money. 
It is my hope that this dissertation has taken a small step in this direction and shown how 
a group of Kenyan innovators at the iHub are negotiating their engagement with an imagined 
community of technology innovators around the world. Through a rich communicative ecology of 
in-person visits and shared online platforms, YouTube videos and TED talks, news articles, 
entrepreneur biographies, and media narratives, members of the iHub are connected to the 
practices, stories, and values of their counterparts abroad. Through physical spaces like the iHub, 
they are adopting elements of material culture that have become “transnationally legible emblems 
of innovation” (Irani. 2015, p. 801), recognizable to anyone building or hoping to build a startup 
around the world. Moreover, through the concurrent migration to and touring of people through 
the iHub and other sites of innovation in Nairobi, and of Kenyan entrepreneurs through similar 
spaces abroad, they are connected in person as well as virtually and symbolically. Some of the 
people I knew at the iHub had studied abroad and returned to start companies in Kenya, like 
Avle’s ‘glocal’ entrepreneurs in Ghana (S. Avle, 2011), others had traveled abroad for startup 
competitions or had been invited to give talks or appear on panels at conferences at MIT Media 
Lab, South by Southwest, and to entrepreneurs’ clubs in Hong Kong. Others had never left 
Nairobi but worked for large Western companies like Google or IBM or with American 
entrepreneurs, Chinese investors, or South African engineers, or met Ugandan entrepreneurs at 
startup competitions or Dutch investors at networking events.  
But while the iHub’s communication strategists would likely characterize these 
international connections and collaborations as necessarily positive, I hope to have shown in this 
dissertation how a more critical lens, using a theoretical framework that integrates narrative 
theory with the communities of practice framework, sheds light on the hierarchies of power and 
legitimacy embedded in many of the narratives and much of this transnational work that can often 
influence Africans’ ability to be taken seriously as workers on an international stage. 
 In Chapter 2, I showed how the development of the Anyone Anywhere Narrative and its 
resonance with pre-existing identity narratives among Kenyans helped to influence many 
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Kenyans to try their luck at becoming tech entrepreneurs. While that narrative became adapted 
and retold locally to become the Kenyans Can! Narrative, conveying a belief that Kenyans were 
particularly well-suited for life as tech entrepreneurs, it could equally be applied in other cultural 
contexts that identify with some of the practices in the GCTI. In short, it could easily become 
something akin to a We Can Here! Narrative in many varied contexts. 
But in Chapter 3, I used the lived experiences of the Kenyan innovators I worked with to 
demonstrate some of the very real limitations Kenyans face in becoming technology 
entrepreneurs and gaining legitimacy as members of the GCTI, limitations which mean that 
everyone everywhere doesn’t always have the same chance of success or access to membership in 
the GCTI. In the case of Kenyan innovators, some of those limitations came in the form of 
geography. Even in a global community in which many individuals travel frequently and pitches 
and ideas can be communicated online, sometimes face-to-face engagement is still necessary for 
gaining access to the full repertoire of practices necessary to gain expertise and membership in a 
community of practice, even a global one. For others, narratives also created barriers. Narratives 
about members’ identity (like the Dominant Identity Narrative that often portrays the lone white 
male genius who drops out of university as the archetypal GCTI member) as well as broader 
narratives outside of the community (like Africa Rising or the Failed Continent Narratives) not 
only create a model for new members, but also create barriers for them, as these narratives can 
influence the expectations of gatekeepers like investors whose perceptions of what makes a 
successful entrepreneur are, often unconsciously, shaped by such narratives. Time and time again, 
I spoke with frustrated Kenyan entrepreneurs who believed that they were being pigeonholed by 
investors as “social” rather than “serious” entrepreneurs. And while many of them cared deeply 
about social issues like access to education or healthcare, their frustration came from the 
perception that they were not the ones setting the terms of what social impact was important or 
from the belief that they were somehow being treated differently from their entrepreneurial 
counterparts elsewhere in the world.  
Moreover, my conversations with investors indicated that there is some basis for their 
concerns. Many investors in Kenya readily acknowledged that in choosing to come to Africa to 
look for startups, they were at least in part motivated by a desire to have a “social impact” and 
were looking for startups that could do so. And while this clearly comes from a well-meaning 
place and a desire to “do good”, it is still an approach that sees Africa as a continent in need of 
help from the “more fortunate” outside, rather than a continent building and shaping its own 
technological future. Furthermore, while many investors I spoke with were well aware of the 
potential for racial power imbalances and worked very hard not to judge entrepreneurs based on 
skin tone or nationality, the most recent data indicates that the majority of startups based in 
Kenya that were successful at receiving investment from venture capitalists had at least one white 
foreigner involved in the management team, if not serving as the founder or CEO. Many 
investors, and even other members of Kenya’s own Community of Technology Innovators (CTI), 
attribute this to other factors, including communication style during the pitches or to a lack of 
experience. Kenya’s own CTI is indeed very young, but there are also not as many opportunities 
in it in which to gain experience in building a “serious” startup as there would be in London or 
Berlin. Part of this, I believe, is directly related to the self-selection of the investors who come to 
Kenya. As of the time of this writing, those looking for the niche kind of startup working on 
“social innovation” seemed to still be more likely to come to Kenya looking for investments than 
those not interested in social entrepreneurship. If other “serious” investors do not begin to see 
Africa as a place worth visiting for businesses beyond those in social fields like waste 
management or health, it will continue to be difficult for Kenyan entrepreneurs to gain access to 
the practices necessary and to build up the expertise necessary to become serious entrepreneurs 
and respected members of the GCTI. This is not to say that social entrepreneurship is a bad thing 
or investors looking for startups with a social impact are in and of themselves problematic, rather 
it is to say that it will be problematic if foreign social impact investors continue to dominate the 
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investment landscape in Kenya’s CTI. More diverse investors from abroad, as well as the growth 
of a Kenyan and African investor pool could go some way to rectifying this.  
Together, narratives in and around the GCTI reinforce pre-existing hierarchies of 
legitimacy within the community that disadvantage African innovators. As such, it is not 
impossible for Africans to gain legitimacy and become respected community members, but they 
do face roadblocks that should be further scrutinized. 
In Chapter 4, I built on these findings and used my narratives-enriched communities of 
practice framework to analyze what happens when a discrepancy emerges between dominant 
community narratives like the Kenyans Can Narrative and the reality experienced by Kenyan 
innovators. In the case of the GCTI, when many Kenyans found membership in the GCTI and 
international legitimacy difficult to obtain and also found it difficult to shape community level 
practices in the GCTI, it is not surprising that many began to reorient towards Kenya’s own CTI 
and gradually turned away from the global. At the national level, many found a community of 
practice in which they had greater influence and legitimacy, and in which they were better able to 
shape the terms of membership and the community’s accepted practices.  
The narrative/communities of practice framework also helps to understand how 
individuals and organizations in Kenya worked to shape the accepted practices in Kenya’s CTI. 
In 2016, I believe that this national level community of practice was actively undergoing an 
important phase of re-negotiation and reconstruction. While in its early years, many of its 
innovation practices had mimicked those of Silicon Valley, by 2016 there was a movement to 
change the community’s practices to better reflect the needs and values of the Kenyans in the 
community. In addition to choices made by individual members to reject practices like the 
pressure to scale globally, inflated valuations, and the fetishization of open-plan spaces, members 
of this movement endeavored to change practices at the community level by employing 
storytelling and narrative construction. By first using more subversive communication techniques 
like rumor and humor for telling counter-stories about exploitative practices in the community, 
they were eventually able to build on real world scandals like those at Angani and Ushahidi to 
construct counter-narratives about how sexual misconduct and discriminatory investment 
practices should be excluded from the community’s repertoire of accepted practices. I also make 
the case that the development of these counter-narratives represents a movement to disentangle 
the Kenyan CTI from the Global Community and to generate a debate about how to practice 
technology innovation in Kenya in a way that is reflective of Kenyan needs and values and not 
just subject to the pressure to conform to existing global norms of practice. 
Of all the members of Kenya’s CTI, one of those that struggled the most during the 
narrative reconstruction of Kenya’s CTI was the iHub. In fact, I would contend that it is 
impossible to fully understand the iHub’s fate and its role in Kenya’s CTI without the 
narrative/communities of practice framework. 
As perhaps the entity that had played the most active part in shaping the narrative about 
Kenya as a “tech hub” of Africa, drawing international media attention and investor money, the 
iHub was in many ways intimately invested in Kenya’s involvement in the GCTI. Acting as a 
gatekeeper for international members of the GCTI wishing to visit Kenya, the iHub also shaped 
which members and in turn the kinds of innovation practices Kenyans had access to; for many 
individual entrepreneurs, the iHub was also instrumental in helping them connect with investors 
and gain their own legitimacy in the GCTI. But with many of the iHub’s most visible members 
having acted as storytellers reshaping the Anyone Anywhere Narrative for the Kenyan context, 
the iHub’s reputation became closely linked with that narrative’s fate. In the end, when that 
narrative came into question as many Kenyan entrepreneurs began to voice their frustrations with 
their experiences with international investors, the iHub’s own reputation and legitimacy in 
Kenya’s CTI also began to suffer. For many in Kenya, the iHub had become more interested in 
belonging to the GCTI than the Kenyan CTI, leading to the growth of counter-narratives about it 
being over-hyped, too elitist, and too international. Over the course of five years, the iHub went 
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from being a prominent shaper of the narratives about its own organization and about Kenya’s 
CTI, to being overwhelmed by counter-narratives questioning its commitment to the local 
community and therefore its legitimacy within it. By bringing on new investors and a new CEO, 
implementing a new business model, and physically moving out of the Bishop Magua Centre, the 
iHub was symbolically re-exerting itself in this ongoing narrative debate. Given its connections to 
the GCTI, it is no wonder that it staked out a position in this debate in favor of moving the 
Kenyan community closer to the global one. But by the end of 2016, the iHub’s power within 
Kenya’s CTI and its ability to shape the community’s narratives and its accepted practices had 
been greatly diminished. 
Theoretical	Contribution		
I began this dissertation by taking a grounded theory approach and building a theoretical 
framework to explain the data that I collected during my ethnographic fieldwork at the iHub in 
Nairobi. I used Lave and Wenger’s communities of practice theory (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and 
integrated narrative theory into it. In doing so, I hope to have 1) strengthened communities of 
practice theory by expanding upon one of its under-researched elements and 2) contributed to 
communications research by helping to theorize how narratives can influence legitimacy in 
international labor practices, and most importantly. 
Communities	of	practice	
Much of communities of practice research has frequently been criticized for misinterpreting the 
theory as prescriptive, believing that communities of practice could and ought to be created to 
help improve knowledge sharing and a sense of belonging among community members (Contu & 
Willmott, 2003; Henderson, 2015; Lave, 2008). But this instrumentalist approach, taking a 
community of practice as an aspirational entity to be fostered and encouraged rather than a 
previously existing social entity to be understood – ignored the richest, most analytically useful, 
parts of the original theory (Amin & Roberts, 2008; Contu & Willmott, 2003; Roberts, 2006). In 
particular, it overlooks the inherently conflictual nature of a community built around practice 
rather than around identity or geography. Instead, in building my own theoretical framework, I 
have attempted to return to the original analytical purpose of communities of practice theory, and 
have brought front and center the potential for conflict as well as the hierarchies of legitimacy and 
power embedded in work in a community of diverse participants.  
In 2014, in an interview with Omidvar and Kislov, Wenger acknowledged some of the 
theoretical weaknesses of their framework and called for more empirical work with which to 
refine the theory (Omidvar & Kislov, 2014). By bringing rich empirical data from my research 
with Kenyan technology innovators in and around the iHub I hope to have helped to do so in this 
dissertation. By looking at a context that is both culturally different from many of the Western 
corporate contexts in which communities of practice theory has been applied, and by studying a 
community of practice that is far larger and more diverse than most of those previously studied, 
the inherent potential for conflict in communities of practice becomes difficult to ignore and 
allows for its role to be more fully theorized. For example, while practices in a community of 
practice may be set in place through a process of “joint-negotiation” among members as Wenger 
laid out (Wenger, 1998), I believe my research shows that not all members have an equal ability 
to participate in those negotiation. New members, particularly new members who do not fit the 
Dominant Identity Narrative or the historic mold of what a ‘successful member’ looks and sounds 
like may find it particularly difficult not only to participate in negotiations about the future of the 
community, but also to have a say over their own future role within it.  
Some scholars have suggested that communities of practice theory has been applied to 
communities that are too broad, arguing that to stretch it beyond face-to-face communities 
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renders the theory useless (Henderson, 2015). However, I hope that I have shown in the preceding 
pages why I believe this perspective has become outdated, particularly in a community with a 
communicative ecology defined by rapid, even instantaneous exchange of information and 
knowledge. Money coming from investors in the United States helps an entrepreneur build a 
startup in Kenya while money withheld by an investor in the Netherlands may restrict the ability 
of a Nigerian startup to grow. Peer groups form online between coders in Europe and Hong Kong, 
startups built in Estonia expand into market in Africa leading to the creation of home grown 
startups to compete, and Indian programmers perform virtual work for software companies in 
Beijing and London. In this Global Community, it is not just ideas that travel rapidly, but money 
as well. 
Those around the globe involved in the design and production of new technologies often 
work at the forefront of rapid changes in communication technologies that make the modern 
information economy possible. As such, they may be more interconnected than other practices 
around the world, but they are increasingly not alone. So many interactions around other practices 
like gaming, law, policymaking, and even knitting are increasingly conducted transnationally and 
online, while members often come to rely on one another through joint collaborations. While it 
may be too early to apply the communities of practice framework to the study of other globally 
interconnected practices, I believe it will likely soon become relevant. As such, there is a need for 
more research that helps theorize about how communities of practice behave, and what 
membership in them looks like, as they change and stretch around the globe. In particular, 
research looking more explicitly at the political, economic, or legal implications of these changes 
would further contribute to the strengthening of the theory in a global context, as well as research 
building on my own incorporating the role of narratives and storytelling. 
The primary way in which I hope that the present study has helped to strengthen the 
relevance of communities of practice theory in a global context is through the integration of 
narrative theory. While there has been some excellent research conducted looking at the micro-
level of communication in communities of practice, like jargon and accents, from linguistics 
scholars in particular (C. A. Cutler, 1999; B. Davies, 2005; Eckert, 1989), other aspects of the 
communicative ecologies of communities of practice have been under-theorized. Integrating 
narrative theory, and highlighting the role that individual stories and larger community narratives 
play, helps to enrich communities of practice theory by giving us a more complete picture of how 
such communities are formed, attract new members, change, and are challenged, how members’ 
sense of meaning and legitimacy are constructed, and how both old and new members negotiate 
their legitimacy in multiple communities of practice simultaneously. Throughout this dissertation 
I have shown how narratives interact with communities of practice in the following ways: 1) 
Narratives, like the Anyone Anywhere Narrative, can encourage outsiders to join a community of 
practice by integrating new heroes, settings, and storytellers into the community’s narratives; 2) a 
community’s Dominant Identity Narratives can reinforce expectations about how members 
should behave or what they should look or sound like, becoming particularly problematic as 
communities grow and become more heterogeneous; 3) aspiring members, like the iHub, can 
skillfully use stories to shape a narrative identity for themselves that helps them to gain 
community legitimacy; 4) broader cultural narratives that seemingly have little to do with a 
community of practice, like the Africa Rising Narrative, can influence an individual’s legitimacy 
within a community of practice; and 5) a community of practice and its narratives can be co-
constructed, though there is often a hierarchy of power that influences who has more influence 
over this process.   
Communications	
It is also my hope that this dissertation has contributed theoretically to my home discipline of 
communications. Within communications, research looking at the role of storytelling and 
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narratives is extensive, spreading from the study of rhetoric (Fisher, 1984; Foss, 2017) and 
political communications (McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Mumby, 1993) to culture studies and 
global communications (Archetti, 2013; Kraidy & Murphy, 2008). In a global context, it has been 
used to examine connections among diaspora communities and how they retain a sense of 
connection and identity (Heyd, 2014; Hua, 2013; O’Neill, 2008), and in research looking at how 
dominant cultural ideas are transmitted through media (e.g. Schiller, 1976),19 particular through 
particularly pervasive content like Hollywood films (Olson, 1999). And while there is a rich body 
of research looking at power imbalances in transnational labor (Irani et al., 2010; W. R. Poster, 
2007; W. R. Poster & Prasad, 2005) I have found it to be rare for narrative theory to be 
incorporated into the study of transnational communities centered around practice rather than 
identity. 
By bringing communities of practice theory into communications, I hope that my 
research has helped to provide some much-needed structure to theories about transnational 
communication among diverse participants working together. In particular, by conceptualizing 
transnational practices around technology innovation work as a community of practice, I believe 
that my theoretical framework can help communication scholars build new theories about why 
and how narratives from one corner of the globe can have such an impact elsewhere, and to 
foreground the power imbalances involved in how new narratives are constructed in an 
international non-geographically confined setting. Conceptualizing it as a community of practice 
may, for example, help researchers foreground the relationship between the power and influence 
of international narratives and the desire many people experience for membership and legitimacy 
in global communities of practice. Future research looking in greater detail at how particularly 
influential narratives are constructed and evolve in an international setting could help to further 
strengthen this area of research. 
Global communications scholars looking specifically at Africa have done important work 
studying how problematic narratives like the Failed Continent Narrative and even the Africa 
Rising Narrative are created with their roots in historic colonial pathways, and how they can lead 
to the perpetuation of negative stereotypes (e.g. Bunce, Franks, & Paterson, 2016). For these 
researchers, my hope is that the integration of communities of practice theory may support future 
research looking at the implications of these narratives for African involvement in international 
labor. A critical interpretation of communities of practice theory helps to show not just how 
African workers are pigeonholed as a result of these dominant narratives, but also helps to 
foreground the very tangible implications of this in terms of their work, their ability to get 
funding, to build networks, and to be seen as legitimate, equally competent workers on an 
international stage. 
Global	practices	and	global	engagement	
Techno-visionary storytellers like Mark Zuckerberg, readily talk about how the technologies 
they’re building are bringing the world closer together. Facebook’s new manifesto, “Building 
Global Community”, released in February 2017 is a perfect example of this (2017). Using 
particularly McLuhan-esque language, Zuckerberg writes in the manifesto about how “our 
greatest opportunities are now global” from “spreading prosperity and freedom” to “lifting people 
out of poverty, and accelerating science,” and he positions Facebook decidedly on the side of 
bringing us closer together and building a global community” (Zuckerberg, 2017). In response to 
the nay-sayers leading “movements for withdrawing from global connection” (Zuckerberg, 2017), 
he acknowledges that more work needs to be done to answer questions like “whether we can 
make a global community that works for everyone, and whether the path ahead is to connect more 
                                                      
19 For an early example of this see Herbert Schiller’s work, Communication and Cultural Domination 
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or reverse course” (Zuckerberg, 2017), though it is clear where he stands on this debate. Over the 
course of the manifesto he acknowledges that, “sitting here in California, we’re not best 
positioned to identify the cultural norms around the world” (Zuckerberg, 2017). As a result, he 
recommends “a system where we can all contribute to setting the standards” and “a new process 
for citizens worldwide to participate in community governance” (Zuckerberg, 2017). In other 
words, he believes that building a more closely connected global community is necessary and that 
getting people in diverse parts of the world involved is an essential part of making that 
community more reflective of and responsive to the varied needs and values of people around the 
world. 
Though Zuckerberg has yet to show how these new processes of community governance 
would happen in practice for his global community of everyone, I suggest that those involved in 
building startups around the world should first use that same argument to reflect on and assess the 
ways in which their own communities of practice are evolving or should be. In the stories of the 
future told by the techno-visionaries, anyone anywhere can build the latest technological 
advancements that can in turn be used anywhere in the world. But in practice, many of these 
‘peripheral’ participants have little influence on the Global Community’s practices and as a result 
can feel ostracized and disconnected from it. Consequently, many turn away and choose instead 
to focus more on constructing a national (or even a regional) community of practice that better 
reflects their values and in which they are better able to influence the terms of the joint enterprise 
around which participants are involved. But with how internationally connected I found placed 
like the iHub to be and with the expansion of internet access to even rural communities in Kenya, 
fully rejecting the GCTI may not be possible for Kenyan innovators. Even if the Kenyan 
government were to decide to ban all foreign investors and entrepreneurs from Kenya (not 
entirely out of the realm of possibility with the current level of disapproval of expat NGO 
workers in the country), and unless they took the extreme step of shutting down the internet or 
building virtual firewalls in the manner of the Chinese, the intractable nature of the hyper-
connected communicative ecology around the practice would ensure that ideas, values, and 
practices, would continue to flow from abroad into Kenya and back out again. I believe that if the 
practice of designing and building new technologies is really globalizing, then it is crucial for 
those involved to pay attention to the diverse experiences of African innovators like Faith and 
Sam and Paul in Chapter 3 and to learn from the complex processes of negotiating meaning and 
acceptable practices through the construction of narratives and counter-narratives that has been 
taking place in national-level innovation communities like the one in Kenya.  
In an endeavor to continue to foreground the lived experiences and perspectives of the 
Kenyan innovators that I worked with, I want to draw this dissertation to a close with a quote 
from one freelancer and blogger I came to know quite well during my time in Nairobi. In it, I 
believe he conveys better than I could the fundamental ways in which the complex array of 
transnational connections, overlapping practices, storytelling, and community memberships are 
shaping the ways in which Kenyan innovators are conceptualizing and constructing their own 
technological futures.  
The representation of Africa is something that matters to me. I kind of 
feel…if you ask me right now, one of the biggest challenges is the issue of 
pride and confidence and identity. For me, once people figure that out, I think 
most of the things people think are problems won’t really be problems 
anymore. Social media did that. There’s a lot of conversations happening 
across borders between African nations. It’s easier now to work with 
somebody you’ve never met in Botswana. I know more about what happens in 
other countries. Right now, Africans are more comfortable with their 
countries, with who they are and where they come from, but not with how 
things are. That makes them believe more in themselves. People are building 
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stuff, having conversations and collaborations. So, for me, of course if those 
things work, then it’s good, it’s great. But for me, the fact that people are 
believing in themselves to do it, that’s what matters. Maybe I think this 
because of the space I am in where people are starting to see building startups 
as an option. But I believe the tech sector has played a role in creating the 
confidence.  
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